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SUMMARY 
This thesis critically examines the statutory unfair prejudice remedy provided for in 
section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’). Section 163 is evaluated 
against its equivalents in England, Australia and Canada. Section 163 is considered 
against its predecessors to determine whether problems associated with the 
formulation and application of its predecessors have now been eradicated. It is argued 
that although it is important to ensure that company legislation is able to provide 
protection of an international standard to shareholders to be able to attract capital 
investment in a competitive market, one has to be cautious of slavishly following 
legislative trends in foreign jurisdictions. The South African legislature indiscriminately 
incorporated only parts of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy in section 163. This 
approach also resulted, amongst others, in the introduction of foreign concepts. The 
legislature further failed to take cognisance of the unique historical developments 
relating to the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa. This has led to the 
reintroduction of problems experienced with previous formulations of the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa and left certain problems relating to the 
interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy unresolved. 
Consideration is also given to the interrelationship between section 163 and some of 
the statutory remedies in the Act. Section 163 is also assessed in the context of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In conclusion, recommendations 
for possible legislative amendments are made and an interpretational framework for 
the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 
163 is provided. 
 
This thesis includes the law as at 1 May 2019 as found in sources available in South 
Africa. 
KEY TERMS 
Companies Act 71 of 2008; commercial unfairness; oppression remedy; 
prejudice; shareholder protection; shareholder remedies; unfair prejudice. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
The protection of shareholders, more specifically minority shareholders, is one of the 
characteristics of a well-developed and sophisticated company law regime. 
Shareholder remedies play an essential role in the corporate governance of a 
company. Company law regimes that provide adequate shareholder remedies have 
the ability to create investors’ confidence which leads to the ability to attract capital 
investments at lower costs. This seems to be a reality that is recognised by the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) as it states that one of the purposes of the Act is 
to ‘create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes, 
and for the investment of that capital in enterprises and the spreading of economic 
risk’.1 A further purpose of the Act is to ‘promote innovation and investment in South 
African markets’.2 
The Act replaced the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the previous Act’) and 
became operational on 1 May 2011. As with it its predecessor, the Act contains various 
provisions aimed at the protection of shareholders and other stakeholders of a 
company.3 The Act provides for very specific remedies.4 Some of these remedies are 
similar to those found in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 but the Act now contains some 
additional remedies and features that may impact on the interpretation and application 
of some of these remedies. The focus of this thesis is on one of these specific 
remedies in the Act, namely, section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.5 Section 
                                                 
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(g). 
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(c). 
3 See Chapter 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
4 See Part B of Chapter 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
5 Institutional investors may play an important role by formally and/or informally exerting pressure on 
companies to adopt appropriate corporate governance practices. This can be done by influencing the 
agenda of the company through the use their voting rights at general meetings to adopt proposed 
resolutions that will reduce the investment risks to which investors in the company are exposed. This 
may in turn create direct value for the investors in a company and, in some cases, indirect value for the 
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163 is a specific remedy in the Act in terms of which relief may be obtained against 
oppressive of prejudicial conduct. 
1.2 The purpose of this study 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate section 163 to determine whether the provision 
in its current form addressed the criticisms raised against predecessors of the 
remedy.6 Section 163 is also evaluated to establish whether the formulation and 
application of the provision are aligned with developments in other comparable 
jurisdictions such as England,7 Australia8 and Canada.9 Based on the evaluation of 
the formulation, interpretation and application of the statutory personal remedy in the 
last mentioned jurisdictions, recommendations are made in the form of proposals for 
legislative reform and an interpretational framework is provided for a principle-based 
interpretation of section 163 within the relevant parameters of the Constitution.10 It is 
submitted that the proposals for legislative intervention and the interpretational 
framework will promote ‘a predictable and effective environment for the efficient 
                                                 
beneficiaries of institutional investors. As this thesis primarily focuses on section 163 of the Act, the role 
of institutional investors is excluded. For insightful views on the role of institutional investors in 
companies see SJ Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur met Besondere Verwysing na 
die Interne Maatskappyverband (1969) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 421-35. 
More recently the voluntary Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) was published with 
an effective date of 1 February 2012 which encourages institutional investors to play a more active role 
in the governance of the companies they invest in through actively using their rights as investors.  
6 See 5.2.4.3 below for criticism raised by academic authors against the provisions of section 252 of 
the previous Act. Section 252 was the predecessor and equivalent of section 163 of the Act. For criticism 
of the common law position see 5.2.2.5 below. 
7 See Chapter 2 below. 
8 See Chapter 3 below. 
9 See Chapter 4 below. 
10 See 6.3 below for the proposed legislative interventions and 6.4 below for a principle-based 
interpretational framework. 
 4 
 
regulation of companies’11 while balancing ‘the rights and obligations of shareholders 
and directors within companies’.12 
 The provisions of section 163 are also considered in the context of other 
provisions of the Act. These provisions include section 76 which contains a partial 
codification of the duties of directors,13 section 161 which deals with the protection of 
the rights of securities holders14 and an order for the declaration of directors as 
delinquent or under probation in terms of section 162,15 16416 and 165.17 
1.3 The need for and importance of the study 
 
The remedy in section 163 is worded in open and flexible terms.18 The purpose of 
formulating section 163 in this manner is to provide courts with a broad discretion to 
apply the remedy to a wide variety of circumstances.19 This formulation creates 
uncertainties in relation to the interpretation and application of the remedy.20 These 
uncertainties are further exacerbated by the fact that section 163 is an equitable 
remedy based on fairness.21  
                                                 
11 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(l). 
12 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(i). 
13 See 5.4.3.4 (a) below. 
14 See 5.9.12.3 (c) below. 
15 See 5.9.7.2 below. 
16 See 5.10 below. 
17 See 5.9.15 below. 
18 See 5.7.2.1 below. 
19 See 5.7.2.1 below. 
20 See 5.7.2.1 below. For a discussion of the legal requirements for standing for purposes of section 
163 of the Act see 5.7.1 below. For uncertainties relating to the jurisdictional grounds and requirements 
see 5.7.2 and 5.7.3 below. For interpretational issues relating to the relief a court may grant see 5.9 
below. 
21 See 5.7.3, and more specifically 5.7.3.5 below.  
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The concept of unfairness has to be determined in a manner that is not 
dependent on the views of a specific individual that has to establish the unfairness of 
conduct for purposes of section 163.22 In order to apply the concept of unfairness 
consistently it has to be established in a principled manner having regard to the 
specific facts and circumstances of each case.23 The issue and problems associated 
with shareholder protection are complex as the protection of shareholders, and in 
particular minority shareholders, often creates conflict between established corporate 
law principles, the constitutive documents of a company and providing and giving 
effect to the agreements between shareholders while providing for the protection of 
shareholders against unfairness.24 Creating remedies aimed at the protection of 
shareholders further requires a delicate balance between the company, shareholders 
and shareholders inter se to prevent these remedies from being abused or used as 
instruments unjustifiably to avoid the consequences of the application of trite company 
law principles.25 Section 163 of the Act has to be applied in the context of fundamental 
company law principles such as the principle of majority rule and the separate legal 
personality of a company.26  
 
                                                 
22 See also the discussion of the concept of ‘fairness’ in the context of the law of contract in 5.6 and the 
relevance thereof for the application of section 163 of the Act in 5.6.6 below. 
23 See 5.7.3 below. 
24 See also Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) 
[64] where the court held that the starting point to determine the fairness or unfairness of conduct is the 
constitutive documents of a company and the principle of majority rule. 
25 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(i).  See also Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others 
[2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [32] where it was remarked that remedies such as section 163 must not be 
used as an instrument of oppression as a shareholder is bound to the principle of majority decision-
making.  
26 See 5.4.3 read with 5.7.3 below. 
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 Despite the fact that the provisions of section 163 are cast in wide and open 
terms, the starting point for the correct application of the remedy remains the wording 
of the Act.27 In this respect the purposes28 and objectives of the Act read with the 
interpretational provisions29 of the Act is of vital importance. The Constitution30 also 
contains very specific provisions relating to the interpretation of legislation such as the 
Act.31 
 The Constitution32 is not only important in relation to the interpretation of the 
provisions of section 163, but is also influential in the role that fairness plays in the 
enforcement of contracts, agreements and understandings.33 This is directly 
applicable to company law as the Memorandum of Incorporation is regarded as 
creating contractual relationships between parties and section 163 also applies to 
shareholder agreements.34 
 The fact that section 163 forms part of a relatively new Act justifies a study of 
this nature for a few important reasons. Firstly, the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of section 163 must be considered in light of the Constitution.35 Secondly, 
major studies such as that of Hurter36 did not have the opportunity to consider 
                                                 
27 See 5.7.3.6 below. 
28 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(a). See 5.12.1 below. 
29 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 5. See also 5.4.4 below. 
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
31 See 5.5.1 read with 5.5.2.4 below. 
32 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
33 See 5.6 below. 
34 See 5.5.3 below. 
35 See 5.5 below. 
36 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa). It should be noted that Hurter’s thesis 
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important judgments on aspects of section 252 of the previous Act that may still be 
relevant to section 163 of the Act.37 Thirdly, the Act contains some novel provisions 
that were not necessarily present in the previous Act. Examples of such provisions 
include the partial codification of the duties of directors and the business judgment rule 
in section 76(4).38 Also included is the relationship between section 163 and other 
remedies such as section 161, section 162, the appraisal remedy in section 164 and 
the derivative action in section 165 of the Act. The relevance of English law has to be 
reconsidered in light of the fact that the South African legislature’s adopted wording 
that is substantially similar to the wording of the Canadian equivalent of section 163.39  
 The provisions of section 163 are applicable to all companies registered in 
terms of the Act. From a practical point of view, it is important to take note of legislation 
and regulations that require companies to meet certain prescribed thresholds in 
relation to the compilation or structure of their shareholders and/or directors. Often the 
purpose of such legislation is the economic empowerment of previously disadvantaged 
individuals. These forms of legislation have as consequence the formation of companies 
which comprise of previously disadvantaged individuals and/or black economic 
                                                 
considered the statutory protection of minority shareholders in general. The thesis did not specifically 
and only focus on section 252 of the previous Act. 
37 See, for example, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 
(4) SA 548 (SCA) and judgments such as McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC). 
38 For a discussion of the partial codification of the duties of directors see L Coetzee and JL van Tonder 
‘Advantages and disadvantages of partial codification of directors’ duties in the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 41:2 JJS 1. See also the commentary on section 76 by PA Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018); FHI Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 507; Michael M Katz ‘Governance under the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008: Flexibility is the keyword’ 2010 Acta Juridica 248. 
39 See below Chapter 4 for the Canadian position and Chapter 5 for the South African position. 
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empowered companies that hold the majority shareholding in the company.40 This 
structurally-created imbalance in the shareholding and/or board of a company 
heightens the potential for conflict between the holders of the majority stake in a 
company and its minority shareholders. This is especially the case when the interests 
of the shareholders in the company differ, for example, when the minority shareholders 
have contributed the majority of the capital in the company. Section 163 is an important 
mechanism for these minority shareholders to protect their interests in a company and, 
where justified, to withdraw their investment from the company. Although the focus is 
not specifically on the impact of section 163 of the Act on transactions related to black 
economic empowerment, one needs to be aware of current business practices in this 
regard, which emphasise the need for a remedy which balances the interests of 
shareholders within a company.41 
1.4 Relevance of previous and similar studies 
 
Prior to section 163 of the Act the personal rights of a shareholder were protected by 
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the previous Act’). This section was 
preceded by section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Both section 252 of the 
previous Act and section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 were scrutinised by 
various academic authors and law commissions.42 Two of most important studies in 
                                                 
40 See, for example, Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) 
Ltd and Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ).  
41 See, for example, Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) 
Ltd and Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) and Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) where the structure and/ or conduct of the relevant companies were 
influenced by considerations such as black economic empowerment. 
42 See 5.2.3 below for a discussion of the provisions of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 
and 5.2.4 below for a discussion of section 252 of the previous Act. 
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this regard are the law commission report of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission43 and 
the doctoral thesis of Hurter.44 Although section 163 does differ materially from its 
predecessors in certain respects, studies conducted and case law developed under 
section 252 of the previous Act and section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 
are still significant for purposes of an accurate evaluation of section 163.45 Knowledge 
and understanding of the historic development of the statutory personal remedy in 
South Africa is imperative for a critical evaluation of the current form of the remedy 
against the criticisms raised against its predecessors.46  
1.5 Structure of study and chapter overview  
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. While chapter 1 and 6 contain the introduction 
and conclusions of the thesis respectively, chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide the 
evaluations of the statutory personal remedy in England, Australia, Canada and South 
Africa. Each of these chapters can broadly be divided into three main sections or parts 
dealing with the provisions of the statutory personal remedy in each jurisdiction. These 
three sections or parts deal with provisions dealing with the persons who enjoy 
standing in terms of the remedy, the jurisdictional requirements of the remedy and 
aspects in relation to the relief that can be granted in terms of the remedy. 
1.5.1 Chapter 02 
 
It is very important to consider English jurisprudence as English company law 
                                                 
43 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970). 
44 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa).  
45 See 5.2.4.2 below. 
46 See 5.2 below. 
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substantially influenced South African company law.47 Although South Africa has its 
own company laws and English law is only persuasive, the influence of English law 
remains and is evident from the reading of South African judgments.48  
                                                 
47 See Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation 
of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) for an example where the court relied on 
English law for guidance on the South African position under the Companies Act 61 of 1973. This was 
based on the similarity between the English and South Africa law principles on a specific aspect of 
company law. See also 5.2.4.2 below for a brief discussion of the relevance of English law for the 
interpretation of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. It is important to note that although 
English law may still be relevant to interpreting section 163, the wording of the latter section is almost 
identical to section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act 1985, c C-44 and therefore one should 
be prudent not to focus only on the English position in this regard. See Chapter 4 below for a discussion 
of the Canadian equivalent of the ‘unfair prejudice remedy’.  
47 This provision is the predecessor of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
48 In Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen [1964] 3 All SA 507 (A) 510-11 the court also warned against 
the danger of the adoption or application of foreign legal principles into South African law by 
emphasising that English precedents are of persuasive value only. See also D-Jay Corporation CC v 
Investor Management Services (Pty) Ltd 2000 (2) SA 755 (W) 761-62 where the court dealt with the 
persuasive value of English decisions in the interpretation of identical legislative provisions taken over 
from England. It was cautioned that, when interpreting a provision adopted from a foreign statute, it 
does not necessarily follow that the legislature has also adopted the interpretation and meaning given 
by the foreign courts to the specific adopted provision. However, the use of the exact words of an 
adopted provision from legislation of a foreign jurisdiction such as England is a strong indication that 
the same meaning is to be attributed to the South African equivalent of the provision, but South African 
courts should be alive to the differences between the English law and the South African common law. 
Companies are creatures of statute, as the early South African common law did not deal with the law 
pertaining to companies. In such circumstances, there are no differences between the South African 
legal system and the English law, and in particular, the judgments of the higher courts in England. In 
instances where the South African common law does regulate or impact on a particular question of law, 
the courts are bound to give effect to the common law, unless legislation provides otherwise, and then 
the law of England is of persuasive value only. See further Sentraal-Suid Koöperasie Bk v Bessemer 
Steel Construction (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) SA 552 (W) 556 where the court confirmed that English company 
law is comparable to South African company law and therefore has important persuasive force, but 
cautioned that South African legal principles and provisions should not be ignored. See HS Cilliers and 
ML Benade et al Corporate Law (3rd, 2000) 19-20 who noted that our courts refuse to adopt principles 
from the English law that are in conflict with the South African legal system. However, where the South 
African common law does not provide guidance on a particular aspect of company law, South African 
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Furthermore, the South African courts have placed much reliance on the 
judgments delivered in terms of section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in the 
application and interpretation of section 163.49 The judgments delivered in terms of 
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 have been influenced substantially by 
English law and reference to these judgments when dealing with section 163 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 indirectly maintains the influence of the English law in the 
development of the personal remedy in section 163. In some instances, courts have 
referred directly to foreign law, such as English law, in the interpretation and 
application of section 163.50 
A study of the English law pertaining to the statutory personal remedy is also 
important as the early development of the statutory personal remedies in Australia and 
Canada has also been influenced by English law.51 Australian and Canadian courts 
often have to consider the relevance and value of English decisions in the 
interpretation and application of aspects of the statutory personal remedy in their own 
                                                 
courts sought guidance from the English law and precedents. The authors (20) pointed out the 
movement of England to align English company law with other member states of the European Union 
and the reform of South African company law in light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 as factors that may create differences between English and South African company law. See 5.5 
and 5.6 below for a discussion of the impact of the Constitution on the interpretation of legislation and 
the development of the common law principles of the law of contract.  
49 See 5.2.4.2 below. 
50 For example, see footnote 8 in Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala [2013] 3 All SA 111 
(SCA). See also Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [43]; Count Gotthard 
SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.4]; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v 
Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). See also 5.4.2.3 below regarding the 
consideration of foreign law in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
51 See 3.3 below for the development of the Australian remedy and see 4.2 for the development of the 
Canadian equivalent of the remedy. 
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jurisdictions.52 
Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 contains the statutory personal remedy 
(or commonly referred to as ‘the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy’) in the English 
law. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the position relating to the statutory unfair 
remedy in England. Research on the English equivalent of the statutory personal 
action is valuable to South African jurists as it may provide insight on the reforms 
contained in section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.53 Thus despite the wording 
of section 163 of the Companies Act,54 South African courts are still heavily reliant on 
English law for guidance.55 
1.5.2 Chapter 03 
 
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the Australian position relating to the oppression or 
unfair prejudice remedy. South African courts have occasionally referred to Australian 
case law for guidance on the interpretation and application of the provisions of section 
                                                 
52 See 3.10 below for the application of case law in England to fair offers in the context of the Australian 
remedy. For example, see also 4.14 below where Canadian courts considered case law in England 
pertaining to the arbitration of unfair or oppression disputes and the role and function of reasonable offers. 
53 Section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 contains the South African form of the statutory unfair 
prejudice remedy and is analysed and discussed in detail in Chapter 5 below. 
54 71 of 2008. 
55 See Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) 119, 123. See further 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd [2012] 4 All SA 
203 (GSJ) 213-14; Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP) 206; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [60]-[62], 
[67]; Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) [5]-[9]; De Villiers 
v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) [68] and more specifically n 33. See also 5.2.4.2 below 
for a discussion of the relevance of the English law on the interpretation of section 252 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 and section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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163 of the Act.56 
1.5.3 Chapter 04 
 
The Canadian unfair prejudice remedy is considered in chapter 4. Although jurists may 
agree that the developments in English company may be of importance in 
understanding, interpreting and applying company law principles in South Africa the 
formulation of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 poses an interesting 
conundrum. The wording of section 163 is almost identical to its equivalent in section 
241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC.57 The question that needs to be 
considered in relation to section 163 of the Companies Act,58 is whether the legislature 
deliberately followed this approach to cut the legalistic umbilical cord between South 
African company law and English company law by replacing the latter with Canadian 
principles.59 Canadian jurisprudence is of specific importance because of the close 
relationship between the wording of the Canada Business Corporations Act and 
section 163 of the Act. This emphasises the desirability and compatibility of the 
Canadian approach to the statutory personal remedy in South Africa. Specific reliance 
is placed on the interpretation and application by courts of federal legislation, but also 
of incorporated legal position in various provinces in Canada where federal legislation 
and/or jurisprudence does not provide clear guidance.  
 
 
                                                 
56 See, for example, Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 
(WCC) and Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
57 1985, c C-44.  
58 71 of 2008. 
59 See Chapter 4 below for a discussion of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy. 
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1.5.4 Chapter 05 
 
Section 163 is critically analysed in Chapter 5. This analysis is done against the 
background of the criticism raised in previous studies against predecessors of the 
section. The interpretations and application of the provisions of this section are then 
further evaluated in light of the approach taken in England,60 Australia61 and Canada.62 
1.5.5 Chapter 06 
 
Chapter 6 contains conclusions and recommendations based on the research in 
preceding chapters. This chapter demonstrates that some of the terms and concepts 
used in section 163 are unusual in light of the historic developments of the remedy in 
South Africa.63 The formulation of section 163 in similar terms as its Canadian 
equivalent is also problematic as this approach ignores or overwrites the historic 
developments of the remedy in South Africa.64 This approach further introduced 
terminology that is foreign to South Africa law into some of the provisions of section 
163.65 The evaluation further reveals that the persons who enjoy standing for purposes 
                                                 
60 See Chapter 2 below. 
61 See Chapter 3 below. 
62 See Chapter 4 below. 
63 See for example 6.3.2 below. 
64 See the extrajudicial criticism of Binns-Ward J in AG Binns-Ward ‘Lost in Translation: The Need for 
the Judicious Use of Comparative Law’ (2017) 2 JCCL&P 1, 2 regarding the judicial approach to the 
application of comparative law. Binns-Ward J argues that ‘notwithstanding the common basis that many 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have in their company law, transplantability is an issue that has to be 
approached with careful attention to context if the foreign law is not to be misplaced locally, with 
potentially dislocating effects on our own company law’. In his address Binns-Ward highlights (12-13) a 
similar problem in the context of the provision of section 165 of the Act. See also 6.3.3. below. 
65 In this regard it appears that the legislature has stepped into the exact trap against which AG Binns-
Ward warned in his address to the International Symposium on Company Law published under the title 
‘Lost in Translation: The Need for the Judicious Use of Comparative Law’ (2017) 2 JCCL&P 1, 1 where 
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of the remedy are too narrowly defined.66 This position is further exacerbated by the 
fact that early indications are that a person has been unfairly prejudiced in the capacity 
as shareholder or director.67  
Some aspects relating to the relief that may be granted in terms of section 
163(2) are also problematic as in some instances there is a disconnect between the 
standing requirements in section 163(1) and the type of relief that is available in section 
162(2).68 In other instances, the nature of some of the forms of relief available in terms 
of section 163(2) is not appropriate in light of the nature and purpose of the remedy.69 
Based on the conclusions reached in this chapter certain recommendations are made 
that include proposed amendments to the wording of section 163 and other related 
sections of the Act. In some instances, legislative amendments are proposed to 
legislation other than the Act. The chapter further contains a framework for the 
interpretation of the provisions of section 163. 
1.6 The use of terminology 
 
Section 163 and its predecessors are the statutory response to the criticisms levelled 
against the strict application of the common law principles in Foss v Harbottle.70 This 
response took the form of the statutory personal action and the statutory derivative 
action. 
                                                 
he remarked that ‘[t]he quickest way to lose credibility in the application of the law is by importing legal 
concepts that have no relevance to the context within which they are applied’. 
66 See 6.3.3 below. 
67 See 6.3.3 below. 
68 See 6.3.3 read with 6.3.5 below. 
69 See 6.3.5 read with 6.3.5.2 below. 
70 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.  
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The statutory personal action is also known as the statutory personal remedy, 
oppression remedy or the unfair prejudice remedy. Although all these terms and 
concepts are often used as synonyms it appears that the use of the term unfair 
prejudice remedy is preferred in the context of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 
to emphasise the fact that only unfair prejudice, in contrast with oppression, is required 
to seek relief in terms of the latter provision. In the context of the statutory personal 
action in Australia, Canada and South Africa the terms or concept oppression remedy 
and unfair prejudice remedy are used interchangeably although these jurisdictions 
only require proof of unfair prejudice to entitle a court to exercise its discretion to grant 
appropriate relief, despite the fact that the provisions of these jurisdictions also still 
expressly refer to conduct that is oppressive as a ground of relief. Unless, otherwise 
indicated the same approach is adopted in this thesis. 
The terms statutory derivative action and statutory derivative remedy are also 
used interchangeably. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of the statutory unfair 
prejudice remedy in England. In this chapter the specific focus is on the Companies 
Act 20061 and the interpretation and application of sections 994-996 of the Act by 
the English courts. The English statutory unfair prejudice remedy is evaluated 
against the background of its historic development,2 established corporate law 
principles,3 other common law principles relating to the law of contract4 and the law 
of damages,5 and its relationship (or potential relationship) with other remedies such 
as the liquidation of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds6 and the statutory 
derivative action.7 The application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in 
arbitration proceedings also receives attention later on in the chapter.8 The chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the English statutory unfair prejudice remedy.9 The 
findings contained in the conclusion are used to measure and critically evaluate the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.10 
                                                 
 Reference to case law is mainly made to the neutral citations of cases followed by an abbreviation 
indicating the court or division. The citation to the best report is also included where available. Cases 
decided prior to 1865 are cited by providing the details of the nominate report and the English reports. 
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for purposes of this chapter. 
2 See 2.3 below. 
3 See 2.2 below. 
4 See for example 2.2 and 2.6.5 below. 
5 See 2.10.6 below. 
6 See 2.9 below. 
7 See 2.10.3 below. 
8 See 2.11 below and more specifically 2.11.3 below. 
9 See 2.12 below. 
10 See Chapter 5 below for an evaluation of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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2.2 The basic principles of English company law11 
 
A company is a separate juristic person distinct from its members.12 The principle 
of separate legal personality is strictly upheld by the courts.13 The relationship 
between the members and the company is a contractual one.14 This relationship 
entails that the members join a company on a voluntary basis and accept the terms 
and conditions of its constitution.  
The principle of majority rule is a further principle that is strictly enforced. By 
becoming a member of a company, a member is bound to the decisions of the 
majority.15 To evaluate the fairness of conduct complained of, the constitution of a 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the relevant principles of South African company law see 5.2 below. 
12 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1; [1897] AC 22. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 29. 
13 Only in exceptional circumstances will the separate juristic personality of a company not be upheld. 
The separate juristic personality will be lifted or pierced in circumstances where it is abused. For a 
discussion of the lifting and/or piercing of the corporate veil see Chapter 8 of Paul L Davies and 
Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016). See also 
the application of this principle in the context of groups of companies in 2.7 below. 
14 Section 33 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that ‘(1) The provisions of a company’s constitution 
bind the company and its members to the same extent as if there were covenants on the part of the 
company and of each member to observe those provisions’. Section 33(2) further provides that 
‘[m]oney payable by a member to the company under its constitution is a debt due from him to the 
company’. See also Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17; [1994] BCC 475. See 
further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 61-62 where it is explained that the constitution of a company is a particular form 
of contract between the members and the company. See also Wootliff v Ruston-Turner [2017] EWHC 
3129 (Ch). See 5.4.1 for the South African position where the position is currently uncertain. 
15 See the Companies Act 2006, ss 282 and 283. The Companies Act 2006 provides for the adoption 
of ordinary resolutions in terms of section 282 and special resolutions in terms of section 283. 
Ordinary resolutions are adopted by a simple majority vote while special resolutions are adopted by 
a minimum of 75% of the persons voting on such resolutions. See 5.2.1 below for the position in 
South Africa. 
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company is the point of departure.16 The constitution of the company contains the 
agreements between the members of a company and the company.17 The 
honouring of agreements between parties is an element of commercial fairness.18 
Traditionally courts were reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of a company 
or the contractual relationship between parties.19 The purpose of the strict 
enforcement of the above-mentioned principles is to achieve legal certainty.  
However, various examples can be provided where the strict enforcement of 
basic company law principles may lead to unfair consequences.20 The fact that a 
company could be wound up on just and equitable grounds is a recognition of the 
individuals that comprise a company.21 These individuals often hold certain ‘rights, 
expectations and obligations’ that are not necessarily contained in the articles of 
association of the company.22 
                                                 
16 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 667 and 669. See also 2.6.3 below. 
17 Companies Act 2006, s 33. 
18 Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18; and [1994] BCC 475. See also Paul L 
Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 
2016) 669; Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies 
Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 72. 
19 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 665. See 2.6.5 below. 
20 See the discussion of the development of the statutory personal remedy in 2.3 below for examples. 
21 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch), [2010] All ER 177 [7]. See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379, [1972] 2 All ER 492. See further O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 
24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. See 2.3.2 below. 
22 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch), [2010] All ER 177 [7]. See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379; O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. 
See further Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies 
Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 72 who argues that the concept of contractual 
incompleteness was recognised in Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, [1994] BCC 
475. See also 2.6.5 below. 
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To remedy the unfair consequences that may flow from the strict enforcement 
of the company law principles moved the legislature to adopt or create remedies to 
prevent and/or remedy these unfair consequences.23 One such example of 
legislative intervention is the introduction of the statutory personal action.24 
2.3 An overview of the development of the statutory personal remedy 
in England 
2.3.1 The rule in Foss v Harbottle25 
2.3.1.1 Introduction 
 
Although the rule in Foss v Harbottle26 was abolished by the Companies Act 2006, 
a brief overview of the rule is important to facilitate the understanding of the 
development of the statutory personal action, and the statutory derivative action in 
England. The purpose of the statutory reform of these common law remedies was 
to address the shortcomings of the rule in Foss v Harbottle.27 The rule is further 
important as it also applied to South African company law.28 
2.3.1.2 The rule 
 
The question in Foss v Harbottle29 was whether the shareholders of a company 
                                                 
23 See 2.3 below for an overview of the historical development of the statutory personal action or 
unfair prejudice remedy.  
24 See Companies Act 2006, ss 994-996. See also 2.4 below. For an overview of the historical 
development of the common law and statutory unfair prejudice remedy see 2.3 below. 
25 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
26 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
27 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
28 See 5.2.2 below. 
29 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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could institute legal proceedings for and on the behalf of the company based on a 
cause of action that vested in the company as a separate and distinct legal entity.30 
The court held that the individual shareholders or members of a company do not 
have the right to institute legal proceeding on behalf of the company as the right to 
institute such legal proceedings vested in the company and not in the individual 
shareholders or members.31 This enforces the legal principle that a company has a 
separate and distinct legal personality from its shareholders or members of the 
company.32 In the context of wrongs committed against the company by the 
directors of a company, company law further acknowledges that directors owe their 
duties to the company and not to the individual shareholders or members.33 
Based on ‘the proper plaintiff rule’ the default position was that when a wrong 
is committed against a company, it is the company, and not the shareholders or 
members of the company that should institute legal proceedings for and on behalf 
                                                 
30 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 490-91; 67 ER 189. In this case, two of the company’s 
shareholders instituted legal proceedings against the directors of the company who allegedly sold a 
property at an undisclosed profit. The directors were entrusted with the duty and power to act in the 
interests of the company. 
31 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 490; 67 ER 189; Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93; 
Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066-67. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 194-95. This aspect 
of the rule is known as ‘the proper plaintiff principle’. See DD Prentice ‘Exception to the Rule in Foss 
v Harbottle’ (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 318, 318. 
32 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 490-91; 67 ER 189. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 196; Julia Tang 
‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 178, 179. See further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ 
Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 595-96 who state that the rule protects the 
company from excessive involvement in litigation driven or motivated by the personal objectives of 
members. See also 2.2 above and 2.3.13 below. 
33 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 196. 
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of the company.34 The courts were very reluctant to deviate from this rule or principle 
without good cause.35  
2.3.1.3 The justification of ‘the proper plaintiff rule’ and ‘the internal 
management principle’ 
(a) The legal personality of a company 
 
The rule that was laid down in Foss v Harbottle36 gives effect to the principle of 
separate legal personality37 and the fact that companies are governed by majority 
decisions.38 A court does not have the jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs 
of a company when the company has acted within its powers.39  
                                                 
34 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 
(CA) 1066-67. In Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [1.4] 
the rule is described as the company acting accordance with the will of the majority shareholders or 
members. 
35 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194. In Edwards v 
Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1067 the court stated that the rule is not inflexible ‘and will be 
relaxed where necessary in the interest of justice’. See also 2.3.1.4 below for a discussion of the 
exceptions to the rule.  
36 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
37 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 196. See also 2.2 and 2.3.1.2 above. 
38 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 194 and 198. See also Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the 
Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 179. 
39 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93. Courts are reluctant to intervene in the decisions of a 
company’s organs as this is often viewed by courts as a usurpation of powers. See KW Wedderburn 
‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 196. 
The author (197-98) further explains that the internal affairs of a company are determined by the 
organs of a company by majority vote to which the minority is bound. This aspect of the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 is known as ‘the internal management principle’. In this 
regard see DD Prentice ‘Exception to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1972) 35 Modern Law Review 
318, 318. 
 30 
 
One of the functions of the rule in Foss v Harbottle40 is to protect companies 
or corporations from being involved in excessive levels of litigation.41 The rule 
further protects a company against the institution of legal proceedings which might 
not necessarily be in the best interests of the company.42 Because minority 
shareholders or members often have little to gain, especially financially, from the 
outcome of litigation, the institution of legal proceedings on behalf of the company 
by individual shareholders or members of a company may not necessarily be in the 
best interests of the company and may rather be motivated by the personal 
objectives of the individual(s) involved.43 
Circumstances may arise where a wrong is committed against a company by 
its directors, shareholders or members, and where the company would be left 
without any redress unless the remaining members or shareholders take steps to 
enforce and protect the rights of the company, depending on whether or not they 
are allowed to institute proceedings on the behalf of the company.44 Considerations 
other than the technical rules enforcing the rights of a company to exercise its rights 
to institute legal proceedings may prompt a court to relax the rule in Foss v 
                                                 
40 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
41 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 195. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles 
of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 595. 
42 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 595. 
43 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 595. 
44 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
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Harbottle.45 However, this is seldom done.46 
(b) The law of partnership and the reluctance of the courts to intervene 
in the internal affairs of a company 
 
The principles underlying the rule in Foss v Harbottle47 should be understood 
against the background of the principles in the law of partnership in England.48 In 
terms of the law of partnership courts refused to interfere in the relations between 
partners.49 The courts extended this principle to the English company law.50 The 
effect of this approach is that courts justify their reluctance to intervene in the affairs 
of company based on this principle.51 However, a more appropriate stance in this 
regard would rather be that companies are governed by majority decisions.52 
(c) The ratification of irregularities 
 
In terms of the rule in Foss v Harbottle53 irregularities that could have been ratified 
                                                 
45 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
46 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194. 
47 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
48 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 195. 
49 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 196-97. 
50 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 197. 
51 See KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 197 who argues that the application of this principle was inappropriately extended 
to company or corporations law. See also 2.3.1.3 (a) above. 
52 See also 2.3.1.3 (c) below. 
53 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
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by the majority are placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court.54 The effect of the 
application of this principle is that it is the company, and not the individual members 
or shareholders, that must institute legal proceedings when a wrong is committed 
against a company.55 In the event that the majority decides not to institute such 
proceedings, the shareholders or members of the company do not have a cause of 
action on which they can rely.56 
2.3.1.4 The ‘exceptions’ to the rule in Foss v Harbottle57 
 
The strict enforcement of the rule in Foss v Harbottle58 may lead to injustices. 
Therefore, the scope of its strict application must be carefully considered.59 
Wedderburn argues that the principle of majority control never intended to provide 
protection to the controllers of a company that committed wrongs against the 
company.60 
                                                 
54 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 197-198. 
Wedderburn argues (198) that the principle of majority decision-making was used to justify the 
reluctance of courts to intervene in the internal affairs of companies. 
55 See 2.3.1.2 above. 
56 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 198. 
57 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
58 (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. 
59 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066-67. In Law Commission ‘Shareholder 
Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [1.4] where it is reported that although provision is 
made for exceptions to the rule, these exceptions are difficult to understand and are in some respects 
‘rigid, old fashioned and unclear’. It was recommended (paras 1.11 and 1.13) that the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 be replaced with a more modern and simplified procedure 
to reduce the costs of litigation and to provide for mechanisms to resolve disputes without court 
intervention. See also para 2.3.1.3 (a) above. 
60 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 200. See also Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93. 
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The court in Edwards v Halliwell61 recognised that the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle62 is not absolute and leaves room for deviation in certain ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances. For instance, the rule will not apply when a contract or transaction 
is ultra vires to the company, or if the conduct is illegal.63 The rule further does not 
apply where the conduct complained of can only be authorised by a special 
resolution.64 The rule further does not bar a member to institute legal proceedings 
to protect his or her membership or personal rights.65 A court would allow a 
shareholder or member (or a minority of shareholders or members) to institute legal 
proceedings on behalf of the company, where the company is wronged by the 
controllers of the company, and where the controllers of the company use their 
power to prevent the company from seeking redress against them.66 This situation 
                                                 
61 [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1067. 
62 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
63 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 203-04. The rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 does not apply 
as the majority cannot ratify ultra vires or illegal conduct. See also Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All 
ER 1064 (CA) 1066-67. 
64 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066-67. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 207-09. The author 
argues (209) that rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 does not apply to situations 
where a special resolution is required to authorise or ratify specific conduct or transactions. This 
approach is based on the enforcement of the contract between the members and the company. This 
is further illustrated by the power of a member to approach a court to prevent a company to do 
anything in breach of its articles of association. This weakens the argument that the rule is based on 
the principle that courts should not interfere with the internal affairs of a company. See also the 
examples of rights given by Wedderburn (211-12) on which a member can rely to seek relief. 
65 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1067. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 209-15. The author 
(210) points out that there may be various sources of these personal membership rights. These 
rights may be found in the articles of association of a company while others may be statutory. 
66 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93. See also Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of 
the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 180. 
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is commonly referred to as ‘fraud on the minority’.67 
Wedderburn argues that it is not always technically correct to refer to the 
‘exceptions’ to ‘the proper plaintiff rule’.68 According to Wedderburn one should 
rather distinguish between situations where the rule applies on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, situations or circumstances where the rule does not find 
application at all.69 For example, the rule does not find application where a member 
institutes legal proceedings to protect his or her membership rights, while a court 
may allow members to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company in order 
to prevent ‘fraud on a minority’.70 Occasionally, courts also do not enforce the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle71 when it was in the interest of justice to do so.72 
2.3.1.5 The problems with the rule in Foss v Harbottle73 
 
The effect of adopting the rule in Foss v Harbottle74 was that courts refused to 
                                                 
67 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 203. In Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 
1997) [1.13] it was recommended that the exception of ‘fraud on the minority’ should be replaced by 
a simplified derivative action. 
68 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 203-04. 
69 KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge 
Law Journal 194, 203-04. 
70 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066-67. See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ 
Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1958) 16 Cambridge Law Journal 93 where the author 
argues that the ‘fraud on a minority’ exception is the only true exception to the rule. 
71 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
72 See OA Osunbor ‘A Critical Appraisal of “the Interests of Justice” as an Exception to the Rule in 
Foss v Harbottle’ (1987) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1-13. The author empasises 
that the recognition of this exception as an additional ‘exception’ is controversial and is too vague to 
able be applied with certainty. 
73 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
74 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493; 67 ER 189. 
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intervene in the internal of affairs of a company.75 First, courts were of the view that 
full effect had to be given to the separate legal personality of a company (‘the proper 
plaintiff principle’) and the decisions of the majority (‘the internal management 
rule’).76 The reluctance of the courts to interfere with the internal affairs was further 
based on an incorrect application of the law of partnerships to company law.77 As a 
result of the courts’ recognition that the rule in Foss v Harbottle78 may in some 
circumstances lead to injustices, exceptions were developed where the rule would 
not find application. These exceptions created more problems than solutions.These 
exceptions were criticised for being too vague and difficult to determine.79  
Many of the scenarios where the courts found an ‘exception’ to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle,80 were in circumstances where the rule did not find application at 
all.81 From the explanation above of the rule in Foss v Harbottle82 the need for 
legislative intervention is evident. It is demonstrated in the discussion below, that 
legislative intervention took the form of a statutory derivative action and a statutory 
personal action.83 The main focus of this discussion is specifically on the statutory 
personal action (or remedy) and related aspects. However, the interrelationship 
between the statutory derivative action and the statutory personal action is 
                                                 
75 See 2.3.1.3 (b) above. 
76 See 2.3.1.3 above. 
77 See 2.3.1.3 (b). See also KW Wedderburn ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ 
(1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, 197-98. 
78 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
79 Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [1.4]. 
80 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
81 See 2.3.1.4 above. 
82 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
83 See 2.3.3 and 2.5 below. 
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considered.84 A brief overview of the legislative response to the problematic aspects 
of the rule in Foss v Harbottle85 in respect of the personal action is provided below.86 
2.3.2 The company as an association of individuals 
 
Although a company enjoys separate juristic personality87 the individuals behind the 
company structure cannot be ignored.88 The relationship between these individuals, 
the company and its organs are regulated by the Act, the articles of association and, 
if applicable, shareholder agreements. In addition to the rights and obligations 
contained in the Act and the articles of association, individuals may have ‘rights, 
expectations and obligations inter se’ that may not be articulated in the articles of 
association or constitution of a company.89 
In appropriate circumstances, a court may restrict the exercise of legal rights 
to equitable considerations.90 In theory, the relationship between the parties to a 
company is of a commercial nature, but in some instances the relationship between 
them can be of a personal nature.91 The personal relationship between the individuals 
                                                 
84 See 2.10.3 below 
85 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
86 The overview in 2.3.3 – 2.3.5 below focuses on the statutory provisions that preceded s 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006. An in-depth analysis of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 is conducted 
from 2.4 onwards. 
87 See 2.2 above. 
88 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
89 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492. See 2.6.5 
below. 
90 In dealing with s 459 of the Companies Act 1985 the court in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] 
WLR 1092, 1099 adopted the reasoning of the court in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 
360 (HL) 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 regarding the winding-up of companies on a ‘just and equitable’ basis. 
91 This may be the case in the context of family-owned companies and where parties to a partnership 
may decide to conduct their business through a company structure. See also 2.6.5.4 below regarding 
‘quasi-partnerships’. 
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of a company is one factor that may justify the restraint of legal rights based on 
equitable considerations.92  
2.3.3 Section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 
2.3.3.1 The need for an alternative remedy93 
 
Prior to 1948 shareholders – especially minority shareholders – had no redress in 
circumstances where the majority shareholders used their power in or control of the 
company in a manner that oppressed other shareholders. The winding-up of 
companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds were also found to be an unsatisfactory 
response to oppressive conduct towards minority shareholders.94  
When a company is wound-up, the assets are sold at a break-up value.95 The 
break-up value of the assets is usually low and often provides the party or parties 
responsible for the oppressive conduct with the opportunity to purchase the relevant 
assets.96 This emphasised the need for the courts to have the discretion to provide 
parties to an oppression dispute with an alternative remedy to the winding-up a 
company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.97 It was clear that this discretion of the 
courts had to be wide and flexible enough to be able to cater for a wide variety of 
circumstances.98 
 
                                                 
92 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
93 See also 2.9 below. 
94 See also 2.9 below. 
95 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659, 1945) para 60. 
96 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659, 1945) para 60. 
97 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659, 1945) para 60. 
98 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659, 1945) para 60. 
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2.3.3.2 The provisions of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 
 
The Companies Act 1948 provided for the statutory protection of minorities in 
section 210.99 In terms of this provision, a member could approach the court on the 
basis that the affairs of a company were conducted in a manner that is oppressive100 
to the particular member and/or ‘some part of the members’ of the company.101  
When a court found that the affairs of a company have been conducted in a 
way that is oppressive towards the member and some part of the members of the 
company, but that the granting of an order for the liquidation of the company on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds would be inappropriate, it has the discretion to make any 
other order it deemed fit in the circumstances.102 Section 210 also contained some 
miscellaneous provisions relating to orders altering the memorandum or articles of 
a company.103 
2.3.3.3 The criticism against section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 
 
The main criticism against section 210 of Companies Act 1948 was that the courts 
                                                 
99 See 3.3.2 below for the influence of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 on the development 
of the statutory personal remedy in Australia. 
100 See 2.6.3.2 below for a discussion of the use of the use of the term ‘unfairly prejudice’ in stead of 
‘oppressive’. 
101 Companies Act 1948, s 210(1). See 2.3.3.1 above. 
102 Companies Act 1948, ss 210(1)(a) and (b). The orders a court may grant include the regulation 
of the future conduct of the affairs of the company; the purchase of shares of members of the 
company by other members of the company or by the company self; and an order for the reduction 
of the company's capital. Section 210(3) of the Companies Act 1948 implies that a court order may 
also be made which has the effect of altering the relevant companyʼs memorandum or articles. See 
also 2.9 below for a discussion of the relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and an order 
for liquidation based on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. 
103 Companies Act 1948, s 210(4). 
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interpreted the provision as being too restrictive.104 Courts were criticised for 
adopting interpretations to section 210 that limited the scope of the provision without 
the wording of the section justifying such a narrow interpretation.105 Further, the 
provisions required that the conduct complained of should have been of a 
continuous nature.106 The section also did not provide for or applied in the event of 
isolated events or conduct that was of an oppressive nature.107 The conduct 
complained of should also have affected some parts of the members of the 
company. Also, relief could be granted only if the petitioner could convince the court 
that it was justified to wind-up the company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.108  
2.3.3.4 The Jenkins Commission and section 210 of the Companies Act 
1948 
 
In 1962 the Jenkins Commission considered section 210 of the Companies Act 
1948 and made some recommendations pertaining to its reform. The report 
recommended that the remedy should clearly be extended to cover both oppressive 
and unfairly prejudicial conduct.109 The reason for this recommendation was that 
oppressive conduct implied that the intention of the oppressor plays a role in 
determining whether the conduct complained of meets the criteria for intervention 
                                                 
104 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 203. See also 2.3.3.4 below. 
105 For example, courts restricted the application of the remedy to unlawful conduct which denied a 
member relief from conduct that was only unfair. Courts were further reluctant to recognise that a 
member could be prejudiced based on conduct affecting a member in a capacity only related to his 
or her membership. See also 2.3.3.4 below. 
106 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 202.   
107 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) paras 202 and 204.  
108 See Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855, [60]; [2012] 1 All 
ER 414 where the court discussed the legal position under section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 
and how the position differs from the current position. See also 2.9 below. 
109 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) paras 203 and 212. 
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as stated in section 210 of the Companies Act 1948.110 This would further extend 
the remedy to apply to conduct that is not necessarily illegal or infringe on the legal 
rights of a member.111 The report further recommended that section 210 be 
amended to state clearly that the provision not only covers particular conduct that 
is oppressive to or is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of a member, but also 
conduct that has the same effect.112  
2.3.4 Section 75 of the Companies Act 1980 
 
Section 75 of the Companies Act 1980 contained amendments to section 210 of the 
Companies Act 1948.113 The amendments were aimed at the restrictive approach 
of the courts to the interpretation of the remedy. One of the important changes 
brought about by section 75 was the introduction of the concept ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’.114 Secondly, the legislature broke the direct link that existed between 
the granting of relief in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy and the liquidation of a 
company on the basis that it is ‘just and equitable’.115  
2.3.5 Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 
 
The remedy was further refined with the introduction of section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985. An important feature of section 459 was that a petitioner had 
                                                 
110 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 203. 
111 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 203. 
112 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 204. 
113 See 2.3.3 above for a discussion of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. 
114 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) paras 202 and 204. See also 2.3.3.3 
above and 2.6.3.2 below. 
115 Fulham Football Club (1987) Limited v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855, [60]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
See 2.9 below for a detailed discussion of the unfair prejudice remedy as an alternative to the 
winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.  
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to be a member of the company to rely on the provisions of the section.116 However, 
it remained uncertain whether a member had to prove that he or she suffered unfair 
prejudice in his or her capacity as member.117  
One of the criticisms against the remedy provided for in sections 459 to 461 
of the Companies Act 1985 was the ‘the efficiency and cost’ of the exercise of the 
remedy.118 It was identified as a problem especially in the context of smaller 
companies. In relation to this issue, the Law Commission made, amongst others, 
the following recommendations:119 
 The court should participate in the case management of the matter to 
curb the length and costs relating to proceedings under section 459 of 
the Companies Act 1985.120 
 Section 459 should provide for specific presumptions to assist with the 
adjudication of matters relating to the remedy. The first presumption 
would deal with conduct that would be presumed to be unfairly 
prejudicial.121 The second presumption would deal with the value of 
                                                 
116 Companies Act 1985, s 459(1). See 2.6, more specifically 2.6.1, below for a discussion of the 
relevance of membership for purposes of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006. 
117 See 2.6.2.2 below for a discussion of whether a member could rely on the remedy only in his or 
her capacity as member. See also 5.2.4.3 below for criticism of the requirement that a member 
should be unfairly prejudiced in his capacity as member under section 252 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973. 
118 Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [1.5] and [1.6]. 
119 Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [1.23]. 
120 See 2.11 below regarding the management of litigation in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. 
121 For purposes of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 see also 2.3.2 below for a discussion of 
prejudice and 2.6.3 below for a discussion of the concept of unfairness. 
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shares that is subject to a purchase order.122 The presumption would 
have the effect that shares would be valued on a pro rata basis.123 
 The introduction of limitation of the period within which proceedings 
can be brought.  
 Provision should be made for the winding-up of a company as a 
remedy under section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.124 
 To avoid potential disputes between parties, draft regulations should 
be included in Table A. 
 The assessment criteria for the institution of a derivative action should 
be modernised.125 
 The Commission found that there is no need for reform pertaining to 
the enforcement of the rights of shareholders under the articles of 
association. 
2.4 The statutory unfair prejudice remedy in the Companies Act 2006 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice remedy is contained in sections 994 to 999 in Part 30 
of the Companies Act 2006. These sections contain the main provisions relating to 
the statutory unfair prejudice remedy. Sections 997 to 999 are known as the 
supplementary provisions to the statutory unfair prejudice remedy. This chapter 
                                                 
122 See 2.10.5.3 below for a discussion of the valuation of shares subject to a purchase order. 
123 See 2.10.5 below regarding the valuation of shares subject to a buy-out order in terms of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy. 
124 See 2.9 below regarding the liquidation and winding-up of companies based unfairly prejudice 
conduct. 
125 See 2.10.3 below for a discussion of the relationship between the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy and the statutory derivative claims. 
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mainly focuses on section 994 read with section 996. 
Section 994, which deals with a petition by a company member, provides as follows: 
‘994 Petition by company member 
(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an 
order under this Part on the ground – 
(a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted 
in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
members generally or of some part of its members (including 
at least himself), or 
(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company 
(including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so 
prejudicial. 
(2) The provisions of this Part apply to a person who is not a member 
of a company but to whom shares in the company have been 
transferred or transmitted by operation of law as they apply to a 
member of a company. 
(3) In this section, and so far as applicable for purposes of this section 
in the other provisions of this Part, “company” means – 
(a) company within the meaning of this Act, or 
(b) a company that is not such a company but is a statutory water 
company within the meaning of the Statutory Water 
Companies Act 1991 (c 58).ʼSection 996 deals with the 
powers of the court in granting relief to a petitioner that is 
successful in proving the requirements set out in section 
994.126 Section 996 provides as follows: 
‘996 Powers of the court under this Part 
(1) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, 
it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of 
the matters complained of. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court’s 
order may – 
(a) regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future; 
(b) require the company – 
(i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, 
or 
(ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has 
omitted to do; 
(c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on 
behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such 
terms as the court may direct; 
(d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, 
alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; 
(e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members or by the company itself and, in 
the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of 
the company’s capital accordingly.ʼ 
                                                 
126 See 2.10 below. 
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As indicated above, section 995 deals with statutory provisions relating to petitions 
by the Secretary of State based on unfair prejudicial conduct.127  
Section 998 deals with the delivery of a copy of a company’s constitution to 
the registrar when a court order alters a company’s constitution or in the event of a 
court granting leave that certain amendments or alterations be made to the 
company’s constitution. Section 998(3) makes it clear that when there is non-
compliance with the provisions of this section, a criminal offence is committed by 
the company and every officer of the company who is in default. The criminal 
sanction for non-compliance is set out in 998(4).  
Section 999 provides that when a court has ordered the alteration of a 
company’s constitution or has granted leave to do so, a copy of the order and the 
company’s articles must be delivered to the registrar.128 Non-compliance with the 
provisions of section 999 is also a criminal office.129 
2.5. The interpretational approach to section 994 of the Companies Act 
2006 
 
A petitioner must prove that the company committed an act or omission that is 
unfairly prejudicial to him- or herself as member and/or other members.130 Section 
                                                 
127 An analysis of this provision falls beyond the scope of this thesis. The same applies to section 
997 which is part of the supplementary provisions of Part 30 which deal in particular with rule-making 
powers under the Insolvency Act 1986 or article 359 of the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 
SI 1989/2405 (NI 19) in respect of a winding-up of a company in terms of Part 30 of the Act. 
128 See also section 998 of the Companies Act 2006. In terms of section 998 a copy of the order 
must be delivered to the Registrar. The company’s articles or the resolution or agreement that was 
the subject of the court order must accompany a copy of the court order. 
129 Companies Act 2006, s 999(4) read with s 999(5). 
130 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 781, [13] and [14]; [2014] BCC 14. 
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994 is drafted in wide and flexible terms.131 The effect of such a formulation creates 
tension between policy considerations such as legal certainty and the wide 
discretion of the courts.132 The wording of the provision in this manner enables 
courts to apply the remedy to a wide variety of factual situations and 
circumstances.133 The legislature further intended to facilitate an interpretation by 
which the judiciary may deviate from previous judgments that gave restrictive 
interpretations to the predecessors of the remedy that led to a relatively stifled 
application of the remedy.134 The factual matrix and context of each case is 
fundamental to the appropriate determination of unfair prejudicial conduct for 
purposes of section 994.135 The term or phrase ‘unfairly prejudicial’ must be given 
content in a specific context. Its interpretation and application must also be done in 
the context of established company law principles.136  
In short, the phrase encapsulates fairness.137 Although the phrase ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ is wide and flexible it is not unrestricted.138 The flexible and open texture 
                                                 
131 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [21]; [2013] BCC 98. See also the discussion of the 
concept of fairness in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098-99. For a detailed 
discussion of fairness within the company context see 2.6.3 below. 
132 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1098-99 where the court considered 
the wide and flexible wording of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 and held that the concept of 
fairness is not an ‘indefinite notion’ but requires a court to exercise its discretion judicially and in a 
principled manner. See also P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ 
(2006) Company Lawyer 204, 214. See further 2.6.3 below for a discussion of the concept of fairness. 
133 Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17-20; [1994] BCC 475. In OʼNeill v Phillips 
[1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098-99 the court stated that the remedy under section 459 of 
the Companies Act 1985 should not be given a technical interpretation and application. 
134 See 2.3.3 above. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. 
135 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21]; [2013] BCC 98. 
136 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [21]; [2013] BCC 98. 
137 See 2.6.3 below for a discussion of the concept of fairness. 
138 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21]; [2013] BCC 98. 
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of the phrase provides for a variety of facts and circumstances in the context of 
company law.139  
Facts and circumstances that may be relevant to determine the fairness of 
the manner in which the affairs of a company is conducted or has been conducted 
include the basis of the association between the incorporators of the company, the 
background and history of the company and the nature of the relationship between 
the members of the company inter se.140 The relationship between the parties to a 
company is normally regulated by the Act, the constitution of a company and in 
some instances a shareholders’ agreement.141 
Another important aspect to take into account is that English company law 
derives from the law of partnership.142 Partnerships are contracts of good faith.143 
This has the consequence that the exercise or enforcement of strict legal rights may 
be restrained in the context of certain relationships.144 The content and meaning of 
the concept of fairness for purposes of section 994 of the Act will be dictated by the 
context (facts and circumstances of each case) to which it should be applied.145  
The fact that the remedy is cast in wide and open language does not mean 
that all conduct falls within the jurisdictional requirements of section 994 or that the 
                                                 
139 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [44]; [2013] BCC 98. 
140 See OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. For a discussion of the application 
of the remedy to quasi-partnerships see 2.6.5.4 below. 
141 See 2.2 above. 
142 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. See also 2.3.1.3 (b) above. 
143 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
144 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
145 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [21]; [2013] BCC 98. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 
UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
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language of section 994 is unbound or unrestricted.146 On previous occasions courts 
cautioned against an unjustified wide interpretation of similar provisions.147 The 
provisions of section 994 must be judicially applied based on rational principles and 
a court must not be drawn into usurping a legislative function.148 Davies and 
Worthington describe the challenge relating to the interpretation and application of 
the unfair prejudice remedy as follows:149 
‘In modern law, giving courts the power by statute to control the exercise 
of discretion by persons of institutions on grounds of “unfairness” is hardly 
novel. Yet such open-ended legislation, which in effect involves a sharing 
of the legislative function between Parliament and the courts, always 
presents the courts with the challenge of how to develop a case-by-case 
criteria by which the imprecise concept of “fairness” can be given 
operational content. As we remarked above, the challenge was 
particularly acute for the courts in relation to the unfair prejudice remedy, 
for the tradition of the courts was not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
companies.’150 
2.6 The jurisdictional requirements of section 994 of the Companies Act 
2006 
 
The wording of section 994 is the starting point for the correct application thereof. 
Before a court has the discretion to grant relief in terms of section 996,151 it needs 
                                                 
146 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [21]; [2013] BCC 98. 
147 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] WLR 1092, 1098-99 decided in terms of section 
459 of the Companies Act 1985. It is submitted that this approach still applies to the interpretation of 
section 994 of the Companies Act 2006. 
148 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [21]; [2013] BCC 98. See also OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] 
UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098.  
149 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 665.  
150 Footnotes omitted. 
151 The nature and forms of relief that a court may grant in terms of section 996 are discussed in 2.10 
below. 
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to be satisfied that the jurisdictional grounds in section 994(1) are proven.152 A 
member has to prove that the affairs of the company are being conducted or have 
been conducted in such a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
members of a company in general or to some part of its members.153  
                                                 
152 In McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [624]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583 
it was held that the jurisdiction of a court to provide relief in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy in 
section 994 is statutory. See also the Court of Appeal in McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd 
[2013] EWCA Civ 781, [11] and [14]; [2014] BCC 14 where the court held that although the powers of 
a court in section 994 of Companies Act 2006 are formulated in very wide terms, a court may only 
exercise these powers (or discretion) when the jurisdictional requirements of section 994 are met. The 
petitioner based his petition on the basis that his co-shareholders failed to offer him the opportunity to 
acquire more shares in the company when they sold their shares. The petitioner argued that the sale 
by his co-shareholders was in breach of a pre-emption right contained in a shareholders’ agreement. 
The petitioner sought relief in the form of an order entitling him to purchase the shares from the new 
shareholder or to entitle him to exercise his pre-emption rights. The court ([17]) held that to prove 
‘unfairness’ the petitioner had to show a breach of the articles of a company or shareholders’ 
agreement. Further, the exercise of legal rights can be subjected to equitable considerations when a 
personal relationship exists between the shareholders ([17]). The court ([17]) found that a personal 
relationship did not exist between the members or shareholders. On the facts of the case it was further 
found that the pre-emption rights under the shareholders’ agreement were not triggered and therefore 
the petitioner did not have a claim under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006.  
153 Companies Act 2006, s 994(1)(a). See also McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 2343 (Ch) [626]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583 where the court emphasised that section 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006 was incorporated to provide relief against the manner in which the affairs of a 
company are conducted. The section does not apply to the activities of members amongst 
themselves, unless such activities or conduct relate to the conduct of the affairs of the company. The 
relationship between shareholders inter se is governed by the law of contract and tort ([626]).  
For purposes of section 994 of the Act a distinction should be drawn between the conduct of a 
member of his or her own affairs and the conduct of the affairs of the company. In Legal Costs 
Negotiators Ltd, Re [1999] 2 BCLC 171, 195-96 the court held that a clear distinction should be 
maintained between the conduct of a company’s organs and that of the individual shareholders or 
members. It should further be noted that, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, it 
can be found that the affairs of a company may not necessarily be conducted by the board, but can 
take the form of conduct by a senior manager or individual director. See specifically the decision in 
Oak Investment Partners XII Ltd Partnership v Boughtwood [2009] EWHC 176 (Ch) [14]; [2009] All 
ER 67 in this regard. In Oak Investment Partners XII Ltd Partnership v Boughtwood [2009] EWHC 
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The petitioner should prove that the conduct complained of is both unfair and 
prejudicial.154 Conduct that is prejudicial to a member may not necessarily be unfair. 
                                                 
176 (Ch), [2009] All ER 67 case the court [13] specifically emphasised the fact that ‘a significant 
shareholder’ was placed in a management position because of his shareholding in the company.  
The fiduciary duty of a shareholder towards a company 
A shareholder does not have a duty towards a company. See Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors [2015] 
EWCA Civ 536 [50] where the court held that a shareholder in his or her personal capacity does not 
owe a duty to a company and may vote his or her shares in his or her own interest. See also 
Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21]; [2013] BCC 98 where the court held that a 
shareholder (or member) cannot be barred from the institution of legal proceedings against the 
relevant wrongdoers based on the fact that a breach of duty towards a company could have been 
detected or seen by its shareholders from the reading of the company’s financial statements. In 
Maidment, a petition was brought by a minority shareholder against the sole director of the company 
based on the excessive remuneration drawn by the director. The director argued that the minority 
shareholder could not rely on this ground because the remuneration was fully disclosed in the 
financial statements of the company in preceding financial years, but the minority shareholders failed 
to act on the information in the statements. The court rejected this argument ([31] and [32]) on the 
basis that a duty to read the financial statements of a company will imply a legal duty towards the 
company. A shareholder or member does not have such a duty to a company.  
Prejudice affecting all shareholders equally as a defence to an unfair prejudice petition 
As regards prejudice suffered by members as a whole or some part of the members of a company 
see Meyer v Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1954 SC 381 (Court of Session) 392 where 
the court held that a petitioner could still successfully rely on the oppression remedy in terms of 
section 210 of the Companies Act 1948, even in circumstances where the oppressor suffered the 
same prejudice as the petitioner. This approach was confirmed in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 368-69; [1958] 3 All ER 66 (HL). In this case the parent company 
adopted a deliberate policy of depriving its subsidiary of business. This caused a fall in value of the 
shares held by an independent minority of shareholders in the subsidiary company. The petitioners, 
the independent minority shareholders, based their case on the failure of the nominee directors of 
the parent company serving on the board of the subsidiary to protect the subsidiary against the 
implementation of the policy of the parent company. In this case it was argued that the conduct of 
the parent company and its directors cannot be regarded as oppressive as the effect of the conduct 
was the same for all members or shareholders of the subsidiary. This argument was rejected by the 
court. According to the judgment, it is no defence to a petition based on unfair prejudice that all the 
shareholders of the company suffered the same prejudice.  
154 See Weatherley v Weatherley & Ors (Shareholder dispute) [2018] EWHC 3201 (Ch) [82]; VB 
Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] EWHC 2767 
(Ch) [314]. 
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The removal of a director from the management of a company’s affairs – the role of such director’s 
conduct 
In Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222, [2006] BCC 85, [2006] 2 BCLC 70 the court found on the 
facts of the case that the removal of a director is prejudicial but not unfair for purposes of section 
459(1) of the Companies Act 1985. In this case the Court of Appeal ([64] and [65]) found that the 
removal of the petitioner as director was not unfair because it could not be seen as ‘either in breach 
of a relevant agreement, or otherwise detrimental to the well-being of the company and its assets’. 
The removal of the director was confirmed as a legitimate exercise of the power by the majority 
shareholders. The conduct of the director, who was removed, may be taken into account to 
determine the fairness of the removal, if required. In this case, the director entered negotiations with 
a potential competitor without disclosing this fact to his co-directors or shareholders ([65] and [70]). 
Unfairness and prejudice as requirements of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 
See also Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 where the court held that section 
994 requires prejudice and unfairness. In this case the petitioner, Ms Kohli, proved that an issue of 
new shares diluted her shareholding, and more particularly, the new issue of shares diluted the value 
of her shareholding due to the fact that the directors issued the new shares at an unjustifiable 
discount [113] and [119]-[120]. Further, the petitioner proved that the directors also failed to disclose 
their remuneration in the financial accounts of the company [225]. According to the court [224] this 
led to unfair prejudice to the Ms Kohli, as minority shareholder, as this caused her to loose trust and 
‘confidence in the competence and integrity of the board’. The board also sold an asset of the 
company without the required shareholder approval (see [255] and [258]-[259]). The court held [82] 
that a rights-offer may be unfairly prejudicial if it ‘unfairly discriminates in its effect against one group 
of shareholders, including shareholders holding shares of the same class as other shareholders who 
are advantaged by the same exercise. This will commonly be so in the case of a minority shareholder 
in a small private company, who is unable or disinclined to invest further in a business in which that 
shareholder has no active role’. See also Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [6] and [88]; [2011] BCC 
105 where the court held that conduct should be unfair and prejudicial to the interests of a member. 
In this case, Mr Croly was excluded from the board of directors and the participation in the 
management of the affairs of a company ([97]). The court found ([97]) this exclusionary conduct to 
be unfairly prejudicial because a quasi-partnership relationship existed between Mr Croly and Mr 
Good and that the participation in the management in the affairs of the company formed part of 
agreement between the parties. It was further found that the failure to declare a dividend from the 
company’s profits amounted unfair prejudice as such failure breached an agreement that existed 
between Mr Croly and Mr Good. An agreement relating to the equal distribution of profits was also 
breached and amounted to unfair prejudice ([99]). In this regard, Mr Good received certain payments 
from the company’s profits to the exclusion of Mr Croly, which also did not relate to services rendered 
to the company ([99]). For further examples see Hale v Waldock [2006] EWHC 364 (Ch), [2006] All 
ER 68. See also Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] EWCH 2999 (Ch) [202]; [2008] EWHC 210 (Ch) for the 
principle that conduct must be both prejudicial and unfair for purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy. 
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The prejudice must also be suffered by a member (petitioner) in his capacity as 
member.155 The concepts ‘unfairly’ and ‘prejudicial’ are not defined in the Act. It is 
the task of the courts to give meaning to these concepts. To establish the meaning 
                                                 
See also the discussion in Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 672-74.  
Forms of conduct that constitute unfair prejudice – breaches of constitution and single acts  
See Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [11] and [12]; [2013] BCC 98. See also Kohli v Lit 
[2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch), [8]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 where the court recognised that serious or repeated 
deviations from its statutes or constitution undermines trust and confidence in the board. This is the 
case even when the conduct does not have adverse financial consequences for the shareholding of 
the shareholder or when compliance is regarded as a mere formality. According to the court the 
standards in terms on which the affairs of the company should be conducted should never be 
regarded as unimportant. In Homan v Adams Securities Ltd [2010] EWHC 2421 [21] the court held 
that a petitionerʼs complaints in terms of section 994 should be considered in totality. However, 
although the totality of the complaints may amount to unfair prejudicial conduct a single act may also 
qualify as unfair prejudicial conduct. 
155 See the obiter remark in OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1105 where the 
court cautioned that the requirement that a member must suffer prejudice in his or her capacity as 
member must not be construed too technically or narrowly. In R & H Electrical Ltd v Haden Bill 
Electrical Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 280, [1995] BCC 958, 968 the court allowed an application based on 
the unfair prejudicial remedy where a member was prejudiced in his capacity as a creditor. The court 
found that a loan to the company provided by the member was sufficiently closely related to his 
capacity as shareholder in the company. The court granted an order for the buy-out of the shares 
and the repayment of the loan. In Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd 1952 SC 49 the court held that a 
petitioner cannot complain of oppression or unfair prejudice in his or her capacity as director or 
employee. See also Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 3269 
(Ch) [38] where the court emphasised that reliance can also not be placed on the unfair prejudice 
remedy in circumstances where the member has not been prejudiced in his or her capacity as 
member of the company. The unfair prejudice remedy also does not apply to circumstances where 
a member has allegedly been unfairly dismissed as employee of a company or when a director is 
removed from the board. However, the unfair prejudice remedy may be available if such a dismissal 
or removal is in breach of a legitimate expectation. Such expectation must be evaluated further 
against the conduct of the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. In this regard see 2.6.4 and 
2.6.5 below. See further 2.6.2 below for a discussion of the capacity in which a member should be 
prejudiced before he or she will be able to rely on the provisions of section 994 of the Act. For the 
position in Australia see 3.5.5 and for the position in Canada see 4.5 below. For the position in South 
African see 5.7.1.4 below. 
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of the concepts ‘prejudice’ and ‘unfairly’ they should be considered in the context of 
company law.156 Case law reveals that although the concept of fairness is flexible 
and open it does not mean that the courts will give it an unrestricted meaning.157 
2.6.1 Standing 
 
Although the terms ‘member’ and ‘shareholder’ are used interchangeably in case 
law, it is fundamental for purposes of section 994 of the Act to maintain the 
distinction between these terms. Only a member of company may apply for relief in 
terms of the Act.158  
A member is specifically defined in the Act. A person is a member of a 
company if such a person agreed to become a member of the company and his or 
her name is subsequently recorded in the register of members.159 Therefore a 
person whose name does not appear in the register of members does not have 
                                                 
156 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21] and [44]; [2013] BCC 98. See also Amin v Amin 
[2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [412] where the court stated that the exercise of powers for an illegitimate 
or ulterior purpose is conduct that is unfair to the petitioner. See further Shepherd v Williamson [2010] 
EWHC 2375 (Ch) [107] where the court explained that ‘conduct for an ulterior purpose, or conduct 
in breach of duty which causes the Company loss, or a diminution in the shares, may be unfairly 
prejudicial. A member’s interests will be prejudiced where the Respondent’s conduct causes, or 
threatens to cause, damage to the value of this shareholding. However the fall in the value of the 
Company’s shares is not the only test. The exclusion of the petitioner from his legitimate expectation 
of participation in a quasi-partnership situation is a classic instance of prejudice’.  
157 See 2.6.3 below for a discussion of unfairness. 
158 Companies Act 2006, s 994(1). See also Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 
2870 (Ch) [53]. 
159 Companies Act 2006, s 112(2). In terms of section 112(1) the subscribers to a company's 
memorandum are regarded to have agreed to become members of the company and upon 
registration become members of such a company whose names must be entered into the register of 
members. See also Farstad Supply A/S v Enviroco Ltd [2011] UKSC 16 [37]; [2011] WLR 921 where 
the court stated that membership is one of the fundamental principles of company law. See further 
Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch). 
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standing to bring a petition for relief in terms of section 994 of the Act, unless the 
shares in the company has been transmitted to the petitioner by operation of law.160  
Further a petitioner must be a member of the company of whose conduct of 
affairs is being complained of.161 The court does not have discretion to extend 
standing to a petitioner who is not a member of a company.162  
2.6.1.1 The standing of beneficial shareholders 
 
The Act determines the standing of a petitioner.163 This implies that a beneficial 
shareholder does not enjoy standing for purposes of section 994 of the Act, because 
a beneficial shareholder’s name is not recorded in the company’s register of 
members. When a beneficial shareholder is of the view that he or she has been 
unfairly prejudiced, the nominee of the beneficial shareholder should initiate a 
petition in terms of section 994 of the Act provided that the name of such nominee 
appears on the register of members.  
When a nominee of a beneficial shareholder acts as a petitioner for purposes 
of section 994 of the Act, it may attract the argument that it is not the nominee’s 
interest that has been unfairly prejudiced, but the interest(s) of the beneficial 
                                                 
160 Companies Act 2006, s 994(2). 
161 In Farstad Supply A/S v Enviroco Ltd [2011] UKSC 16 [37]; [2011] WLR 921 the court held that it 
is a fundamental principle of company law that persons on the register of members are the members 
of the company to the exclusion of all other persons. A person whose name does not appear on the 
register of members cannot rely on the provisions of section 994 of the Act and must find recourse 
in either an action for the rectification of the register of members or alternatively the enforcement of 
the subscription agreement. See also Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) 
[53]. 
162 However, see 2.7 below for a discussion of the application of section 994 of the Act 2006 in the 
context of company groups. 
163 See 2.6.1 above. 
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shareholder that had been unfairly prejudiced. The nominee will then have the 
difficulty to prove that he or she as member suffered prejudice.164 In Atlasview Ltd 
v Brightview Ltd165 the court held that the interests of a nominee shareholder may 
include the economic and contractual interests of the relevant beneficial 
shareholder.166 Without such an approach, a beneficial shareholder (owner) will not 
be able to rely on section 994 of the Act as he or she would not have standing and 
the registered nominee would not be able to prove a prejudiced interest.167 
2.6.1.2 The standing of majority shareholders 
 
The fact that minority shareholders often rely on section 994 of the Act does not 
mean that the remedy is only available to minority shareholders.168 The wording of 
section 994 is clear that ‘[a] member’ may rely on the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. The fact that a member is a majority shareholder does not disqualify the 
member from having standing for purposes of section 994.169  
                                                 
164 See Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch) [35]; [2004] BCC 543 for an example 
of such an argument. 
165 [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch); [2004] 2 BCLC 191. 
166 Compare with the position in South Africa as discussed in 5.7.1.1 and 5.7.1.2 below. 
167 Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch) [36]; [2004] 2 BCLC 191. 
168 See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 662 where it is noted that the controlling shareholders of a company are not 
excluded from relying on the provisions of section 994 of the Act. The reasoning behind this approach 
is that in most cases the controlling shareholders of a company will be able to exercise their powers 
to remedy any harm suffered by them. The remedy will usually be utilised by non-controlling or 
minority shareholders. See Cool Seas (Seafoods) Ltd v Interfish Ltd & Ors [2018] EWHC 2038 (Ch) 
[153] for an example where relief was granted to a majority shareholder because such shareholder 
could not use its majority voting rights to protect itself from harm or prejudice. 
169 In Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd, Re [1999] 2 BCLC 171 the court entertained an application in 
terms of the oppression remedy where the applicant held 75% of the shares in the company. See 
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2.6.2 Prejudice and the capacity in which a member is prejudiced 
2.6.2.1 Prejudice  
 
For purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy courts take a wide or broad view on 
prejudice for purposes of section 994 of the Act.170 Prejudice may present in various 
forms.171 Prejudice is usually financial loss suffered by a member.172 However, the 
rights or interests of a petitioner may be infringed or prejudiced without the petitioner 
suffering any financial loss.173 
Usually prejudice of a member takes the form of a diminution of the value of 
shares.174 A diminution of value of shares or financial damage is not the only form 
                                                 
3.5.1 below of the position in Australia and 4.5 below for the Canadian position. For the position in 
South Africa see 5.7.1.1 below. 
170 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [12]; [2013] BCC 98. See also Weatherley v 
Weatherley & Ors (Shareholder dispute) [2018] EWHC 3201 (Ch) [83]. 
171 The exclusion of a member from the participation in the affairs of a company which is formed on the 
basis of a quasi-partnership is one example of prejudice that may be suffered by a member. See for 
example Quilan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 417. Such an exclusion will only be regarded as 
unfair in the absence of a reasonable offer. See further Weatherley v Weatherley & Ors (Shareholder 
dispute) [2018] EWHC 3201 (Ch) [83] where the court found that ‘[p]rejudice may found in the form of 
an economic and non-economic act or omission’. For a discussion of reasonable offers see 2.11 below. 
172 Corran v Butters [2017] EWHC 2294 (Ch) [109]; McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [630]-[631]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583. In Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v 
FI Call Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch) [41] the court stated that prejudice to a member is not 
limited to prejudice of a financial nature or affecting the value of the member’s shareholding. In Yusuf 
v Yusuf [2019] EWHC 90 (Ch) [138] the court confirmed that the prejudice a member may suffer may 
extend beyond the member’s financial interests and can include infringements of the Companies Act 
2006. See also Routledge v Skerritt [2019[ EWHC 573 (Ch). See further Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 673. 
173 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [630]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583; 
McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 781 [16]; [2014] BCC 14. See also 
Routledge v Skerritt [2019[ EWHC 573 (Ch). 
174 Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [107]; McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments 
Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [630]; and [2013] 2 BCLC 583. See 2.10.6 below for a discussion of the 
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of damage or prejudice that a shareholder or member may suffer.175 However, a 
petitioner may find it difficult to prove that any prejudice is suffered if he or she is 
unable to convince the court that the conduct complained of caused negative 
financial consequences.176 
2.6.2.2 The capacity in which the member is prejudiced 
 
One of the requirements of section 994 of the Act is that a member has to prove 
that he or she suffered prejudice in his capacity as member of the company.177 It is 
                                                 
diminution of the value of shares as a form of loss for purposes of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. 
175 Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) para [107]. See also McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) 
Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch). In McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 2343 (Ch) [630]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583 the court alluded to the possibility of a member suffering 
prejudice which is not damages or loss of a financial nature. 
176 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [630]-[631]; [2013] 2 BCLC 
583. 
177 Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 536 [45]; See also Routledge v Skerritt [2019] 
EWHC 573 (Ch). See also Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd [2007] UKPC 26 [30] 
and [37]-[38], [2007] 4 All ER 164 where the court held that the interests of the shareholder or 
member as creditor were sufficiently related to his capacity as shareholder. See further Hawkes v 
Cuddy [2007] EWCH 2999 (Ch) [202]; [2008] EWHC 210 (Ch); Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 
(Ch) [564], [572]; Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch); Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 
(Ch); McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch), [630]; [2013] 2 BCLC 
583. In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [6] it was held that a petitioner cannot rely on the remedy 
in his or her capacity as employee. In this case the court ([89]-[90]) found that the petitioner was not 
an employee but was rather presented as the ‘principal’ in the business of the company. This 
distinguished the petitioner from an employee who has been given some shares ([88]-[90]). In 
Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [151] the court held on the facts and circumstances 
of the case that the unfair prejudice suffered by the petitioner was sufficiently closely connected to 
his shareholding in the company. In this case the petitioner was an employee of the company and 
held shares in the company. The petitioner was excluded from participating in the management of 
the company. It is important to note that the court found that the company was a quasi-partnership. 
It must be stressed that the court emphasised the relevance of the arrangement between the 
petitioner and co-shareholders. See further Re a Company (No 004175 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 574. 
For examples of judgments dealing with the exclusion of a member from the management of a 
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in some circumstances sufficient if the member can demonstrate he or she has 
suffered prejudice in a capacity closely related to his or her membership.178 This is 
in keeping with the interpretational philosophy that the provisions of section 994 
must be given a wide and flexible interpretation.179 To strictly apply the requirement 
that a member should have suffered prejudice in his or her capacity as such, would 
be too a restrictive interpretation and lose sight of the commercial realities within 
which companies function.180 
2.6.3 Unfairness 
2.6.3.1 Introduction 
 
Initially the English courts adopted a very conservative and restrictive approach to 
the statutory provisions containing the personal remedy aimed at the protection of 
                                                 
company see R & H Electrical Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 280, [1995] BCC 958 
and Hollaus v Moria 2019 BCSC 14, 2019 CarswellBC 162 [60] where the court stated conduct that 
has the effect of excluding a shareholder from exercising his powers in the capacity as shareholder 
may attract relief under the unfair prejudice remedy. A petitioner cannot rely on section 994 of the 
Act if the member has been prejudiced in a private capacity. See 2.6.5.4 below for a discussion of 
the relevance of quasi-partnerships in adjudicating disputes in terms of section 994 of the Act. 
178 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [12]; [2013] BCC 98. See also Wootliff v Rushton-
Turner [2016] EWHC 2802 (Ch). See further Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd 
[2007] UKPC 26. In Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd [2007] UKPC 26, [35]-[37]; 
[2007] 4 All ER 164 the court cautioned against the strict application of the requirement that a 
member must have suffered prejudice in his or her capacity as such. In Wootliff v Rushton-Turner 
[2016] EWHC 2802 (Ch) [28] the court held that ‘[a] shareholder’s right in the context of an unfair 
prejudice petition may be wider or greater than just his rights qua shareholder. Much will depend on 
the arrangements between the shareholders and the company, and how closely connected the 
interests of members are and how they relate to it in other capacities’. The court ([34]) further found 
that the possibility to award compensation for a breach of a service agreement is not excluded. See 
also Robert Goddard ‘The Unfair Prejudice Remedy’ (2008) 12:1 Edinburgh Law Review 93, 96. 
179 See 2.5 above regarding the interpretation of the unfair prejudice remedy. 
180 See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 664. 
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members.181 The statutory development of the unfair prejudice remedy suggests a 
wide and flexible interpretation of section 994 of the Act.182 Even though a wide 
interpretation is to be given to the provisions of section 994, a court is still bound to 
the wording of the provisions. A court must exercise its discretion judicially based 
on rational principles.183  
2.6.3.2 Unfair prejudicial versus oppressive conduct 
One of the jurisdictional requirements of section 994 of the Act is that the conduct 
complained of should not only be prejudicial but also unfair.184 This is clear from the 
reference to the concept of unfair prejudice instead of oppression or oppressive. 
One must consciously take note of the fact that the provisions of section 994 do not 
refer to oppressive conduct.185 This approach by the legislature is indicative of the 
intention to move away from the concept of oppressive conduct in contrast with the 
description of the conduct that is unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly disregards the 
interests of a member.186  
                                                 
181 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 665 refer to the reluctance of courts to interfere in the internal affairs of companies. 
182 See 2.3 above for a discussion of the development of the statutory personal remedy. 
183 VB Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] 
EWHC 2767 (Ch) [315]. See also OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098 in the 
context of the Companies Act 1985. 
184 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 781 [15]; and [2014] BCC 14. See 
also Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] EWCH 2999 (Ch) [202]; [2008] EWHC 210 (Ch). See further 2.6.2 and 
2.6.3 above. 
185 Section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 used of the term ‘oppressive’. See also Paul L Davies 
and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 664 
and specifically n 13. See 2.3.3 above for a brief overview of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948.  
186 Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [57]. See also Saul D Harrison & 
Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17; [1994] BCC 475. 
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Predecessors of section 994 of the Act referred to the term ‘oppressive’.187 
The use of this term created interpretational difficulties. It created uncertainty on 
whether oppressive conduct implied wrongful (or illegal) conduct or whether the 
remedy required an invasion of a petitioner’s legal rights.188 Courts interpreted the 
term oppressive as conduct that is ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’.189 For 
purposes of the unfair prejudicial remedy the principles in Elder v Elder and 
Watson190 is to be preferred even though the judgment dealt with the interpretation 
of the term ‘oppressive’.191 Oppressive or alternatively unfairly prejudicial conduct 
is a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing that violates the condition of 
fair play on which every shareholder is entitled to rely when he or she invests in a 
company.192 A court would evaluate the conduct or result complained of against the 
standard of fairness (or unfairness)193 which may have the result that conduct can 
be unfair despite being lawful.194 
                                                 
187 See Companies Act 1985, s 459. 
188 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [11]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
189 See also Meyer v Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1954 SC 40 (HL) 47 and Scottish 
Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 342. See further Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 
(Ch) [11]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367.  
190 [1952] SC 49. 
191 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 204. 
192 Elder v Elder and Watson [1952] SC 49. 
193 See Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21]; [2013] BCC 98. See also OʼNeill v Phillips 
[1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092. In OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098-
100 where the court held that the concept of unfairness in section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 
runs parallel to what can be regarded as ‘just and equitable’ grounds for the winding-up of a 
company. The court emphasised that conduct that does not justify an order for liquidation based 
upon just and equitable grounds, does not by default mean that the specific conduct is fair. See 2.9 
below. 
194 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL); O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. See also McGuinness v Bremmer Plc (1988) 4 
BCC 161. This is in line with the predecessor of section 994 of the Act, namely, section 459 of the 
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2.6.3.3 The context in which unfairness must be established  
 
The assessment of unfairness must be done in a commercial law context.195 This 
entails that although recognising a company as a juristic person, the individuals 
behind the company structure together with the background against which a 
company is formed should not be ignored.196  
The context in which the prejudice is suffered plays an important role in the 
finding of a court on whether such prejudice is fair or unfair.197 Where a strict 
enforcement of rights and agreements may be fair in a context where a pure 
commercial relationship exists between parties, such an approach in other 
circumstances may be unfair.198 Examples of such other circumstances include 
where the association between the members is based on a personal relationship or 
                                                 
Companies Act 1985, where the legislature also elected to describe the nature of the conduct that 
can be found as unfairly prejudicial. In Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [61]; [2006] BCC 85 
the court confirmed that the conduct complained of only needs to be unfair and not necessarily 
unlawful. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 664-665. 
195 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [61]; [2006] BCC 85. See also Saul D Harrison & Sons 
plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17; [1994] BCC 475.  
196 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [6]; Waldron v Waldron [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) [23]-[24]. See 
also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). See further 2.3.2 
above. 
197 See Waldron v Waldron [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) [24] and [46]. 
198 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098 where the court in dealing with 
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 made the following observation regarding the context in 
which fairness should be determined:-  
‘Although fairness is a notion which can be applied to all kinds of activities, its content will 
depend upon the context in which it is being used. Conduct which is perfectly fair between 
competing businessmen may not be fair between members of a family. In some sports it 
may require, at best, observance of the rules, in others (“it’s not cricket”) it may be unfair in 
some circumstances to take advantage of them. All said to be fair in love and war. So the 
context and background are very important.’ 
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where the strict enforcement and exercise of rights may be in breach of 
undertakings, agreements or promises exchanged between the relevant parties.199 
These considerations are important in light of the fact that the constitution of a 
company may be imperfect in that it may not necessarily encapsulate the full 
agreement between the parties behind the company.200  
Usually, companies are formed to achieve some commercial objective.201 
The relationship between the company, incorporators and shareholders are 
contained in the articles of association and in some cases even other forms of 
agreements.202 Although companies derive from the law of partnership and may 
consist of a small number of members, the relationship between the members of a 
                                                 
199 The classic example is where the members of a company agree that all or some of them are 
entitled to participate in the management of the affairs of the company, and then one or more of the 
members are excluded from such agreed participation by an exercise of a lawful majority vote. The 
exclusion from management can be problematic as the law may entitle the removal of a director from 
the board of the company, but such exclusion can be in breach of an understanding between 
members and the relevant member or members will be unable to withdraw their capital investment 
in the company. See 2.6.5 below. 
200 See 2.6.5 below for a discussion of the legal basis for the enforcement of legitimate (reasonable) 
expectations 
201 See OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098 where the court further remarked 
that the basis of association between members is contained in the articles of association, but 
additional agreements may be made between members. See 2.6.5 below. 
202 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [22]; [2013] BCC 98. See also LCM Wealth 
Management Limited, Re [2013] EWHC 3957 (Ch). See further OʼNeill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, 
[1999] WLR 1092. In Moxon v Litchfield [2013] EWHC 3957 (Ch) [7]-[8] the court strictly enforced 
contractual arrangements against the petitioner and did not find any considerations in terms of 
section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 to overwrite the agreement between the parties. In LCM 
Wealth Management Limited, Re [2013] EWHC 3957 (Ch) [45] the court held that its jurisdiction in 
terms of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 does not include the power to ignore or rewrite the 
contractual agreements between parties. However, a court may restrain the exercise of legal rights 
based on equitable considerations. 
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company must not be equated to that of partners in a partnership.203 
The wording of section 994 of the Act is wide and open textured. However, 
this does not imply that the provisions of the section are unrestricted.204 The 
concepts in section 994 require a principle-based interpretation while taking into 
consideration the context of the relationship between the various parties to the 
company structure.205 Unfairness is often determined with reference to the rights 
and duties contained in the articles of association, statute and the established 
principles of company law.206  
In short, fairness should be determined with specific reference to the 
established company law principles as the starting point of the enquiry. These 
principles include the fact that a company is a separate juristic person;207 that the 
affairs of a company are managed by the directors of a company;208 and the 
principle of majority rule or decision-making.209 The articles in the constitution of the 
company210 and any relevant shareholder agreements are important sources of 
                                                 
203 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 380; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). See also 
2.6.3.4 below. 
204 In O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098 the court held that the concept of 
fairness should be judicially applied based upon rational principles and that the content of the 
concept should not be dependent on the subjective views of individual judges. See 2.5 above. 
205 F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch) [77]; Maidment 
v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21]; [2013] BCC 98; [2012] 3 WLR 10; Birdi v Specsavers Optical 
Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [57]; Hart Investment Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWHC 2067 (Ch) 
[36]. 
206 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See also para 2.6.3.5 below. 
207 See 2.2 above and 2.6.3.4 below. 
208 See 2.6.3.5 below. 
209 See also 2.6.3.6 regarding the decision-making within companies. 
210 See 2.6.3.6 below. 
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understandings and arrangements between the members of a company.211 
2.6.3.4 Separate legal personality 
 
When the unfairness of conduct is evaluated it has to be taken into consideration 
that a company is a separate legal personality. Courts must not apply the principles 
of the law of partnership by default to company structures, just because the 
members of a company regard themselves as partners. Because companies are 
separate juristic personalities this has as consequence that a company is a person 
separate from its members.212 As an investor, a shareholder or member of a 
company does not have the right unilaterally to withdraw his or her investment form 
a company, which means that a member is not by default entitled to a buy-out based 
on the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.213 
2.6.3.5 The management of a company214 
 
The allocation of power between the board and the shareholders of a company is 
regulated in the articles of association and therefore the position may differ from 
company to company.215 Usually, the directors of a company are entrusted with the 
management of the company’s business.216 In terms of the articles of association, 
the power to manage a company is delegated by the members of a company to the 
                                                 
211 See 2.6.5 below. 
212 See 2.2 above. 
213 See 2.6.5.4 (b) below. 
214 See 2.2 above. 
215 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 356.  
216 This is the position based on the model sets of articles that will apply to companies unless the 
incorporators adopt a different version. See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 350. 
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board.217 The implication of this is that shareholders are bound by the decisions of 
the board as far as these decisions fall within their power to manage the business 
of a company.218 
2.6.3.6 Decision-making within companies219 
 
The allocation of power between the board of directors and shareholders is a private 
matter.220 The power of the board to manage the business of a company is not an 
original power, but one that is delegated to the board in terms of the articles of 
association by the shareholders (or members).221 Unless the company has adopted 
and customised its articles of association to a different effect, the board of directors 
is entrusted with the management of the business of a company.222 Most decisions 
in relation to the affairs of a company are taken by the board.223 The power to 
manage the business of a company is delegated to the board by the shareholders 
through the articles of association.224 There are, however, instances where the Act 
and/or the articles of association requires shareholders to participate in the 
                                                 
217 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 350. 
218 See 2.6.3.6 below. 
219 See 2.2 above. 
220 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 356. 
221 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 357. 
222 The default division of powers for public and private companies is contained in article 3 of the 
model articles in the Companies Act 2006. See the discussion in Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 357. 
223 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 355. 
224 See 2.2 and 2.6.3.5 above. 
 65 
 
decision-making of the company.225 Most often the source of the unfair prejudice 
suffered by a shareholder originates from a decision of the board or the majority 
shareholders relating to the affairs of a company.226 
A company and its members are contractually bound to the provisions of the 
company’s constitution.227 The Act also places a legal duty on the members to 
comply with the provisions of the constitution.228 The regulation of the relationship 
between the company, its directors and its members is of vital importance to 
determine unfairness for purposes of section 994 of the Act.229 The Act and the 
company’s constitution are the point of departure in the evaluation of the fairness or 
unfairness of conduct for purposes of section 994. Unless a petitioner is able to 
prove a breach of some agreement, understanding or expectation, he or she would 
not be able to prove unfairness.230  
Directors must comply with their fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill 
                                                 
225 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 401. 
226 In Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 536 [45] the court stated that the affairs of a 
company are matters that are effected by a company or on its behalf.  
227 Companies Act 2006, s 33(1). See 4.3 below for the position in Canada. For the position in South 
Africa see 5.4.3.3 below where it is stated that the power of the board to manage the business and 
affairs of a company is now an original power.  
228 Companies Act 2006, s 33(1). 
229 See 2.6.3 above read with 2.6.5 below. 
230 Unfairness may be established based on a breach of a right in terms of the articles of association 
or a shareholders’ agreement. See McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 
781 [17]; [2014] BCC 14; Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [106]. See also O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092 where the court held that cases will not be adjudicated 
solely on the basis of unfairness, but what is required is a breach of the rules of understanding upon 
which a company is formed or a deviation from equitable principles. See 2.6.5 below. 
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when exercising their powers in terms of the Act or articles of association.231 The 
directors are under a duty to exercise these powers for the benefit of the 
company.232 A mere breach of a duty of directors does not automatically qualify as 
unfair prejudicial conduct.233 Such irregularities may be disregarded or ignored 
when compliance with the duty would have made no difference to the outcome 
flowing from the conduct complained of or the prejudice suffered.234 The primary 
duty of a director or directors is to act in the best interests of the company.235 When 
determining whether directors complied with their duty to promote the success of a 
company, the fairness of their conduct towards members will be taken into 
                                                 
231 Companies Act 2006, s 174. See also Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18 and 
31; [1994] BCC 475. 
232 Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [57]. See also Saul D Harrison & 
Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18 and 31. 
233 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [22]-[23]; and [2013] BCC 98. See also Kohli v Lit 
[2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [7]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. In Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [22]-
[23]; [2013] BCC 98 the court held that one of the most important matters that a court will consider 
is the basis or terms on which the parties agreed to do business with each other. The agreement 
between the parties should be considered in light of the rights and duties contained in the Act, such 
as the rights and duties of directors. The court remarked that a breach of duties by the directors will 
be indicative of the occurrence of unfair prejudice. The court further stressed that the fiduciary duties 
of directors are enforced strictly. In Maidment the petitioner was a 25% shareholder in a company 
while the remaining 75% of the shares were held by one other shareholder, Mr Attwood, who was 
also the sole director of the company. The petitioner approached the court for relief, amongst others, 
on the basis that Mr Attwood has paid himself an alleged excessive remuneration or disproportionate 
remuneration to the financial performance of the company. In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 
2375 (Ch) [107] the court took the view that the unfairness of the conduct will depend on whether 
the conduct complained of is in breach of an agreement between the members of or regarding the 
company.  
234 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [7]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
235 Companies Act 2006, s 172(1). It is important that a director must in complying with this duty have 
regard to, amongst others, ‘the need to act fairly as between members of the company’. See in this 
regard specifically section 172(1)(f). 
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consideration as a factor.236  
2.6.3.7 The nature and evaluation of unfair prejudicial conduct 
 
The unfairness of the conduct complained of is determined with reference to the 
effect of the conduct.237 This means that the conduct complained of must prejudice 
the member (or petitioner).238 When the conduct has no effect or does not cause 
prejudice, a member will not be able successfully to rely on section 994 of the Act.239  
Relief will be not be granted in terms of section 994 of the Act when the 
conduct can be regarded as ‘trivial’ or the effect of the conduct did not impact on 
the interests of the petitioner.240 This is the position even when the conduct 
complained of is in breach of a legal requirement.241 The prejudice may be 
determined with reference to a depressive effect on the value of a member’s 
                                                 
236 Companies Act 2006, s 170(1). See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 465 read with 610. This provision should 
be read with section 172(1)(f) of the Act. This provision provides that a director is under a duty to act 
in a manner that ‘he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to’ ‘(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company’. 
237 See, for example, Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 where the court 
established prejudice with reference to the depressive effect the complained conduct had on the 
value of the shareholding of shareholders. The court ([10]) made it clear that a court could find that 
the affairs of the company had been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner towards a member 
even though the conduct had no impact on the value of the shares of the petitioner. See also RA 
Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd, Re [1983] BCLC 273. See further 2.6.2.1 above. 
238 See 2.6.2.1 above. 
239 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. In Sprint Electric Ltd v Buyerʼs Dream 
Ltd & Anor [2018] EWHC 1924 (Ch) [324] and Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & 
Ors [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch) [42] where the court emphasised that there must be a causal link 
between the conduct and the effect complained of.  
240 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [7]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
241 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [7]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
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shares.242 The content of the concept of fairness should be based on rational 
principles.243 Fairness should be determined in light of the provisions of the Act, the 
constitution of the company and the departures therefrom.244 The deviations or 
departure must be ‘sufficiently serious’ to justify relief.245 Such departure may justify 
relief even when a member does not suffer financial prejudice or when the non-
compliance of a formality undermines confidence in the board.246 
To determine whether the conduct complained of is unfair for purposes of 
section 994 of the Act, an objective test is applied.247 An objective test does not take 
into consideration the motive or intent of the party against whom the relief is 
sought.248 The unfairness of the conduct is established with reference to the 
                                                 
242 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
243 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [632]. See also O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] WLR 1092, 1098.  
244 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [8]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
245 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [8]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
246 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [8]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See 2.6.2.1 above. 
247 J&S Insurance & Financial Consultants Ltd, Re, [2014] EWHC 2206 (Ch) [17]; Fisher v Cadman 
[2005] EWHC 377 (Ch) [90]; [2006] 1 BCLC 499; Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] 
EWHC 2810 (Ch) [49]; Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [4], [11]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Waldron v 
Waldron [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) [45]. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 673. See further Re RA Noble & Sons 
(Clothing) Ltd Re [1983] BCLC 273.  
248 In Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [414]-[418] the court held that because the test to determine 
whether conduct is unfairly prejudicial is objective, the conduct of both the petitioner and respondent is 
relevant whether or not it was known at the time. In accordance with this approach the conduct of the parties 
prior to the presentation of the petition, between the presentation of the petition and the hearing of the 
petition – which may include the conduct of the parties during trial – may be taken in consideration to 
determine whether the conduct is unfair. See also Corran v Butters [2017] EWHC 2294 (Ch) [110]. See 
further O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24; [1999] WLR 1092, 1104 where the court held that the unfair 
prejudice remedy is not available where the petitioner based his or her application on the basis that the 
petitioner experienced a breakdown of trust and confidence due to his or her own subjective beliefs. In DR 
Chemical Ltd, Re (1989) 5 BCC 39, 46 the court found that although the application of the objective 
bystander test may find conduct or power that is exercised with a proper purpose and with a proper motive 
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company’s constitution and the normal principles of corporate law as a starting 
point.249 A violation of any of the provisions contained in the last mentioned 
documents or legal principles are indicative of unfairness.250 The use of the term 
‘unfairly’ enables a court to take into consideration wider equitable considerations 
in contrast with the enforcement of strict rights of the parties involved in an unfair 
prejudice dispute.251 In O’Neill v Phillips252 the court clearly stated that the concept 
of fairness should not be subjected to ‘technical considerations of legal right’253 as 
courts are required to exercise a wide power to achieve what is ‘just and 
equitable’.254 The concept of fairness for purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy is 
                                                 
to be unfairly prejudicial, it does not mean that when conduct is committed with an improper purpose or 
motive that such improper purpose or motive must be ignored because the test for unfair prejudicial conduct 
is objective. See further Re RA Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd Re [1983] BCLC 273. See 2.6.4 below for a 
discussion of the relevance of the petitioner’s conduct for purposes of relief in terms of section 994. 
249 Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [13]; Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [6]; Maidment v 
Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [21] and [42]; [2013] BCC 98. See also Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1222 [61]; [2006] BCC 85 [61]. In Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [13]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 
the court emphasised that a breach of directors’ duties is not an absolute requirement for a finding 
that conduct is unfairly prejudicial. Conduct of a director or directors can be found to be unfairly 
prejudicial even though no breach of these duties has taken place. In Homan v Adams Securities 
Ltd [2010] EWHC 2421 [19] the court held that a breach of the fiduciary duties of directors or an 
abuse of powers will likely be regarded as unfairly prejudicial conduct. See also Saul D Harrison & 
Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17; [1994] BCC 475. See further 2.6.3.3 above. 
250 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [24]; [2013] BCC 98. 
251 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL); Re a 
Company (No 00477 of 1996) [1986] BCLC 376, 378. In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] 
AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) the court confirmed that the exercise of legal rights may be 
subjected to equitable considerations such as the nature of the relationship between the parties. See 
also 2.6.5.4 below. 
252 [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
253 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
254 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [632]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583. 
See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
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not unrestricted and should be applied judicially.255  
2.6.4 The conduct of the petitioner 
2.6.4.1 The ‘clean hands’ doctrine 
The ‘clean hands’ doctrine entails that a petitioner can be denied relief based on or 
because of his or her own misconduct.256 The doctrine does not require that the 
misconduct of the parties be balanced against each other.257 
2.6.4.2 The application of the ‘clean hands’ doctrine to the unfair prejudice 
remedy 
 
A petitioner may rely on section 994 of the Act even though he or she is unable to 
approach the court with clean hands in relation to the dispute which is the subject 
of the petition.258 This also means that the conduct of a petitioner will also not bar a 
petitioner from having standing.  
2.6.4.3 The possible effect of the petitioner’s conduct on the discretion of 
a court 
 
The conduct of a petitioner may cause a court to find that the conduct of the 
respondent is prejudicial but not unfair.259 Alternatively, when a court finds that the 
                                                 
255 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [632]; [2013] 2 BCLC 583; 
Yusuf v Yusuf [2019] EWHC 90 (Ch) [138]. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] 1 WLR 
1092, 1098.  
256 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [41]; [2013] BCC 98. 
257 Robert Hollington QC Shareholder Rights (8th ed, 2016) 7-202. 
258 Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd & Anor v Singh & Ors [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch) [616]; Shepherd v 
Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [108]-[109]. 
259 Interactive Technology Corporation Limited v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2898 (Ch) [318]; Richardson 
v Blackmore [2006] BCC 276; Shephard v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [109]. In Richardson 
v Blackmore [2006] BCC 276 [53] the court held that depending on the seriousness of the conduct 
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conduct of a party is unfairly prejudicial, the conduct of the petitioner may still be an 
important consideration in formulating the nature of relief in terms of the unfair 
prejudice remedy.260 The conduct of the petitioner may also be taken into account 
to make an appropriate order as to costs.261 
2.6.4.4 The conduct of the petitioner 
 
The fact that the ‘clean hands’ doctrine does not find application in unfair prejudice 
proceedings does not mean that the conduct of the petitioner relating to the dispute 
is irrelevant. However, the conduct (misconduct) of the petitioner will only be 
considered as far as the conduct is relevant to the alleged unfair prejudicial conduct 
complained of.262 Because the clean hands doctrine does not apply in determining 
whether conduct is unfairly prejudicial or not and/or the appropriateness of the relief, 
the conduct of both the majority and minority shareholders has to be taken into 
                                                 
of the petitioner and the relevance of the conduct to the dispute before the court, the conduct of the 
petitioner may have the effect that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See also London School of 
Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211, 222; [1985] 3 WLR 474; Jones v Jones [2002] EWCA Civ 961 
[44]; [2003] BCC 226. See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 673. 
260 Interactive Technology Corporation Limited v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2898 (Ch) [318]. See also 
Jones v Jones [2002] EWCA Civ 961 [44]; [2003] BCC 226; Richardson v Blackmore [2006] BCC 
276 [53]; Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [414]-[415]; Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 
2375 (Ch) [109]. In Vujnovich v Vujnovich [1990] BCLC 227, 231 the court found that both majority 
and minority shareholders acted oppressively on the facts of the case. Based on this the court 
ordered the winding-up of the company as appropriate relief for the company. See further Braid 
Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2015] ScotCS CSOH 146 [89]-[90] where the misconduct of the petitioner 
had an influence on the value of the shares of all shareholders. The conduct of a petitioner may have 
an influence on how the shareholding of the petitioner may be valued. See in this regard Paul L 
Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 
2016) 673. See further London School of Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211, 222; [1985] 3 WLR 474.  
261 Richardson v Blackmore [2006] BCC 276 [62]. 
262 Robert Hollington QC Shareholder Rights (8th ed, 2016) 7-202. 
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consideration.263  
The conduct of a petitioner that a court may take into consideration to 
formulate appropriate relief includes the conduct of the petitioner prior to the 
presentation of the petition, during the time between the presentation of the petition 
and the date of the hearing of the petition and the conduct of the petitioner during 
the trial.264 Such considerations are important for making an order that is appropriate 
at the time of the hearing of the petition.265 
2.6.5 Legitimate expectations and the doctrine of equitable considera-
tions 
2.6.5.1 Introduction 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice remedy may create the impression that it overwrites 
established principles of company law such as the principle of majority decision-
making. This is often the case when agreements or understandings that are not 
embedded in the constitution of a company or a shareholders’ agreement are 
enforced. These agreements or understandings are described by courts as 
legitimate expectations.266 Often it is minority members that rely on the unfair 
                                                 
263 Robert Hollington QC Shareholder Rights (8th ed, 2016) 7-200. 
264 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [73]; [2006] 2 BCLC 70. See also Richardson v Blackmore 
[2006] BCC 276 [57]; Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [417]. See 2.10 below for a discussion 
of the relief a court may grant in terms of section 994 of the Act. 
265 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [73]; [2006] BCC 85; Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 
(Ch) [417]. 
266 It should be noted that the courts moved away from the use of the term ‘legitimate expectations’ 
because of the connotation of the term in the context of the public law. The term ‘legitimate 
expectations’ was used in the case of Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 19. The 
use of this terms was later replaced by the concept of ‘equitable considerations’ in O’Neill v Phillips 
[1999] WLR 1092, 1102. 
 73 
 
prejudice remedy to enforce such an agreement or understanding. Courts will give 
effect to or enforce such reasonable expectations, provided that the member or 
petitioner relying on such an expectation is able to prove the existence thereof.267 
The enforcement of such understanding or agreement is of particular interest when 
it is taken into acccount that the majority of members have the right to amend a 
company’s constitution.268 
The enforcement of agreements or understandings that exist in addition to 
the constitution and/or shareholders’ agreements becomes especially important in 
circumstances where there has been a substantial change in the relationship 
between the company and its members or the members inter se and/or when there 
was a change since the incorporation of the relevant company in the circumstances 
upon which the association between members were formed. This is also the case 
when the majority of members or the board adopts resolutions to deal with aspects 
relating to the affairs of a company that are not dealt with in the Act and/or 
constitution or shareholders’ agreements of a company. This creates the 
opportunity for the controllers of a company to abuse their powers.269 
                                                 
267 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 667. 
268 This is especially the problem when the company contract or the shareholders’ agreement is 
silent on a matter. See Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 786. The 
author (786-87) further points out that the principle of majority rule is inadequate in resolving issues 
such as the allocation of powers and the conditions relating to the exercise of majority decisions. 
See also 2.10.4 below regarding the amendment of the articles of association of a company. 
269 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 66; H-Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way 
to Reconceptualise Minority Shareholder Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 312. See 
also 2.6.3.3 above for a discussion of the company contract as ‘imperfect’ or incomplete. 
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There are mainly two theories that attempt to explain nature of a court’s 
discretion in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice and the reason why courts are 
giving effect to legitimate expectations instead of established company principles. 
On the one hand this can be explained in terms of the contractual approach while 
others argue that courts owe their jurisdiction to equitable considerations.  
An overview is now provided of the contractual approach and the restraint of 
rights based on equity considerations in the context of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. Although these theories are inconclusive in explaining the exact nature of 
and the manner in which a court should exercise its discretion, both theories 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the theoretical issues underpinning the 
unfair prejudice remedy and the enforcement of understandings (or agreements) 
that are not necessarily contained in a company’s constitution and/or shareholders’ 
agreements. An understanding of these theories further gives insight on how courts 
may construct the concept of fairness for purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy, 
especially in light of the fact that English company law has been substantially 
influenced by the law of partnership.270 
2.6.5.2 The intervention in private bargains based on fairness  
 
Some authors argue that the statutory unfair prejudice remedy creates a discretion 
for a court to intervene in private bargains.271 This discretion or power of a court is 
based on judicial fairness.272 When intervening in the private bargains of parties the 
                                                 
270 See also 2.3.1.3 (a) and 2.5 above. 
271 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 66. 
272 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 66. 
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challenge faced by a court is to achieve fairness in giving effect to the freedom of 
contract.273 Traditionally courts were reluctant to intervene in the private bargains 
or arrangements between parties based on the principle that an agreement 
voluntary concluded must be honoured.274  
2.6.5.3 The contractual approach (or theory) and hypothetical bargains 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
In accordance with the contractual approach companies should be viewed as a 
network of contractual agreements.275 These bargains and relationships are 
contained within the company structure.276 Each shareholder or role player strives 
to promote his or her own objectives that may include wealth maximisation.277 The 
company structure can be described as the ‘equilibrium’ of the competing interests 
of the role players in a company.278 The company structure can also be described 
as a framework in which parties may reach understandings or arrangements 
                                                 
273 H-Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way to Reconceptualise Minority 
Shareholder Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 312 and 316 where the author notes 
that a careful balance needs to struck between the freedom to contract and the intervention of courts 
in private bargains, arrangements or agreements to address issues of fairness. 
274 See also 2.3.1.3 (a) on the reluctance of a court to intervene in the contractual relations of 
partners. 
275 The contractual approach to company law is the opposite of the traditional legal theory regarding 
the company structure. See Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of 
the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55:6 Modern Law Review 782, 782. 
276 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 67 states that the company structure reduces transactional costs. 
277 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 67. See also Benjamin Means ‘A Contractual Approach to 
Shareholder Oppression Lawʼ (2011) 79 Fordham Law Review 1161, 1165. 
278 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 67 
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pertaining to the affairs of the company.279  
(b) Hypothetical bargains and the incomplete company contract  
 
Because the constitution and/or shareholders’ agreement often do not contain all 
the arrangements or understandings between the parties or do not provide for all 
possible circumstances that may influence the relationship between the members 
and/or the company, the company contract can be regarded as incomplete.280 To 
                                                 
279 See Rita Cheung ‘Shareholdersʼ Agreements – Shareholdersʼ Contractual Freedom in Company 
Lawʼ (2012) 6 Journal of Business Law 504, 529-30 who states that the challenge for the English 
law company is to establish an appropriate balance between the freedom of contract and established 
company law principles. See also Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-
461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 67 who argues that the company 
structure reduces transactional costs. 
280 According to Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies 
Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 796 practical issues such 
as time, costs and other uncertainties are identified as factors preventing shareholders from 
formulating comprehensive agreements that would not need judicial intervention in resolving 
disputes caused by uncertainties. See further Benjamin Means ‘A contractual Approach to 
Shareholder Oppression Lawʼ (2011) 79 Fordham Law Review 1161, 1163-64. See also Robert 
Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) 
Company Lawyer 66, 67 where it is explained that the reasons why parties are not able fully to define 
their relationships and to reach agreements or understandings are an important aspect within the 
context of the relational contract. Reasons for such failure include the long duration of the contract 
and transactional costs. The other factor that may contribute to disputes within the company context, 
is that a party or parties to the company contract may not direct their behaviour on the same 
information. This may be due to the fact that one or more of the parties deliberately refuses to share 
information. See the reference to Drury in Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: 
Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 
782, 785 where it is argued that agreements amongst shareholders are usually of a long duration 
and therefore need to be treated differently from other forms of contracts. Parties to a company 
contract need protection against opportunism when situations arise that are not governed by the 
company contract. See Benjamin Means ‘A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Lawʼ 
(2011) 79 Fordham Law Review 1161, 1164. See further See Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out 
of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 
 77 
 
bridge this problem some authors argue that the unfair prejudice remedy is a 
mechanism to enforce hypothetical bargains on parties.281 Hypothetical bargains 
refer to those understandings ‘which shareholders would have agreed upon, had 
they fully recorded their understanding’.282 Such a hypothetical bargain would be 
influenced by expectations held by a member or members of a company. The 
expectation of members can be divided in two main categories, namely, universal 
expectations283 and particularised hypothetical bargains.284 
(c) Universal expectations and generalised hypothetical bargains 
 
Generalised hypothetical bargains contain ‘the expectations and intentions of a 
collectivity of corporate actors. The generalised bargain is thus formulated without 
reference to individuals, identified parties or the totality of contractual relations’.285 
General hypothetical bargains may consist of the intentions and expectations of the 
collectivity of corporate actors while other rules are of a mandatory nature.286 
                                                 
Modern Law Review 782, 786 who highlights that in most cases shareholders will be unable to 
foresee and anticipate future contingencies. 
281 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 213. See also Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of 
the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 68-69 and 72. 
282 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 211. See also Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of 
the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 68-69 and 72. Contra the approach in JE 
Cade and Son Ltd, Re [1992] BCLC 213 where the court rejected the notion that a court has the 
power to ‘superimpose on the rights, expectations and obligations springing from those agreements 
or understandings further rights and obligations arising from its own concept of fairness’. 
283 See 2.6.5.3 (c) below. 
284 See 2.6.5.3 (d) below. 
285 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 73. 
286 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 73. 
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Mandatory rules apply to all companies and reduces transactional costs.287  
(d) Particularised hypothetical bargains  
 
Particularised hypothetical bargains focus on the individual expectations of a 
shareholder.288 Such expectations will only be enforced or protected when the 
shareholder is able to provide that the individual expectation is ‘founded on a 
fundamental understanding, or shared expectation, which is not subject to 
contractual provision’.289 It is not a requirement for the petitioner to prove a legally 
enforceable contractual agreement.290 The petitioner only has to prove that such an 
understanding existed between the parties.291 Courts have emphasised that the 
recognition of such understandings or reasonable expectations plays an important 
                                                 
287 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 73. 
288 Compare with the expectations held by parties to a quasi-partnership that will be discussed in 
2.6.5.4 below. 
289 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 76. 
290 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [61]; [2006] BCC 85. See also 2.6.5.2 above. 
291 In Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 666-70 the identification of understandings and/or expectations that justify judicial 
intervention is one of the main issues to be determined under the remedy as not every expectation 
is protected. According to P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ 
(2006) 27:7 Company Lawyer 204, 211 agreements, contracts and understandings are given a very 
broad meaning and such agreements, contracts or understandings can be proven with reference to 
the words or conduct of the members of the company even though such an agreement, contract or 
understanding is not formally incorporated into the constitution of the company. In this context, 
according to the author, the reference to ‘contractual approach’ may be considered inappropriate 
and he suggests that reference to the ‘quasi-contractual approach’ is more accurate. The author 
(212-13) further points out that, should the parties have failed to cover certain issues and 
circumstances in their agreement or understanding, it does not mean that they have deliberately 
failed to do so, as it can be explained by the fact that the parties might not have applied their minds 
to or consciously addressed the particular issue or issues. In light of this last mentioned argument, 
the jurisdiction of the court to impose an agreement on the parties cannot be excluded. 
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function in the commercial context, as policy dictates that the honouring of such 
understandings or agreements forms the cornerstone of commercial conduct.292 
However, the exercise of rights in terms of the constitution of a company or a 
shareholders’ agreement may be subject to equitable considerations.293 This will be 
the case when the exercise of such a right is in breach of a broader understanding 
that existed between the parties to the company contract.294  
2.6.5.4 Quasi-partnerships 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The use of the unfair prejudice remedy is especially relevant in the context of quasi-
partnerships. Quasi-partnerships are characterised by the very specific contractual 
relationships that exists between members.295 Quasi-partnerships can also be 
characterised by the personal relationships between members. These relationships 
are often based on mutual confidence and trust.  
In the context of public and listed companies, the unfair prejudice remedy is 
                                                 
292 Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17; [1994] BCC 475. See also P Paterson ‘A 
Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company Lawyer 204, 214-
15. 
293 In Astec (BSR) plc, Re [1998] 2 BCLC 556, 558 the court held that a party who wishes to restrain 
the exercise of a right must prove ‘a personal relationship or personal dealings of some kind’ between 
the party seeking relief in the form of restraining the exercise of the right and the party who is entitled 
legally to exercise the right in question. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 
1092, 1101 where the court referred with approval to Astec (BSR) plc, Re [1998] 2 BCLC 556. 
294 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 211. 
295 In Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 666 the authors make the important remark that ‘a company is a quasi-partnership 
because of the particular understandings among its members, not that the understandings exist 
because the company is a quasi-partnership’. See also 2.6.5.3. (d) above. 
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often used to enforce and protect universal expectations.296 In these types of 
companies, a shareholder will find it more difficult to prove the existence of a 
personal expectation between himself, the company and/or the other 
shareholders.297 Although not impossible, it is unlikely that a quasi-partnership 
relationship exists between members of a public and listed company. 
Quasi-partnerships are usually companies characterised by a small number 
of shareholders and where particular or specific agreements exist between the 
shareholders.298 When a court finds that a company is a quasi-partnership it would 
be more inclined to uphold arrangements between parties even though such 
arrangements may be informal or even not legally enforceable.299 The personal 
relationship amongst members requires conduct of mutual confidence and trust 
from each other.300 However, when unfairness is to be determined in the context of 
                                                 
296 See 2.6.5.3 (c) below for a discussion of universal expectations. 
297 See Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 796 who notes that ‘there will 
come a point where the extent of the parties’ express contracting induces the court to find that the 
company is not quasi-partnership, but a commercial body based upon contracting at arms-length. 
Such a finding clearly reduces the court’s readiness to imply members’ interests, for greater the size 
of the membership and the more arms-length the relationship between the members, the less easily 
can it be assumed that shareholders would have reached agreement on any issue hypothetically’. 
298 See also 2.6.5.3 (d) above for a discussion of the protection of specific understandings, bargains 
or expectations. 
299 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [8]. In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [89] 
the court held that in some instances such as the case with quasi-partnerships, the association 
between the parties is not exhaustively described in the articles of association and/or shareholders’ 
agreement. In this case the company was managed by two director-shareholders. One of the 
directors, Mr Shepherd, was excluded from the management of the company on certain baseless 
grounds. The court held [131] that ‘Mr Shepherd’s expulsion prevented him from participating in the 
Company’s management and from contributing to the prosperity of its business which could lead to 
profits in which he was entitled, as a member, to share’.  
300 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [91]. 
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a quasi-partnership, the courts have indicated that one should not lose sight of the 
fact that it is a company.301  
(b)  The law of partnership and quasi-partnerships 
 
Often it happens that a partnership relationship existed between members prior to 
the formation of a company. This pre-existing partnership relationship is often 
subsequently transferred to and maintained after the formation of a company.302 
This is an important aspect to take into consideration when determining whether 
conduct is unfair. Partnership agreements are contracts of good faith in which equity 
plays an important role.303 The rights in terms of such agreements should be 
exercised in good faith.304 Equity may in certain circumstances be relied on to 
restrain a party from exercising his or her strict legal rights.305 Additional 
                                                 
301 See O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1104 where the court referred to the 
caution expressed in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 380; [1972] 2 All ER 492 
(HL) where the court remarked that the concept or analogy of a quasi-partnership should not be 
pressed too far. 
302 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379-80; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). In this 
case a relationship in the form of a partnership existed between Mr Ebrahimi and Mr Nazar. In terms 
of the partnership relationship, Mr Ebrahimi shared equally in the management of the partnership. 
The court accepted that subsequent to the formation of the company the relationship that existed 
prior to the formation of the company continued. Mr Nazar removed Mr Ebrahimi lawfully from his 
position as director of the company. The court found (381) that the exclusion of Mr Ebrahimi from 
the management of the company justified an order for the winding-up of a company, as the removal 
of Mr Ebrahimi deprived him from sharing in the profits in the company that were usually paid to the 
members in the form directors’ remuneration. 
303 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098. 
304 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. 
305 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 781 [17]; [2014] BCC 14. See 
also Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [57]. See further Saul D Harrison 
& Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 19 and 32; [1994] BCC 475 and more specifically O’Neill v Phillips 
[1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099 where the court held that the unfairness in the exercise of 
strict legal rights may be based on a breach of rules, or the use of powers, rights or rules in a manner 
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considerations of equity apply in the context of quasi-partnerships.306 
To determine the content and meaning of the concept of fairness in the 
company law context, the fact that the English company law derived and developed 
from the legal principles pertaining to partnerships plays an important role in 
understanding the regulation of relationships in the company law context.307 In 
terms of English law, companies that can be categorised as quasi-partnerships, can 
                                                 
that is regarded as ‘contrary to good faith’. In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 
379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) the court held that such equitable considerations may arise at the time 
of the formation of the relationship between the parties as shareholders of the company or that it 
may arise at a later stage. See further Brownlow v Marshall Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 655 [45] decided in 
terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.  
306 See Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [7] and [8] where the court held that ‘[i]f it is found that 
the company falls into this quasi partnership category, the court is more likely to conclude that it is 
unfair to fail to give effect to, or bring to an end, arrangements which have been made on an informal 
basis, even though they do not give rise to legal entitlements, or to exclude a participator from the 
management or conduct of the company’s business, if it was part of the arrangement that he should 
take part in it’. In Wootliff v Rushton-Turner [2016] EWHC 2802 (Ch) [16] the court held that in a 
quasi-partnership the principles of equity require the majority to act in good faith. In the context of a 
company where the relationship between the parties to the company is of a pure commercial nature, 
a petitioner will not able to prove unfairness for purposes of section 994 unless the petitioner can 
demonstrate that there has been a breach of an agreement relating to the manner in which the affairs 
of a company would be conducted. In Brownlow v Marshall Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 655 [45] the court 
remarked that ‘it seems to me that was indeed a company in which considerations of a personal 
character arising out of the relationships between these family shareholders, gave rise to the type of 
conditions in which equitable considerations, envisaged by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries and by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill, might disentitle the majority to remove a 
minority shareholder director from office without making a reasonable offer’. See further O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. 
307 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [9]. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 
1092, 1098 where the court remarked that ‘company law has developed seamlessly from the law of 
partnership, which was treated by equity like the Roman societas, as a contract of good faith. One 
of the traditional roles of equity, as a separate jurisdiction, was to restrain the exercise of strict legal 
rights in certain relationships in which it is considered that this would be contrary to good faith. These 
principles have, with appropriate modification, been carried over into company law’. 
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be wound-up if the facts on which relief is sought in the form of a winding-up order 
would justify the dissolution of the company if the company was a partnership.308 
When a petitioner relies on the fact that the affairs of a company are conducted as 
a quasi-partnership, he or she should provide the relevant evidence in proving such 
a relationship.309 The concept of a quasi-partnership has been imported from case 
law dealing with the winding-up of companies based upon just and equitable 
grounds.310 It would not suffice to argue that a company should be regarded as a 
quasi-partnership just because the company is small or a private company.311 There 
are many small companies or private companies whose affairs are conducted on a 
pure or exclusive commercial basis. The articles of association are the primary 
source of regulation of the relationship of members to these companies.312  
To determine whether a quasi-partnership relationship exists between the 
members of a company regard should be had to whether the association between 
the members are founded upon personal relationships;313 whether an agreement 
                                                 
308 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 375; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). The court 
(379) remarked that ‘it is the law of partnership which has developed the conceptions of probity, good 
faith and mutual confidence, and the remedies where these are absent’. The court (380) described 
the position relating to the winding-up of a company on a just and equitable basis as follows ‘[t]he 
just and equitable provision nevertheless comes to his assistance if he can point to, and prove, some 
special underlying obligation of his fellow member(s) in good faith, or confidence, that so long as the 
business continues he shall be entitled to management participation, an obligation so basic that, if 
broken, the conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved’. 
309 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). 
310 Flex Associates Ltd, Re [2009] EWHC 3690 (Ch) [29].  
311 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). 
312 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). 
313 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [91] and [92]. In this case the court found that a quasi-
partnership existed between the members of the company. This finding was based on the fact that 
the members agreed that they will only be remunerated in the form of dividends that could only have 
been declared from the profits of the company [90]. The court further based the finding of a quasi-
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has been reached in respect of the participation in the management of the 
company;314 or whether there are any restrictions upon the transfer of a member’s 
interest.315 The shareholders may also be bound to other forms of agreements or 
                                                 
partnership on the fact that the members conducted the affairs of the company based on mutual 
agreement between themselves [91]. The court further held that it does not have to ‘expressly 
articulate’ an understanding of trust and confidence as such an agreement was an essential 
ingredient of their relationship in order to give effect to their understanding pertaining to the conduct 
of the affairs of the company [91]. The court held [89] that the participation in the management of the 
company was substantial and similar to that of an owner instead of an employee. The exclusion of 
the petitioner from the management of the affairs of the company was unfairly prejudicial to the 
petitioner, as the petitioner had a substantial interest in the management of the company to generate 
profits and further was in breach of an understanding between the members [93]. 
314 In Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [560] the court held that a shareholder in a quasi-
partnership company will be entitled to rely on unfair prejudice when his or her exclusion from the 
management of a company is in breach of an understanding between the parties. In this case the 
two directors where removed from their positions as such. The court held that their removal was not 
only lawful but also justified on the basis that the two excluded directors (who were also members of 
the company) had frustrated the proper financial management of the company, specifically in respect 
of the payment of suppliers and unauthorised withdrawals. The company was a family business. 
315 In Annacott Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119 [9], [2013] 2 BCLC 46 the court remarked 
that a quasi-partnership exists when a ‘special relationship’ is present between the parties and 
equitable considerations applicable to partnerships apply. In this case the two shareholders each 
held 50% of the shares in the company. Only one of them was a director of the company. See also 
Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 1740 [17]; [2003] 1 BCLC 76 where the court 
had to determine whether a quasi-partnership existed between the shareholders pertaining to the 
interests and the conduct of the company’s business. In this case the three shareholders of the 
company had an understanding that all the shareholders would participate in the management of the 
company’s business. A further question the court had to deal with was whether the alleged quasi-
partnership between the shareholders included an understanding on the consequences that would 
follow should one of the shareholders decide to leave the company. The petitioner argued that he 
was unfairly prejudiced as he was denied access to accounting records of the company. The court 
had to determine whether the denial of access to company records as a director of the company also 
impacted on or prejudiced the petitioner as shareholder. The fact that a quasi-partnership exists 
between the parties does not mean that one or more of the members may withdraw unilaterally from 
the company and claim that the remaining shareholders buy the withdrawing shareholder’s interest 
([28]). In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [108] the court held that section 994 does 
not entitle a member unilaterally to withdraw from a company even if the company is a quasi-
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understandings inter se. 
A quasi-partnership relationship does not have to be present at the time of 
the formation of the company. Such a relationship may develop later in the lifetime 
of the company.316 The totality of the arrangements and understandings between 
the members relating to the conduct of the company’s affairs must be considered to 
establish whether such a relationship is present.317  
In the context of quasi-partnership companies, the personal relationship 
amongst members is an important factor for purposes of determining fairness.318 In 
                                                 
partnership and the petition is based on a breakdown in trust and confidence between the members. 
See also Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [531]; Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] 
AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL). See Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [93] where the court 
held that an exclusion from the management of the company may in certain circumstances prejudice 
a member in his capacity as such. See further O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 
1102. See also 2.6.2 above. 
316 In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [88] the court had to determine precisely when the members 
commenced with conducting the affairs of a company as a quasi-partnership. The court held that the 
important question was whether the quasi-partnership had existed at the time of the conduct 
complained of. 
317 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [88]. 
318 See, however, Brett v Migration Solutions Holdings Limited [2016] EWHC 523 (Ch) [193] where 
the court found that the existence of a quasi-partnership is not a prerequisite for restraining the 
exercise of legal rights on equitable grounds. In Hart Investment Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWHC 
2067 (Ch) [38] the court found that there were not only a personal relationship between the members 
of the company, but that there were also an agreement or understanding of trust and confidence. 
See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, 379; [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) where 
the court held that a court’s discretion does not entitle a party to be relieved (exempted) from an 
obligation that he or she assumed on becoming a member of a company. However, the exercise of 
a legal right could be subject to equitable considerations. According to the court in O’Neill v Phillips 
[1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1098-99 the principle is that the association between the 
members of a company is contained in the articles of association or other agreements. On a strict 
application or enforcement of this principle a member will not be able to demonstrate that conduct is 
unfair ‘unless there has been some breach of the terms on which he agreed that the affairs of the 
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quasi-partnerships, equitable considerations may require that the conduct, 
permitted by law or by the constitution of a company, be restrained in the event of 
such conduct being inconsistent with an agreement or understanding between the 
parties to the quasi-partnership.319  
2.6.5.5 Criticism of the contractual approach  
 
The concept of the hypothetical bargain is open for criticism because parties are 
bound to agreements that they have not actually agreed to.320 It is uncertain whether 
parties would have agreed to a hypothetical bargain imposed by a court.321 This will 
also often prompt a court to impose a hypothetical bargain that protects the minority 
of members. It is unlikely that the majority shareholders would have agreed to terms 
and conditions to protect the interests of the minority.322 The contractual approach 
also fails to explain why courts are reluctant to grant relief based on the 
mismanagement of companies as it is unlikely that shareholders would have agreed 
                                                 
company should be conducted’. See further Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [7]. See also 2.6.5.4 
above and 2.10.5.5 below on how the shares of a company that is a quasi-partnership are valued. 
319 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [7]; Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [106]; 
Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [57]. The quasi-partnership may 
consist of mutual agreements and understandings that are not incorporated in the articles of 
association of the company. In other words, the reasonable expectations of the party may go beyond 
the founding documents of a company. See the obiter remark by the court in McKillen v Misland 
(Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 781 [17]; [2014] BCC 14.  
320 See 2.6.5.3 (d) above regarding the power of a court to ‘superimpose’ agreements on the basis 
of fairness. 
321 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 213. 
322 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 213. 
 87 
 
to the management of the company.323 From a theoretical point of view, the 
contractual approach does not provide an adequate explanation for the basis of a 
court’s jurisdiction under the unfair prejudice remedy.324 Further, the unfair prejudice 
remedy is not based on contract. If this was the case, it would have been possible for 
shareholders contractually to exclude the operation of the unfair prejudice remedy.325  
Besides from interpreting and explaining the enforcement of agreements and 
undertakings between parties, the contractual approach fails to explain the 
application of an external value to the relationship between parties to a contract.326 
It should be kept in mind that the parties to a company contract may reach an 
agreement or understanding that may impact on the interpretation of the notion of 
fairness.327 Because parties may influence the meaning of fairness for purposes of 
the unfair prejudice remedy, it is doubted whether the concept of fairness can be 
regarded as a foreign value that this imposed on the parties to the company 
contract.328 
                                                 
323 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 214. 
324 P Paterson, ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27(7) Company 
Lawyer 204, 212. 
325 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27(7) Company 
Lawyer 204, 212. See also Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of 
the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 797 where 
the author argues that section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 was a mandatory provision and 
therefore could not be contractually excluded. 
326 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 212. 
327 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 212. 
328 P Paterson ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27:7 Company 
Lawyer 204, 212. See Anderson v Hogg 2000 SLT 634, 630; and [2000] ScotCS 26 where the court 
remarked that the parties through their words or conduct may have agreed that the affairs of a 
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2.6.5.6 The introduction of the value of fairness by the unfair prejudice 
remedy to the law of contract  
 
The purpose of section 994 of the Act is to protect shareholders against the power 
and control of majority shareholders. Where disputes between shareholders arise 
due to a breach of an obligation contained in a contract, the dispute relates to the 
law of contract.329 The difference between the application of section 994 and the 
law of contract to the breach of agreements is that a breach of a common law 
contract does not always raise questions of fairness or equity, while the unfairness 
of conduct is a prerequisite in obtaining relief in terms of section 994 read with 
section 996.330 The effect of section 994 of the Act is thus that the value of fairness 
is an important consideration which has to be taken into account together with the 
contractual arrangements that regulate their relationship.331 
2.6.5.7 The value of the contractual approach 
 
It is important to note that although the contractual approach provides valuable 
insight into the application of minority protection in the form of the unfair prejudice 
remedy, it has its limitations.332 Fairness empowers courts to enforce agreements 
or understandings that are not necessarily formally recorded in the constitution or 
                                                 
company would be conducted in a particular manner. This will require a court to view the unfairness 
of the conduct complained of in light of the understanding or agreement between the parties rather 
than in light of the provisions of the articles of association. 
329 H-Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way to Reconceptualise Minority 
Shareholder Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 315-16. 
330 H-Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way to Reconceptualise Minority 
Shareholder Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 316. 
331 See 2.6.5.7 below. 
332 See 2.6.5.5 above. 
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shareholders’ agreements.333 The power, however, does not extend to imposing 
hypothetical bargains on members.334 An agreement or understanding will only be 
protected or enforced if it can be proven that the parties have reached an actual 
agreement. In the absence of any understanding or agreement the main source of 
the regulation of the relationship between parties or members is the Act, the 
constitution and where applicable a shareholders’ agreement. The contractual 
approach to the unfair prejudice remedy explains that a court can protect and 
enforce the legal expectations of members as fairness requires parties to comply 
with the agreements or undertakings they have voluntarily given.335 The unfair 
prejudice remedy further entitles a court to intervene in the affairs of a company 
based on fairness.336 Prior to the unfair prejudice remedy courts were reluctant to 
do so. Quasi-partnerships refer to companies where particular agreements or 
understandings exist among members of a company.337 Quasi-partnerships are not 
dependent on the number of their members.338 From an evidential point of view it 
would be easier to prove the existence of an agreement or understanding between 
a small number of members than it would be to prove such agreement or 
understanding between a large number of members.339 
 
                                                 
333 See 2.6.5.3 (d) above. 
334 See 2.6.5.3 (d) above. 
335 See 2.6.5.2 above. 
336 See 2.3.1.5 above where the reluctance of the courts to intervene in the affairs of companies was 
applied on an incorrect basis. 
337 See 2.6.5.4 above. 
338 See 2.6.5.4 above. 
339 See 2.6.5.4 (a) above. 
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2.7 Groups of companies 
2.7.1 Introduction 
 
The business and affairs of some companies are conducted in the context of a group 
structure.340 Within a group of companies the interests of members may also be 
vulnerable and susceptible to unfairly prejudicial conduct. This makes the 
consideration of the application of the unfair prejudice remedy within a group of 
companies not only relevant but also important because of the dominance certain 
companies, directors and/or shareholders may exercise within a group of 
companies, which in turn may create opportunities for abuse.341 When dealing with 
companies in a group structure, the legal personality of each individual company 
must not be ignored.342 This means that each company conducts its own affairs. 
The wording of section 994(1)(a) of the Act speaks prima facie directly to the 
conduct of the company whose affairs are conducted in an unfairly prejudicial 
manner to the interests of a member of that company.343 This presupposes that the 
petitioner must be a member of the company whose affairs are conducted unfairly 
prejudicially towards him or her. Therefore, when seeking relief in terms section 994, 
the relief must relate to the company whose affairs are conducted or have been 
                                                 
340 See 2.7.2 below for a discussion of the holding-subsidiary relationship between companies. 
341 See 2.7.2 and 2.7.3 below. 
342 See 2.2 above for a discussion of the separate legal personality of companies. See also Paul L 
Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 
2016) 193-94. 
343 On the wording of section 994(1)(a) of the Act, the conduct can affect the interests of members 
in general or only some part of the members of the company, but at least the petitioner himself should 
be affected by the alleged unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
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conducted unfairly prejudicially to the interests of the petitioner.344 However, it must 
be cautioned that this interpretation of section 994 may be a too technical and 
legalistic view of the affairs of a company within a group structure. A court must not 
follow too restrictive an approach to the interpretation of section 994 and, more 
specifically, of what constitutes the affairs of a company.345  
Case law suggests that the affairs of a company should be determined with 
specific regard to the business realities of the company.346 This requires that the 
affairs of a company should be given a wide and broad interpretation, taking into 
consideration the business realities of the company.347 One such reality may be the 
                                                 
344 See City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [27]; [2004] 4 All ER 735 where the court 
cautioned against the mechanical application of unfair prejudice cases which dealt with companies 
that did not operate within a group structure, to unfair prejudice disputes involving companies and 
parties within a group.  
345 See 2.5 above. 
346 See in this regard McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [628]; 
[2013] 2 BCLC 583. In Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291, [2009] 2 BCLC 427 [50] the court 
adopted the approach in Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd, Re (1990) 2 ACSR 553 where it was held 
that the affairs of the company should be given a wide and broad interpretation where the business 
realities of a situation are taken into consideration. The affairs of a company include the matters 
considered or to be or may be considered the board ([50]). The affairs of a company may also consist 
of matters that are not considered by or actually serve before the board of a company ([50]).  
347 See Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291, [2009] 2 BCLC 427 [50] where the court adopted 
the approach in Dernacourt Investments (Pty) Ltd, Re (1990) 2 ACSR 553. See also City Branch 
Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [22]-[23]; [2004] 4 All ER 735 where the court with reference 
to Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd [1993] BCLC 360 held that when the holding company 
exercises substantial control over the financial affairs of the subsidiary, the conduct of the affairs of 
the subsidiary can be attributed to the holding company. A legalistic or narrow view of the affairs of 
the affairs of a company is inappropriate. When determining the affairs of a company a court should 
take the business realities of the situation into consideration. Indicators of financial control include 
the authorisation of payments by the holding company and the non-payment of the holding company 
of monies due to the subsidiary. See further Meyer v Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 
1954 SC 381 (Court of Session) 391. 
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fact that the affairs of the company are conducted within a group structure.348 The 
fact that the affairs of a subsidiary have been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial 
manner does not restrict the application of section 994 of the Act to the subsidiary 
company.349  
2.7.2 The subsidiary-holding company relationship 
 
A group of companies exists when one company is a subsidiary of another. The last 
                                                 
348 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 228 point out that the principle of limited liability is not simply ignored because a 
group of companies operate as a single-economic entity.  
349 See City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [28]-[29], [2004] 4 All ER 735 where the 
court held, after considering the Australian decisions of Norvabron Pty Ltd, Re (No 2) (1986) 11 
ACLR 279 and Dernacourt Investments (Pty) Ltd, Re (1990) 2 ACSR 553, that ‘the affairs of the 
holding company towards the subsidiary may constitute the conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary 
and vice versa’. In this case the company was the holding company of three subsidiaries. Two of 
these subsidiaries were wholly-owned subsidiaries of the company, while the third subsidiary was a 
subsidiary of one of the last mentioned wholly-owned subsidiaries of the company. The shares in 
the holding company where held on a 50%/50% basis by two families namely Gross and Rackind. 
Gross instituted legal proceedings in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 and alleged 
unfair prejudice regarding the manner in which the affairs of one of the wholly-owned subsidiaries 
were conducted. The Rackind family argued ([15]) that the holding company and the specific wholly-
owned subsidiary were separate legal personalities, and therefore members of the holding company 
could not rely on the provisions of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 for relief, based on the 
manner with which the affairs of the wholly-owned subsidiary were conducted. This is because the 
members of the holding company are not members of the wholly-owned subsidiary ([19]). The court 
rejected this argument of the Rackind family by holding that the affairs of a holding company may 
include the affairs of a wholly-owned subsidiary. The court explained ([19]) ‘that the conduct 
complained of is certainly capable of prejudicing the interest of the subsidiary concerned, on which 
footing there will be a risk of diminution in value of the company’s investment in the subsidiary, which 
in turn will mean actual or potential prejudice of the interests of the shareholders in the company’ 
The court specifically stressed ([21] and [26]) the fact that Mr Gross and Mr Racking where the only 
directors of the holding company and of the two relevant wholly-owned subsidiaries and the directors 
of the third wholly-owned subsidiary save for one. The court held ([26]) that ‘the affairs of a subsidiary 
can also be the affairs of the its holding company, especially where, as here the directors of the 
holding company, which necessarily controls the affairs of the subsidiary, also represent a majority 
of the directors of the subsidiary’.  
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mentioned company is the holding company.350 A company will be a subsidiary of 
the holding company when the holding company can exercise control over the 
subsidiary.351  
To apply section 994 of the Act to a holding-subsidiary relationship of 
companies, the degree of relevance of the conduct of the holding company’s affairs 
to the subsidiary company and vice versa needs to be determined.352 Common 
directors of the boards of the holding company and the subsidiary company is 
indicative of a clear link or relevance between the conduct of the affairs of the 
companies within a group structure.353 
                                                 
350 Companies Act 2006, s 1159(1). 
351 Section 1159(1)(a)-(c) of the Companies Act 2006 states that a company is a subsidiary of 
another company (the holding company), in circumstances where the holding company holds the 
majority of the voting rights in the subsidiary, or is a member of the subsidiary company and has the 
right to appoint or remove the majority of the board members of the subsidiary, or if the holding 
company is a member of the subsidiary company ‘and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with 
other members, a majority of the voting rights in it, or if it is a subsidiary of a company that is itself a 
subsidiary of that other company’. Section 1159(2) defines a ‘wholly-owned subsidiary’ as a company 
whose total share capital is held by the holding company or its wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
352 See, for example, City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [22]-[23]; [2004] 4 All ER 735 
where the court held with reference to Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd [1993] BCLC 360 that 
when the holding company exercises substantial control over the financial affairs of the subsidiary, 
the conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary can be attributed to the holding company. 
353 See also in the context of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 City Branch Group Ltd, Re 
[2004] EWCA Civ 815, [2004] 4 All ER 735 where the court further held ([26]) that the phrase ‘affairs 
of a company’ should be given a wide and broad interpretation. The affairs of the subsidiary company 
can also be the affairs of the holding company, especially when the directors of the holding company 
comprise the majority of the members of the board of the subsidiary ([26]). The court held that the 
board members of the holding company serving on the board of the subsidiary company were well 
aware of the manner in which the affairs of the company were conducted ([28]). In Meyer v Scottish 
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1954 SC 381 (Court of Session) 391 and Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324; [1958] 2 All ER 66 (HL) the holding company (‘the 
parent company’) established a subsidiary. The holding company appointed three nominee directors 
to the board of the subsidiary. The two petitioners were also appointed to the board of the subsidiary. 
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2.7.3 Control and separate legal personality in company groups 
 
Based on the separate juristic personalities of companies it can be argued that a 
member of a subsidiary company cannot rely on the unfair prejudice remedy when 
the affairs of the holding company are being or have been conducted unfairly 
prejudicially.354 When this line of argument is accepted, a member may only seek 
relief against the company whose affairs are being conducted or have been 
conducted unfairly prejudicially to the interests of a member or members of that 
                                                 
The two petitioners were also given a minority shareholding in the subsidiary. Due to a change in 
circumstances, the holding company did not need to conduct its business through the subsidiary 
anymore. The holding company attempted to buy the shareholding of the petitioners at a far lower 
value than its true or actual value, which caused the petitioners to refuse to sell their shares. The 
holding company subsequently adopted a policy to divert business away from the subsidiary to the 
holding company. In the Court of Session it was held (391) that when a holding company creates a 
subsidiary that deals in the same line of business as the holding company and the subsidiary 
company has an independent minority of shareholders, an obligation arises to deal fairly with the 
subsidiary company. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 367; 
[1958] 2 All ER 66 (HL) the court, in dealing with section 210 of the Companies Act 1948, found that 
the nominee directors of the holding company placed their duty to the holding company above the 
duty they had to the subsidiary company. In this case the directors failed to do something positive to 
protect the interests of the subsidiary. According to the court (367) the affairs of a company can be 
conducted oppressively when such conduct takes the form of an omission or a failure to act. The 
court rejected the argument of the directors that if they had acted positively it would not have had 
any effect or made any difference. As regards the issue of the freedom of directors to serve as 
members of more than one board of directors, the court (368) made the following comment: ‘Your 
Lordships were referred to Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 (HL) at 195], where Lord 
Blanesburgh said that a director of one company was at liberty to become a director also of a rival 
company. That may have been so at that time. But it is at risk now of an application under s 210 if 
he subordinates the interests of the one company to those of the other.’ 
354 For an example of such an argument see City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [15]; 
[2004] 4 All ER 735 where the petitioner relied on section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 for relief 
against the holding company based on the manner with which the affairs of the wholly-owned 
subsidiaries were conducted. 
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particular company.355 Simply put: the petitioner must prove that he or she is a 
member of the company whose affairs are being conducted in a unfairly prejudicial 
manner. This approach is open to criticism.356  
Although each company within a group of companies has separate juristic 
personality, the influence that a holding company may exert over a subsidiary 
company regarding the manner with which the affairs of a subsidiary are conducted 
cannot be ignored.357 Circumstances may arise where the affairs of one company 
can be attributed to another.358 This will especially be the case where one company 
                                                 
355 See also Re a Company (No 001761 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 141, 144. See City Branch Group 
Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [27]; [2004] 4 All ER 735 where the court emphasised that the court 
in Re a Company (No 001761 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 141 did not deal directly with the question on 
whether the conduct of affairs of one company can be attributed to another.  
356 In McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [628]; [2013] 2 BCLC 
583 the court held that an interpretation and application of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 
should not lose sight of business realities in determining the affairs of a company. See also Meyer v 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1954 SC 381 (Court of Session) 390 where the Court 
of Session held that when interpreting and applying section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 ‘the 
business realities of a situation’ should be taken into account and that a narrow legalistic approach 
is inappropriate. 
357 In Meyer v Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 1954 SC 381 (Court of Session) 390 the 
court held, in the context of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948, that when a subsidiary is formed 
the parent company (holding company) should when conducting its own affairs act fairly towards the 
subsidiary, especially when the subsidiary has an independent group of minority of shareholders. In 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 366-67; [1958] 2 All ER 66 
(HL) the court found oppression in the conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary, as the nominee 
directors of the Society on the board of the subsidiary, placed their duty towards the Society above 
those of the subsidiary. By doing so they have failed to take steps to defend or protect the subsidiary 
against the actions of the Society. The court further held that it is no defence to the directors of the 
subsidiary to argue that they have done nothing, because any action on their part would have been 
outvoted by the majority on the board. 
358 City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [24], [26], [29] and [33]; [2004] 4 All ER 735. 
See also Birdi v Specsavers Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [53]. See further R v Board 
of Trade ex p St Martins Preserving Company Limited [1965] 1 QB 603, 613 where it was held that 
the affairs of a company can include the affairs of its subsidiary.  
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exercises a form of control over the affairs of another.359 It should be noted that the 
application of the unfair prejudice remedy within a group company structure cannot 
be equated to the lifting or piercing of the corporate veil.360 
2.7.4 Unfair prejudice and the affairs of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
 
It may be argued that the member of a holding company cannot be said to have 
suffered prejudice because the affairs of a wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding 
company have been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner.361 This argument 
                                                 
359 In McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [628]; [2013] 2 BCLC 
583 the court explained that ‘[i]f the affairs of the subsidiary are being conducted in a manner which 
damages the subsidiary and hence the value of the holding company’s interest in the subsidiary and 
hence the value of the holding company’s interest in the subsidiary, then the omission of the directors 
of the holding company to take steps to rectify the situation seems to me plainly capable of falling 
within section 994(1). Likewise, where the directors of the partly owned subsidiary nominated by the 
holding company permitted the holding company to build up a business at the expense of the 
subsidiary’s business, which was allowed to wither, without taking steps to protect the subsidiary’s 
position, they were engaged in the conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary’. See also City Branch 
Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [26]; [2004] 4 All ER 735. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 361; [1958] 2 All ER 66 (HL) where Lord Keith of Avonholm 
found, after acknowledging the existence of two separate legal personalities, that on the facts of the 
particular case, the parent (or holding) company and the subsidiary company conducted their 
business in principle as a partnership. However, this did not mean that the parties could rely on the 
legal remedies available to partners, but the principle is important to describe the close relationship 
that existed between the parent and subsidiary company. See further R v Board of Trade ex p St 
Martins Preserving Company Limited [1965] 1 QB 603, 613. 
360 In Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 231-32 the point is made that although it is possible to ignore the principle of limited 
liability within a group of companies, it is rarely done. The authors (193-94) explain that the strict 
application of the principle of limited liability within a group of companies ‘could be justified on the 
grounds that it encourages investment by “outside” investors in the subsidiaries (as opposed to the 
parent)’. The authors (194) further point out that this argument is thin when applied in the context of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
361 See the argument in City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [19]; [2004] 4 All ER 735. 
See also Apex Global Management Ltd & Anor v FI Call Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch) where 
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can be rejected on the basis that when the investment of the holding company in 
the wholly-owned subsidiary is destroyed, it translates into exposure to a risk in the 
form of the diminution of the value of the shareholding of the member in the holding 
company.362 To evaluate the conduct of the business affairs of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary and a holding company in strict isolation is an approach that loses sight 
of the practical business operations of such a group of companies. Often the 
directors of the holding company are well aware of the dealings or conduct in 
respect of the business affairs of the wholly-owned subsidiary. It is submitted that 
the same principles may apply in the context of an ordinary holding subsidiary 
company relationship.363 
2.8 Interests 
 
Section 994 of the Act explicitly protects the ‘interests’ of a member. The Act does 
not define the term ‘interests’. To determine the interests of a member, the question 
must be approached with the assistance and guidance of case law decided in terms 
of section 994 of the Act and its predecessors. It is clear that the interests of a 
member are wider than the rights of a member.364 The interests of a member are 
                                                 
the court gave the example that the affairs of a company may include the affairs of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in circumstances where the two companies have common directors. 
362 City Branch Group Ltd, Re [2004] EWCA Civ 815 [19]; [2004] 4 All ER 735. In this case the court 
held that the conduct complained of prejudiced the affairs of the subsidiary company which in turn 
created the risk of the diminution of the value of the investment of the holding company in the 
subsidiary. 
363 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) [628]. 
364 In Interactive v Corp Ltd v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2896 (Ch) [314] the court favoured a wide 
definition to the concept of interests. See also Stephan Griffin ‘Shareholder Remedies and the no 
Reflective Loss Principle – Problems Surrounding the Identification of a Membership Interest’ (2010) 
6 Journal of Business Law 461, 468. See also Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 542 
[101]; [2007] 1 All ER 1106 where the court referred to the concept of interests for purposes of 
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985. See further Sam Weller & Sons Ltd, Re [1990] Ch 682, 685. 
 98 
 
not limited to the constitution of a company.365 To establish the interest of a 
petitioner a court may have to look beyond the legal entity to consider the rights, 
obligations and expectations of the members of a company while taking into 
consideration surrounding circumstances accurately to define and establish the 
interests of a member.366  
The provision can be used to enforce undertakings and agreements between 
members. In certain circumstances ‘equitable principles might make it unjust, or 
inequitable (or unfair) for a party to insist on legal rights or to exercise them in a 
particular way’.367 It is submitted that the provision cannot be used to avoid such 
undertakings and agreements.368 The interests of a member may consist of legal 
expectations that a member may have in relation to the manner in which the affairs 
                                                 
365 In VB Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] 
EWHC 2767 (Ch) [312] the court stated that the interests of a member is not limited to ‘strict legal 
rights under the constitution of the company or under collateral agreements’. In Carrington Viyella 
plc, Re (1983) 1 BCC 98 the court equated membership rights with interests while in Re a Company 
(No 008699 of 1985) (1986) 2 BCC 99 the court looked beyond membership rights to establish the 
interests of the petitioner. See Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-
461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 72 where it is emphasised that section 
459 went further than the protection of the personal rights of a shareholder, as it may also be relied 
on to protect a shareholder’s interests, which is a wider concept than rights. Unfair prejudicial conduct 
is not confined to conduct that is illegal. In Wootliff v Rushton-Turner & Ors [2016] EWHC 2802 (Ch) 
[34] the court held that the interests of a member is dependent of his or her relationship with the 
other members of the company. 
366 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379, [1972] 2 All ER 492. See also 
Interactive v Corp Ltd v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2896 (Ch) [314] where the court also took the view 
that a wide definition should be given to the concept of interests.  
367 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099. 
368 In context of the ‘just and equitable’ provision on which a company could be wound-up in terms 
of the Companies Act 1948 the court in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 
379, [1972] 2 All ER 492 held that the ‘provision does not, as the respondents [the company] suggest, 
entitled one party to disregard the obligation he assumes by entering a company, nor the court to 
dispense him from it’. 
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of a company will be conducted.369 Such expectations should be given effect to, but 
the court should remain cautious not to rewrite such expectations or other relevant 
agreements.370 It forms part of the interests of a member that the affairs of the 
company must be conducted in accordance with the articles and that any powers in 
the articles will be exercised properly.371 The provision also comes into play when 
a personal relationship exists between the members of a company.372 
2.9 Alternative remedy373 
 
2.9.1 Introduction 
 
It is interesting to note that the wording of section 996 of the Act does not expressly 
provide for relief in the form of a winding-up order based on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds.374 However, section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 makes specific 
provision for such relief.375 When one considers the development of the statutory 
                                                 
369 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 72 notes that membership interests are wider than legal rights. It 
is not possible to define or determine protectable membership interests. See 2.6.5 above for a 
discussion of the legitimate expectations of a member as a protectable interest.  
370 Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 
1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 77. 
371 See Christopher A Riley ‘Contracting out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985 and the Role of the Courtsʼ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782, 793-94 where it is argued that 
the interests of a member may in appropriate cases extend beyond the membership rights contained 
in the constitution of a company. See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 
379, [1972] 2 All ER 492. 
372 Interactive v Corp Ltd v Ferster [2016] EWHC 2896 (Ch) [314]. See 2.6.5.4 above for a discussion 
of the role of quasi-partnerships in determining the unfairness of conduct. 
373 See 2.3.3.1 above regarding the need for an alternative remedy to the winding-up of a company 
on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. See also 2.9 below of a discussion of the unfair prejudice remedy 
as an alternative to the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. 
374 See Companies Act 2006, s 996.  
375 See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 682-84. 
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unfair prejudice remedy, it is clear that the remedy was developed to provide an 
alternative to the winding-up of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.376 This 
may also explain why section 996 does not expressly state the winding-up of a 
company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. Because section 994 read with section 
996 of the Act provides for an alternative remedy to section 122(1)(g) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, it is important to understand the potential interrelationship 
between these two remedies.  
2.9.2 Policy considerations and the winding-up of companies 
 
Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 has been influenced substantially by 
equitable principles derived from the law of partnership.377 In the event of the 
availability of alternative relief, policy considerations may require courts to exercise 
their discretion sparingly under section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986.378 This 
is because the only outcome of a successful reliance on section 122(1)(g) of the 
                                                 
376 Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [2]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. See also Fulham 
Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [56]; [2012] 1 All ER 414 where the court 
held that ‘[s]ection 994 will usually provide the source of a satisfactory alternative remedy such a 
buy-out order that winding-up under s 122(1)(g) is therefore a last resort, and in my experience, an 
exceptional remedy to grant in the context of disputes between shareholders’. The same court [57] 
stated that ‘[t]he residual power of the court under s 122(1)(g) to order winding-up where no other 
remedy would be appropriate or available does not therefore support the characterisation of a 
petition for s 994 relief as a class remedy. It is designed to resolve issues of unfair prejudice without 
the winding-up of the company’. In Badyal v Badyal & Anor [2018] EWHC 68 (Ch) [112] the court 
described the winding-up of a company as a remedy of ‘last resort’ as ‘section 994 will normally 
provide a more appropriate alternative’. See further 2.3 and more specifically 2.3.3.1 above. For the 
position in Australia see 3.5.1 below. 
377 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 683. See also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379, [1972] 
2 All ER 492 regarding the winding-up of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. 
378 Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999 (Ch) [246]-[247]; [2008] BCC 390. See also Paul L Davies 
and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 683. 
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Insolvency Act 1986 is that a perfectly viable and sustainable company will have to 
be wound-up.379 
2.9.3 Unfair prejudice and winding-up on ‘just and equitable’ grounds – 
is there a difference? 
 
Although section 994 read with section 996 of the Act provides an alternative 
remedy to the winding-up of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds, it is 
important to note the differences in the grounds for relief regarding each of these 
remedies. The question arises whether a court may grant relief in terms of section 
996, without making a specific finding that the conduct of the affairs of a company 
are unfairly prejudicial, in circumstances where the making of a winding-up order on 
‘just and equitable’ grounds is justified.380 The argument is often made that the 
grounds for relief in terms of section 994381 and the grounds for a winding-up of a 
company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds must be equated.382 In O’Neill v Phillips383 
the court emphasised that the concept of fairness for purposes of section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 does not require a petitioner to prove that he or she is also 
entitled to an order for the winding-up of the company based on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds.384 The court held that a petitioner should prove that the affairs of the 
                                                 
379 This is one of the criticisms against section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986. See Paul L 
Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 
2016) 683. 
380 See Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999 (Ch) [101]; [2008] BCC 390 for an example of such an 
argument in the context of a deadlock between parties. See also the argument in O’Neill v Phillips 
[1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1104. 
381 Companies Act 2006. 
382 See the argument which is based on the judgment in Guidezone Ltd, Re [2000] EWHC 1561 (Ch), 
[2000] 2 BCLC 321 in Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999 (Ch) [102]; [2008] BCC 390. 
383 [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092. 
384 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1099-100. 
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company is conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner.385 
However, in Guidezone Ltd, Re386 the court held that conduct cannot be regarded 
as unfairly prejudicial for purposes of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 if such 
conduct would not be able to justify a winding-up order on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds.387  
The judgment in Hawkes v Cuddy388 is directional on this point. The court in 
                                                 
385 In O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1104-05 the court held that the petitioner, 
Mr O’Neill, failed that to prove that Mr Phillips undertook to do the things he is accused of failing to 
do and secondly that Mr Phillips did not commit the transgressions that Mr O’Neill thought he did. 
The court found that Mr Phillips had no fault in or conducted the affairs of the company in an unfairly 
prejudicial manner that caused Mr O’Neill to have lost mutual trust and confidence in Mr Phillips. The 
court further held that a court would not allow a member unilaterally to withdraw his or her capital 
from a company on a misplaced perception of a loss of trust and confidence between members when 
the business of the company can still be conducted in accordance with the articles of association. 
See also Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 1740 [32]-[33]; [2003] 1 BCLC 76. 
386 [2000] EWHC 1561 (Ch); [2000] 2 BCLC 321. 
387 Guidezone Ltd, Re [2000] EWHC 1561 (Ch) [179]-[180]; [2000] 2 BCLC 321. The petitioners were 
the shareholders of a company, Guidezone. They sought an order in terms of which the other 
shareholders of the company purchase their shares at a fair value or that the company purchases 
the shares from the petitioners. Alternatively, the petitioners sought an order for the winding-up of a 
company on just and equitable grounds. One of the petitioners proposed at a meeting that the hotel, 
which was the subject of the sole business of the company, be sold and the company be wound-up. 
The board of the company rejected the proposal. The petitioner argued that the rejection of the 
proposal was unfairly prejudicial. The petitioner based its case on a legitimate expectation that the 
hotel would be sold and the company be wound-up at a time determined by the petitioner ([14]). The 
court found ([188]-[189]) that no factual basis existed for the legitimate expectation on which the 
petitioner relied. Further, the court found ([190]) that although there had been a change in the 
circumstances on which the association of the members were based, the understanding between 
the parties made allowance for future changes. See also Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport 
Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) [48] where the court expressed doubt on the correctness of the 
approach taken by the court to the grounds in section 994 of the Act and the winding-up of a company 
on ‘just and equitable’ grounds in Guidezone Ltd, Re [2000] EWHC 1561 (Ch), [2000] 2 BCLC 321. 
388 [2009] EWCA Civ 291, [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
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Hawkes v Cuddy389 rejected the approach in Guidezone Ltd, Re.390 It acknowledged 
the fact that the same facts and circumstances may justify relief in terms of both 
section 994 of the Act and section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986.391 The 
rejection of this argument means that a petitioner will not only be entitled to relief in 
terms of section 994 of the Act once a court is satisfied that an order for the winding-
up of company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds is present. There are important 
differences between section 994 of the Act and section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986. These differences are emphasised by the wording in which the sections 
are formulated.392 It is not a requirement to prove unfair prejudicial conduct for the 
winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.393  
2.9.4 Circumstances where only section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 
1986 applies 
 
A petitioner may be entitled to relief in terms of section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 in circumstances where he or she has not been unfairly prejudiced.394 
Examples where a court may grant a winding-up order based on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds include where the substratum of a company disappeared395 or where there 
is a loss of mutual trust and confidence between the members.396 The court in 
                                                 
389 [2009] EWCA Civ 291, [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
390 [2000] EWHC 1561 (Ch); [2000] 2 BCLC 321. 
391 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [104]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
392 See Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [105]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
393 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [110]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
394 See Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [104]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427 where the court gave the 
example of the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds where the substratum of 
the company does not exist anymore.  
395 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [104]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
396 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [108]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. It must be noted that the court 
in Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222; [2006] BCC 85 [61] stated that a breakdown of a 
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Hawkes v Cuddy397 emphasised that a breakdown in trust and confidence does not 
necessarily justify relief in terms of section 994.398 
2.9.5 Situations where both section 994 of the Act and section 122(1)(g) 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 may apply 
 
The same conduct may justify relief in terms of section 994 of the Act and in terms 
of section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986. This will be, for example, the case 
in the event of a deadlock caused by the unfair prejudicial conduct of one of the 
parties. The appropriate remedy for such a deadlock may take the form of relief 
either in terms of section 994 of the Act or section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 
1986. 
2.9.6 Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the availability of 
alternative remedies 
 
Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 should be read with section 125. 
Section 125 contains the powers of a court when hearing a petition for the winding-
up of a company. Section 125(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 empowers a court to 
grant relief in the form of a winding-up order on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. Section 
125(2) further provides that the winding-up order may be granted if the grounds for 
                                                 
relationship between members based on mutual trust and confidence will only justify relief when the 
majority excluded ‘the petitioner from the management of the company or otherwise to cause him 
prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder’. The court confirmed [61] that a shareholder has no right 
of unilateral withdrawal. This approach was followed in Badyal v Badyal [2018] EWHC 68 (Ch) [118]-
[119]. 
397 [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [108]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. 
398 See Badyal v Badyal [2018] EWHC 68 (Ch) [119] where the court held that a petitioner should 
only prove a mere breakdown of trust and confidence that justifies the liquidation of a company. Such 
an order will only be made when no other form of relief is appropriate. See further RA Noble & Sons 
(Clothing) Ltd, Re [1983] BCLC 273, 291. 
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such an order is proven and no appropriate alternative remedy is available.399 The 
courts take the view that these two remedies should be viewed as running parallel 
to each other and should not necessarily be equated.400  
2.10 The relief 
 
Once a petitioner established a proper case on the grounds of section 994(1) of the 
Act, a court may grant relief in terms of section 996.401 Section 996 cloaks the court 
with a very wide discretion to tailor relief according to the specific circumstances of 
each case.402 The broad discretion with which the courts are entrusted in terms of 
                                                 
399 Insolvency Act 1986, s 125(2)(a) read with subsection (b). 
400 Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [104]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427. See also Ex parte Estate 
Acquisition and Development Ltd [1991] BCLC 154, 161; [1990] BCC 221 where the court held that 
a petitioner does not have to prove that the conduct complained of justifies relief, because such 
conduct would have justified the granting of a different remedy. See also Fulham Football Club 
(1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [60]; [2012] BCLC 335 in commenting on O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092 where the court stated that ‘[t]he jurisdiction contained in 
s 994 originated as an alternative to winding-up on just and equitable ground. Section 210 of the 
1948 Act required the court to be of the opinion that the facts would justify the making of a winding-
up order on the just and equitable ground. But this link was broken by s 75 of the Companies Act 
1980 as a result of the recommendations in the Jenkins Committee (Cmnd) 1749) in 1962 that the 
grounds for seeking alternative relief should be widened. The decision in O’Neill v Philips was 
intended to define the circumstances in which the s 994 jurisdiction should be exercised but it has 
not re-forged the original link with s 122(1)(g)’. 
401 Griffith v Gourgey & Ors [2018] EWHC 1035 (Ch) [143]. 
402 Goodchild v Taylor & Anor [2018] EWHC 2946 (Ch) [104]; Badyal v Badyal [2018] EWHC 68 (Ch) 
[112]; Rembert v Daniel [2018] EWHC 388 (Ch). See also Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2015] 
ScotCS CSOH 146. See further Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222, [2006] 2 BCLC 70; Cobden 
Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch); Oak Investment Partners XII Ltd 
Partnership v Boughtwood [2009] EWHC 176 (Ch) [105]; [2009] All ER 67; Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 
1 (Ch); Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [144]; F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) 
Ltd v Barthelemy [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch) [77]; [2012] 3 WLR 10; Singh v Singh [2014] EWCA Civ 
103. See also Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 1740. See further Bird Precision 
Bellows, Re [1986] Ch 658. In Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2016] CSIH 146 [58] the court 
emphasised that the relief should be granted in respect of the matters complained of. In Grace v Biagioli 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [73]; [2006] 2 BCLC 70 the court held that it has a broad discretion in tailoring 
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appropriate relief based on the facts and circumstances of each case. To determine and formulate an 
order that is fair, a court should consider all the relevant circumstances of a case. When the appropriate 
relief is considered, a court may take into consideration the conduct that took place between the date 
of the presentation of the petition and the hearing thereof. A court should take a practical approach to 
tailoring relief by considering ‘the overall situation, past, present and future’. In Hawkes v Cuddy [2007] 
EWHC 2999 (Ch) [243] and [246]; [2008] BCC 390 the court emphasised the fact that a remedy granted 
by a court should be proportionate to the unfair prejudice complained of. The court remarked that an 
order in terms of which the shares of the petitioner should be bought by the company or other members 
may be inappropriate in circumstances where the conduct complained of is ‘relative modest’. With 
reference to Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 1740 [51]; [2003] 1 BCLC 76 the 
court found that the purpose of the remedy is not to serve as punishment for inappropriate behaviour, 
but focuses more on the protection of the interests of the petitioner. In this case, a company had three 
shareholders who all held equal shares in the company and served as directors of the company ([3]). 
Two of the shareholders wrongfully excluded the petitioner (a director of the company) from access to 
company records ([3]). In Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) [47] 
the court held that relief will only be granted if there is a causal link between the unfair prejudicial 
conduct and the prejudice suffered by the petitioner. SCFF was a company whose shares were held 
equally by the Coden family and the Heffer family. The Coden family held 50% of the shares in SCFF 
through the petitioner, CIL. The balance of the shares in SCFF were held by the Heffer family through 
RWM Langport. Both CIL and RWM Langport had the right to appoint directors to the board of SCFF. 
The court referred to Blackwood Hodge plc, Re [1997] 2 BCLC 650, 673 where it was held by Parker 
J that ‘the petitioners must establish not merely that the BH directors have been guilty of breaches of 
duty in the respects alleged, but also that those breaches caused the petitioners to suffer unfair 
prejudice in their capacity as preference shareholders’. See in this regard also Irvine v Irvine [2006] 
EWHC 406 (Ch) [256]; [2007] 1 BCLC 349 where the court held that the prejudice suffered by the 
members ‘must be real, rather than merely technical or trivial, and must flow from the conduct said to 
be unfair’. The company in this case was the holding company of two subsidiaries. The general 
business of the company was conducted through one of the subsidiaries. At a specific time, the 
business of this subsidiary was transferred to the other. The shares in the holding company were held 
by the petitioners (49.96%) and by Ian Charles Irvine (50.04%). In this case, the petitioners alleged 
([6]) that their interests were unfairly prejudiced on the basis that Ian Charles Irvine secured payment 
to himself that is ‘excessive, unreasonable, and unjustified levels of remuneration’. This conduct led to 
the payment of an inadequate dividend to the petitioner ([6]). The petitioners further alleged ([6]) that 
the affairs of the company were conducted in breach of the Companies Act 1985. The court ([325]) 
found that the remuneration drawn from the company was excessive and unfairly prejudicial. It further 
confirmed ([346]-[347]) that the Companies Act 1985 was breached as the companies did not table the 
financial statements of the companies at shareholders’ meetings, but compliance with the particular 
provisions would not have changed the position and the prejudice suffered by the petitioners. The court 
([358]) ordered Ian Charles Irvine to buy the shares of the petitioners. In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 
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section 996 is, however, not unfettered or unrestricted and must be exercised 
judicially.403 Proving the jurisdictional requirements in section 994(1) does not entitle 
the petitioner to relief in terms of section 996; it only means that a court has the 
discretion to grant such relief.404 The nature of the relief that may be granted in 
                                                 
(Ch) [101] the court held that the discretion will not be used to make orders against parties who did not 
participate in the conduct complained of or who are not parties to the proceedings before the court. In 
this case, the petitioner, a minority shareholder, sought an order in terms of which his shares in a 
company should be bought out by the other members of the company. In his petition the petitioner 
based his application on an agreement that he will participate in the management of the affairs of the 
company, that all the members of the company will draw equal amounts of remuneration and profits 
distributed in the form of dividends. In November 2007 the petitioner was allegedly excluded from 
participating in the affairs of the company and denied access to the company’s business premises. 
Since the exclusion of the petitioner, Mr Good, one of the members of the company, proceeded to 
make excessive withdrawals of cash from the company, and failed to declare dividends to reduce the 
loan accounts of the members. It is on this basis that the court was approached for relief. The court 
([91]) found that a quasi-partnership existed between the members of the company. The court ([93]) 
further held that the exclusion from the management of the company was prejudicial and unfair in light 
of the fact that the affairs of the company were conducted in the form of a quasi-partnership. The court 
([96] and [99]) further found that the withdrawal of cash and remuneration from the company was in 
some respects excessive and unfairly prejudicial, as this was done in breach of an arrangement 
between members. Relief was granted to the petitioner in the form of a buy-out order against Mr Good. 
The court ([101]) refused to make the order against Mrs Good as she was not a participant in 
conducting the affairs of the company unfairly. See further Singh v Singh [2014] EWCA Civ 103 [23]. 
In Bird Precision Bellows, Re [1986] Ch 658, 669 the court held that the wide discretion entrusted to 
courts allows a court to grant relief that is ‘fair and equitable’ in the particular circumstances of the case. 
See further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 680. 
403 VB Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] 
EWHC 2767 (Ch) [425]; Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [46]; 
[2012] BCLC 335. See also Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291 [104]; [2009] 2 BCLC 427; Kohli 
v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [277]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2016] CSIH 
146 [58]. In Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [46]; [2012] BCLC 
335 the court stated that the interests of other members and creditors can be taken into account 
when formulating relief. See further JE Cade & Son Ltd, Re [1992] BCLC 213, 227. 
404 In Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [10]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 the court explained that the 
seriousness of the conduct should justify judicial intervention. See also Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, 
Re [2015] ScotCS CSOH 146 [59].  
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terms of section 996 falls within the exclusive discretion of the presiding officer.405 
The wide range of relief that a court may grant in terms of section 996 is regarded 
as one of the strengths of the unfair prejudice remedy in terms of section 994.406  
One of the main functions of the relief that a court may grant is to remedy the 
interests of members in the event of an infringement upon or wrong committed 
against their interests.407 Section 996(2) contains a list of orders that a court may 
grant.408 A court is not bound or restricted to the orders listed in section 996(2) of 
the Act.409 A discussion of the most important forms of relief a court may grant in 
terms of section 996 of the Act follows. 
2.10.1 Regulation of future conduct 
 
To prevent the re-occurrence of the conduct complained of in terms of section 994 
a court may make an order to regulate the future affairs of a company.410 Neither 
this specific provision nor its predecessor411 has been considered directly by the 
                                                 
405 Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2016] CSIH 146 [59] 
406 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [28]; [2013] BCC 98. 
407 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [28]; [2013] BCC 98. See also VB Football Assets v 
Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] EWHC 2767 (Ch) [425] where 
the court held that in granting relief a court must do what is fair in the circumstances of the particular 
case. The fact that the relief must be proportionate to the unfair prejudice suffered is an element of 
fairness. 
408 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 680 note that relief in the form of a buy-out order in terms of which the shares of a 
petitioner is bought by the controlling shareholder, is the order most often used.  
409 Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2016] CSIH 146 [60] and [65] where the court also found that the 
discretion of the court includes the discretion to attach a value to the shares in question that is fair 
to all parties to the dispute. See also Yusuf v Yusuf [2019] EWHC 90 (Ch) [136]. See further 2.10.5.2 
below. 
410 Companies Act 2006, s 996(2)(a). 
411 Companies Act 1985, s 461(2)(a). 
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courts. The reason for this may be that most courts prefer relief in the form of 
termination of the relationship between the members. A second reason may be that 
courts are reluctant to participate or intervene in the management of a company, 
because courts are of the view that the director and/shareholders of a company are 
in the best position to determine what is in the best interests of the company.412 
2.10.2 A restraining order or an order to compel 
 
A court can also grant relief in the form of an interdict restraining a company from 
committing or continuing with conduct complained of in terms of section 994.413 
Alternatively, an order can be made to compel a company to do something which it 
has omitted to do when such omission was the subject matter of a petitioner’s 
complaint terms of section 994.414 
2.10.3 Authorisation of civil proceedings 
2.10.3.1 Introduction 
 
An interesting and very important feature of the unfair prejudice remedy is that a 
court may grant relief in the form of an order authorising a member or members to 
institute civil proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company.415 This 
statutory provision is significant as it potentially creates an alternative procedure to 
the statutory derivative action whereby a member can institute legal proceedings on 
                                                 
412 See 2.3.1.3 (b) and 2.5 above. 
413 Companies Act 2006, s 994(2)(b)(i). 
414 Companies Act 2006, s 994(2)(b)(ii). 
415 Companies Act 2006, s 994(2)(c). This provision provides that a court may ‘authorise civil 
proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons 
and on such terms as the court may direct’. 
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behalf of the company.416  
 This approach of the legislature is a unique feature in light of the fact that 
traditionally the personal remedy (or unfair prejudice remedy) and the derivative 
action were separate and distinct from each other.417 In terms of ‘the proper plaintiff 
rule’ a member could only institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company in 
certain exceptional circumstances.418 The distinction between the statutory personal 
action and the statutory derivative action is further blurred by the express reference 
in section 260(2)(b) to the right to institute legal proceeding on behalf of a company 
in terms of section 994.419  
 
                                                 
416 The primary provisions regulating the statutory derivative claim are found in sections 260–264 of 
the Companies Act 2006. The legislature replaced the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 
67 ER 189 with a statutory form of the derivative action (claim). See 2.3.1 above for a discussion of 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See also Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re 
[1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18; [1994] BCC 475 where the court with regard to section 459 of the Companies 
Act 1985 stated that ‘[e]nabling the court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle was one of the purposes of the section’. 
417 See 2.3.1 above for a discussion of ‘the proper plaintiff rule’ and ‘the internal management rule’ 
in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. 
418 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 210; [1982] 1 
All ER 354. See also 2.3.1.4 above.  
419 Section 260(2) of the Companies Act 2006 provides that: 
‘A derivative claim may only be brought -under this Chapter, or in pursuance of an order of 
the court in proceedings under section 994 (proceedings for protection of members against 
unfair prejudice).’ 
Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 651 explains that a shareholder may obtain 
personal relief in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 for a wrong committed against a 
company. However, section 459 could not be used to obtain corporate relief for a company, save for 
an order in terms of which leave is granted to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company 
(651). 
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2.10.3.2 The personal remedy versus the derivative action (or claim) 
(a) The difference between the purpose of the personal remedy and the 
derivative action 
 
Traditionally a distinction was drawn between the personal remedy and the 
derivative action.420 This distinction is important as the personal remedy and a 
derivative action each gives effect to and protects different principles and interests 
in the context of company law. While the derivative claim is aimed at obtaining 
corporate relief for a wrong committed against a company, the personal remedy is 
aimed at the protection of the individual rights and interests of members.421 
(b) The decision not to institute action against wrongdoers as an abuse 
of power 
The same conduct may simultaneously affect the rights and interests of both the 
company and its members.422 According to the principles established in Foss v 
                                                 
420 See the discussion by Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future 
of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647 in the context of Companies Act 
1985. 
421 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 650. See also Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: 
Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 205. See 
further 2.3.1.4 above. 
422 See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 674, where they point out that a wrong committed against a company affects the 
interests of the members of the company. The authors (674-75) remark that the availability of the 
derivative claim or action does not preclude a member from relying on the personal action. Jennifer 
Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 
64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 650 argues that the nature of the complaint and the applicable relief 
sought are important considerations in determining whether the statutory personal remedy or 
statutory derivative claim applies to a matter. She further argues (648) that section 459 was ‘a 
deliberate attempt to avoid the narrow rights-based protection that existed previously’. 
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Harbottle423 and due to the distinction between corporate rights and personal rights, 
it is the company, and not its members, that should institute legal proceedings 
against a wrongdoer when a wrong had been committed against the company.424 
This distinction now appears to be dispensed with in the formulation of the statutory 
personal remedy and statutory derivative claim.425  
Some authors argue that the statutory personal remedy can now justifiably 
be used to obtain relief (corporate relief) when wrongs were committed against the 
company.426 In terms of this approach the grounds for such relief are then not the 
wrong committed against company, but the abuse of the controllers’ power in the 
company to prevent the company from instituting legal proceedings against the 
                                                 
423 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
424 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 650 points out that prior to the decision in Clark 
v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733, the personal remedy was not available to 
obtain relief for a company. Prior to this decision it was more likely for a shareholder to obtain relief 
for him- or herself in terms of the personal remedy. The judgment in Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA 
Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733 does make the use of the statutory personal remedy a more attractive 
option than the statutory derivative claim when the facts and circumstances in which these remedies 
can apply overlap (654).  
425 See section 994 read with section 996(2)(c) and sections 260 to 264, and specifically section 
263(3)(e) of the Companies Act 2006. See also 2.10.3.1 above. 
426 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 652. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 676-77. See 
further Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810 [8]; [2003] 4 All ER 733 where the Court of Appeal 
noted and confirmed that ‘there was a wide jurisdiction under section 461 to give relief against third 
parties which could have been granted in a derivative action’. This observation was made by the 
Court of Appeal in respect of the findings of the court a quo. The findings of the judge a quo were 
not challenged in the Court of Appeal. 
 113 
 
wrongdoers.427  
2.10.3.4 Corporate relief and the unfair prejudice remedy  
 
Section 994 of the Act is the statutory equivalent of the personal remedy.428 The 
relief usually claimed in terms of the personal remedy is of a personal nature. 
Because section 994 read with section 996(2)(c) provides for the institution of legal 
proceedings on behalf of the company, the question arises whether the personal 
remedy in section 994 can also be utilised to obtained relief for the company and 
not necessarily for the petitioner (or member).429  
Relief in the form of compensation to the benefit of the company based on a 
wrong committed against it is usually associated with the statutory derivative claim, 
whereas relief in the form of a buy-out order of the shares of the petitioner by the 
company (or other members) is usually associated with the statutory personal 
                                                 
427 See Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 652 where she argues that when a company 
does not act against wrongdoers who committed a wrong against a company, it may be argued that 
a wrong is indirectly committed against the members or shareholders of the company. The 
reluctance to act can be regarded as a disregard of the interest of the minority (652). It is interesting 
to note that section 263(4) of the Companies Act 2006 provides that ‘the court shall have particular 
regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the company who have no personal 
interest, direct or indirect, in the matter’.  
428 See the argument of Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future 
of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 650 regarding section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985. 
429 See in this regard Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 
210 where the court stated that ‘[a] derivative action is an exception to the elementary principle that 
A cannot, as a general rule, bring an action against B to recover damages or secure other relief on 
behalf of C for an injury done by B to C. C is the proper plaintiff because C is the party injured, and, 
therefore, the person in whom the cause of action is vested’. 
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remedy.430 However, it should be noted that there is case law that supports the grant 
of corporate relief in terms of a petition based on the unfair prejudice remedy.431  
In Clark v Cutland432 the court awarded relief to the benefit of the company 
in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985. This case is authority for the 
principle that a court’s discretion in terms of section 461 of the Companies Act 1985, 
the predecessor of section 996 of the Companies Act 2006, is wide enough ‘to grant 
relief against third parties which could have been granted in a derivative action’.433 
Payne argues that the judgment in Clark v Cutland434 has the potential effect that 
the decision ‘to litigate on behalf of the company can be delegated to individual 
minority shareholders’.435 
                                                 
430 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 676. 
431 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733. See also Wootliff v Rushton-Turner 
[2016] EWHC 2802 (Ch) [32]. See further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ 
Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 676-77. 
432 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733. 
433 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810 [8]; [2003] 4 All ER 733. See also Atlasview Ltd v Brightview 
Ltd [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch) [60]; [2004] 2 BCLC 191. Julia Tang ‘Shareholder remedies: Demise of 
the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 206 points out that 
both a derivative action and unfair prejudicial proceedings were instituted in Clark. These actions 
were consolidated. Despite this the author (208) emphases that relief was ultimately granted in terms 
of unfair prejudice proceedings. 
434 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733. 
435 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 659. The author further notes (658) that it may 
sometimes be possible to use the unfair prejudice remedy to circumvent the requirements of the 
statutory derivative claim. Payne holds the view (659-60) that the test for unfair prejudice may be 
inappropriate to replace the leave requirement of the derivative action. According to the author (659), 
courts used to develop the test of unfair prejudice from the point of view of the complaining 
shareholder to a dispute and whether the rights of the shareholder attached to the shares were 
breached. As the court focuses on the legal position of the shareholders to a dispute, no room is left 
to determine whether a claim on behalf of the company in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy is in 
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2.10.3.5 The use of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy to circumvent the 
statutory derivative claim 
 
If a petitioner is allowed to rely on the provisions of section 996(2)(c) to institute 
legal proceedings on behalf of the company, the question arises whether this 
section can be used to circumvent the requirements of the statutory derivative claim 
as set out in sections 260 to 264.436 If this is possible, it creates the possible problem 
that the provisions of sections 260 to 264 may become redundant which could not 
have been the intention of the legislature.437  
Such an approach would also ignore important fundamental differences 
between the statutory personal action and the statutory derivative claim. One such 
difference is that the statutory derivative claim procedure described in sections 260 
to 264 gives effect to very specific and important policy considerations. Firstly, it 
                                                 
the best interest of the company (660). According to Payne (660) it is not impossible for the courts 
to develop the concept of unfair prejudice to take into account the best interest of the company. An 
alternative approach proposed by Payne (660) is that a court may refuse corporate relief when 
exercising its discretion to order relief in terms of section 461 of the Companies Act 1985, the 
predecessor of section 996 of the Companies Act 2006. The author (660) is of the view that such an 
approach is unsatisfactory, as much time would have been spent and expenses incurred during the 
litigation process prior reaching the stage where the discretion of the court arises. The ratification of 
wrongs committed and the views of independent organs within a company must also be considered 
for purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy (660-61). 
436 See 2.10.3.4 above where it is explained that the statutory personal action can be utilised to 
obtain relief for the benefit of the company. 
437 The availability of the statutory derivative claim does not bar a petitioner form relying on the unfair 
prejudice remedy. Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 675 expressed their doubts on whether it was the intention that the 
provisions of the unfair prejudice remedy should be interpreted in such a manner to ‘side-step’ the 
provisions regulating the statutory derivative action. According to the authors section 996(2)(c) is a 
remedial power to authorise proceedings on behalf of the company and the provision should not be 
seen as a general leave to commence with derivative proceedings. See Lowe v Fahey [1996] 1 
BCLC 262.  
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recognises that a company should be protected from being involved in vexatious 
legal proceedings and secondly the provisions recognise that it will not always be 
in the best interests of the company to pursue and enforce the rights of the 
company.438  
2.10.3.6 Some practical considerations 
 
(a) The protection of corporate rights and the interests of members 
 
The statutory derivative claim is an action that protects the rights of a company. 
Further, the relief sought in terms of the statutory derivative action is aimed at 
redressing harm suffered by or committed against the company.439 The statutory 
personal action in section 994 of the Act is aimed at redressing unfair prejudice to 
the interests of a member or members.440 The flexible interpretation of section 994, 
the judgment in Clark v Cutland441 and the complex requirements of derivative 
claims are all factors that may encourage a litigant rather to attempt to rely on the 
unfair prejudice remedy in stead of the derivative claim.442 
                                                 
438 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 675. See section 263(3)(e) of the Companies Act 2006 in terms of which a court may 
take into consideration whether the company decided to pursue a claim. See also 2.10.3.4 above. 
439 See 2.10.3.4 above for a discussion whether section 994 can be used to secure relief to the 
benefit of the company. 
440 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 674. 
441 [2003] EWCA Civ 810. See also 2.10.3.4 above for a discussion of the use of the unfair prejudice 
remedy to obtain corporate relief. 
442 See Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 658 where the author described the jurisdiction 
of the derivative claim in the Companies Act 1985 as ‘undoubtedly complex and obscure’. As regards 
the purpose of the requirements of the derivative claim the author states that ‘the hurdles facing 
minority shareholders and which make the derivative action cumbersome are there to protect the 
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(b) Standing and the time of the occurrence of the conduct complained 
of443 
 
The statutory form of the personal remedy is contained in section 994 of the Act. 
Section 994 provides standing to the members of a company. The remedy is not 
available to shareholders whose names do not appear on the register of 
members.444 Because of the personal nature of the remedy, a shareholder cannot 
rely on unfair prejudicial conduct that occurred prior to becoming a member of a 
company.445 
It should be noted that only the members446 of a company may approach a 
court for relief in terms of the derivative action. However, in terms of this action, a 
member can rely on wrongs committed against the company prior to the particular 
member becoming a member of a company.447 This is because the cause of action 
                                                 
company against the single irritated shareholder who through malice or misjudgment would waste 
the company’s time and money if allowed to litigate on the company’s behalf’. See also Julia Tang 
‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 178, 206. 
443 See also 2.6.1 above for a discussion of the standing of a petitioner for purposes of the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy. 
444 The only exception is that standing extends to persons to whom shares are transferred by 
operation of law. See also para 2.6.1 above.  
445 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 656. The author, however, correctly points out 
(656) that the effect of the judgment in Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733 
is that a shareholder can obtain corporate relief in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985, 
and that a shareholder may be able to rely on conduct that took place prior to the shareholder 
becoming a member of the company. 
446 For purposes of the statutory derivative claim in the Companies Act 2006, section 260(5)(c) 
provides that a member of a company ‘include[s] a person who is not a member but to whom shares 
in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law’. 
447 Companies Act 2006, s 260(4). See also Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 
in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 655. 
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belongs to the company and not the member who is instituting the derivative 
claim.448 
In Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd449 the court held that for purposes of the 
statutory personal remedy in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985, a 
nominee shareholder has the necessary standing to protect the interests of the 
beneficial owner of the relevant shares. The rights of the beneficial owner can 
therefore be protected indirectly through the nominee who is a member of the 
company.450 It is important to note that the same position pertaining to the standing 
of a shareholder does not apply to the derivative claims.451 
(c) Interpretation  
The distinction between the statutory personal remedy and the statutory derivative 
claim is blurred by the manner in which these remedies are formulated. In some 
circumstances a petitioner can be in doubt as to whether he or she should base his 
or her petition on the statutory personal remedy or on the statutory derivative 
claim.452  
From a practical point of view it is more advantageous for a petitioner to base 
his or her petition on the provisions of section 994, as the petitioner would not have 
                                                 
448 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 655. 
449 [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch); [2004] 2 BCLC 191 [38]. 
450 For a discussion of this case on this point see Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 
1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 655-56. 
451 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 656. 
452 See 2.10.3.1 above. 
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to comply with the procedural requirements set out in sections 260 to 264.453 In such 
circumstances it would be argued that it would be more advantageous for a 
petitioner to base his or her petition on section 994 of the Act instead of the statutory 
derivative action that requires the petitioner to comply with various statutory 
requirements which include obtaining permission from a court to institute derivative 
proceedings on behalf of a company.454  
Although section 994 read with section 996 of the Act provides for the 
authorisation to institute legal proceedings on behalf a company, the provision 
should not be abused to circumvent the statutory requirements of the derivative 
                                                 
453 In terms of section 260(3) a derivative claim may only be instituted on specified grounds. In terms 
of section 261(1) a member of a company needs the leave of a court to commence and/or continue 
with a derivative claim. Leave will only be granted once the court has taken into account the issues 
and aspects set out in section 263. Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise or the Derivative 
Claim?’ (2012) 1 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 205 argues that the availability of relief 
in the form of authorisation to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company under section 994 
may reduce the use of the derivative claim. It is further argued (206) that the judicial approach to 
petitions in terms of section 994 makes the derivative claim available to petitioners even in 
circumstances where the derivative claim would not have been available due to the complex and 
restrictive rules in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. Courts have interpreted section 
994 in a much more flexible manner in comparison with the restrictive interpretation and application 
of the provisions dealing with derivative claims (206). The broad discretion that a court enjoys under 
section 994 read with section 996, makes the remedy an attractive option to minority shareholders 
(206). Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 676 argues that section 459 of the Companies 
Act 1985 provided a more flexible alternative to pursue a corporate claim. Payne (662-63) points out 
that when a wrong is committed against a company the possibility to obtain corporate relief by way 
of the statutory personal action in section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 exists. The derivative 
action was not available to a shareholder when a wrong was committed against the personal 
interests of the shareholder or member (662-63). Payne (662-63) further argues that the unfair 
prejudice remedy may be available on the grounds of a negligent breach of a director’s duty, but this 
is not the case in the context of the derivative claim. 
454 Companies Act 2006, s 261(1). See Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative 
Claim?’ (2012) 1:2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 208-09. 
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claim.455 Courts need to develop principles to ensure that the available procedure 
in section 996 is not abused by petitioners. 
(d)  The indemnification of costs  
 
(i) Costs and derivative claims 
When a court grants permission or leave to a member to institute legal proceedings 
or claim on behalf of a company, such permission or leave may be subjected to 
certain terms.456 These terms are determined by a court ‘as it thinks fit’.457 Such 
terms may include the indemnification of a member against the reasonable costs 
incurred in litigation on behalf of a company.458 Usually, a member will have the right 
to be indemnified even when the derivative claim is unsuccessful.459 Courts are 
readily inclined to order the indemnification of a member’s costs.460 According to the 
courts equity requires that the company, and not the relevant member, should carry 
the costs of such a derivative claim.461 The reason for this is that any benefit that 
                                                 
455 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 659 in the context of section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985. 
456 Companies Act 2006, s 261(4). 
457 Companies Act 2006, s 261(4)(a). See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 606. 
458 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 607. See also Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849, 871 where the court 
found the indemnification of a plaintiff in a derivative action to be a matter of discretion. 
459 See Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849, 859 where the court confirmed the ‘well-
known maxim of the law that he who would take the benefit of a venture if it succeeds ought also 
bear the burden if it fails’. 
460 See Steiner v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] 1 BCLC 537 [56] where the court held that 
Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 is ‘clear authority that a shareholder who receives 
the sanction of the court to proceed with a derivative action should normally be indemnified as to his 
reasonable costs by the company for the benefit of which the action would accrue’. 
461 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849, 858.  
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derives from a successful derivative claim accrues to the company and not the 
member. Based on this principle, a member may be indemnified for all costs and 
expenses reasonably incurred.462 
(ii) The issue of costs and the unfair prejudice remedy  
When relying on the unfair prejudice remedy the petitioner carries the costs of the 
suit by default. Usually, the company involved is not ordered to carry the costs 
incurred by a member in using the unfair prejudice remedy because the relief sought 
usually provides relief of a personal nature.463 Because the court in Clark v 
Cutland464 opened the door to obtain corporate relief for a company in terms of the 
unfair prejudice remedy,the default position in relation to costs needs to be 
reconsidered. The court in Clark v Cutland465 made it clear that when relief in terms 
of the unfair prejudice remedy is sought for the benefit of the company, the petitioner 
may seek an order for costs against the company.466  
One of the biggest advantages of the derivative claim compared to the unfair 
prejudice remedy is in relation to costs because an order for the indemnification of 
costs could be obtained at a very early stage in terms of the derivative claim or 
action.467 In terms of the unfair prejudice remedy an order for costs will usually be 
made only after the dispute has been determined by the court. This means that a 
                                                 
462 According to the court in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849, 858 and 871 a minority 
shareholder is in the same position as an agent who has the right to be indemnified for all reasonable 
costs and expenses incurred in execution of his or her mandate. 
463 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810 [35]; [2003] 4 All ER 733.  
464 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733. 
465 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 4 All ER 733. 
466 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810 [35]; [2003] 4 All ER 733. 
467 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 664. 
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member first has to incur the actual costs of the relevant litigation in the hope that 
he or she will be able to obtain an order for the indemnification of costs against the 
company.468 It is argued by some that obtaining an order in relation to costs in terms 
of the derivative action does act as a strong enough incentive for litigants to make 
use of the derivative action instead of unfair prejudice proceedings.469 
(e) The application for corporate relief in the context of a group of 
companies 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice remedy can be applied in the context of a group of 
companies.470 The formulation of the statutory derivative claim prevents it from 
being applied within a group structure of companies.471 Because the possibility 
exists to use the unfair prejudice remedy to obtain relief for the benefit of the 
company, the possibility arises that a member of company within a group structure 
may seek relief for the benefit of another company within the same group.472 Payne 
suggests that a member of a company that forms part of a group of companies may 
use the unfair prejudice remedy to obtain corporate relief for one of the other 
companies in the group of which the shareholder is not necessarily a member.473 In 
                                                 
468 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 665. 
469 See Julia Tang ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1(2) UCL 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178, 209. 
470 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 662. 
471 See Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 661 where it is emphasised that the ‘double 
derivativeʼ or ‘multiple derivativeʼ is not recognised in English law. 
472 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 661-62. See also 2.10.3.4 above.  
473 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 661-62. 
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contrast with the unfair prejudice remedy, the derivative claim can only be relied on 
by a member of a company on whose behalf relief is sought. 
(f) An abuse of control and the protection of a company against 
frivolous and vexatious litigation  
 
The derivative claim is an equitable remedy.474 Individual members may commence 
with the process to seek leave or permission to commence with legal proceedings 
on behalf the company. The leave or permission requirement protects the company 
from being unnecessarily entangled in frivolous and vexatious litigation.475 This is 
also in line with the view that the institution of a derivative claim is an exception to 
the proper plaintiff rule.476 
The statutory derivative action attempts to strike an appropriate balance 
between the protection of a company against frivolous and vexatious litigation on 
the one hand and the protection of a company against an abuse of control.477 When 
balancing these interests, the legislature also took into consideration established 
company law principles.478  
                                                 
474 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 657. 
475 Companies Act 2006, s 261(1). See also Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 
in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 658. 
476 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 657. See 2.3.1.4 above. 
477 See also 2.10.3.2 above where the point is made that such an abuse may constitute unfair 
prejudice. According to Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future 
of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 657-58 the possible ratification of 
the conduct committed complained of and the views of an independent group in the company are 
important considerations to determine whether leave should be granted to commence with a 
derivative claim on behalf of the company. 
478 For a general discussion of the company law principles see 2.2 above. 
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In the formulation of the statutory derivative claim, the legislature gave 
recognition to the principle of majority rule.479 Further, it acknowledged that in some 
circumstances it would not be in the best interests of the company to institute legal 
proceedings on behalf of the company.480 Because a company is a separate juristic 
person, the company is the proper plaintiff to institute legal proceedings when a 
wrong is committed against the company as the cause of action vests in the 
company and not in the individual shareholders of the company.481  
2.10.4 Restraining the alteration of a company’s articles 
 
The court may issue an order in terms of which any amendments or alterations to 
the articles of a company are prohibited, unless such alteration or amendment is 
made with leave of the court.482 
2.10.4.1 The review of decisions to amend the articles of a company 
 
Decisions or resolutions adopted to amend the articles of a company are 
reviewable. The ability to challenge these decisions or resolutions is important as 
such amendments may affect the rights of other members or shareholders of the 
company that do not necessarily share the sentiments of the majority members of 
                                                 
479 Companies Act 2006, s 263(3)(e). See the discussion of Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 
Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law 
Journal 647, 653 in the context of Companies Act 1985. Payne (657) notes that the courts attached 
considerable weight to the ability of a company to ratify the conduct complained of in determining 
whether permission should be granted to commence with a derivative claim. 
480 Companies Act 2006, s 263(3)(b). Section 263(3)(a) requires that a member should be bona fide 
in pursing an application to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company. See also Jennifer 
Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 
64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 658. 
481 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 657. See also 2.2 read with 2.3 above. 
482 Companies Act 2006, s 996(2)(d). 
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a company.483  
Although the judicial test to determine whether a resolution to amend articles 
is reviewable the test to be applied is somewhat uncertain. Such resolutions are 
usually reviewed on the basis that they have not been adopted bona fide in the best 
interest of the company as a whole.484 A member will have difficulty in challenging 
a resolution if it can be demonstrated that the resolution has been adopted in good 
faith and on a rational basis.485 In some other instances it needs only to be proved 
that the resolution was adopted in bad faith as it is only the members of the company 
that can judge whether a specific resolution is in the best interest of a company.486 
There is no unanimity on the question whether it is required that the general 
meetings acted with a proper purpose in adopting the resolution.487 
2.10.4.2 Amendments in the interests of the majority 
 
The temptation will also exist for majority shareholders to adopted resolutions to 
amend the articles of a company that will more often than not only serve the 
                                                 
483 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 639. 
484 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 639-40. 
485 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 640. 
486 See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 640 who expressed doubt regarding the correctness of the approach. The 
authors further point out (642) that it does not make any contribution to consider whether the 
members of the company regard a particular amendment to be in the interests of the company, in 
order to determine whether the resolution adopting an amendment to the articles of association 
should be upheld.  
487 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 643-44. 
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interests of the majority.488 Such amendments may also be at the expense of other 
or minority shareholders. Examples of such amendments or resolutions include the 
expropriation of the interests of other shareholders in the company on terms and 
conditions favourable to certain other shareholders, often majority shareholders.489  
Although the required majority does have the power to amend the articles of a 
company, such power is not without limits.490 It is submitted that the provisions of 
section 994 of the Act can be used to challenge resolutions or amendments to the 
articles of association on the basis that they are unfairly prejudicial.491 The use of 
the unfair prejudice remedy is advantageous as a member will have to convince the 
court that the resolution or amendment is unfair and also prejudicial, a criterion that 
is wider and in some respects more certain than the judicial tests applied by a court 
to have such resolutions reviewed. It also affords courts with a range of relief that 
can be used in balancing the rights of the various parties and stakeholders affected 
by the resolution.492 One of the forms of relief that a court may order in these 
circumstances is to prohibit certain amendments without the leave of the court or 
                                                 
488 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 639. 
489 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 639-42. 
490 Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 536 [47]. 
491 An amendment may be valid but unfair in certain circumstances. See Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & 
Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 536 [48] read with [90]. In [95]-[96] the court expressed its preference to test 
the validity of amendments to the articles of association based on unfair prejudice, because an 
amendment to the articles of association does not involve the interests of the company. See also 
Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th 
ed, 2016) 645. 
492 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 643 are sceptical about the application of section 994 in this context because it will 
be highly likely that the complaining members would be bought out which will result in the total 
exclusion of their participation in the company. 
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alternatively order the buy-out of certain shareholders depending on the 
circumstances of the particular case. The court is free to make any further orders. 
2.10.5 Purchase or buy-out orders  
2.10.5.1 Introduction 
(a) The right of a member to withdraw his or her investment from a 
company 
 
When a member is dissatisfied with the manner with which the affairs of the 
company he or she invested in are conducted, one of the member’s options is to 
sell his or her shares. However, this is not always practical or even possible, as 
such a sale may, for example, be subject to rights of pre-emption.493 There may also 
be an inadequate market for the sale of the shares.494 This makes the withdrawal of 
the investment of members in some companies problematic and may often lead to 
the investments of members being locked into the company.495  
The default position is that a member does not have the right to compel a 
company and/or other shareholders of a company to purchase his or her shares.496 
                                                 
493 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 681. 
494 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 680. 
495 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 680-81. 
496 Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch); Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [108]; 
[2010] All ER 142. In Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [531] and [583] the court held [531] that 
a shareholder does not have the right to ‘putʼ his or her shares on other shareholders at ‘full value’ 
unless he or she suffered at the hands of unfairly prejudicial conduct. The same applies when there 
was a breakdown of mutual confidence and trust between the members of the company. A petitioner 
should prove that he or she was unfairly prejudiced before he or she may be entitled to relief. This 
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Generally it would not be an option to such a member to relinquish his or her shares 
in the company without compensation of some sort, as the company will retain the 
benefit of the capital invested by the members without the members deriving any 
potential benefit from their investments.497 When a locked-in member wishes to 
withdraw his or her investment in a company, one of the options available to a 
member may be to prove that the affairs of the company are conducted in a manner 
that is unfairly prejudicial which may entitle the member to relief in terms of section 
996 of the Act.498 The advantages of making a buy-out order is that a member is 
free from being locked in a company and/or the company is preserved for the 
remaining members and employees of a company.499 
(b) Unfair prejudice and the right of a member to withdraw his or her 
investment 
Section 994 read with section 996 of the Act provides a court with a wide and 
                                                 
is also the case in the context of quasi-partnership companies. See also Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd 
v Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 1740, [2003] 1 BCLC 76; O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092, 1104. In 
O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092, 1104 the court remarked that ‘[i]t is not fair to the excluded 
member, who will usually have lost his employment, to keep his assets locked in the company. But 
that does not mean that a member who has not been dismissed or excluded can demand that the 
shares be purchased simply because he feels that he has lost trust and confidence in the others. I 
rather doubt whether even in partnership law a dissolution would be granted on this ground in a case 
in which it was still possible under the articles of the business of the partnership to be continued’. 
See further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 684-85. In Law Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 
3769, 1997) [3.66] it is stated that ‘there are strong economic arguments against allowing 
shareholders to exit at will’. 
497 Such investments are also made based on certain expectations or agreements. See in this regard 
2.6.5.  
498 See 2.9 above regarding the unfair prejudice remedy as an alternative remedy to the winding-up 
of a company on a just and equitable basis. 
499 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222 [75]; [2006] BCC 85. 
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flexible discretion to order relief to rectify the unfair prejudice suffered by a 
member.500 Once the member has proven that the company’s affairs have 
been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, the member should 
then further attempt to convince the court that the purchase of his or her shares 
by the company and/or other members of the company is an appropriate 
remedy in the circumstances of the case.501  
(c) The terms of a buy-out or purchase order 
 
The discretion of a court in terms of section 996 of the Act includes the power to 
make an order in terms of which the shares of the petitioner or relevant member be 
bought at fair value.502 Usually, such an order is made in circumstances where the 
basis of the association between the parties to the dispute has been destroyed and 
the subsequent continuation of their association would be unfair to the petitioner.503 
The advantage of this form of relief is that the association between the petitioner 
                                                 
500 KR Hardy Estates Ltd, Re [2014] EWHC 4001 (Ch), [2014] All ER 146 [86]; Birdi v Specsavers 
Optical Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch) [365]; [2015] All ER 144. See 2.10 above regarding the 
discretion of a court in terms of section 996 of the Companies Act 2006. 
501 Should the company be ordered to purchase the shares of some of its members, such a purchase 
will qualify as a reduction of the company’s share capital. See Companies Act 2006, s 996(2)(e). 
See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 682. 
502 Companies Act 2006, s 996(2)(e). See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 684-85 who emphasise that a purchase 
order is a form of relief that can be granted in terms of a petition in terms of section 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006, and is not a right of a member to withdraw his or her shareholding from a 
company. 
503 Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [412]. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington 
Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 680 and 684-85. See further 
in this regard 2.6.5 above. 
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and other members of the company is terminated.504 This form of relief, as with other 
forms of relief, may only be granted when all the jurisdictional facts in section 994(1) 
are met.505 A further important aspect of relief in the form of a buy-back or purchase 
of shares is the valuation of the relevant shares. This aspect is discussed below. 
2.10.5.2 The duty of a court to determine the value of shares 
 
In line with comparable jurisdictions, English courts often grant relief in the form of 
purchase or buy-out orders.506 When a court grants this form of relief, it also has a 
duty to determine the value of the relevant shares.507 Courts in England have 
adopted a flexible approach to the valuation of shares that are the subject of a buy-
out order in terms of section 996.508 When valuing shares that are subject to a buy-
out or purchase order, a court is guided by fairness in the context of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.509  
                                                 
504 See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 680 n 89 who refer to Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70 (CA) to point out that 
a buy-out order is a more effective remedy as a member is protected from future exposure to harm 
as opposed to a compensation order. 
505 See 2.6 above. 
506 Companies Act 2006, s 996(2)(e). For the position in South Africa see 5.9.14 below. See 3.9.4 
for the position in Australia and 4.11.9 for the Canadian position.  
507 Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [147]; [2010] All ER 142. See also Paul L Davies 
and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 680. 
A court should assign a fair value to the shares in question. In determining the value of shares, a 
court may take into account the differences in interests of the various shareholders. The fact that a 
shareholder was a passive investor or acquired his or her shares at a discount may lead to a finding 
that the shares should not be valued on a pro rata basis. See further Robert Goddard ‘Enforcing the 
hypothetical bargain: Section 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) Company Lawyer 66, 78. 
508 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [26]; [2012] All ER 203. 
509 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [283]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See also Estera 
Trust (Jersey) Ltd & Anor v Singh & Ors [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch) [644]-[645] read with [648] where 
the court held that the fair value and market value of shares cannot always be equated. There are 
 131 
 
While a court enjoys a wide discretion in fixing the value of the shares in a 
company, this discretion should be exercised judicially while taking into 
consideration the concept of fairness.510 The concept of fairness requires a court to 
value the shares that are subject to a purchase or buy-out order in such a manner 
that one of the parties is not unjustly enriched.511 This will prevent that unfair 
                                                 
many factors that a court has to take into account to determine the fair value at which shares must 
be bought in terms of a buy-out order. Factors may include the nature of the relationship between 
the shareholders involved and the purchaser of the shares [646], the fact that the shares are not sold 
in an open market [645] and that the acquisition will affect the position of the remaining shareholders 
in the company. Such acquisition may increase the purchaser’s power within the company [646] and 
the acquisition of the relevant shares below their fair value may financially benefit the acquiring 
shareholder [646]-[647]. The fair value further has to be determined in light on the unfair prejudicial 
conduct found [648]. See further McCallum-Toppin v McCallum-Toppin [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) [208] 
where the court held that on the fact of the specific case the shares of the company subject to a 
purchase order would be more valuable in the hands of an existing member or shareholder than 
when they are sold to an investor outside the company.  
510 In Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [299]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 the court 
remarked that a shareholder who became a member of a company by the subscription of shares in 
the company at a discounted price will usually be unable to argue that his or her shares should be 
bought at an undiscounted price in the event of a purchase order made on unfair prejudicial conduct. 
511 For example, where the controlling shareholders intentionally adopt a strategy to diminish the 
value of a company’s shares with the purpose to buy the shares of minority shareholders on more 
favourable terms. See Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [283]; [2010] 1 BCLC 
367. See also Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd v Singh 2019 WL 01641174 (ChD) where the court held that 
section 996 of the Companies Act 2006 does provide the discretion to order the payment of interest 
as part of compensation to compensate a member whose shares will be bought by the company or 
other members from the time of the order until the actual payment of the determined price for the 
relevant shares. Such an order would usually be made when indulgence is sought to acquire the 
necessary finance to buy the relevant shares. In such circumstances the company will have the 
benefit of the member’s capital but such member will be excluded from sharing in the growth of the 
company. It is important to distinguish between interest awarded as a form of compensation in terms 
of section 996 of the Act and judgment interest in terms of the Judgments Act 1838. No award for 
interest would be made unless the value of the shares subject to a buy-out order is determined. 
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prejudicial conduct is incentivised.512 
(a) The role of experts and the discretion of the court 
The discretion of a court to make such an order includes the power to determine the 
fair value of the relevant shares.513 The determination of the value of shares is a 
very complex matter and often the expertise of experts such as accountants or 
actuaries is required to provide the court with guidance. However, the ultimate 
power and duty to fix the value of the relevant shares resides with the court. The 
court should fix a value that is fair based on the evidence provided.514 The court’s 
discretion is only subject to the overriding principle that the value determined by the 
court must be fair in the circumstances of the specific case.515 
                                                 
512 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [283]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Re Blue Index Ltd 
[2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) [26]; Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd & Anor v Singh & Ors [2018] EWHC 1715 
(Ch) [647]; McCallum-Toppin v McCallum-Toppin [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) [216]. See also 2.10.5.5 for 
a further discussion of the application of a minority discount. 
513 Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [33]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. 
514 Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [152]; [2010] All ER 142. 
515 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [105]; [2010] All ER 177. See also Profinance Trust SA v 
Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [33]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. In Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1031, [2002] 1 BCLC 141 the petitioner, Profinance, was a 40% shareholder in a 
company Americanino Ltd (‘the company’). The respondent, Mr Gladstone, held the remaining 60% 
of the shares in the company. The company carried on the business of selling computer memory. It 
was agreed that Profinance will provide the start-up capital while the day-to-day business would be 
managed by Mr Gladstone. Initially it was further agreed that Profinance and Mr Gladstone would be 
equal shareholders in the business. The business was initially very successful and Profinance and 
Mr Gladstone adjusted their shareholding to a 60/40% shareholding in favour of Mr Gladstone. 
Profinance approached the court by way of petition, based on unfair prejudice, for relief in the form 
of an order that Mr Gladstone should buy its shares in the company at fair value. It was conceded 
that the affairs of the company were conducted unfairly. Mr Gladstone made various offers to buy 
the shares of Profinance of which none were accepted because the parties could not agree on a fair 
value of the shares held by Profinance. For a more detailed summary of the facts of the case see 
Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [14]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. See also Sunrise 
Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [279], [280]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 regarding the 
 133 
 
(b) The flexibility of a court’s discretion and the factors and circum-
stances affecting the valuation of shares 
 
During the valuation of shares for purposes of a purchase or buy-out order, the 
unique facts and circumstances of each case must be carefully considered.516 
Because the facts and circumstances differ from case to case, the principles 
contained in legal precedence should be applied with the necessary flexibility to 
provide for the unique context of the specific case before a court. Although courts 
should approach the valuation of the shares of a member based on the individual 
facts and circumstances of a case, consistency in their approach to the valuation of 
shares is essential.517 This can be achieved by having due regard to the principles 
developed in case law. Existing precedents of other courts should not be blindly or 
mechanically applied.518  
(i) Quasi-partnerships and ‘the clean hands’ principle as factors 
influencing the value of shares 
Factors that may influence the value of the petitioner’s shares in a company include 
whether the relevant company is quasi-partnership519 and/or whether the member 
approached the court with clean hands.520 Where a member to a quasi-partnership 
approaches a court with clean hands, a valuation of the shares on an undiscounted 
                                                 
appropriate date of valuation and the application of a minority discount. More specifically see 
2.10.5.3 and 2.10.5.5 for a discussion of the date to be used as basis for the valuation of the shares 
subject to a buy-out order and the application of a minority discount, respectively. 
516 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [299]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
517 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [299]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
518 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [299]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
519 See 2.6.5.4 above for a discussion of quasi-partnerships. 
520 See 2.6.4 above for a discussion of how the conduct of a petitioner may affect unfair prejudice 
proceedings. 
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basis is favoured.521 An appropriate valuation must prevent unjust enrichment of a 
party and must carefully consider the appropriateness of the application of a 
discount to the value of the shares.522  
(ii) Other considerations 
A shareholder who has been subjected to unfair prejudicial conduct cannot always 
be regarded as a willing seller of his shares.523 Further, the availability of relief in 
the form of winding-up order is an important consideration in determining the price 
or value of shares and/or tailoring relief for purpose of a petition based on unfair 
prejudicial conduct.524 The winding-up of the company must be considered in light 
of the difference in the value of what the petitioner will receive and the perceived 
value to the respondents.525 
When determining the value of shares in the context of a purchase or buy-
out order, a court should be cautious in fixing a value to the shares with reference 
                                                 
521 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [102]; [2010] All ER 177. See also Profinance Trust SA v 
Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [18], [47]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. See also 2.10.5.5 below for a 
discussion of the application of a minority discount. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington 
Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 681 who point out that a 
minority discount is generally applied when a company is not a quasi-partnership. 
522 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [283]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. Unjust enrichment 
may occur where it was the purpose of the buyer’s unfairly prejudicial conduct to diminish the value 
of the seller’s shares to enable to the buyer to purchase the shares at a discount ([305]). For 
example, where business is diverted away from the company. 
523 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [298]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
524 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [303]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
525 Such an approach is aligned with the principle that the relief should remove the complaint and, 
objectively viewed, be fair in the circumstances of the case. See Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] 
EWHC 2893 (Ch) [303]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Annacott Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119 [12]; 
[2013] 2 BCLC 46. 
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to what a willing purchaser is willing to pay for the shares.526 The purchasers of the 
shares are often unwilling or reluctant purchasers of shares.527 During the valuation 
of shares a court should take into consideration certain factors that may have an 
effect on the adjustments made to the value of the shares. For example, the actual 
value of the shares may be adjusted to rectify the prejudicial effects that the unfair 
conduct has on the value of the shares of the petitioner.528  
2.10.5.3 The date on which the shares are to be valued – the principles 
 
(a)  Introduction 
 
The date that will be used as the basis for the valuation of the relevant shares may 
have a substantial impact on determining the value of the shares.529 Generally, 
three possible dates could be used as the basis for the valuation of shares that are 
subject to a buy-out or purchase order. Arguments exist for the use of the date on 
which the unfair prejudice occurred,530 the date on which the petition is presented 
to court531 and the date on which the order for the purchase of the shares is made.532  
In Shepherd v Williamson533 the court held that ‘decisions are best made with 
                                                 
526 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16, [44]; [2002] All ER 348. A willing 
buyer or third party will often only be prepared to pay a value for the relevant shares that reflects the 
harm done. See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 680. 
527 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16, [44]; [2002] All ER 348. 
528 Maidment v Attwood [2012] EWCA Civ 998 [26]; [2012] All ER 203. 
529 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 681-82. 
530 See 2.10.5.3 (b) below. 
531 See 2.10.5.3 (c) below. 
532 See 2.10.5.3 (d) below. 
533 [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [152]. 
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all relevant evidence before the Court. However, it does not seem to me that expert 
evidence on values at different times affects the Court’s decision as to which date 
should be selected. That is the wrong way round’. In other words, the date that a 
court uses as basis for the valuation for the shares is not determined or dictated by 
the value of the shares on a particular date. A court should first determine the date 
that should be used as basis for the valuation and only thereafter determine the 
appropriateness of the valuation.534 
(b) The date of the unfair prejudicial conduct  
 
The date on which the unfair prejudicial conduct took place is one of the dates that 
could be used as the basis to value the relevant shares.535 When this date is used 
for the valuation of shares, consideration should be given to the possibility that the 
value of the shares may have been diminished as a result of the unfair prejudicial 
conduct. This may require adjustments to be made to the base value of the shares 
to remedy the effect that the unfair prejudicial conduct had on the value of the 
shares.536 The same applies to benefits that accrued to the member (petitioner) 
                                                 
534 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 681-82 state that the courts have a wide discretion regarding the date which must be 
used as basis for the valuation of the shares that are subject to a buy-out order. 
535 See, for example, Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [117], [119]; [2010] All ER 177 where the 
court used the date upon which the petitioner was unfairly excluded from the management of the 
company. 
536 In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [118]; [2010] All ER 177 it was submitted that ‘the shares 
were clearly valueless, whatever date was chosen. This was based on the submission that even at 
the date of expulsion the Company was insolvent unless the director’s loan accounts, then 
amounting to about £400,000, could be collected. It does not however seem to me to be fair that Mr 
Good should be able to rely on his own inability to pay his debt to the Company to reduce the price 
that he ought to pay to acquire Mr Crolyʼs shares. Nor does it seem to me right that he should seek 
to reduce the amount paid by reference to any difficulty Mr Croly might have in repaying the amount 
he owes, in circumstances where Mr Good has exacerbated that difficulty by failing to declare the 
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because of his or her shareholding in the company.  
(c) The date of the petition  
A court can also order that the shares be valued as on the date of the 
commencement of proceedings relating to unfair prejudice.537 The benefit of this 
approach is that it often reflects the date on which the petitioner regarded the 
conduct complained of as having become unfairly prejudicial.538 However, the date 
of the presentation of the petition, as a basis for the valuation of shares, does not 
provide concrete and clear answers in relation to the valuation of shares. This date 
may be insufficient in some respects.539 Using the date on which the petition is 
                                                 
dividends that could have been declared which would have reduced this liability and leaving Mr Croly 
in the situation in which he is exposed to a claim for recovery by the administrators but the asset 
which he will presumably wish to use to discharge it, that is the price of his shares, is to be reduced 
in value by virtue of the very existence of the liability in the first place. I propose therefore to direct 
that in conducting the valuation exercise the valuer should assume that the director's loan accounts 
will be recoverable in full’. See also [120] where the court held that ‘[i]t may be necessary to give 
further directions as to the basis upon which the valuation will be performed. One matter which I do 
wish to deal with now however is a claim in the petition that the valuer should assume that Mr Good 
must repay to the Company all the amounts which are said to have been misappropriated by him 
from it. These are the amounts paid to Mr Good on account of dividend and other amounts drawn in 
cash or paid by the Company in respect of his personal expenses. Since all of these amounts have 
been debited to Mr Good's loan account, he is already liable to repay those amounts to the Company, 
that liability will be treated as an asset of the Company by virtue of the direction I have referred to 
above, and no further adjustment is required to be made’. 
537 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 364; [1958] 3 All ER 66.  
538 Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [117]; [2010] All ER 177; Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 
2375 (Ch) [152]; [2010] All ER 142. See also Cumana, Re [1986] BCLC 430, 435-36. In Shepherd v 
Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [146]; [2010] All ER 142 the court explained that the date of the 
presentation of the petition may be regarded as the most appropriate date because this is the date 
upon which the conduct complained of became unfairly prejudicial to such an extent that the 
petitioner required relief from a court. 
539 In Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [37]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141 the court 
remarked that this may be the case in the event of ‘a major change in the (whether for the better or 
for the worse) in the company’s capital structure and business’. The court cited Re OC (Transport) 
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presented may ignore unfair prejudicial conduct and/or its effects that transpired 
prior to and after the date of the presentation of the petition.  
The court will have to take into consideration the contribution of a member in 
the increase or decrease in the value of shares after the presentation of a petition.540 
A court could also order that adjustments be made to compensate for unfair 
prejudicial conduct that took place in the past.541 It is very important that an increase 
or decrease in the value of shares must be supported by a proper evidential basis.542 
(d) The date on which a court orders the purchase of the shares 
Generally, the most appropriate date to use as a basis for the valuation of shares 
for purposes of a purchase or buy-out order, is the date closest to the actual sale of 
the shares.543 According to this point of view the shares should be valued as on the 
                                                 
Services [1984] BCLC 251 as an example where a major change took place in the form of a 
substantial increase in the company’s issued capital. The use of an earlier date may be more 
appropriate in such circumstances. 
540 See, for example, Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [54]; [2002] 1 BCLC 
141 where the value of the company in question ‘increased almost threefold after the date of the 
presentation of the petition’ in circumstances where the expected industry trend was downwards. In 
this case the court ([54]) could not find a causal link between the increased value of the company 
and the efforts or contributions by Mr Gladstone. See also London School of Electronics, Re [1986] 
Ch 211, 225 where the court held that the use of a later date than the date of the presentation of the 
petition would be unfair in the circumstances of the case as the respondents managed to grow their 
business through their own efforts and the evidence indicated that the growth would not have been 
possible with involvement of the company. 
541 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324; [1958] 3 All ER 66; and [1959] 
3 WLR 404. 
542 Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [54]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. 
543 See Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd & Anor v Singh & Ors [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch) [632]; Profinance 
Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [33]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. See also Shepherd v 
Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [146]; [2010] All ER 142; Brownlow v Marshall [2000] 2 BCLC 
655; Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [287]-[288]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See further 
London School of Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211; Elgindata, Re [1991] BCLC 959. In London 
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date the order is made by the court.544 This general rule of application is subject to 
                                                 
School of Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211, 224 the court stressed that this is especially the case 
when the shares of the company are to be valued as going concern. In Brownlow v Marshall [2000] 
2 BCLC 655 [76] the value of the company increased between the date of the petition and the date 
when the court granted relief. The court held ([76]) that the appropriate date to use for the valuation 
of the shares was the date of the court order. The court ([76]) advanced two reasons for the decision. 
Firstly, that such an increase in value was in part derived from the benefit of having the share capital 
provided by the petitioner and secondly that the increase in value was achieved through the 
managers and staff of the company who were not shareholders ‘(but whose services are paid equally 
by all shareholders)’. In Elgindata, Re [1991] BCLC 959, 1006 the court remarked that it established 
the extent to which the value of the shares of the petitioners’ were diminished by conduct in terms of 
which petitioners may complain of in terms of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985. 
544 In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [1]; [2010] All ER 177 the petitioner, Mr Croly, sought an order 
that his shares in a company be bought by Mr and Mrs Good. The petition was based on the unfairly 
prejudicial conduct of the affairs of the company for purposes of section 994 of the Companies Act 
2006 ([1]). The fact that the petitioner required that the shares be valued as on the date of 7 November 
2007 was significant in the context of the petition, as the last mentioned date was the date on which 
the petitioner had been excluded from the management of the company ([1]). The company’s financial 
position also started to deteriorate to a point where the company was placed under administration on 
11 April 2009 ([1]). The court [105] explained that the starting point for fixing a date for valuation is the 
date upon which the order for the purchase of shares is made. This is the position unless the 
circumstances and facts of the case dictate that an alternative date should be fixed in order to ensure 
that fairness is achieved between the parties to the dispute. The petitioner argued ([106]) that an earlier 
date should be used as the basis for valuing the shares. According to the petitioner ([106]) the financial 
decline of the company was caused by the conduct of Mr Good. It was further argued ([106]) that Mr 
Good would benefit from such decline as a company that was incorporated by him would purchase the 
assets. The court held [117] that in the circumstances of the case the date of the expulsion of the 
petitioner is the most appropriate date to use as the basis for the valuation of the petitioner’s shares in 
the company. See also Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [21], [60]-[61]; [2002] 
1 BCLC 141 where the court ([61]) referred to various cases and circumstances that may justify the 
use of an earlier valuation date. The court remarked that ‘[i]t would be wrong to enumerate all those 
cases but some of them can be illustrated by the authorities already referred to: 
i) Where a company has been deprived of its business, an early valuation date (and 
compensating adjustments) may be required in fairness to the claimant (Meyer). 
ii) Where a company has been reconstructed or its business has been changed 
significantly, so that it has a new economic identity, an early valuation date may be 
required in fairness to one or both parties (OC Transport, and to a lesser degree 
London School of Electronics). But an improper alteration in the issued share capital, 
unaccompanied by any change in the business, will not necessarily have that 
outcome (DR Chemicals). 
iii) Where a minority shareholder has a petition on foot and there is a general fall in the 
market, the court may in fairness to the claimant have the shares valued at an early 
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the principle that the valuation must be fair in the context of the facts of the particular 
case.545 In appropriate circumstances, a court may deviate from the general rule 
and order that the shares be valued based on an earlier date.546 
                                                 
date, especially if it strongly disapproves of the majority shareholder’s prejudicial 
conduct (Cumana). 
iv) But a claimant is not entitled to what the deputy judge called a one-way bet, and the 
court will not direct an early valuation date simply to give the claimant the most 
advantageous exit from the company, especially where severe prejudice has not 
been made out (Elgindata). 
v) All these points may be heavily influenced by the parties’ conduct in making and 
accepting or rejecting offers either before or during the course of the proceedings 
(O’Neill v Phillips)’. 
The court in Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [60]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141 held 
that the shares of a member in a going concern should be valued at the date on which the purchase 
is ordered, following London School of Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211, 222; [1985] BCLC 273, 
281. See also Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [285]-[288]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 
where the court held that it will only depart from the general principle to use the date of the order as 
the basis for the valuation of a member’s shares unless there are circumstances that justify another 
course of action. Examples of such circumstances may include a fall in the market during the hearing 
of the petition or the conduct of the respondent or respondents ([286]). 
545 Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [60]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. See also 
Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [280]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See further Birds 
Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] 1 Ch 419 and on appeal [1986] Ch 658 (CA); London School of 
Electronics Ltd, Re [1986] Ch 211, 224; [1985] BCLC 273. 
546 KR Hardy Estates Ltd, Re [2014] EWHC 4001 (Ch) [86]; [2014] All ER 146. See also Croly v Good 
[2010] EWHC 1 (Ch), [2010] All ER 177; Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch), [2010] All 
ER 142. See further OC Transport Services Ltd, Re [1984] BCLC 251; Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1031 [61]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141. In Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1031 [61]; [2002] 1 BCLC 141 the court emphasised the following factors that are indicative of the 
fairness of the use of an earlier valuation date to determine the fair value of the shares of a petitioner. 
These factors include whether the company has been deprived of business; whether a significant 
change of business took place within the company; whether an alteration of the share capital of the 
company was made; whether there was a sudden fall in the market; and whether a reasonable offer 
has been made. These factors should be taken into account, but a petitioner is not entitled to an earlier 
valuation date just because such a date will be more advantageous. In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] 
EWHC 2375 (Ch) [150]; [2010] All ER 142 the court held that ‘[t]hus it may be appropriate to specify 
an early valuation date where it is simply unclear whether the respondent’s conduct after the date of 
unfairly prejudicial conduct has caused the diminution in the value of the shares, on the basis that it is 
unfair for the petitioner to assume the burden of the risk: see Re OC Transport. In Croly v Good and 
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2.10.5.4 The breakup value of a company versus the value of a company as 
a going concern 
 
When a company is wound-up, a member shares in a rateable portion of the 
                                                 
Others [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) His Judge Cooke (sitting as deputy Judge of this Division) fixed the date 
of valuation as the date of expulsion, although that was considerably earlier even than the date of the 
Petition. One factor relevant of this finding that a valuation after the date of expulsion would be unfair 
to the petitioner was that the company had been put into administration by the majority shareholder for 
the purpose of implementing a pre-pack sale of its assets to a new company owned by that shareholder 
and his wife’. In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) [151]; [2010] All ER 142 the court 
considered the unjust exclusion of the petitioner and the conduct of the respondent towards the 
petitioner after the exclusion; the fact that a quasi-partnership existed between the members that 
entitled the petitioner to participate in the management of the affairs of the company, the exclusion of 
the petitioner from the management of the company impacted on his interests as shareholder of the 
company; the general fall in the market has partially caused the diminution in the value of the shares 
of the company, and because the respondent has been the sole control of the affairs the company 
since the date of the exclusion of the petitioner from the management of the company, the respondent 
should ‘take some responsibility for the decline in business’; the deadlock between the members of the 
company and the impact thereof on the company’s credit rating may be one of the causes of the 
company’s decline, but the respondent rather opted to continue with the business of the company than 
to wind-up the company; various offers were made to purchase the shares of the petitioner, but none 
of the offers were ‘an equivocal offer to purchase at a fair value’; ‘(vi) Mr Shepard hedged his bets by 
bringing proceedings in the Tribunal against the Company at the same time as pursuing his s 994 
remedy. While he may have known that the costs of the defence were being borne by the Company’s 
assets he put down a marker at an early stage as to illegitimacy of doing so and as to Mr Williamson’s 
lack of authority to exclude him on any basis.’ ‘(vii) The Company was placed in administration. It 
emerged only very shortly before trial that its assets have been pre-packed to a new company, Equiss 
Services Limited, controlled by the Company’s associate directors Mr Peters, Mr East and Mr Vann. 
The Administrators’ Report indicates that work in progress was disposed of at some 15% of its 
ostensible value, although other evidence suggests that it could perhaps have realised some 40%. Mr 
Williamson is presumably aware of the facts about this sale; Mr Shepherd is not.’ The court ([151]) took 
into consideration that a considerable amount of time had lapsed between the exclusion of the 
petitioner from the management of the company and the making of the court order. See also OC 
Transport Services Ltd, Re [1984] BCLC 251 where the valuation date was set at 18 months prior to 
the presentation of the petition. In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [113]; [2010] All ER 177 the court 
fixed the date for the valuation of the shares of the petitioner as the date of his expulsion from the 
management of the company.  
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remaining assets – after the payment of creditors – valued on a breakup basis.547 
Whether the shares of a member is valued based on the breakup value of the assets 
of the company or on the basis that the company as going concern, makes a 
substantial difference to the value that a court would attribute to the shares.548 In 
the event of the company being wound-up on ‘just and equitable’ basis, the fair 
value of the shares of a member is measured against the ‘rateable proportion of the 
realised assets’ that a member would receive.549  
When obtaining relief on the basis of section 994, minority shareholders 
should not, as general rule, be worse off than when a winding-up order is made.550 
Normally when shares are valued on the basis that a company is a going concern, 
                                                 
547 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [303]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
548 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 681 note that the valuation of a company’s shares on a break-up basis is usually 
lower than when a company’s shares are valued as a going-concern. 
549 Kohli v Lit & Ors [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [301]. 
550 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [56], [58]; [2012] 1 BCLC 335. 
See also Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch), [2010] 1 BCLC 367. See further 
CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 [46]; [2002] 2 BCLC 108. In Sunrise 
Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [301], [303]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 the court explained that, 
when dealing with a petition for the winding-up of a solvent company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds, 
the possibility exists that the court may direct the liquidator to continue with the business of the 
company in an attempt to realise the business of the company as a going concern. In Fulham 
Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [56], [58]; [2012] 1 BCLC 335 the court 
stated that the liquidation of a company is ‘an exceptional remedy’. A dispute relating to a solvent 
company will not usually involve the rights and interests of creditors and the purpose of the remedy 
is to preserve the value of the company. The remedy is designed to resolve disputes without the 
winding-up of the company. In CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 [46]; 
[2002] 2 BCLC 108 it was stressed that the fair value of shares should be determined with reference 
to all the parties to the dispute. To use the break-up value to value the assets of the company and 
thereby determining the value of shares which are subject to a purchase or buy-order, is not 
necessarily a reflection of the fair value of the shares between the parties to the dispute ([46]). See 
also 2.9 above for a discussion of the unfair prejudice remedy as an alternative remedy. 
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shares will carry a higher value than when a company would be valued on a breakup 
basis.551 
The valuation of the shares of a quasi-partnership is usually done on the 
basis that the company would be sold as a going concern.552 This is an important 
consideration, because when the shares of a minority shareholder are bought by 
the majority shareholder or the company valued at a breakup basis, the respondents 
or majority shareholder will receive a ‘windfall’ that can be regarded as being at the 
expense of the petitioner or minority shareholder.553  
In CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida554 the court held that an 
offer to purchase the shares of a minority shareholder was not fair because the offer 
reflected the breakup value of the company.555 Such valuation would be unfair 
towards the member (petitioner) if the respondent would be allowed to continue to 
carry on the business of the company.556 This principle does not prevent a court 
                                                 
551 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch); [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Annacott Holdings Ltd, 
Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119; [2013] 2 BCLC 46. In Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) 
[303]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367 the court stated that ‘[a] winding-up, though producing a rateable 
proportion of the assets for all shareholders, will often be at break-up value, and therefore not 
necessarily advantageous to the shareholders’. In Annacott Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119 
[5]; [2013] 2 BCLC 46 the court remarked that the proceeds of a sale of assets on a breakup basis 
are usually lower than when the company is sold as a going concern. See also Paul L Davies and 
Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 681. 
552 Annacott Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119 [11], [12]; [2013] 2 BCLC 46. In the Law 
Commission ‘Shareholder Remedies’ (Law Com No 246 Cm 3769, 1997) [3.8] and [3.9] it is 
recommended that the valuation of shares be done on a pro rata basis without the application of a 
minority discount in circumstances similar to Ebrahimi, while acknowledging that there is room for 
the application of a minority discount in companies that are not quasi-partnerships. 
553 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 [38]; [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
554 [2002] UKPC 16; [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
555 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 [46]; [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
556 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 [46]; [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
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from ordering the valuation of shares of a company on a going concern basis in 
other circumstances such as where a quasi-partnership is not present.557 
2.10.5.5 The application of a minority discount 
 
The principles relating to the valuation of shares are flexible.558 As general rule, a 
minority discount is not applied when the shares of a quasi-partnership are 
valued.559 This is because a member of a quasi-partnership whose shares are sold 
in terms of such order cannot always be regarded as a willing seller.560 This does 
not mean that the shares of companies that are not quasi-partnerships cannot be 
valued on an undiscounted basis.561 However, this will only be done in exceptional 
                                                 
557 Annacott Holdings Ltd, Re [2013] EWCA Civ 119 [11]; [2013] 2 BCLC 46. See also Paul L Davies 
and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 681. 
See further 2.10.5.5 below. 
558 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [292]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
559 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [290]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367. The court ([294]) 
further explained that a departure from this principle is justified in circumstances where the petitioner 
caused the destruction of the quasi-partnership relationship between the parties. See also Brownlow 
v Marshall Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 655 [75]. 
560 See Re Blue Index Ltd [2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) [23] where the court emphasised that the 
application of a minority discount is dependent on whether or not the seller is a willing seller. When 
the seller is a willing seller the general rule is that a minority discount will be applied. When the seller 
is not a willing seller a minority discount will not be applied. A member who is selling his or her shares 
in terms of a buy-out order as a result of unfair prejudice committed against him or her, is an example 
of an unwilling seller. The application of a minority discount would, however, be appropriate when 
the shares were acquired by the unwilling seller in a quasi-partnership at a discounted price. 
561 Strachan v Wilcock [2006] EWCA Civ 13; Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) 
[290], [297]; [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch), [2010] All ER 177. See also 
Fowler v Gruber [2009] CSOH 36. In Croly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch) [8] read with [102]; [2010] 
All ER 177 the court remarked that a minority discount is not generally applied to a quasi-partnership. 
In Strachan v Wilcock [2006] EWCA Civ 13 [31]; [2006] 2 BCLC 555 the court held that the shares 
of a member of a quasi-partnership should be valued without applying a minority discount. In Fowler 
v Gruber [2009] CSOH 36 [186] the court held that a minority discount must be applied in the absence 
of a quasi-partnership relationship between the parties. See 2.10.5.4 above. 
 145 
 
circumstances.562  
2.10.6 Compensation orders and the principle of reflective loss  
2.10.6.1 Introduction 
Although not specifically stated in section 996 of the Companies Act 2006 a court 
may grant compensation as a form of relief.563 In some instances, compensation 
                                                 
562 Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch); [2010] 1 BCLC 367; Irvine v Irvine [2006] 
EWHC 583 (Ch); [2007] 1 BCLC 445. In Irvine v Irvine [2006] EWHC 583 (Ch) [11]; [2007] 1 BCLC 
445 the court held that ‘[a] minority shareholding, even one where the extent of the minority is as 
slight as in this case, is to be valued for what it is, a minority shareholding, unless there is some 
good reason to attribute to it a pro-rata share of the overall value of the company. Short of a quasi-
partnership or some other exceptional circumstance, there is no reason to accord to it a quality which 
it lacks. CIHL [the company] is not a quasi-partnership’. See also McCallum-Toppin v McCallum-
Toppin [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) [197]. In Sunrise Radio Limited, Re [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) [293]; 
[2010] 1 BCLC 367 the valuation of a minority shareholding of a company that was a quasi-
partnership was distinguished from a company that was not. When the determining the value of a 
minority shareholding in a company that is not a quasi-partnership, the fact that the shares are a 
minority shareholding should be taken into account. The court ([306] and [308]) valued the shares of 
the petitioner on an undiscounted basis despite the fact that initial quasi-partnership relationship 
existed between the members. There was an absence of a quasi-partnership at the time of the 
relevant unfair prejudicial conduct. The remaining shareholders would potentially have been unduly 
enriched if the shares were to be valued at a discount as high as 80% ([308]). The court ([308]) took 
into consideration that the petitioner subscribed to the shares of the company at an undiscounted 
price. A further enrichment would possibly follow in the event of the shares of the company being 
sold in the near future (2 years) ([308]). The fact that the shares of the petitioner would be transferred 
to the remaining shareholders justified a valuation on an undiscounted basis ([308]). The petitioner 
is not a willing seller ([308]). The petitioner should not be worse off because the exit of the petitioner 
has been forced by unfairly prejudicial conduct and therefore would not be able to share in a future 
sale ([308]). The petitioner should benefit from the capital growth of the investment ([308]). The facts 
of the case ([308]) justified the winding-up of the company on a ‘just and equitable basisʼ, but the 
winding-up of the company would result in a less favourable return for shareholders, while a 
purchase order provides the remaining shareholders with the opportunity to continue with the 
business of the company as a going concern ([308]). The court ([308]) also took into consideration 
that an attempt was made to dilute the shareholding of the petitioner in the company. 
563 Rembert v Daniel [2018] EWHC 388 (Ch). 
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can be granted in combination with other orders such as a buy-out order. When a 
wrong is committed against a company the loss or damages suffered by the 
company may be reflected in the value of shares held by its members.564 In light of 
this a brief analysis of the principle of reflective loss is valuable in understanding the 
role that the relief in section 996 of the Companies Act 2006 plays in compensating 
members or shareholders of company.  
The default legal position is that a member cannot institute legal proceedings 
in terms of section 994565 to recover loss or damages suffered in the form of a 
diminution of the value of his or her shares in a company.566 This is because the 
diminution of the value of the shares in the company is a mere reflection of the loss 
or damages suffered by the company.567 The cause of action for such recovery also 
                                                 
564 Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120: Jul Law Quarterly Review 
457, 458 explains that this loss may take the form of a diminution in value of shares in a company 
or a reduction of dividends. 
565 Companies Act 2006. 
566 See Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 65, [2001] 1 All ER 481, 503 where the court 
explained that ‘a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, only the company may 
sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no 
other to make good a diminution in the value of the shareholder’s shareholding where that merely 
reflects the loss suffered by the company’. See also Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] EWHC 
1056 (Ch), [2004] 2 BCLC 191. See further Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 222-24; [1982] 1 All ER 354; Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower 
and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 610-12.  
567 See also Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120: Jul Law 
Quarterly Review 457, 458 where it is argued that some authorities do not regard a diminution of 
value in the shares of a company as a personal loss to the members of that company. However, 
Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 667 argues that a shareholder will be able to 
base a claim, in the form of the diminution of the value of the its shares in the company, in the event 
of a breach of a duty towards the shareholder. The author cites George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd v 
Multi Construction Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 260 as authority. See also Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ 
Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business Organization 
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vests in the company and not the member or shareholder.568  
A share entitles a member to participate in the company in accordance with 
the rights attached to the specific class of shares.569 Mitchell is of the view that this 
approach is too narrow and disregards the reality that a share or shares has an 
inherent value as property to generate income and can be sold to others.570 
2.10.6.2 A diminution in the value of shares as a result of a breach of 
directors’ duties 
 
The problem with the reflective loss principle becomes more evident when the basis 
for the relief is the breach of a director’s duty. This because it may then be argued 
that such a breach does not only infringe on the rights of a company but also affects 
the interests of the members of a company.571 Although it is true that directors’ 
                                                 
Law Review 97, 98 and 99 who argues that the use of the term ‘personal loss’ is not appropriate to 
determine whether as shareholder has a direct claim for damages as both a reflective loss and a 
non-reflective loss are losses suffered personally by a shareholder. 
568 In Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 it was held that when a breach to the company 
occurs the company is the proper plaintiff to institute legal proceedings against the wrongdoer. For 
a discussion of Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 and ‘the proper plaintiff rule’ see 
2.3.1 above. See Stephan Griffin ‘Shareholder Remedies and the no Reflective Loss Principle – 
Problems Surrounding the Identification of a Membership Interest’ (2010) 6 Journal of Business Law 
461, 464. 
569 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 222-23. See also 
Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 667-68. See further Charles Mitchell 
‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law Quarterly Review 457, 459. 
570 Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law Quarterly Review 
457, 459. 
571 Based on the obiter remarks of the court in Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2), Re [1990] BCLC 760, 
Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th 
ed, 2016) 675-76 highlight that the mere breach of a director’s duty would not justify relief in terms 
of the unfair prejudice remedy, but that the petitioner should demonstrate conduct on the part of the 
controllers of the company that is unfairly prejudicial to the minority. The purpose of the unfair 
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duties are owed to the company, and not individual shareholders, it can be argued 
that in some circumstances a breach of a director’s duty may constitute grounds for 
the application of the unfair prejudice remedy.572 
2.10.6.3 Loss or damages suffered separately and distinctly from the 
company 
However, in some instances a shareholder may claim for the loss or damages 
suffered as a result of a diminution in value of his or her shares in a company. In 
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co573 the court emphasised the fact that the authorities do 
support the principle that a shareholder may recover loss suffered in the form of a 
diminution in the value of his or her shareholding. This is only the position when the 
company suffered a loss, but the cause of action to recover such a loss does not 
vest in the company.574 A shareholder or member will also be able to recover or 
claim for losses or damages suffered, in the form of a diminution in the value of 
shares, if such losses or damages are separate and distinct from the loss or 
                                                 
prejudice remedy is to provide redress for a disregard of the interests of the minority by the controllers 
of the company. For example, where directors breached their duties towards the company and the 
board refuses to institute legal proceedings to remedy such a breach. See also this regard 2.10.3 
below. According to Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 610 the reflective loss principle applies to situations where the 
company and a shareholder have a claim based on the same facts and the alleged loss suffered by 
the shareholder is a total or partial reflection of the loss suffered by the company. 
572 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 649-50. 
573 [2000] UKHL 65, [2001] 1 All ER 481, 503. 
574 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 65, [2001] 1 All ER 481, 503. See also Bas J De Jong 
‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business 
Organization Law Review 97, 112 who is of the view that a shareholder can claim for losses in the 
form of a reflective loss, provided that the wrongdoer owed a separate duty to the shareholder and 
the cause of action vests in the shareholder. 
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damages suffered by the company.575  
 
2.10.6.4 Criticism of the reflective loss principle in the prevention of a 
double recovery  
The reflective loss principle is not free from criticism, especially in light of the 
recognition that a diminution of the market value of shares can be regarded as a 
loss suffered by the relevant shareholder.576 Some approach the reflective loss 
principle as a mechanism to prevent double recovery from the same victim.577 This 
                                                 
575 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 65, [2001] 1 All ER 481, 503. See also Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 222-24; [1982] 1 All ER 354. See 
further Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law (10th ed, 2016) 612. See also Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 
120:Jul Law Quarterly Review 457, 460-61; Stephan Griffin ‘Shareholder Remedies and the no 
Reflective Loss Principle – Problems Surrounding the Identification of a Membership Interest’ (2010) 
6 Journal of Business Law 461, 463. 
576 See Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 65, [2001] 1 All ER 481, 503 where the court 
described the problem in dealing with actions regarding reflective loss as follows: ‘On the one hand 
the court must respect the principle of company autonomy, ensure that the company’s creditors are 
not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders and ensure that a party does not recover 
compensation for a loss which another party has suffered. On the other, the court must be astute to 
ensure that the party who has in fact suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation. The 
problem can be resolved only by close scrutiny of the pleadings at the strike-out stage and all the 
proven facts at the trial stage: the object is to ascertain whether the loss claimed appears to be or is 
one which would be made good if the company had enforced its full rights against the party 
responsible, and whether (to use the language of Prudential at page 23) the loss claimed is “merely 
a reflection of the loss suffered by the company”.ʼ See also Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 
Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law 
Journal 647, 668. See further Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business Organization Law Review 97, 100 who points 
out that a wrongdoer is only under an obligation to compensate a victim for actual losses or damages 
suffered. 
577 For such an example see the comment made by the court in Rembert v Daniel [2018] EWHC 388 
(Ch). See also Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of 
Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 668. See further Charles Mitchell 
‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120 Jul Law Quarterly Review 457, 463-64 where 
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approach is described by some authors as ‘artificial’, because the right to obtain 
relief from the same wrongful conduct is given to one victim, the company, at the 
expense of another, the individual shareholder.578 This further leads to the question 
of the application of the reflective loss principle in circumstances where the 
company did not recover the damages or loss suffered.579 If the reflective principle 
is not applied in such circumstances and the shareholder is then allowed to proceed 
with his or her claim against the wrongdoer, situations may arise where the creditors 
of the company may be prejudiced.580 
                                                 
it is explained that the loss or damages suffered by a company will be addressed if the company 
enforces its rights against the wrongdoer. This principle also protects the interests of other 
shareholders and the creditors of the company.  
578 Jennifer Payne ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 668. See, however, Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 611-12 where 
it is argued that the principle of reflective loss ‘supports the principle of centralised management of 
the company’s assets through the board’. See also Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ Claims for 
Reflective Loss: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business Organization Law Review 
97, 101-102 who explains that a shareholder entrusts his or her interests to the company and its 
board and therefore should ‘share the company’s fate’. Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for 
Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law Quarterly Review 457, 464 points out that the recovery for 
reflective loss cannot be denied when the wrongdoer took up a legal obligation towards a member 
and the company. The author further cautions (465) against an inflexible approach in denying a claim 
for reflective loss especially when both the relevant member and the company have a cause of 
action. 
579 See Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law Quarterly 
Review 457, 464 who argues that there is no justification in the application of denying the recovery 
of a reflective loss suffered by a member to prevent a potential double recovery when in the 
circumstances there is no such a risk. See also Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective 
Loss: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business Organization Law Review 97, 100. 
See also Giles v Rhind [2008] EWCA Civ 118 where the court held that a shareholder may institute 
a claim for a reflective loss in circumstances where the company is unable to do so because of the 
conduct of the wrongdoers. 
580 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th 
ed, 2016) 611 explain that creditors may be prejudiced as the result of a claim of a shareholder that 
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The application of the reflective loss principle further appears to be restrictive 
in circumstances where the company cannot institute or be successful with legal 
proceedings because the wrongdoer has a proper defence against the claim of the 
company, but such a defence cannot be raised against a claim of the shareholder.581  
The principle of reflective loss appears not to be applied when an order is 
made to buy out the shares of a member.582 Usually, such a buy-out is done at a 
fair price. In determining a fair price, the value of the share price prior to the unfair 
prejudicial conduct is compared to the value after the unfair prejudicial conduct to 
establish the decrease in value of the shares that the conduct caused. In making an 
order for the buy-out of shares, courts usually order that the shares be bought at 
thair value prior to the commission of the unfair prejudicial conduct. The effect of 
                                                 
may remove assets belonging to the company from the company. The rights of creditors may be 
detrimental to creditors as they will only able to institute a claim against the company, and not the 
shareholder, for the satisfaction of the creditor’s claims. The authors (611) state that different 
considerations may apply in the case where company possesses sufficient distributable assets to cover 
the claims of creditors. Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law 
Quarterly Review 457, 464-65 highlights that this application should be reconsidered in light of the fact 
that the capital maintenance rule does not apply anymore and that different considerations should 
apply, for example, when one is dealing with companies with one shareholder and/or when those 
companies are solvent. See also Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 European Business Organization Law Review 97, 100-01 who 
compares such a claim to a dividend. The author further points out that the issue of prejudice to 
creditors and/or other shareholders will not arise if the company has ‘sufficient distributable assets’. 
581 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 612. Charles Mitchell ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120:Jul Law 
Quarterly Review 457, 472-73 argues that the cited authorities who support the proposition that 
shareholders or members can recover losses or damages based on a reflective loss where the 
company does not have the ability to recover the loss or damages suffered at the hands of the 
wrongdoer, provided that double recovery is not a risk. 
582 For a discussion for the buy-out of shares in terms of a court order see 2.10.5 above, more 
specifically 2.10.5.2 and 2.10.5.3. 
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this approach is that a member is then compensated for a reflective loss which is in 
actual fact a corporate loss.583 
2.11 The unfair prejudice remedy and the management of litigation  
2.11.1 Introduction 
 
Petitions based on unfair prejudicial conduct are generally characterised by long, 
protracted and often complex facts.584 This also translates into voluminous court 
papers. From a practical point of view, it is important that cases based on the unfair 
prejudice remedy should be efficiently managed and dealt with to save time and 
costs for all parties involved. There is a clear need for mechanisms to deal 
adequately with cases involving the unfair prejudice remedy. In England, such 
mechanisms are found in the form of alternative dispute resolution, more specifically 
arbitration proceedings, and the enforcement of principles, guidelines and practices 
found in case law that encourage parties to settle matters of this nature in an attempt 
to avoid court proceedings.585 The making of reasonable offers in an attempt to 
settle a petition based on unfair prejudicial conduct and the role of arbitration 
proceedings as mechanisms to manage and deal with unfair prejudice petitions are 
discussed below.586 
                                                 
583 Bas J De Jong ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 14:1 
European Business Organization Law Review 97, 106. See also Stephan Griffin ‘Shareholder 
Remedies and the no Reflective Loss Principle – Problems Surrounding the Identification of a 
Membership Interest’ (2010) 6 Journal of Business Law 461, 467-68. 
584 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 678. 
585 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 678-80. 
586 See 2.11.2 regarding reasonable offers and 2.11.3 regarding arbitration proceedings. 
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2.11.2 Reasonable offers and the abuse of the court process 
2.11.2.1 Resolving of disputes without court intervention 
The general principle is that parties are encouraged to attempt to resolve their 
differences and disputes without court intervention.587 This may be achieved by the 
making of offers in an attempt to settle a dispute.588 The making of settlement offers 
holds the benefit that it usually reduces the costs and length of the litigation 
process.589  
2.11.2.2 The effect of reasonable offers 
Reasonable settlement offers in the context of the unfair prejudice remedy play a 
significant role in the application of the remedy and the adjudication of the relevant 
dispute. A reasonable offer made in respect of a petition based on unfair prejudicial 
conduct may have a direct impact on whether the conduct of the respondent(s) can 
be held as being unfairly prejudicial and/or have an impact on the costs order.590 
(a) The guidelines in O’Neill v Phillips591 
In respect of reasonable offers, the case of O’Neill v Phillips592 is directional despite 
                                                 
587 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1106. 
588 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1106. 
589 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1106. 
590 Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(10th ed, 2016) 679 explain that in some circumstances a court can regard the refusal of a reasonable 
offer and the subsequent institution of legal proceedings based on the unfair prejudice remedy as an 
abuse of the court process which may lead to the petition being struck down. The authors (679) 
further state that such an abuse of the court process can take the form a rejection of an ‘ad hoc offer’ 
or the refusal to participate in a mechanism in the articles of a company which may have the same 
effect or other reasonable effect as a buy-out of the petitioner at a fair price. 
591 [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092. 
592 [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092. 
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the fact that the court’s comments in relation to reasonable offers were obiter.593 
Although the case dealt with section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 it is submitted 
that the same principles still apply to litigation involving section 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006. This case provided clarity on the legal effect that a reasonable 
offer has on a petition based on unfair prejudice in the event where such an offer is 
rejected by the petitioner.594 The court also discussed the factors that are taken into 
account to determine whether an offer in reaction to a presentation of a petition in 
terms of the unfair prejudice remedy is reasonable.595 
(b) Dismissal of petition based on unfair prejudice 
 
The rejection by a petitioner of a reasonable offer to buy his or her shares at a fair 
value may be detrimental to a petition based on unfair prejudicial conduct.596 A court 
may dismiss a petition based on unfair prejudicial conduct if the petitioner has 
rejected a reasonable offer597 from his or her opponents.598  
(c) Costs orders 
 
The rejection of a reasonable offer may also impact on the nature of the cost order 
a court can make.599 When a reasonable offer, which contained the same or more 
                                                 
593 See, for example, Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 [47]; [2014] All ER 260. See 4.12.3 
below for comments on the application of the principles in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] 
WLR  
594 It should be noted that although the court in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 
1105-06 disposed of the matter on other grounds the court still considered the issue due to its ‘great 
practical importance’. 
595 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107-08. 
596 In Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [421] the court held that ‘[a] petitioner who rejects a 
reasonable offer will not be entitled to any relief because he will not have suffered any prejudice’. 
597 See 2.11.2.3 below for a discussion of the elements of a reasonable offer. 
598 Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [423], [531]. 
599 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1106. 
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beneficial terms of relief than what the court ordered, had been made to a petitioner 
prior to the granting of such relief, a court can make an adversarial cost order 
against the petitioner. The petitioner would then usually be ordered to carry the legal 
costs of the litigation from the date when the reasonable offer was made.600 
2.11.2.3 The offer: Elements of reasonableness  
 
In O’Neill v Phillips601 the court provided guidelines which can be used to determine 
whether an offer is reasonable.602 Although these guidelines are contained in obiter 
remarks of the court, the application of these guidelines were directional in a number 
of judgments where the courts had to adjudicate on the reasonableness of offers 
made for purposes of settling disputes between parties involving unfair prejudice.603 
The five elements of a reasonable offer are: 
(a) Proportional value and the application of minority discount 
The offer should be an offer to purchase the shares of the member at a fair value.604 
Such value should represent a proportional value of the total value of the issued 
                                                 
600 In O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1106 the court remarked that ‘I think that 
parties ought to be encouraged, where at all possible, to avoid the expense of money and spirit 
inevitably involved in such litigation by making an offer to purchase at an early stage’. 
601 [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092. 
602 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107-08. 
603 Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 [44]; [2014] All ER 260; Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 
(Ch) [421]. 
604 The court in Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [422] noted that often majority shareholders 
will buy the shares of the minority shareholders. However, this is not a set rule, as in some 
circumstances it would be appropriate for the minority to buy out the shareholding of the majority 
shareholders. In such circumstances ‘[i]t will not, therefore, necessarily always be the case that an 
offer by the respondent majority shareholder to buy out the minority at full value and with a payment 
of all costs would justify the striking-out of the petition although ordinary that would be so’. For a 
discussion of the valuation of shares and the determination of the fair value of shares see 2.10.5.3 
to 2.10.5.5 above. 
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share capital of the company.605 Only in exceptional circumstances will a discount 
be applied to a member’s shares.606 
(b) Experts and the procedure to determine the value of shares 
(i) The appointment of a competent independent expert 
 
If the parties cannot agree on the value of shares, the offer should provide for a 
mechanism for purposes of the determination of the value of the shares.607 The offer 
should be clear that such determination would be done by a competent independent 
expert.608 The parties must agree to the appointment of a specific expert or 
alternatively to nominate a professional body or an association of experts to 
nominate and appoint an expert to establish the value of shares that are subject to 
the dispute.609  
(ii) The process  
When the value of the shares will be determined by an expert, such determination 
does not have to be done by way of arbitration proceedings.610 The expert also does 
not have to provide reasons for his or her determination.611 The overriding objective 
is to achieve an economical and expeditious method for determining the value of the 
                                                 
605 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
606 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. However, see the application of a 
minority discount as discussed in 2.10.5.5 above and the relevance of a quasi-partnership 
relationship for purposes of valuing shares for purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy as discussed 
in 2.10.5.2 (b)(i). 
607 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
608 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. See also Paul L Davies and Sarah 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, 2016) 679. 
609 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
610 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
611 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
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shares ‘even if this carries the possibility of a rough edge for one side or the other 
(and both parties in this respect take the same risk) compared with a more elaborate 
procedure’.612 All the parties to the dispute should have equal access to company 
information as far as it is relevant to the valuation of the shares standing central to 
the dispute between the parties.613 The parties should have the right to make 
submissions to the expert responsible for the valuation of the shares.614 The expert 
may then deal with these submissions in accordance with his or her discretion.615 
(c) Costs 
From a practical perspective, costs and more specifically costs orders are an 
important aspect of any litigation. An offer does not always have to include an offer 
to pay the legal costs of the petitioner before it can be regarded as reasonable.616 
A shareholder (usually the majority shareholder) also should be provided with a 
reasonable opportunity, from the date of the conduct triggering a petition, to 
                                                 
612 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
613 See, for example, Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 [47]; [2014] All ER 260 were the 
valuation report was not provided to the petitioner. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] 
WLR 1092, 1107.  
614 In Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 [47]; [2014] All ER 260 the court stressed the 
importance of the right. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107;  
615 O’Neill v Phillips O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
616 Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 3356 (Ch) [531]. See also O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] 
WLR 1092, 1108 where the court held ‘[b]ut this does not mean that payment of costs need always 
to be offered. If there is a breakdown in relations between the parties, the majority shareholder should 
be given a reasonable opportunity to make an offer (which may include time to explore the question 
of how to raise finance) before he becomes obliged to pay costs. As I have said, the fairness does 
not usually consist of merely in the fact of the breakdown but in failure of a suitable offer. And the 
majority shareholder should have a reasonable time to make the offer before his conduct is treated 
as unfair. The mere fact that the petitioner has presented his petition before the offer does not mean 
that the respondent must offer to pay the costs if he was not given a reasonable time’. 
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consider the formulation of an offer and, if accepted, the implementation an offer.617 
When the value of shares relevant to a reasonable offer has to be determined 
with the assistance of a suitably qualified expert the costs of the appointed expert 
should be carried by the parties equally.618 However, the expert must have the 
power to make an alternative determination regarding costs.619 
2.11.3 The arbitration of unfair prejudice disputes 
2.11.3.1 Introduction  
 
In a commercial context, the effective and expeditious resolution of disputes is an 
important component of business efficacy. Often commercial disputes are for many 
reasons subjected to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms of which arbitration 
is one.620 It is of great practical importance to consider the application of section 994 
of the Act in this context. An analysis of the legal position in England may provide 
insight into the extent to which disputes in terms of section 994 of the Act can be 
                                                 
617 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1108. See also Amin v Amin [2009] EWHC 
3356 (Ch) [583] where the court held that ‘[i]t is certainly not the case that a minority shareholder 
who wants to end his involvement and to recover his investment can make an offer, either to sell his 
own shares or buy the majority’s shares, at a proper value and then to allege, when the offer is 
refused, that the refusal amounts to unfairly prejudicial conduct. All he can do is to make the offer 
and rely on it when it comes to costs if he is successful in an unfairly prejudice petition based on 
some other unfairly prejudicial conduct’. See Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 [47]; [2014] All 
ER 260 where the court held that the rejection by the petitioner was not unreasonable as the offer 
amongst others did not provide for costs. 
618 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
619 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24, [1999] WLR 1092, 1107. 
620 See Justice Quesntin Loh ‘The Limits of Arbitration’ (2014) 1:1 McGill Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 66, 67 who states that arbitration is a ‘primary mode’ of dispute resolution pertaining to 
international commercial transactions. See also 2.11.3.2 below for a brief reference to the 
advantages of alternative dispute resolution in the form of arbitration. 
 159 
 
subjected to arbitration proceedings.621 
The resolution of disputes by means of alternative dispute resolution is 
usually dependent on voluntary agreements entered into by the parties involved. 
Unless the relevant agreement infringes on public policy considerations, voluntary 
agreements in terms of which parties undertake to subject disputes covered by the 
agreement to arbitration are valid and enforceable.622 The wording of the unfair 
prejudice remedy in the Act specifically considers together issues relating to public 
policy and the arbitrability of disputes. These aspects must be evaluated in light of 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 read with the Act. 
2.11.3.2 Arbitration Act 1996 
(a) The legislative framework applicable to arbitrations 
 
There are many advantages to arbitration proceedings which include the cost-
effectiveness of the proceedings and the reduction of delays in the resolution of 
disputes.623 Arbitration in England is regulated by the Arbitration Act 1996 read with 
the arbitration agreement applicable to the relevant dispute. The Arbitration Act 
                                                 
621 The position in England must be compared to the position in South Africa where early indications 
are that courts are of the view that disputes relating to the unfair prejudice remedy in the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 cannot be subjected to arbitration. For the position in South Africa see 5.11.2 below. 
622 See also Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 
(Ch) [21]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179 where the court remarked that public interest encourages arbitration. 
See further Harry McVea ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract’ 
(2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1123, 1132 who describes the decision in Fulham Football Club 
(1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855, [2012] 1 All ER 414 as ‘pro-arbitration’. See further H-
Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way Reconceptualise Minority Shareholder 
Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 324. 
623 Arbitration Act 1996, s 1(a). See Harry McVea ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the 
Primacy of Contract’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1123, 1132 who argues that arbitration has the 
potential to be less costly and time-consuming in comparison with the judicial process. 
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1996 provides for the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal.624 The 
Arbitration Act 1996 also specifically recognises the right of parties freely and 
voluntarily to choose the manner in which disputes between them should be 
resolved.625  
(b) The enforcement of arbitration agreements and the right to stay 
court proceedings 
When court proceedings are instituted against a party by a party who is bound to an 
arbitration agreement, the other party to the arbitration agreement (the respondent(s) 
or defendant(s)) may approach a court for relief in the form of a stay of the court 
proceedings against such a party.626 Such a petition will be based on the existence 
of an arbitration agreement requiring that the matter (or dispute) be referred for 
arbitration.627 If the dispute before a court is covered by the wording of the arbitration 
agreement, the court will enforce the arbitration agreement by granting a stay of 
proceedings.628 Generally, a court will not interfere with an arbitration agreement.629 
                                                 
624 Arbitration Act 1996, s 1(a) of the. See H-Y Chiu ‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way 
Reconceptualise Minority Shareholder Remediesʼ (2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 325. 
625 Arbitration Act 1996, s 1(b). See Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 
855 [29]; [2012] 1 All ER 414 where the court confirmed the principle, but recognised that the 
provision does not indicate when public policy considerations would override the principle contained 
in the provision and the provision does not speak to the overarching principle of arbitrability. 
626 Arbitration Act 1996, s 9(1). 
627 Arbitration Act 1996, s 9(1). Section 6(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 defines an ‘arbitration 
agreement’ as an agreement in terms of which the parties to the agreement undertake to subject 
present or future disputes to arbitration. See also Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football 
Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 [14]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179 where the court held that a court may 
also stay proceedings when more suitable alternatives are available to resolve a dispute. 
628 Arbitration Act 1996, s 9(1). 
629 Arbitration Act 1996, s 1(c). See also Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA 
Civ 855 [31]; [2012] 1 All ER 414 where the court confirmed that the Arbitration Act 1996 makes the 
stay of court proceedings mandatory when a dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement. Prior 
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(c) Public interest considerations and statutory limitations or 
restrictions that apply to the arbitration of disputes 
The right to have disputes submitted for arbitration proceedings is, however, subject 
to public interest considerations and/or statutory induced limitations or 
restrictions.630 If a court is satisfied that the applicable arbitration agreement is null 
and void, inoperative631 or incapable of being performed in terms of the Arbitration 
Act 1996632 it may not grant a stay of proceedings.  
The effect of a refusal to grant a stay of legal proceedings is that ‘any 
provision that an award is a condition precedent to the bringing of legal proceedings 
in respect of any matter is of no effect in relation to those proceedings’.633 
(d) The enforcement of arbitration agreements and the rights and 
interests of third parties 
There are a number of considerations specific to section 994 read with section 996 
of the Act that must be evaluated to ascertain whether or not unfair prejudice 
disputes may be subjected to arbitration proceedings. One of these considerations 
is the fact that the resolving of disputes by way of arbitration is founded and 
dependent on consensual agreements between the parties involved.634 This raises 
                                                 
to the Arbitration Act 1996 such issues were dealt with as a matter of discretion of the court under 
the Arbitration Act 1975. 
630 Arbitration Act 1996, s 1(b) of the. See also Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] 
EWCA Civ 855 [27]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
631 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [35]-[36]; [2012] BCLC 
335. 
632 Arbitration Act 1996, s 9(4). See also section 81(1)(a) for the regulation of matters that cannot be 
resolved by way of arbitration. 
633 Arbitration Act 1996, s 9(5).  
634 In terms of section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 only a party to an ‘arbitration agreement’ 
against whom legal proceedings are instituted may apply to a court for stay of proceedings. Such 
 162 
 
questions on the role that the interests of parties who are not a party to the 
arbitration agreement play in the enforcement of arbitration agreements pertaining 
to disputes in terms of section 994 of the Act.635  
The submission of unfair prejudice disputes to arbitration can potentially be 
challenged on the basis that third parties are often not bound to arbitration 
agreements, and secondly that the nature of the relief that may be granted may affect 
the interests of these third parties, despite not being involved in the dispute between 
the parties concerned.636 
(e) Arbitration and matters against or of public interest  
 
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 recognises the notion that some disputes 
cannot be subjected to arbitration.637 Agreements that are against public policy will 
not be enforced. It can be argued that the provisions of the Act are aimed at the 
protection of the public interest and therefore cannot be contractually excluded, 
                                                 
application must be based on an arbitration agreement. The result of an order staying legal 
proceedings is that the relevant dispute must be referred for arbitration. See also H-Y Chiu 
‘Contextualising Shareholdersʼ Disputes – a Way Reconceptualise Minority Shareholder Remediesʼ 
(2006) Journal of Business Law 312, 324. 
635 See Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [39]; [2012] 1 All 
ER 414 where it was argued that disputes involving section 994 of the Act cannot be subjected to 
arbitration proceedings as the relief may affect the interests of shareholders (or other third parties) 
who may not be parties to the arbitration agreement. 
636 In Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [51]; [2012] 1 All ER 
414 it was argued that unfair prejudice disputes cannot be subjected to arbitration as the relief may 
impact on the interests of shareholders and creditors. In this respect the unfair prejudice remedy can 
be equated with the winding-up of company. See 2.11.3.2 (e)(ii) for a discussion of the court’s attitude 
towards such an argument. It should be noted that a similar argument was accepted by the court in 
Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 [22]. 
637 Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch) 
[21]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179. 
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waived or subjected to arbitration proceedings. If such an approach is accepted a 
court has to refuse a petition to stay proceeding in terms of section 9 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996.  
(i) The approach in Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v 
Football Conference Ltd638 
In Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd639 the court 
held that a petition under section 459 of the Companies Act 1985640 cannot be 
subjected to arbitration proceedings.641 The court took the view that the rights under 
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 were inalienable.642 This means that parties 
cannot contractually exclude or waive their right to rely on statutory remedies such 
as the one provided for in section 994 of the Act.643 From this point of view the 
                                                 
638 [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch); [2004] 4 All ER 1179. 
639 [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch); [2004] 4 All ER 1179. 
640 The predecessor of section 994 of the Companies Act 2006. 
641 Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 [23] and 
[26]-[27]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179. It is important to note that the approach taken in this decision was 
criticised in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
642 In Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 [23]; 
[2004] 4 All ER 1179 the court held that ‘[t]he statutory rights conferred on shareholders to apply for 
relief at any stage are, in my judgment, inalienable and cannot be diminished or removed by contract 
or otherwise’. In support of this argument see Harry McVea ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 
and the Primacy of Contract’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1123, 1132. Compare K Reece- Thomas 
and C Ryan ‘Section 459, Public Policy and Freedom of Contract: Part 2ʼ (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 
198, 198 and 205 where the authors in the context of section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 argued 
that the use of the word ‘may’ and the absence of an express indication against the contractual 
exclusion of the provisions of the remedy, is indicative of the fact that the remedy is not mandatory 
and can contractually be limited, excluded or waived. 
643 See the criticism of Harry McVea ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of 
Contract’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1123, 1132 on the decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) 
Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855; and [2012] 1 All ER 414. According to the author (1132) the 
emphasis on party autonomy and the view that company law is based on contractual terms, allows 
for the replacement of ‘statutory rules designed for a public purpose – to be set aside by private 
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contractual exclusion or waiver of the right to petition in terms of section 994 of the 
Act may be regarded as being against public policy.644 Companies are creatures of 
statute and the court has an important power to exercise supervision over the 
creation, management and administration and the winding-up and liquidation of a 
company.645 During the lifetime of a company shareholders should be able to rely 
upon the provisions of the Companies Act 1985 – now the Companies Act 2006 – 
to approach a court for the relief entrenched in the Act and can therefore not be 
bypassed or limited by a contract or an agreement.646  
(ii) The approach in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards647 
In Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards648 the court also had to consider 
whether or not a dispute based on section 994 of the Act can be subjected to 
arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act 1996. The court considered the Exeter City 
judgment and cautioned against the argument that the provisions of section 994 of 
the Act had not been amended after the Exeter decision and that therefore it must 
                                                 
bargaining’. The author argues (1132) that this also entrusts arbitrators with rights that are conferred 
to shareholders in terms of statue. The right of a shareholder under section 994 of the Act and section 
122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 is a statutory right that ‘represents a fundamental mandatory 
condition of a company’s incorporation under the Companies Act 2006’. These statutory rights 
‘cannot be removed or relinquished by contract, arbitration clause, or otherwise’ (1133). 
644 See in general K Reece-Thomas and C Ryan ‘Section 459, Public Policy and Freedom of 
Contract: Part 2ʼ (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 198. 
645 Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch) 
[22]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179. See section 994 and 996 which make specific reference ‘the court’. See 
2.11.3.2(e)(ii) below for the court’s approach in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] 
EWCA Civ 855; [2012] 1 All ER 414 to the reference to a ‘court’ in these sections. 
646 Exeter City Association Football Club Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch) 
[23]; [2004] 4 All ER 1179. 
647 [2011] EWCA Civ 855; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
648 [2011] EWCA Civ 855; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
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be taken that the approach taken by the court in Exeter City is correct in holding that 
unfair prejudice disputes cannot not be subjected to arbitration proceedings.649 
The court held that neither the Act nor the Arbitration Act 1996 excludes 
arbitration as a mechanism by means of which disputes under section 994 of the 
Act may be resolved.650 Disputes based on the unfair prejudice remedy is capable 
of being determined or resolved by an arbitrator as a dispute between members 
relating to a breach of ‘the articles of association or a shareholders’ agreement is 
an essentially contractual dispute’.651 These type of disputes usually do not involve 
the rights of creditors and/or the statutory rights or protection given to third 
parties.652 Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal found that the main 
question to be decided is whether a particular dispute is susceptible to arbitration. 
The answer to this question is not necessarily dependent on whether the interests 
of parties, who are not party to the arbitration agreement, are affected.653 The 
question is rather whether the dispute involves a matter of public interest that cannot 
be determined during arbitration or ‘engaged third party rightsʼ.654 The fact that both 
                                                 
649 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [88]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
650 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [27]-[28]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
Compare with the approach discussed in 2.11.3.2 (e)(i).  
651 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [77]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
Compare with the approach discussed in 2.11.3.2 (e)(i). 
652 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [77]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
653 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [40]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
654 See Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855 [40]; [2012] 1 All ER 414 
where the court stated ‘that the limitation which the contractual basis of arbitration necessarily 
imposes on the power of the arbitrator to make orders affecting non-parties is not necessarily 
determinative of whether the subject matter of the dispute is itself arbitrable. As Mustill & Boyd point 
out, it does not follow from the inability of an arbitrator to make a winding-up order affecting third 
parties that it should be impossible for the members of a company, for example, to agree to submit 
disputes inter se as shareholders to a process of arbitration. It is necessary to consider in relation to 
the matters in dispute in each case whether they engage third party rights or represent an attempt 
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section 994 and section 996 refer to orders a ‘court’ can make does not imply that 
matters relating to unfair prejudice disputes falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
the courts and therefore cannot be referred to arbitration.655 This is based on the 
fact that statute had to provide courts with powers it would not have had if it was not 
for the enactment of the Act.656 
2.12 Conclusion 
2.12.1 The influence of the law of the partnership on the development of 
company law 
In this chapter various aspects of the unfair prejudice remedy in England were 
                                                 
to delegate to arbitrators what is a matter of public interest which cannot be determined within the 
limitations of a private contractual process’. A court [46] may take into consideration the interests of 
members who are not part of the arbitration agreement and/or of a creditor when tailoring the 
appropriate relief in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy. The court [61] conceded that some of the 
relief that may be granted in terms of section 996 may have an impact on third parties or 
shareholders. However, this does not make section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 a class remedy, 
but may ‘impose limitations on the scope of relief obtainable in arbitral proceedings’. According to 
the court ([76]) only a court can make an order for the winding-up of a company. The court further 
held ([78]) that ‘[t]he statutory provisions about unfair prejudice contained in s 994 give to a 
shareholder an optional right to invoke the assistance of the court in cases of unfair prejudice. The 
court is not concerned with the possible winding-up of the company and there is nothing in the 
scheme of these provisions which, in my view, makes the resolution of the underlying dispute 
inherently unsuitable for determination by arbitration of grounds of public policy. The only restriction 
placed upon the arbitrator is in respect of the kind of relief which can be granted’. It was further held 
([83]) that ‘[i]f the relief sought is of a kind which may affect other members who are not parties to 
the existing reference, I can see no reason in principle why their views could not be canvassed by 
arbitrators before deciding whether to make an award in those terms. Opposition to the grant of such 
relief by those persons may be decisive. Similarly if the order sought is one which cannot take effect 
without the consent of third parties then the arbitrators’ hands will be tied’. 
655 See in this regard the judgment of Longmore LJ in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards 
[2011] EWCA Civ 855 [96]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. See also Leonardo VP de Oliveira ‘The English Law 
Approach to Arbitrability of Disputes’ (2016) 19:6 International Arbitration Law Review 155, 161-62. 
656 See in this regard the judgment of Longmore LJ in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards 
[2011] EWCA Civ 855 [96]; [2012] 1 All ER 414. 
 167 
 
considered. What is clear from the research is that the unfair prejudice remedy was 
introduced to provide an alternative remedy to the winding-up of companies on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds.657 It has to be emhasised that the origin of the winding-up 
of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds stems from the law of partnership.658 
It further has to be noted that company law developed from the law of partnership.659 
The close relationship between the law of the partnership and company law is 
further maintained by traditional law of partnership remedies such as the winding-
up of partnerships on ‘just and equitable’ grounds of which an equivalent remedy is 
found in the Insolvency Act 1986. The close relationship in certain respects between 
the law of partnership and the company law had and has important implications for 
the interpretation and application of the unfair prejudice remedy. In the 
consideration of the oppression remedy and later the unfair prejudice remedy the 
courts justified their reluctance to intervene in the affairs of a company based on an 
adapted form of the law of partnership principle that courts cannot intervene in the 
relationship between partners.660 In exceptional circumstances where the court did 
intervene the approach was justified on equitable considerations by drawing from 
the analogy that a partnership is a contract of good faith.661 Based on this approach 
a court could restrain a party from exercising his or her rights if it was found that 
such an exercise of rights was in conflict with equitable considerations or good 
faith.662 This may provide a further explanation for the application of the remedy in 
the context of quasi-partnerships and specifically in the enforcement of the 
                                                 
657 See 2.3.3.1 and 2.9 above. 
658 See 2.9.2 above. 
659 See 2.6.5.1 above. 
660 See 2.3.1.3 (b). 
661 See 2.5 and 2.6.5.4 (b) above. 
662 See 2.5 above. 
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legitimate or reasonable expectations of members.663 The enforcement of 
reasonable expectations is based on the particular agreements or understandings 
between members. To a degree it resembles a partnership relationship.664 Although 
it is not impossible for similar understandings or agreements to exist between 
members of relative large companies, a member may find it difficult to prove an 
understanding or agreement with a larger enough number of members for the 
understanding or agreement to form part of the conduct of the affairs of a 
company.665 This approach limits the application of reasonable expectations to 
companies where a particular relationship exists between members in relation to 
the manner in which the affairs of a company should be conducted.666 
Although some of the principles of the law of partnership were influential to 
the interpretation and application of some company law principles, one should not 
lose sight of the fact that a company is a separate juristic entity which is regulated 
by its own and unique legal principles.667 The statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
recognises that the strict enforcement of company law principles such as separate 
legal personality and majority decision-making may be abused to the detriment of 
other members of the company.668  
2.12.2 The criteria of fairness as guiding a paradigm shift 
 
The development, formulation and application of the unfair prejudice remedy in 
                                                 
663 See 2.6.5 above. 
664 See 2.6.5.4 above where it is cautioned that one should not lose sight of the fact that one is in 
actual fact dealing with a company. 
665 See 2.6.5.4 (b) above. 
666 See 2.6.5.4 (b). 
667 See 2.6.5.4 above. 
668 See 2.2 read with 2.3 above. 
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England hold important lessons for the formulation and application of the remedy in 
other jurisdictions such as South Africa. It is important to note the terminology used 
in the English statutory unfair prejudice remedy. Describing the conduct complained 
of, it is important to note the remedy is aimed at conduct that is ‘unfairly prejudicial’ 
in stead of ‘oppressive’. The significance of the use of the term unfairly prejudicial 
is that the conduct of the company’s affairs is determined with reference to the 
fairness thereof.669 The lawfulness and fairness of conduct cannot be equated.670 
This means that there may be circumstances where lawful conduct can be regarded 
as unfair and vice versa.671 The fact that the activation of the unfair prejudice remedy 
is not dependent on the lawfulness of the particular conduct makes the remedy 
unique. Fairness does not only play an important role for purposes of the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 994 of the Act, but also influences the form 
and nature of the relief that a court may grant as well as the application of other 
related principles of law such as the law of contract and the law of damages. 
The use of the term unfairly prejudicial is further important because it makes 
the test to determine the fairness or unfairness of conduct an objective one.672 An 
objective test entails that the fairness or unfairness of the conduct complained of is 
not determined by the subjective intention of the party committing the conduct.673 
Another important feature with regard to the assessment of the fairness or 
unfairness of conduct is that it is not determined only with reference to the nature of 
                                                 
669 See 2.6.3.2 above. 
670 See 2.6.3.2 above. 
671 See 2.6.3.2 above. 
672 See 2.6.3.7 above. 
673 See 2.6.3.7 above. 
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the conduct but is also considered with reference to the effect of the conduct.674 
For purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy the fairness of the conduct 
complained of needs to be established in a particular commercial context while 
taking into consideration that companies are separate legal entities that are 
managed by a board of directors.675 The relationship between the company, the 
board, the shareholders and the shareholders inter se is regulated by the Act, the 
articles of association and in some instances by shareholders’ agreements.676  
Company matters are decided by means of majority decision-making.677 The 
directors of a company owe their legal duties towards the company and not the 
members of a company.678 However, the unfair prejudice remedy has the effect that 
directors must in the exercise of their duties act fairly towards the members of the 
company.679 The principle applies to the decisions and conduct of the members of 
a company as far as their conduct and decisions relate to the affairs of a company. 
Other principles and considerations, such as the conduct of the petitioning member 
and voluntarily exchanged agreements between members inter se and the 
company, also play an important role in determining fairness in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case.680  
The honouring of undertakings voluntary given by a party is one aspect of 
                                                 
674 See 2.6.3.7 above. 
675 See 2.6.3.3–2.6.3.5 above. 
676 See 2.6.3.6 above. 
677 See 2.2 above. 
678 See 2.3.1.2 and 2.6.3.6 above. 
679 See 2.6.3.6 above. 
680 See 2.6.4 above on the relevance of the conduct of the petitioner and 2.6.5 above for the 
enforcement of legitimate expectations. 
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fairness.681 This requires that when a court has to scrutinise the fairness of a 
majority decision of members or a board decision, it has to take into consideration 
that a member had contractually agreed to be bound by the majority decisions of 
the members of the company and that the company is managed by the board.682  
The use of an open-ended concept such as fairness as a requirement for 
triggering the jurisdiction of a court to provide appropriate relief does not mean that 
the fairness or unfairness of conduct is to be determined in the air.683 The content 
of the terms or value of fairness must be established in a principled manner.684 The 
purpose of the use of the term is to provide for a wide variety of facts and 
circumstances.685  
Because the unfair prejudice remedy is phrased in wide and open terms, it 
may in some instances be vague and therefore its application may be uncertain. 
The English version of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy has in this regard done 
well to eradicate certain uncertainties which has the potential to be problematic in 
South Africa.686  
2.12.3 Standing and the capacity in which a member suffered prejudice 
 
Section 994 of the Act is clear that a registered member may rely on the unfair 
prejudice remedy.687 In other jurisdictions the restriction of the remedy to registered 
                                                 
681 See 2.2 and 2.6.5.2 above. 
682 See 2.2 and 2.6.3.5 above. 
683 See 2.5 above. 
684 See 2.5 above. 
685 See 2.5 above. 
686 See Chapter 5 below for a discussion of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
687 See 2.6.1 above. 
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members has been criticised.688 In this respect the English provision extends 
standing not only to registered members but also to a person to whom shares are 
transferred by operation by law.689 Although the unfair prejudice remedy is restricted 
to registered members, it is important to note that courts have held that the interests 
of a registered member include the economic interests of the beneficial holder of 
the shares.690 The unfair prejudice remedy is further not limited to minority 
members.691 Any member may rely on the unfair prejudice remedy. This means that 
the remedy may find application in situations where members have equal 
shareholding in a company and/or where a member is a majority shareholder but 
cannot use his or her voting power to remedy the unfair conduct he is complaining 
of.692  
The English courts also had to deal with the technical argument that a 
member does not only have to be a registered member of a company to rely on the 
unfair prejudice remedy, but also must have suffered the unfair prejudice 
complained of in his or her capacity as member.693 The courts are of the view that 
requiring that a member should have suffered prejudice in that capacity is a too 
restrictive and technical interpretation of the unfair prejudice remedy. Although the 
legislature and the courts acknowledge that a registered member may suffer unfair 
prejudice in other capacities than that of being a member, courts do require that the 
capacity in which the member is unfairly prejudiced must be closely related to his or 
                                                 
688 See, for example, Chapter 5 below. 
689 See 2.6.1 above. 
690 See 2.6.1.1 above. 
691 See 2.6.1.2 above. 
692 See 2.6.1.2 above. 
693 See 2.6.1.2 above. 
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her capacity as member.694 
2.12.4 Single occurrence of unfair conduct 
 
Another notable aspect of the formulation of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
is that the provision does not require the conduct complained of to be of a 
continuous nature.695 The remedy further covers once-off or single acts of unfair 
prejudicial conduct. Previous versions of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
required that the conduct had to be of a continuous nature and to be present at the 
time relief against such conduct is sought. The tense used in section 994 of the Act 
also makes this clear. 
2.12.5  Company groups 
 
The conduct of the affairs of the company of which a shareholder is a member is 
usually of primary importance for purposes of having standing in terms of the unfair 
prejudice remedy. However, the courts recognised that the interests of members 
can be protected by the unfair prejudice remedy in the context of a group of 
companies.696 Although each of the companies within a group is separate legal 
entity, English courts acknowledged that members, and especially minority 
members, are potentially exposed to an abuse of power and recognise the business 
realities associated with a group of companies.697 Here criticism can be levelled 
against the English approach for not expressly recognising in the legislative 
provisions of the unfair prejudice remedy for the application of remedy in the context 
of a group of companies and leaving it up the courts to provide direction on the 
                                                 
694 See 2.6.2.2 above. 
695 See 2.6 above. 
696 See 2.7 above. 
697 See 2.7 above. 
 174 
 
application of remedy in this regard.  
2.12.6 The scope and purpose of available relief 
The unfair prejudice remedy provides for courts to grant innovative forms of relief. 
Section 996 of the Act provides courts with a wide discretion to grant relief.698 This 
wide discretion enables courts to tailor relief that is appropriate to the facts and 
circumstances of each case.699 Forms of relief are listed in the statutory form of the 
unfairly prejudice remedy that were not available under early statutory formulations 
of the remedy or the common law form of the remedy.700 Initially the only form of 
relief a court could grant against oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct was the 
liquidation of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds, similar in nature the 
remedy available to the partners in a partnership.701 Although there are close 
similarities and to a certain degree overlap between the winding-up of partnerships 
on ‘just and equitable’ grounds and the unfair prejudice remedy in terms of which a 
similar form of relief can be granted, there are important differences in the liquidation 
of companies and partnerships on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.702 One of the 
characteristics of a company is perpetual succession, a characteristic a partnership 
lacks. Policy considerations further require that sustainable companies should be 
formed and maintained.703 Therefore, a remedy such as the liquidation of 
companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds which may result in the demise of a 
perfectly sustainable company should only be relied on as a last resort. The English 
                                                 
698 See 2.10 above. 
699 See 2.10 above. 
700 See 2.10 above. 
701 See 2.3.3.1 above. 
702 See 2.3.4 above read with 2.9 above. 
703 See 2.3.3.1 above. 
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legislature and courts also went about a lot of trouble to break the link between the 
winding-up on ‘just and equitable’ grounds and the unfair prejudice remedy, which 
is welcomed because although the grounds for the liquidation of companies on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds may overlap with the unfair prejudice remedy there are some 
important differences.704 
Traditionally courts were very reluctant to intervene in the affairs of a 
company.705 The wide forms of relief a court is able to grant in terms of the unfair 
prejudice remedy have brought a change to this approach. It is therefore necessary 
to consider the nature, scope and purpose of relief that courts may grant in terms of 
the unfair prejudice remedy. The purpose of the relief a court may grant in terms of 
the unfair prejudice remedy is to stop the unfair prejudice complained of and not 
necessarily remedy the prejudice suffered. As indicated above, the winding-up of a 
company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds is now a remedy of last resort and therefore 
a court should strive to provide an alternative form of relief for purposes of the unfair 
prejudice remedy.706 In formulating appropriate relief, courts will take into 
consideration the causal link between the conduct complained of and the unfair 
prejudice suffered.707 The relief must also be proportionate to the conduct 
complained of.708 It needs to be stressed that even if the jurisdictional requirements 
in section 994 of the Act were proven a court still has the discretion on whether or 
not any relief will be granted. Therefore, technical transgressions of the Act and an 
amendment of the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement may not 
                                                 
704 See 2.9 above. 
705 See 2.5 above. 
706 See 2.9.1 above. 
707 See 2.6.3.7 above. 
708 See 2.10 above. See also Griffith v Gourgey & Ors [2018] EWHC 1035 (Ch) [25]. 
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necessarily attract relief.709 The basic principles established by the courts in the 
granting of relief in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy need to be 
considered with specific reference to the forms of relief that a court may grant.  
2.12.7 The protection of informal agreements or undertakings 
 
In the application of the unfair prejudice remedy courts recognise that the individuals 
behind the company structure do hold some reasonable expectations which may 
not be articulated in the company’s articles of association and/or shareholders’ 
agreements.710 These reasonable expectations are taken into consideration to 
determine fairness and the relief in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy is usually 
employed to enforce such expectations.711 This enforcement of legitimate 
expectations is justified on the basis that the honouring of voluntary agreements is 
an aspect of fairness.712 In this respect it is important to note that a court would only 
enforce such a reasonable expectation if it is based on an actual agreement or 
understanding. A court will not enforce hypothetical bargains between parties. In 
light of this, the application of the unfair prejudice remedy should not be seen as 
being restricted to quasi-partnerships or other smaller type of companies. From an 
evidential perspective, the existence of a reasonable expectation may be more 
difficult to prove in companies with larger numbers of members. This cannot be 
attributed to a restrictive interpretation by the courts of the unfair prejudice remedy 
or that the existence of reasonable expectations is only possible in small companies 
                                                 
709 See 2.10 above. See also See also Waldron v Waldron [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) [51] and 
Routledge v Skerritt [2019] EWHC 573 (Ch) [22].  
710 See 2.2 and 2.3.2 above  
711 See 2.6.5 above. 
712 See 2.2 above. 
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or companies with only a few shareholders.  
2.12.8  Relief against future conduct 
One of the strengths of section 996 of the Act is that relief may be granted against 
threatening conduct.713 The effect of this is that relief may be proactively granted 
and therefore a member does not have to wait until his or her interests have been 
unfairly prejudiced. This is not necessarily the position in other jurisdictions 
considered in this thesis.714 
2.12.9  Relief in the form of a buy-out of shares 
 
The most widely-used form of relief granted by the English courts is the buy-out or 
purchase order. It can be ordered that either the company and/or other members of 
the company must buy the shares of the petitioner. Section 996 makes express 
provision for this form of relief.715 Although it is usually ordered that the shares of a 
minority member should be bought by a majority member it may be ordered in 
exceptional circumstances that the shares of a majority member be bought by a 
minority member. Buy-out orders have the practical value of terminating the 
relationship between the parties involved in the dispute.716 The shares subject to a 
buy-out order have to be bought at a fair value.717 The English courts provide some 
useful guidelines relating to the basis on which such shares should be valued. In 
determining the fair value of shares it should be taken into consideration that a 
                                                 
713 See 2.10.2 above. 
714 See Chapter 5 below for a discussion of the uncertainty regarding the application of section 163 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to future or threatening conduct which may lead to the reduced 
protection of shareholders. 
715 See 2.10.5 above. 
716 See 2.10.5 above. 
717 See 2.10.5 above. 
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member cannot ‘put’ his shares on the company or the other members of the 
company.718 The market value of the shares and the breakup value of a company 
should be taken into account.719 A range of other factors also play a role in the 
assessment of the fair value of shares. From a legal perspective the date720 on 
which the valuation is done; whether a company is valued on a break-up basis or 
as a going concern;721 and whether a minority discount722 is to be applied are some 
of the most important factors to consider. The overarching principle is that the value 
assigned to the shares subject to a buy-out order should be fair in the circumstances 
of the case.723 In this context courts caution against unjustly enriching one or more 
of the parties involved in a dispute.724 
2.12.10 Compensation as a form of relief 
 
The Act does not expressly make specific provision for awarding compensation 
caused by unfair prejudice.725 However, English courts did point out that it is 
possible to award compensation.726 The award for compensation of the members 
of a company may in some instances be conceptionally difficult to apply and may 
create certain anomalies in its application when compared to the buy-out of shares 
at a fair value. This is especially the case when a member suffered prejudice in the 
form of a diminution of the value of his or her shares in a company due to a wrong 
                                                 
718 See 2.10.5.1 (a). 
719 See 2.10.5.4 above. 
720 See 2.10.5.3 above. 
721 See 2.10.5.4 above. 
722 See 2.10.5.5 above. 
723 See 2.10.5.2 above. 
724 See 2.10.5.2 above. 
725 See 2.10.6 above. 
726 See 2.10.6 above. 
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committed against the company by one or more of its directors.727 The loss in the 
form of a diminution of the value of his or her shares in a company is only reflective 
of the loss suffered by the company and therefore a member cannot claim 
compensation for such a loss. For purposes of the unfair prejudice remedy a 
diminution of the shares of a company held by a member is recognised as 
prejudice.728 However, the no reflective loss principle may prevent a shareholder 
from claiming compensation for such a loss.729 Compensation will only be awarded 
in exceptional circumstances.730 A more appropriate form of relief would be an order 
directing the payment of compensation to a company based on the successful 
reliance on the unfair prejudice remedy by a member.731 
The application of the no reflective loss principle in the context of buy-out 
orders has not yet been thoroughly considered. The application of this principle 
becomes relevant to buy-out orders in those cases where a court in its assessment 
of the fair value of a member’s shares provides for rectifying the loss of value a 
member suffered as a result of unfair prejudicial conduct. This may be explained 
based on the fact that the purpose of the unfair prejudice remedy is to establish 
fairness amongst the parties and the purpose of any compensation in terms of the 
unfair prejudice remedy is not to compensate a party for a loss suffered in accordance 
with the traditional principles relating to the law of damages but rather to ensure 
fairness amongst parties by preventing that one party obtains an unfair advantage 
over the other as result of the buy-out order. This makes the no reflective loss 
                                                 
727 See 2.10.6.2 above. 
728 See 2.6.2.1 above. 
729 See 2.10.6 above. 
730 See 2.10.6.3 above. 
731 See 2.10.3.4 above. 
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principle inapplicable in these circumstances.  
2.12.11 The authorisation to institute legal proceeding on behalf of a 
company 
One of the innovative provisions of section 996 of the Act is the authorisation of a 
member to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company.732 This approach of the 
legislature must be viewed against the fact that the enforcement of strict company law 
principles fails to protect members in specific circumstances.733 This is especially the 
case when the controllers of a company commit wrongs against a company and use 
their control to prevent the company from seeking relief against such wrongs. The 
failure to pursue legal proceedings against wrongdoers is often justified based on the 
strict enforcement of the principle of majority rule and/or that the board of directors is in 
the best position to determine whether it is the best interest of a company to do so.734 
The failure to act and the last mentioned justification therefo may in some 
circumstances be a form of unfair prejudice.735 It should be noted that this form of relief 
can only be sought in a very limited set of circumstances and therefore does not create 
the risk for causing the statutory derivative claim to become redundant.736 In contrast 
with the statutory derivative claim, a member relying on the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy is not required to obtain authorisation to institute legal proceedings.737  
2.12.12 Dispute resolution 
 
Due to the nature of unfair prejudice proceedings the efficient management of such 
                                                 
732 See 2.10.3 above. 
733 See 2.2 and 2.3.1.4 above. 
734 See 2.3.1.4 above. 
735 See 2.3.1.4 above. 
736 See 2.10.3.5 above. 
737 See 2.10.3.5 above. 
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proceedings is essential. The making of reasonable offers is an important aspect that 
may impact on the application of the unfair prejudice remedy. The rejection of a 
reasonable offer may be considered to determine whether or not the conduct 
complained of is unfairly prejudicial and/or whether to make an appropriate costs 
order.738 A second aspect in dealing with unfair prejudice claims is whether such 
disputes can be disposed of in arbitration proceedings. The current position is that 
disputes involving the unfair prejudice remedy may be dealt with by way of arbitration 
proceedings, provided that relief is not sought which can only be granted by a court.739 
Just because the interests of third parties may be affected by relief in terms of the unfair 
prejudice remedy does not bar the application of the remedy in arbitration 
proceedings.740 
  
                                                 
738 See 2.11.2.2 above. 
739 See 2.11.3.2 (e)(ii) above. 
740 See 2.11.3.2 (e)(ii) above. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Sections 232 to 235 of the Corporations Act 2001 provide for the Australian statutory 
personal action (or remedy), generally referred to as the oppression remedy.1 This 
remedy can be used for relief against, amongst others, oppressive or unfair prejudicial 
conduct.2 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the statutory 
oppression (or unfair prejudice) remedy under Australian law. This analysis includes 
an evaluation of the statutory formulation of the remedy in the Corporations Act 2001. 
The judicial interpretation and application of the oppression remedy are also 
scrutinised. As with its South African equivalent, the Australian oppression remedy 
has also been substantially influenced by English law.3 After an analysis of the 
wording of sections 232 to 235 and their application, aspects that may be beneficial 
or relevant to the reform of the South African position are pointed out.4 
3.2 The basic principles of Australian company law 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
As with other jurisdictions,5 the statutory remedy against oppressive or unfair 
prejudicial conduct must be considered in the context of established company law 
                                                 
 Reference to case law is mainly made to the neutral citations of cases and where available the 
reported citation of cases is also provided. It should also be noted that the detail in the neutral 
citations is sufficient to identify the relevant court. 
1 See 3.4 below where these provisions are outlined. 
2 See 3.5 and specifically 3.5.5 below for a discussion of the grounds of the statutory oppression 
remedy. 
3 See 3.3 below and more specifically 3.3.2. 
4 The analysis of the statutory oppression remedy in Australia is provided in 3.4–3.7 and 3.10 below. 
5 See, for example, the law in England as discussed in Chapter 2 above, the law in Canada as 
discussed in Chapter 4 below, and the law in South Africa as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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principles.6 The incorporation of the oppression remedy creates some conceptional 
challenges for the application of established company law principles. The statutory 
oppression remedy requires courts to use their broad discretion to tailor relief in an 
endless variety of circumstances, while navigating through and upholding 
established company law principles.7 This often brings the oppression remedy in 
conflict with these established company law principles such as a company being a 
separate juristic person,8 the principle of majority decision-making,9 and the 
governance of a company and its relationship with its members which are regulated 
by the constitution.10 
3.2.2 The company as a body corporate 
 
After registration, a company becomes a body corporate.11 As a body corporate, a 
company enjoys all the common law attributes of a body corporate, unless 
legislation provides otherwise.12 A company is a separate legal entity which entails 
that it is the bearer of rights, privileges, duties and liabilities separate from its 
                                                 
6 See also 3.6 below. 
7 See 3.9 below. Compare the position in England in this regard as discussed in 2.10 above. See 
also 5.4.3 below for the application of the oppression remedy in South Africa in the context of 
established corporate law principles. 
8 See 3.2.2 and 3.8 below. 
9 See 3.2.3 and 3.6.2 below. 
10 See 3.6.1 and 3.9.4.2 (f) below. 
11 Corporations Act 2001, s 119. The registration process is regulated by section 117 read with 
section 118 of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
12 Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law 
(17th ed, 2018) 107. 
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members or directors.13 A company has the capacity and powers of an individual.14  
3.2.3 The management of and decision-making within a company 
 
The business of a company is managed by or under the direction of the board.15 
Unless otherwise provided by the Corporations Act 2001 or the constitution of a 
company, the directors of a company are entitled to exercise all the powers of the 
company.16 Generally, the decision-making of or within the company is based on 
the principle of majority rule meaning that resolutions are adopted by ordinary or 
simple resolutions.17 
3.3 The development of the statutory oppression remedy – an overview 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
The early statutory development of the Australian oppression remedy shares a 
                                                 
13 Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law 
(17th ed, 2018) 116. For the position in England see 2.2 above. 
14 Corporations Act 2001, s 124. The power of a company may be restricted in its constitution or by 
its objects but conduct beyond its objects or restrictions in its constitution does not necessarily render 
the relevant conduct invalid. See in this regard s 125 of the Corporations Act 2001. Compare with 
the position in South African as discussed in 5.2 below. 
15 Corporations Act 2001, s 198A(1). In this context it is interesting to note that section 232 refers to 
the conduct of the company’s affairs and not business. ‘[A]ffairsʼ is defined in section 53 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. See also Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations (Pty) Ltd [2014] 
FCAFC 55 [8] where the court held that the definition of ‘affairs’ in section 53 is not exhaustive. For 
the South African position see 5.2.3 below. Note that in section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 the legislature expressly stated that the board of directors is responsible for the management 
of the affairs and business of a company. In this regard see the South African position in 5.4.3.3 
below.  
16 Corporations Act 2001, s 198A(2). 
17 See RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th 
ed, 2018) 221. However, some instances require the adoption of a special resolution as defined in 
section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001. See 3.6.2 below for a discussion of the principle of majority 
decision-making within companies. 
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number of similarities with its English counterpart.18 Differences between the two 
jurisdictions can be ascribed to the statutory formulation or wording of the remedy 
in the Companies Act 2006 and the Corporations Act 2001.19 The predecessors of 
the current formulation of the oppression remedy in the Corporations Act 2001 is 
briefly discussed below in order to provide context to the current formulation of the 
remedy in sections 232 to 235.20 
3.3.2 Section 186 of the Companies Act 1961 
 
Section 186 of the Companies Act 1961 was modelled on section 210 of the 
Companies Act 1948 (UK) and the recommendations of the Cohen Committee.21 
 Section 186(1) of the Companies Act 1961 provided: 
‘Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company 
are being conducted in a manner oppressive to one or more of the 
members (including himself) may, or, following on a report by an inspector 
under this Act, the Minister may apply to the Court for an order under this 
section.’ 
 
                                                 
18 See 2.3.3 above for the statutory development of the remedy in England and 3.3. below for the 
statutory development of the remedy in Australia. 
19 See Chapter 2 above for an analysis of the unfair prejudice remedy in England. See 3.4 for an 
analysis of the statutory oppression remedy in Australia. 
20 See 3.3.2 to 3.3.4 below. 
21 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 704. See 2.3.3 above for a discussion of section 210 of Companies Act 1948 (UK) and 2.3.3.1 
above for a discussion based on recommendations of the Cohen Report. It should be noted that the 
basis of section 186 of the Companies Act 1961 was the Companies Act 1958 of the state of Victoria. 
Section 94(1) of the Victorian Companies Act 1958 provided: 
‘Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (including himself) may 
with the leave of a judge of the Court or, following a report by an inspector under this Act, 
the Attorney-General, may without leave apply to the Court for an order under this 
section.’ 
See also Campbell v Backoffice Investments (Pty) Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [336]. 
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3.3.2.1 Standing and oppressive conduct 
Section 186(1) of the Companies Act 1961 entitled a member of a company to apply 
to a court for relief when the affairs of a company are conducted in a manner that is 
oppressive to one or more members of the company. The conduct of the company’s 
affairs must have been at least oppressive towards the member who brought the 
application.22  
The section extended standing to the Minister.23 The Minister may have 
brought an application based on a report issued by an inspector under the 
Companies Act 1961.24  
3.3.2.2 The relief  
The object of the relief was to put an end to the matters complained of in relation to 
the affairs of a company.25 Once the requirements of section 186(1) were proven, 
default relief in the form of a winding-up order could be granted.26 However, the 
provision recognised that relief in the form of a winding-up order could in some 
cases be inappropriate.27 In such cases, a court could consider alternative forms of 
                                                 
22 Companies Act 1961, s 186(1). 
23 Companies Act 1961, s 186(1). See 3.9 below for a discussion of the relief that may be granted in 
terms of the current statutory oppression remedy. 
24 Companies Act 1961, s 186(1). 
25 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2). 
26 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(a). 
27 See Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b). According to this provision it would be inappropriate to 
order the winding-up of a company when such an order would be unfairly prejudicial to a member or 
members in terms of s 186(1) of the Companies Act 1961. See also 3.9.1 below for a discussion of 
the grounds for the winding-up and liquidation of a company and the ground for relief against 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
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relief.28 Alternative forms of relief could be granted if the conduct of the company’s 
affairs justified the winding-up of a company.29 Forms of alternative relief included 
orders for the regulation of the future affairs of a company30 and the purchase of 
shares of members by other members or even by the company itself.31 When a 
company acquired the shares from a member, the capital of the company was 
reduced.32 The discretion of a court to grant relief included the power to order 
alterations or additions to a company’s memorandum or articles.33 
3.3.3  Section 320 of the Companies Act 1981 
3.3.3.1 Oppressive, unfair or unjust conduct 
Section 320 of the Companies Act34 provided for a member of a company to apply 
for relief when the affairs of the company were conducted in a manner that was 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against one or more of 
the members (including that member) or which was contrary to the interests of the 
members as whole.35 This section covered both the conduct of the affairs of a 
                                                 
28 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b). 
29 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b). See also 3.9.1 below for a discussion of the overlap between 
the winding-up of a company on the grounds in section 232 and the winding-up of a company on a 
‘just and equitable’ basis. 
30 See also 3.9.3 below. 
31 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b). See also 3.9.4 below. 
32 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b). See also 3.9.5 below. 
33 Companies Act 1961, s 186(2)(b) and s 186(4). In this regard, the provision was similar to the 
current provision in the Corporations Act 2001. See also 3.9.2 below. 
34 No 89 of 1981. 
35 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(1)(a)(i). The exact wording of section 320(1) reads: 
‘An application to the Court for an order under this section in relation to a company may be 
made: 
by a member who believes: 
that affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members, or in a manner that 
is contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or  
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company and any actual or proposed act, omission or resolution by or on behalf of 
the company.36 Reliance could also be placed on the remedy on the ground that the 
directors of the company have acted in their own interests and not in the interest of 
the members as a whole or where their conduct was unfair or unjust to one or more 
members (including that member) other than the directors.37 The Commission also 
had the power to apply for relief in terms of section 320.38 
3.3.3.2 Forms of relief 
If a court found that one or more of the grounds in section 320(1)(a) existed it could 
grant relief in a variety of forms.39 Section 320(2) made it clear that a court could 
make any order that it deemed fit. The relief included, but was not limited to, the 
following orders: - 
 the winding-up of a company;40  
 the regulation of the future affairs of the company;41  
 an order in terms of which the shares of a member be purchased by 
                                                 
that an act or omission, or proposed act or omission, by or on behalf of the company, or a 
resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of members, was or would be oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members or was or 
would be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole’.  
See also 3.5.5.1 below for a discussion of similar grounds in the context of section 232 of the 
Corporations Act 2001.  
36 See also 3.5.3 below in the context of section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
37 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(1)(a)(ii). See also 3.9.6, and more specifically 3.9.6.3, where the 
overlap between the oppression remedy and derivative proceedings is discussed in the context where 
the interests of members as a whole are in potential conflict with that of the directors of a company.  
38 Companies Act 81 of 1981, s 320(1)(b). 
39 Read with section 320(2)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act 89 of 1981. 
40 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(2)(c). See also 3.9.1 below for a discussion of the current 
position with regard to this form of relief. 
41 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(2)(d). See also 3.9.3 below. 
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any other member or members;42 and  
 an order in terms of which the shares of a member are purchased by 
the company and the share capital the company is reduced 
accordingly.43 
In section 320, the legislature also acknowledged that relief in the form of a winding-
up order would often not be appropriate.44 In those circumstances a court could 
grant alternative forms of relief when a winding-up order would have caused unfair 
prejudice to a member or members in terms of section 320(2)(a) and section 
320(2)(b). 
Section 320 further contained provisions dealing with the practicalities in the 
event of a court making an order that altered or added additions to the memorandum 
or articles of a company.45 
3.3.4 Section 260 of the Corporations Law 
3.3.4.1 The personal remedy and the protection of corporate rights 
Prior to the statutory reform of the derivative action, the institution of legal 
proceeding on behalf of a company was regulated in accordance with the principles 
in Foss v Harbottle.46 Section 260(2)(g) of the Corporations Law made specific 
                                                 
42 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(2)(e). Compare also with the current position as discussed in 
3.9.4 below. 
43 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(2)(f). Compare also with the current position as discussed in 
3.9.5 below. 
44 Companies Act 89 of 1981, s 320(3). See also 3.3.3.2 above. 
45 Companies Act 89 of 1981, see ss 320(4) -(7). 
46 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See 2.3.1 above for a discussion of the principles in Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 in the context of England. For a discussion of the proper 
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provision for a court to authorise the institution and defence of legal proceedings on 
behalf of the company.47 The introduction of section 260(2)(g) was significant as it 
enabled a court to authorise the institution of legal proceedings on behalf of a 
company based on an application or petition based on the statutory personal 
remedy.48 This approach was not free from criticism.49 
3.3.4.2 Criticism against the protection of corporate rights by way of the 
personal action  
The inclusion of section 260(2)(g) was subject to criticism. The main criticism was 
that this remedy diluted or blurred the division between individual membership rights 
on the one hand and corporate rights on the other.50 According to some authors, it 
is inapt to provide for the redress of corporate rights in a statutory action designed 
to protect the individual rights of members.51 
3.3.5 General problems associated with the oppression remedy 
 
An overview of the development of the statutory personal remedy in Australia 
provides a valuable framework for understanding the current form of the remedy. 
                                                 
plaintiff rule in the context of Australian law see RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and 
Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 687-89.  
47 See 3.9.6 below for a discussion of the current position in this regard. 
48 Compare with the current position in England as discussed in 2.10.3 above. See also 3.9.6 below 
for a discussion of the authorisation of a member to institute or intervene in legal proceedings on 
behalf of a company under the Corporations Act 2001. 
49 See 3.3.4.2 below. 
50 G Shapira ‘Minority Shareholders Protection – Recent Development’ [1982] 10 NZULR 134, 159. 
However, see also JF Corkery ‘Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers – What can a Shareholder 
do about it? An Analysis of s 320 of the Companies Code (1988) 9 Adel Review 437, 460-61 argues 
that the confusion created by section 260(2)(g) is only academic. 
51 G Shapira ‘Minority Shareholders Protection – Recent Development’ [1982] 10 NZULR 134, 159. 
For a discussion of the interrelationship between the current statutory personal remedy and the 
statutory derivative action see 3.9.6.3 (a) below. 
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The statutory provisions before 1983 only referred to oppressive conduct.52 It is 
notable that the legislature extended the statutory provisions to unfair prejudicial 
conduct.53 This approach was taken in light of the restrictive and limited scope of 
application of the term ‘oppressive’.54 The other problematic issue with the original 
forms of the statutory oppressive remedy was that the remedy only appeared to be 
applicable to conduct that was positive or continuing.55 The remedy did not provide 
for broad and flexible relief.56  
3.4 The oppression remedy in the Corporations Act 2001 
Section 232 provides as follows: 
‘Grounds for Court order 
The Court may make an order under section 233 if: 
(a)  the conduct of a company’s affairs; or 
(b)  an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a 
company; or 
(c)  a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of 
members of a company; 
is either; 
                                                 
52 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 705. 
53 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 705. See also 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 above. 
54 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 705. For a similar approach and criticism in the context of the English law see 2.3.3.3 and 
2.3.3.4 above. 
55 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 705. See 3.5.2 below on how this aspect has been addressed in section 232 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. 
56 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 705. See 3.3 above and especially 3.3.2. Compare with the wording of the current oppression 
remedy as discussed in 3.5.2 below. 
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(d)  contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or 
(e)  oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any 
other capacity. 
For purposes of this Part, a person to whom a share in the company has 
been transmitted by will or by operation of law is taken to be a member of 
the company.’ 
Section 233 provides as follows: 
‘Orders the Court can make 
(1) The Court can make any order under this section that it considers 
appropriate in relation to the company, including an order: 
(a) that the company be wound up; 
(b) that the company’s existing constitution be modified or 
repealed; 
(c) regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future; 
(d) for the purchase of any shares by any member or a person to 
whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or 
by operation of law; 
(e) for the purchase of shares with an appropriate reduction of the 
company share capital; 
(f) for the company to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue 
specified proceedings; 
(g) authorising a member, or a person to whom a share in the 
company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law, 
to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified 
proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company; 
(h) appointing a receiver or a receiver and manager of any or all 
the company’s property; 
(i) restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or 
from doing a specified act; 
(j) requiring a person to do a specified act 
Order that the company be wound up. 
(2)  If an order that the company be wound up is made under this 
section, the provisions of this Act relating to the winding up of 
companies apply: 
(a) as if the order were made under section 461; and 
(b) with such changes as are necessary. 
Order altering constitution 
(3)  If an order made under this section repeals or modifies a company’s 
constitution, or requires the company to adopt a constitution, the 
company does not have the power under section 136 to change or 
repeal the constitution if that change or repeal would be inconsistent 
with the provisions of the order, unless: 
 198 
 
(a) the order states that the company does have the power to 
make such a change or repeal; or 
(b) the company first obtains the leave of the Court.ʼ 
 
Section 234 provides as follows: 
‘Who can apply for order 
An application for an order under section 233 in relation to a company 
may be made by: 
(a) a member of the company, even if the application relates to an act 
or omission that is against: 
(i) the member in a capacity other than as a member; or 
(ii)  another member in that capacity as a member; or 
(b) a person who has been removed from the register of members 
because of a selective reduction; or 
(c) a person who has ceased to be a member of the company if the 
application relates to the circumstances in which they ceased to be 
a member; or 
(d) a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by 
will or by operation of law; or 
(e) a person whom ASIC thinks appropriate having regard to the 
investigations it is conducting or has conducted into: 
(i) the company’s affairs; or 
(ii) matters connected with the company’s affairs.ʼ 
3.5 The interpretation and application of sections 232 to 234 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 
3.5.1  Section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001  
To be entitled to rely on section 232 a member must prove actual or proposed 
conduct by or on behalf of a company,57 alternatively an actual or proposed 
resolution by members or a class of members58 or that the affairs of a company is 
conducted in a manner59 or that is, either ‘contrary to the interests of the members 
as a whole’60 or is ‘oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
                                                 
57 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(b). 
58 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(c). 
59 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(a). 
60 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(d). See 3.5.5.1 below. 
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against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.’61  
Section 232 contains the jurisdictional grounds that must be proven before a 
court has a discretion to order relief in terms of section 233.62 The first part of section 
232 clearly describes the forms of conduct that may trigger the provisions of section 
232.63 The section expressly covers conduct in relation to the affairs of a company. 
Section 232 further covers conduct by or on behalf of a company. Resolutions of 
members or classes of members are specifically included. It should specifically be 
noted that both section 232(b) and 232(c) cover proposed conduct and 
resolutions.64 
To determine whether the conduct described in section 232(a)-(c) may attract 
relief, it has to be measured against the criteria in section 232(d) and (e). This 
means that the conduct in question must either be contrary to the interests of 
members as a whole65 or be commercially unfair.66 This can be referred to as the 
effect of the conduct.67 Another important aspect on the formulation of section 232 
is that is that it expressly recognises that a petitioner may also suffer oppression in 
capacities other than in the capacity as member.68 
 
                                                 
61 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(e). See 3.5.5.2 below. 
62 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [111]. 
63 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(a)–(c). 
64 See 3.5.3 below for a discussion of the relevance of the inclusion of proposed conduct. 
65 See 3.5.5.1 below. 
66 See 3.5.5.2 below. 
67 See Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations (Pty) Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55 [9] where the court 
held that the conduct complained of must be assessed with reference to the effect or result of the 
conduct complained of. See 5.7.1.4 read with 5.7.3.6 below for a similar approach in South Africa. 
68 See 3.7.4 below. Compare with the approach followed in South Africa in 5.7.1.4 below. 
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3.5.2 When the jurisdictional grounds of section 232 have to be present 
to attract relief  
The point in time when the relevant conduct should be present to justify relief in 
terms of section 23269 is an important aspect of interpretation that has enjoyed the 
attention of some Australian courts. Potentially it may be argued that relief may only 
be granted in terms of the oppression remedy when the conduct complained of is 
present at the time the court considers the matter.70 Alternatively, it can also be 
argued that it must be proven that the relevant conduct was present at the time of 
the commencement of legal proceedings.71  
The more difficult question is whether relief can be granted if the unfair 
prejudicial conduct existed at the time of the institution of the legal proceedings, but 
is absent at the time when the matter is considered by a court.72 Predecessors of 
                                                 
69 Read with section 233 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
70 See Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [126] read with [132] where 
the court clearly held that case law supporting the argument that the complained conduct must be 
present at the time of the commencement of legal proceedings is based on the wording of 
predecessors of section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001. These predecessors were directed at the 
manner in which the affairs of a company ‘are being conducted’. See 3.3 above for a brief discussion 
of the development of the statutory oppression remedy. See also Munstermann v Rayward [2017] 
NSWSC 133 [22]. 
71 See the reference to case law in Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 
[126]. See also Bessounian v Australian Wholesale Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 35 [7] where 
the court remarked obiter that it is not required that the conduct complained of has to be present at 
the time of the institution of legal proceedings when the oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct is 
present at the time when the matter is considered. See further Munstermann v Rayward [2017] 
NSWSC 133 [22] where the court held that whether conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial must 
be determined with reference to the time when the legal proceedings are instituted, the appropriate 
relief is determined with reference to the date of the hearing. In Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings 
Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [159] the court adopted a similar point of view in terms of section 260 
of the Corporations Law. 
72 Bessounian v Australian Wholesale Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 35 [7]. 
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section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 required that the affairs of the company 
‘are being conducted’ in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial.73 The use of the word 
‘is’ in section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 is not indicative of the time at which 
the conduct needs to be present, but is rather indicative of the nature of the conduct 
upon which an applicant may rely to obtain relief in terms of section 232.74  
The word ‘is’ may also refer to the temporary nature or occurrence of the 
conduct referred to in section 232(a)-(c).75 Such an interpretation can further be 
justified and reinforced based on the fact that section 232 covers conduct or 
resolutions which cannot be described as being presently oppressive, such as a 
proposed conduct or resolution that may well be oppressive in nature.76 
With the relief stipulated in section 233 the conduct complained of does not 
have to continue until the commencement of the proceedings nor until the time when 
a court considers the appropriate relief to be granted.77 A member may still rely on 
section 232 even when the conduct complained of ceased at the time of the trial or 
                                                 
73 See section 94(1) of the Victorian Companies Act 1958; section 186(1) of the Companies Act 1961 
and section 320(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 1981. The court in Campbell v BackOffice Investments 
Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [130] described the formulation of section 232 as ‘significantly’ different 
from its predecessors. See also 3.3.5 where it is pointed out that this requirement was one of the 
weaknesses of some of the predecessors of the current oppression remedy. See 2.3.3.3 above 
where a similar problem was encountered in the development of the English oppression remedy. 
See 5.6.2.2 below for a discussion of the tense in which the grounds in section 163(1) of the Southern 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 is formulated. 
74 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [130]-[131]. 
75 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [130]. According to the court the 
conduct referred to in section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 includes present and past conduct. 
76 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [131]. According to the court the 
same argument can be applied to actual conduct or resolutions. Thus, the provisions of section 232 
of the Corporations Act 2001 refer to the nature of the conduct or resolution complained of and not 
the timing or continuance of the conduct or resolution. 
77 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [131].  
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hearing of the matter.78 However, this may affect the nature of the relief a court may 
grant, if any at all.79 A court may exercise its discretion to grant relief based on 
oppressive conduct that occurred in the past.80 This argument is supported by the 
fact that a court may modify the constitution of a company or make an order to 
regulate the future affairs of the company.81 This emphasises the fact that the court 
may still grant relief in those cases where the conduct has ceased temporarily.82 
There is nothing in the wording of section 232 that deprives a member of relief after 
the conduct that justifies such relief came to an end.83 However, when a court has 
to consider a matter in which oppression is alleged, information available to the 
court at the time of considering the matter may qualify information that was available 
at the time of the institution of the legal proceedings.84 
3.5.3  Threatening and/or future conduct 
 
Specific provision is made for future conduct (an act or omission) or resolutions that 
threaten the interests of members of the company as whole or are oppressive, 
                                                 
78 Peter Exton & Anor v Extons Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] VSC 14 [34]. In De Tocqueville Private Equity 
Pty Ltd v Linden & Conway Ltd, re Linden & Conway Ltd (2006) 59 ACSR 587 [25] it was held that 
the conduct complained of does not have to be present at the time of the commencement of legal 
proceedings or even when the matter is considered by a court. 
79 See Peter Exton & Anor v Extons Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] VSC 14 [34] where the court remarked in 
this context that ‘[t]here may be no need or utility for any remedy’. See also De Tocqueville Private 
Equity Pty Ltd v Linden & Conway Ltd, re Linden & Conway Ltd (2006) 59 ACSR 587 [25]. 
80 See also Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [129] and the authorities 
cited by the court. 
81 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [131]. 
82 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [131]. 
83 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [131]. 
84 See Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 where the court ([128]) referred 
to Jenkins v Supscaf Pty Ltd [2006] NZHC 416; (2006) 3 NZLR 264 [103]. It is important to note that 
the Jenkins decision dealt with the winding-up of a company on a just and equitable basis. 
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unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory to a member or members.85 The fact that the 
provision covers threatening or future conduct or the adoption of proposed 
resolutions is one of the strengths of the remedy.86 This ties in neatly with the 
interpretational philosophy or approach that requires courts to adopt an 
interpretation of the provisions that will enhance the remedy rather than to limit it.87  
3.5.4 Single or isolated (once-off) conduct 
 
Further, it also does not have to be proven that the conduct complained of is 
continuing or is of a continuous nature to be able to rely upon section 232.88 A single 
occurrence of the complained conduct is adequate when such conduct falls foul of 
the provisions in section 232.89 
3.5.5 Sections 232(d) and 232(e) of the Corporations Act 2001 
 
In order to rely on section 232, an applicant has to prove that the conduct 
complained of is of a nature described in section 232(a)-(c) and is either ‘contrary 
to the interests of the members as a whole’90 or is ‘oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial 
                                                 
85 See Corporations Act 2001, ss 232(b) and (c) read with ss 232(d) and (e). For the position in South 
Africa see 5.9.1 below. See 2.6.3.7 above for the position in England.  
86 Compare to the position South Africa in 5.9.2 below where the position seems uncertain.  
87 KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2015] VSC 712 [26]. 
88 William McCausland v Surfing Hardware International Holding Pty Ltd ACN 090 252 752 (No 2) 
[2014] NSWSC 163 [47]. See also 3.3.3 and 3.5.2 above. 
89 Spence v Rigging Rentals WA (Pty) Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [137]; McLaughlin v Dungowan Manly 
Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 215 [50]. See also Hannon v Doyle [2011] NSWSC 10 [103] where the court 
emphasised that ‘[i]ndividual acts and transactions may be relied upon; but a much more powerful 
case may often be made by reference to the cumulative effects of a course of conduct and a series 
of acts, events and transactions’. In Grego v Copeland & Ors [2011] VSC 521 [47] the court held that 
the contrary may also be true, namely, that a single isolated action or failure to act may not be unfair 
but may be regarded as unfair when all the single acts are viewed cumulatively. See 2.6 above for 
the position in England. 
90 Corporations Act 2001, s 232 (d).  
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to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity 
or in any other capacity’.91 Although these two sections may overlap to some extent, 
the courts have emphasised that sections 232(d) and (e) form two separate and 
independent grounds for relief.92  
3.5.5.1 Section 232(d) 
In contrast with section 232(e),93 section 232(d) is not limited to commercial 
unfairness.94 The grounds in section 232(d) can be linked to breach of the duties of 
directors.95 Although directors’ duties are owed to the company, the Corporations 
                                                 
91 Corporations Act 2001, s 232 (e). 
92 Bideena Pty Ltd as trustee for the Bideena Pty Ltd Superannuation Fund [2016] NSWSC 735 [53]; 
KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2015] VSC 712 [27] and [36]; Ubertini v 
Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [492]; Solanki v Cufari [2014] VSC 345 [56]; 
Lenark Pty Limited v TheChairmen1 Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 529 [21]; Turnbull & Ors v NRMA [2004] 
NSWSC 577 [32]; McLean v DID Piling Pty Ltd & ORS [2014] SASC 76 [70]. See also Medical 
Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [19]-[20] where the 
court accepted that section 232(d) is a separate ground upon which relief can be sought in terms of 
section 233. In KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 712 [36] the court 
held that factual considerations relevant to one ground may also be relevant for purposes of the 
other. 
93 See 3.5.5.2 below for a discussion of s 232(e). 
94 Peter Exton & Anor v Extons Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] VSC 14 [39]; Australian Institute of Fitness Pty 
Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [83]; 
Corbett v Corbett Court Pty Limited, in the matter of Corbett Court Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1176 
[127]; Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [491]. See also Turnbull v 
National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd [2004] NSWSC 577 [32] where the court gave the 
example of wastefulness as being contrary to the interests of the members of a company as a whole 
which is not necessary commercially unfair. For a discussion of section 232(e) see 3.5.5.2 below. 
95 See regarding section 320 of the Companies Code the discussion by JF Corkery ‘Oppression or 
Unfairness by Controllers – What can a Shareholder do about it? An Analysis of s 320 of the 
Companies Code (1988) 9 Adel Review 437, 447-48 who explains that ‘[n]egligence and breaches 
of fiduciary duty by directors, even though those duties are owed to the company and not the 
shareholders, are indirectly contrary to the interests of the members as a whole’. See Campbell v 
Backoffice Investments (Pty) Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95; (2008) 66 ACSR 359 [241] where the court 
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Act 2001 recognises that a breach of such duties is indirectly contrary to the 
interests of the members of a company as a whole.96  
Section 232(d) must not be interpreted in a manner that unjustifiably restricts 
or limits its scope of its application.97 To determine whether conduct is ‘contrary to 
the interests of the members as a whole’ courts apply an objective test.98 The 
determination is made in relation to standards of corporate behaviour or by 
evaluating the conduct against what would have been expected of reasonable 
directors conducting the affairs of a company.99 A court will pay due regard to the 
facts and circumstances to determine whether the conduct complained of is not in 
the best interests of the company as a whole.100 
It is argued that the phrase ‘contrary to the interests of the members as a 
                                                 
remarked that it may not always be possible clearly to distinguish between the breach of duties of 
directors and cases that amount to oppression. 
96 JF Corkery ‘Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers – what can a Shareholder do about it? An 
Analysis of s 320 of the Companies Code (1988) 9 Adel Review 437, 447-48 
97 Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 
3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [82]. 
98 Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 
3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [84]; Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2002] NSWSC 640; 
(2002) 42 ACSR 534 [42]-[44]. 
99 Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 [301]; Bideena Pty Ltd as trustee for the Bideena 
Pty Ltd Superannuation Fund [2016] NSWSC 735 [54]; Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v 
Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [84]; Grego v 
Copeland & Ors [2011] VSC 521 [47]. It is important to note that the conduct of directors may be 
oppressive despite the absence of a breach of their fiduciary duties. However such a breach is 
relevant in determining unfairness (Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 [302]). See 
Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Limited v Cassegrain [2011] NSWSC 1156 [19]. In Munstermann v 
Rayward [2017] NSWSC 133 [22] the court stated that the compliance of a director with his or her 
duties as director does not automatically mean that the conduct fair. 
100 Peter Exton & Anor v Extons Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] VSC 14 [39].  
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whole’101 should not be interpreted to mean that the conduct must be contrary to the 
interests of each and every individual member.102 For purposes of section 232(d) 
the interests of members as whole are not the interests of the actual members but 
that of the individual hypothetical member.103 Section 232 has ‘a wholly objective 
content and as existing independently of the identity and will of the totality of the 
shareholders for the time being’.104 
3.5.5.2 Section 232(e) and the concept of commercial fairness 
Section 232(e) covers conduct that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or is 
discriminatory to or against a member or members of a company. The prejudice 
suffered in terms of section 232(e) is not necessarily ‘contrary to the interests of the 
members as a whole’.105 Section 232(e) must not be applied restrictively and be 
given a broad interpretation, unless the wording of the provision calls for a restrictive 
or limited application.106 A breach of directors’ duties does not per se amount to 
oppression, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory conduct for purposes of 
section 232(e).107 Oppressive or unfair conduct may be conduct that advances the 
                                                 
101 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(d). 
102 L Griggs ‘Specific Problems with the Oppression Section’ 1993 (9) Queensland University of 
Technology Law Journal 101, 105. 
103 Bideena Pty Ltd as trustee for the Bideena Pty Ltd Superannuation Fund [2016] NSWSC 735 
[54]. 
104 Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 640;(2002) 42 ACSR 534 [44]. 
105 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(e). See also Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] 
VSC 47 [491]. 
106 Vigliaroni & Ors v CPS Investment Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] VSC 428 [64]. 
107 A breach of fiduciary duties to a company will not necessarily constitute unfair prejudice for 
purposes of section 232(e) but may be found to be contrary to the interests of members as a whole. 
See Peter Exton & Anor v Extons Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] VSC 14 [39]. See also Campbell v Backoffice 
Investments (Pty) Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95; (2008) 66 ACSR 359 per Basten JA at [214]. See further 
Dr Leo Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 (16 July 2018) [302] where the court held 
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interests of the majority or controlling members to the detriment of the balance of 
the members of a company.108 Therefore it cannot be argued that when the majority 
of the members or controlling members act in their own interests, it must be 
regarded as acting in the interests of the members as a whole.109 
 The concepts of oppressive conduct, unfair prejudice and unfair 
discrimination empower a court to look beyond legal rights and to provide relief that 
is just and equitable in the particular circumstances.110 This also highlights the fact 
that a member does not have to prove illegal or wrongful conduct before he or she 
will be entitled to relief.111 
To determine whether a member is entitled to relief in terms of section 232(e), 
a member has to prove commercial unfairness.112 Commercial unfairness consists 
of conduct that is oppressive to and/or, unfairly prejudicial to, and/or conduct that is 
                                                 
that a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty is relevant in determining whether there is unfairness for 
purposes of the oppression remedy. See 3.5.5.1 above. 
108 JF Corkery ‘Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers – what can a Shareholder do about it? An 
Analysis of s 320 of the Companies Code (1988) 9 Adel Review 437, 448. 
109 JF Corkery ‘Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers – what can a Shareholder do about it? An 
Analysis of s 320 of the Companies Code (1988) 9 Adel Review 437, 448. 
110 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [85]; Spence v Rigging Rentals 
WA (Pty) Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [138]. 
111 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [85]; Shew & Ors v Police and 
Citizens Youth Club & Ors [2013] NTSC 15 [42]; Munstermann v Rayward [2017] NSWSC 133 [22]. 
See 2.3.3 above for the position in England. 
112 In the matter of Pure Nature Sydney Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 914 (19 June 2018) [60]; Dr Leo 
Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 (16 July 2018) [300]; In the matter of ICB Medical 
Distributors Pty Ltd and The International College of Biomechanics Pty Ltd; ICB Gait and Posture 
Clinic Pty Ltd; Foot Steps Orthotics Pty Limited [2018] NSWSC 1315 (29 August 2018) [67]; Boyd v 
Feeney & Ors [2017] NSWSC 1595 (22 November 2017) [35]. See also Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd 
[2018] NSWSC 1088 [300]; Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [138]. 
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unfairly discriminatory against a member or members of a company.113 Each of 
these phrases in section 232(e) should not be given its own interpretation, but 
should be understood to form aspects of commercial unfairness.114 These concepts 
form a standard against which conduct complained of must be evaluated or 
measured.115 Although these phrases do overlap to some extent, the section should 
be read in a manner that the phrases or concepts provide meaning to each other.116  
                                                 
113 Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 [300]; Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited v 
Queensland Sugar Limited, in the matter of Queensland Sugar Limited [2016] FCA 20 [88]; Morara 
Pty Ltd v Kingslane Property Investments Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 136 [71]. See also Morgan v 45 
Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692, 704. 
114 Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [86]; Corbett v Corbett Court Pty Limited, in the matter of Corbett Court 
Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1176 [128]; Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited v Queensland Sugar Limited, in 
the matter of Queensland Limited [2016] FCA 20 [88]; Ubertini v Saeco International Group Spa (No 
4) [2014] VSC 47 [492]; In the matter of the New South Wales Bar Association [2014] NSWSC 1695 
[33]; Solanki v Cufari [2014] VSC 345 [57]-[58]; Wambo Coal Pty Ltd v Sumiski Materials Ltd [2014] 
NSWCA 326 [226]; Ian Allan Byrne v AJ Byrne Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667 [44]; Saykan v Elhan; 
Elhan v Saykan [2004] VSC 83 [104]; Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692, 704; 
Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [140]; Territory Realty 
Pty Ltd v Garraway [2009] FCA 292 [310]; KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings Pty Ltd 
[2015] VSC 712 [28]. In Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [134]-[135] the court found that these 
phrases in section 232(e) should be read as a ‘compound expression’. See also Hillam v Ample 
Source International Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 73; (2012) 202 FCR 336 [4]; Re Ledir Enterprises Pty 
Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1332; (2013) 96 ACSR 1 [178]; and Knights Quest P/L (ACN 116 122 939) and 
SMS Management P/L (ACN 101 453 865) v Daiwa Can Company and Barokes P/L (ACN 
079 714 579) [2018] VCSA 349 [130]. 
115 Tomavic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [172]. 
116 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [85] & [87]; Joint v 
Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [134];  Hillam v Ample Source International Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 
73;(2012) 202 FCR 336 [4]; Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692; Dosike Pty 
Ltd v Johnson (1996) 16 WAR 241; Turnbull v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd [2004] 
NSWSC 577; (2004) 50 ACSR 44 [27]. 
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The fairness or unfairness of conduct is determined objectively117 and should 
not be determined from the point of view of a particular member.118 A court in its 
application of the criteria of fairness should judicially apply the concept in 
accordance with rational principles.119 The application of an objective test to 
determine the fairness of conduct holds certain implications. Because the test is 
objective, the subjective intentions of the parties do not play a role in whether or not 
conduct would be regarded as fair or unfair.120  
Secondly, the conduct complained of should be viewed in the context of the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case.121 To consider the relevant conduct 
                                                 
117 Dr Leo Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088  [301]; Mair v Rhodes & Beckett [2018] 
VSC 132 (29 March 2018) [508]; Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of 
Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [90]; Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd 
[2015] FCA 1158 [138]; Corbett v Corbett Court Pty Limited in the matter of Corbett Court Pty Limited 
[2015] FCA 1176 [128]; Hunter v Organic & Natural Enterprise Group Pty Ltd & Ors [2012] QSC 383 
[102]; Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [39]; Vigliaroni & Ors v CPS Investment Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors 
[2009] VSC 428 [62]; Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [138]. See also Shelton v NRMA [2004] FCA 
1393 [23] where the court cautioned against a ‘narrow approach to cases of oppression’. 
118 See Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692, 704 where the court formulated 
the test in the form of a question, namely, ‘whether objectively in the eyes of a commercial bystander, 
there has been unfairness, namely conduct that is so unfair that reasonable directors who consider 
the matter would not have thought the decision fair’. See also RBC Investor Services Australia 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Brickworks Ltd [2017] FCA 756; (2017) 120 ACSR 517 and Knights Quest P/L 
(ACN 116 122 939) and SMS Management P/L (ACN 101 453 865) v Daiwa Can Company and 
Barokes P/L (ACN 079 714 579) [2018] VCSA 349 [130]. 
119 Netbush Pty Ltd v Fascine Developments Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 73 [54]. See also 2.5 above 
for the approach of the English courts. 
120 Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [138]. See also Jawhite Pty Ltd v Trabme Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 
174 (2 August 2018) [520] where the court noted that even bona fide conduct may be oppressive. 
121 Lukaszewicz v Polish Club Ltd [2019] NSWSC 446 [8]; Mair v Rhodes & Beckett [2018] VSC 132 
(29 March 2018) [510]; Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness 
(Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [90]; Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA 
(No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [494]; Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55 
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in context entails that the conduct must be viewed against the fact that the conduct 
took place within a company structure.122 However, section 232 allows a court to 
take other considerations into account. Fairness for purposes of the oppression 
remedy may require the weighing and balancing of various competing interests 
against each other.123 These varying and often competing interests may be held by 
various groups (or stakeholders) within a company.124 
3.6 Considerations taken into account in establishing the fairness (or 
unfairness) in the context of a company 
 
The concept of fairness is dependent on the context in which it is applied.125 For 
purposes of the oppression remedy, it is important to determine fairness in the 
context of unique and established company law principles.126 The oppression 
remedy must be applied in the context of the fact that a company is a separate legal 
                                                 
[9]; In the matter of the New South Wales Bar Association [2014] NSWSC 1695 [76]; William Buck 
(WA) Pty Ltd v Faulkner [No 6] [2013] WASC 342 [35]. See also Hunter v Organic & Natural 
Enterprise Group Pty Ltd & Ors [2012] QSC 383 [140] confirmed in Hunter v Organic & Natural 
Enterprise Group Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] QCA 331. See further Chung-Yi Pty Limited v Justin Chih-
Yang Chang (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1112  [78]. 
122 In Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [137] where the court held that fairness 
should be evaluated within a commercial context. See Bull v The Quarter Horse Association [2014] 
NSWSC 1665 [407] where it is noted that courts are reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the 
board by replacing the discretion of the board with that of the court. See also Australian Institute of 
Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 
[95]-[97]. 
123 Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [136]. 
124 Solanki v Cufari [2014] VSC 345 [58]. 
125 See 3.5.5.1 above. RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of 
Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 714-15. 
126 See 3.2 above for a discussion of some of these principles. See 5.4.3 below for the role similar 
principles play in the determination of fairness or unfairness for purposes of section 163(1) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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entity governed by the principle of majority decision-making.127 In this context, the 
powers, rights and duties of directors, and the rights and duties of majority 
shareholders towards minority shareholders are important considerations.128 In 
some circumstances the expectations of a member are protected by the oppression 
remedy.129 
3.6.1 The constitution of a company  
3.6.1.1 The constitution as a start for the assessment of rights and 
interests 
The basis for the regulation of the relationship between members is the constitution 
of a company. Each member of a company is contractually bound to the 
constitution.130 A member must conduct him- or herself in accordance with the 
constitution. Unless, other considerations apply, courts will give effect to the 
constitution of a company.131 Although the constitution is the starting point in 
determining the rights and obligations that exist between members, other 
considerations may also come into play. These considerations often take the form 
of reasonable expectations. The concept of reasonable or legitimate expectations 
is discussed below.132 
                                                 
127 See 3.2 above for a discussion of the principle of separate legal personality and 3.6.2 below for 
a discussion of the principle of majority rule. 
128 See the discussion in 3.6.1 below on the constitution of a company as a source of powers, rights, 
and duties.  
129 See 3.6.7 below. 
130 Corporations Act 2001, s 140(1). See 5.5.1 below for the position in South Africa. 
131 Conduct in accordance with the constitution of a company may still be found to be oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial. See RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of 
Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 717  
132 See 3.6.7 and more specifically 3.6.7.2 below. 
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3.6.1.2 The provisions of a company’s constitution and unfairly prejudicial 
conduct  
(a)  The power of a court to modify the constitution of a company 
Although the constitution of a company is the starting point in determining the 
relationship between members, it must be noted that the constitution may contain 
provisions that may in themselves be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. Therefore it 
is important to understand how the provisions of a company’s constitution can be 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial towards members of the company.133 It must be 
added that courts are generally reluctant to order the amendment or repeal of 
certain provisions in the constitutive documents of a company on the basis that they 
are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.134 A court will only make such an order if the 
amendment of the constitution or the removal of a particular provision in the 
constitution will eradicate or mitigate the oppressive or unfairly prejudicial effect of 
such a provision.135  
(b) Oppressive conduct versus the mere presence of an oppressive 
provision in the constitution of a company 
One of the requirements of these last mentioned provisions of section 232 of the 
                                                 
133 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [14]. 
See, for example, Re Spargos Mining NL (1990) 6 ACSR 1 and Sutherland v National Roads and 
Motorists’ Association Ltd [2003] NSWSC 829; (2003) 47 ACSR 428. 
134 See Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [17] 
where the court also stressed the principle that a court has no power to repeal a provision or 
provisions of the constitution of a company unless it is proven that that particular provision or 
provisions are oppressive and that it is necessary to repeal that particular provision or provisions in 
order to address the oppression. See also 3.9.2 below. 
135 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [16]. 
See also 3.9 on the purpose of relief in terms of section 233 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
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Corporations Act 2001 is that there must be conduct that forms the subject matter 
of the complaint. The mere inclusion of a provision or an article in the constitutive 
documents of a company does not trigger the provisions of section 232 and 233.136 
The conduct may take the form of any positive act or omission.137 A complaint 
directed against the presence of a particular provision in the articles of association 
does not constitute conduct in the form of a positive act or omission by the directors 
and such conduct is not conduct of the company.138 A change of circumstances 
since the adoption of the constitutive documents (articles of association) also does 
not per se constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct.139 
3.6.2 The principle of majority rule 
 
To effectively govern and manage a company the majority should be given the 
freedom to do the necessary to enhance the value of the company for the benefit of 
all shareholders without the burden of an obstructive minority.140 One of the 
consequences of becoming a member of the company is that members are subject 
to majority rule.141 Unless otherwise provided by either the Corporations Act 2001 
or the constitution of the company, decisions of the company are adopted in 
accordance with the principle of majority rule.142  
 
                                                 
136 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [23]. 
137 In Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [22] 
and [24] the court regarded a resolution of the company as conduct for purposes of section 232. 
138 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [30]. 
139 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [25]. 
140 Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [63]. 
141 See 3.2.3 and 3.6.1 above. 
142 See 3.2.3 above. 
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Being merely a minority shareholder bound to the decisions of the majority 
does not entitle a minority member to relief in terms of sections 232 and 233 solely 
because the member suffered prejudice or financial detriment as a result of the 
principle of majority decision-making or rule.143 Conduct of the majority that 
negatively affects the value of a minority’s shareholding does not necessarily 
constitute oppressive conduct, especially when the conduct or alleged misconduct 
was undertaken in the pursuit of creating value for the company.144 Section 232 
recognises that the interests of the controlling members do not necessarily coincide 
with the best interests of the company.145 
3.6.3 Ability to withdraw the capital invested in a company 
 
A member cannot rely on the fact that he or she is unable to dispose of his or her 
shareholding in the company.146 As regards the repayment of the capital invested 
by a member in a company, courts often remind members that taking up shares in 
a company is generally a long-term investment.147 Unless an event occurs that 
makes it impossible for a company to pursue its objectives a member’s investment 
should be available to a company to achieve its objective or objectives.148 Only then 
                                                 
143 See Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [94] read with [108] where the court stated that a minority shareholder will 
not be able to mount a case of oppression only on the basis that the shareholder is a minority 
shareholder. A member may have a case that merits relief in terms of section 232 and 233 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 if the minority member can demonstrate that the directors of the company or 
the majority of the shareholders conduct the affairs of a company in such a manner that benefit their 
own interests or that of others at the expense of the minority member. See also 3.5.5.2 above. 
144 Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [63]. 
145 See 3.5.5.2 above. 
146 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [497]; Ian Allan Byrne v AJ Byrne 
Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667 [47]; Lucy v Lomas [2002] NSWSC 448 [43]. 
147 Lucy v Lomas [2002] NSWSC 448 [42]. 
148 Lucy v Lomas [2002] NSWSC 448 [42]. 
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a court would consider to wind-up a company so that any residual capital can be 
returned to investors and members.149 Following this approach a member cannot 
argue that he or she is being oppressed because of the mere fact that he or she 
cannot regain his or her investment in the company or is unable to find a buyer for 
the member’s shares in a company.150 
3.6.4 Poor management 
 
The management of a company is the responsibility of the board of directors.151 
Usually courts are slow to intervene in the decisions made by the board, even when 
a decision by the board may have a detrimental or adverse effect on a member.152 
The poor or mismanagement of a company is not grounds to obtain relief in terms 
of the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy.153 In order to obtain relief on this basis 
it has to demonstrate that no reasonable board would have reached the decision or 
an absence of good faith.154 
3.6.5 The clean hands principle and the conduct of the member 
Section 232 does not require a member to approach the court with clean hands.155 
                                                 
149 Lucy v Lomas [2002] NSWSC 448 [42]. 
150 Lucy v Lomas [2002] NSWSC 448 [43]; Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global 
Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [40]. 
151 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [41]. 
152 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [41]. 
153 Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Limited [2015] FCA 498 [250]; Ananda Marga Pracaraka 
Samgha Ltd v Tomar (No 6) [2013] FCA 284; (2013) 300 ALR 492 [417]. 
154 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [41]. See 3.5.5.2 above. 
155 Spence v Rigging Rentals WA (Pty) Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [138]; RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, 
Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 711. See 5.7.5 for the position 
in South Africa. 
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This is the position because the conduct of the member seeking relief is only one of 
various factors that will be taken into consideration to determine the unfairness of 
the conduct complained of. The conduct of the member seeking relief in terms of 
section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 may be significant for the following 
reasons: 
 Firstly, it could render the conduct complained of fair even though it is or was 
prejudicial.156 Secondly, the conduct of the applicant may affect the nature of the relief 
a court may consider appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case.157  
3.6.6 The labelling of conduct 
 
When the unfair prejudice remedy is applied, one should always start at the wording 
in which section 232 is formulated.158 Over the years, the courts have identified 
various forms of conduct that can be regarded as oppressive, but these forms of 
                                                 
156 Corbett v Corbett Court Pty Limited, in the matter of Corbett Court Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1176 
[131]; Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [101] and [105]; Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] 
VSC 47 [494] and [496]. 
157 Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [101] and [105]; Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] 
VSC 47 [494] and [496]. For example, the exclusion of a member from the management of the 
company may trigger the application of the provisions of sections 232 and 233. However, it should 
be noted that the exclusion from the management of the company is not per se oppressive as the 
oppressiveness of the conduct is vested in the exclusion from management of a member without a 
reasonable offer to be bought out. See Grego v Copeland & Ors [2011] VSC 521 [50]; Tomanovic v 
Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic 
[2010] NSWSC 152 [42]; In the matter of Courtesy Real Estate (NSW) Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 
1666 [19]. However, the conduct of the excluded member from the management of the company 
may be justified based on the conduct of the member. In this regard see Australian Institute of Fitness 
(Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [105]; 
In the matter of Ledir Enterprises Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1332 [188].  
158 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [233].  
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categories of conduct are only guidelines. The classification or labelling of 
circumstances which are indicative of when conduct can be regarded as oppressive 
or justifies relief in terms of section 232 read with section 233 does not substitute the 
duty of the court to apply the statutory test for relief to the facts and circumstances of 
each case.159 The wording of section 232 and the context in which the conduct took 
place (the facts and circumstances of each case) remain conclusive. 
3.6.7 The protection of ‘legitimate expectations’ 
 
The structure and form of a company is also an important consideration.160 Due 
consideration should also be given to the history pertaining to the formation of a 
company and the nature of the association of the various members.161 In disputes 
relating to the personal rights of a member, reliance is often placed on sections 232 
to 233 of the Corporations Act 2001. The exact legal relationship between parties 
to a dispute can be established with relative ease by interpreting the constitution of 
a company.162 This is the starting point when determining the rights and interests of 
the parties involved. 
However, the matter can become far more complex when the relationship 
between the parties is not of a pure commercial nature.163 The determination of the 
                                                 
159 Tomavic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [185]; In the matter 
of ICB Medical Distributors Pty Ltd and The International College of Biomechanics Pty Ltd; of ICB 
Gait and Posture Clinic Pty Ltd; Foot Steps Orthotics Pty Limited [2018] NSWSC 1315 [70]. See also 
Bull v The Quarter Horse Association [2014] NSWSC 1665 [331] where the court stated that a breach 
of the expectations of a party to a dispute may be held as oppressive conduct. Ian Allan Byrne v AJ 
Byrne Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667 [50]. 
160 See 3.6.7.1 below 
161 See 3.6.7.1 below 
162 See 3.6.7.1 below 
163 See 3.6.7.1 below 
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legal position of each party relative to another is then not as simple as applying the 
constitution of the company. In some instances a court would be required to direct 
its investigations into matters beyond the company structure to establish the 
relationship between the members as individuals.164 This is done based on 
equitable considerations.165 Not only does the remedy require a court to balance 
various rights of members, but regard must be had to the interests of members. In 
some circumstances a court may be justified in restricting a party in the exercise of 
his or her rights on equitable considerations. 166 
 Often parties forming a company do so to achieve some economic purpose 
or objective.167 Some expectations are not necessarily embodied in the constitutive 
documents and shareholders’ agreements.168 When understandings, arrangements 
or agreements that fall beyond the scope of the articles of association exist between 
members, conduct in strict compliance with the provisions or articles in the articles 
of association of the company may constitute oppressive or unfair prejudicial 
conduct of the affairs of the company.169 A member may be entitled to relief on the 
basis of section 232 if the conduct of which a member complains does not conform 
to the legal expectation of the member.170 Legitimate or reasonable expectations 
                                                 
164 See 3.6.7.1 below. 
165 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 715. 
166 See RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th 
ed, 2018) 715. 
167 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [419]. 
168 Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [81]. 
169 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [29]. 
See also 3.6.7.1 below. 
170 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [39]. 
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may be created in a variety of contexts. 
3.6.7.1 Quasi-partnerships or the role of the personal relationship between 
members 
When a company is incorporated it acquires its own separate juristic personality.171 
The company is a legal person separate from its shareholders.172 The company is 
managed by the board of directors.173 The relationship between the company and 
its shareholders is regulated by the constitutive documents of the company, namely, 
the Memorandum and Articles of Association.174 To establish the relationship 
between the company and shareholders the point of departure is the constitutive 
documents of the company.175 The provisions of the constitutive documents must 
be strictly enforced.176 Members have the right that a company’s business and 
                                                 
171 See 3.2 above. 
172 See 3.2 above. 
173 See 3.2 above. 
174 See 3.2 and 3.6.1 above. 
175 Medical Research and Compensation Foundation v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1227 [29]. 
See also Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [61] where the court 
explained that members of the company derive they rights from the constitution and statute of the 
particular company, but that in addition to the rights of members contained in the constitution or 
statute of the company, a member may also seek protection against the abuse of his or her rights 
from the general principles of company law and/or legislation. The sources of these potential abuses 
are often the controllers of the company in the form of the board and controlling shareholders. The 
main difference between the board and controlling shareholders is that the board owe fiduciary duties 
towards the company in contrast with shareholders or in particular controlling shareholders. See also 
3.2 and 3.6.3 above. 
176 In Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [84] 
the court emphasised that on the facts of a particular case is not that of a quasi-partnership ‘such as 
that identified in Ebrihimi (sic) in which the strict contractual rights of the shareholders are hedged 
with equitable obligations. In those cases the relationship and its terms are underpinned by an 
arrangement existing outside the Articles. In this case, the contract between the parties has full force 
and effect according to its strict terms’. 
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affairs be conducted in accordance with Memorandum and Articles of Association.  
If one deals with a company where the relationships between the members 
are only of a commercial nature, the constitution of the company is the primary 
source that regulates their relationship.177 A case is far more complex when one 
deals with a company where the relationship between the members are not of a 
pure commercial nature.178 In such circumstances, equity may require a court to 
look beyond the company structure and recognise the individuals behind the 
company.179 A court may then restrict the exercise of rights on equitable grounds.  
This is particularly the case when the relationship between the shareholders 
or members take the form of a quasi-partnership. In such circumstances the 
exercise of legal rights may be restricted based on equitable considerations.180 
These relationships are marked by the personal nature of the relationship between 
the members and/or the existence of a relationship based upon mutual trust and 
confidence between them.181 These relationships are often characterised by an 
agreement or understanding that all or some of the shareholders will participate in 
the management of the company and/or that a restriction is placed on the 
                                                 
177 See Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [141] where the court emphasised 
that the nature of the relationship between the members must be considered to determine 
commercial unfairness. See also 3.6.3 above. 
178 See also 3.6.3 above. 
179 Courts view relief in terms of section 232 as exceptional. See Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia 
Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [78]. 
180 Rocco Triulcio v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 311 [31]. 
181 Rocco Triulcio v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 311 [31]. 
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transferability of members’ interests.182  
The role of the personal relationship between members also plays an important 
role in the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. Despite the fact 
that members may have chosen the company structure to conduct their business, 
courts have recognised that one cannot ignore the personal nature of the 
relationship amongst the members thereof. In such circumstances the mutual 
breakdown of a relationship between the members of a company may justify the 
winding-up of a company.183 The winding-up of the company will be done on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds.184  
From a practical perspective, the oppression remedy is more likely to be relied 
on in the context of smaller companies in comparison to shareholders in listed 
companies.185 The reason for this is that members in listed companies are in a 
position to dispose of their shareholding far easier than it is for shareholders in 
smaller companies, which often leaves the shareholders in a smaller company 
entrapped and unable to withdraw their investment.186 If such a member succeeds 
in proving that the affairs of the company are conducted in an oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial manner, the court may grant relief in terms of which a member will be 
                                                 
182 Rocco Triulcio v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 311 [31] and [33] where the 
court found that a relationship of a personal nature existed between the members of the company 
despite the absence of pre-emptive rights in favour of shareholders. 
183 Rocco Triulcio v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 311 [32]. See also 3.9.1 
below. 
184 Rocco Triulcio v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 311 [32]-[33]; Fexuto Pty 
Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [420]. 3.9.1 below. 
185 Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [62]. 
186 Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [62]. 
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able to withdraw his or her investment from the company.187  
3.6.7.2 Reasonable expectations and changing circumstances 
A legal expectation does not have to be present at the time of the formation of a 
company. A legal expectation can be created at any time subsequent to the 
formation of the company.188 Regard must further be given to the fact that a legal 
expectation of a member is not immutable.189  
Due to the lapse of time and changing circumstances, situations may arise 
during which it is not possible to give effect to the promises and arrangements and 
other appropriate forms of relief need to be considered.190 When ‘good reason’ 
exists to extinguish a legal expectation, a member may find it difficult successfully 
to rely on section 232 for relief based on the relevant expectation.191 The existence 
of a legal expectation may be challenged in prevailing circumstances.192  
                                                 
187 Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [62]. See, for example, 
3.9.4 below for a discussion of buy-out orders in the context of the oppression remedy. 
188 Fexuto Pty Limited v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Limited & Ors [2001] NSWCA 97 [420]. 
189 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [39]; Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 
342 [96]. 
190 See also Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [90] 
where the court remarked that ‘irreconcilable differences will cause the court to conclude that an 
understanding or expectation as to the participation in management should be taken to have ceased’.  
191 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [39]; Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 
97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [90]; Guerinoni v Argyle Concrete & Quarry Supplies Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 
170; (2000) 34 ACSR 469; see also Belgiorno-Zegna v Exben Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 884; (2000) 
35 ACSR 305 [142], [151]. 
192 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [649] and 
[650]. 
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3.6.7.3 The justification for the enforcement of reasonable expectations  
The enforcement of reasonable expectations may potentially be criticised as it 
creates the impression that the subjective considerations of the parties play a role 
in determining whether a member has been oppressed or treated in an unfair 
prejudicial manner.193 However, section 232 and 233 entrust the court with the 
jurisdiction to look beyond legal rights of the parties and to tailor relief that is just 
and equitable in light of the particular circumstances of a case.194 The unfair 
prejudice remedy gives the court a mechanism to give effect to the intention of the 
members as far as their intentions are not aligned with the rights bestowed on 
members due to the particular company structure.195  
A substantial number of the reported cases dealt with members that have 
entered a company on a mutual understanding with their co-shareholders.196 An 
example of such mutual understanding is that the company will be managed in a 
certain or particular manner.197 These promises or understandings on which the 
association between the members is based are not necessarily contained in the 
constitutive documents of a company,198 but are in many cases unwritten or 
                                                 
193 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [171]. See 3.5.5 
above where it is explained that the test is objective. 
194 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group (Pty) Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [85]. 
195 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group (Pty) Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [88]. See also 3.6.1 read 
with 3.6.7.1 and 3.6.7.2 above where the point is made that in some circumstances the relationships 
between members are not exhaustively defined in the constitution of a company, but may be 
contained in the form of legitimate or reasonable expectations. 
196 See also 3.6.7.1 and 3.6.7.2 above. 
197 See also 3.6.7.1 and 3.6.7.2 above. 
198 See 3.6.7.1 above. 
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deducted from the conduct between the parties.199  
The parties or members to these arrangements or mutual understandings are 
bound to their promises based on the requirements of justice and equity. This is 
usually the situation when the parties formed a company based on certain mutual 
understandings between themselves as members of the company. Under certain 
circumstances such mutual understandings create complex disputes because from 
a company law perspective the members should not be treated as partners to a 
partnership nor can it be argued that there are more to the relationship between the 
members as only that of being members of the same company.  
It is important to understand that the concept of legitimate expectations is not 
a criterion for reliance on section 232, but is mere a conclusion of the facts relating 
to the relationship between the parties.200 A party may be entitled to relief in terms 
of section 233 in circumstances where there is no breach of an agreement or 
understanding.201 
3.6.7.4 Irreconcilable differences as a breach of a legitimate expectation 
It should be emphasised that courts do not recognise irreconcilable differences 
between members as a ground of oppression for purposes of section 232.202 
Irreconcilable differences between members do not automatically constitute 
                                                 
199 See Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [420] 
referring to Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360. 
200 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [62]. 
201 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672 [4]. 
202 Solanki v Cufari [2014] VSC 345 [58].  
 225 
 
oppressive conduct by one or more of the members203 nor does the fact that a 
member is regularly outvoted.204  
3.7 Standing – section 234 of the Corporations Act 2001  
3.7.1 A member of a company 
 
Section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 is not concerned with oppressive conduct 
towards a person who is not a member of the company.205 A person who is a 
member may rely on sections 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001.206 A 
person is a member of a company if such a person is a member at the registration 
of a company207 or after the registration of the company has agreed to become a 
member of the company and such person’s name is entered into the register of 
members.208 A member may rely on the provisions of section 232 of the Act 
                                                 
203 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [497]; Ian Allan Byrne v AJ Byrne 
Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667 [48]; Tomavic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] 
NSWCA 104 [199]. See also Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) 
[2004] SASC 242 [77]. The adoption of policies relating to the business of a company in respect of 
which legitimate differences of opinions exists, does not trigger relief. In this regard see Catto & Ors 
v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [77]. See further Mark 
Gerard Ireland as Executor of the Estate of the late Charles Stuart Gordon v Sandra Jane Retallack 
& Ors [2011] NSWSC 846 [20].  
204 Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [79] and 
[87] where the court stated that the majority has the right to exercise and enjoy protection of their 
rights and interests. See also Shelton v NRMA [2004] FCA 1393; (2004) 51 ACSR 278 [24]. See 
3.6.2 above regarding the principle of majority rule or decision-making. 
205 Batterham v Nauer, in the matter of Peter James Batterham [2019] FCA 485 [109]. See also 3.7.2 
below. 
206 Corporations Act 2001, s 234. See also Batterham v Nauer, in the matter of Peter James 
Batterham [2019] FCA 485 [112] where it was held that a person who relies on section 232 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 must be a member of the company to which the oppressive conduct relates. 
207 Corporations Act 2001, s 231(a). 
208 Corporations Act 2001, s 231(b). In terms of section 231(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 a 
member includes a person who becomes a member in terms of section 167 for purposes of a 
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irrespective of whether the member has been prejudiced in his or her capacity as 
such or not.209 
3.7.2 Extended standing 
 
Section 234 extends standing for purposes of the oppression remedy to a person 
whose name has been removed from the register of members as a result of a 
selective reduction210 or if such a person has ceased to be a member of the 
company and the circumstances which led to the termination of the person’s 
membership are the subject matter of the application.211 The section also provides 
for persons to whom shares in the company have been transmitted by will or by the 
operation of law.212 Standing may further be extended to any other person whom 
the ASIC considers appropriate in light of investigations it is conducting or has 
conducted into the company’s affairs or matters connected with the company’s 
affairs.213 
3.7.3 Non-controlling members and the oppression remedy  
 
The introduction of section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 provided an alternative 
                                                 
company limited by guarantee that is converted to a company limited by shares. See also Mio Art 
Pty Ltd v Macequest Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] QSC 211 [33]. See the position in South Africa in Chapter 
5 below. 
209 Corporations Act 2001, ss 234(e)(i) and (ii). See 3.5.5 above and 3.7.4 below. Compare with the 
position in South Africa as discussed in 5.7.1.4 below. 
210 Corporations Act 2001, s 234(b). See the problems outlined with the South African position in 
5.7.1.1 below. 
211 Corporations Act 2001, s 234(c). See the problems outlined with the South African position in 
5.7.1.1 below. 
212 Corporations Act 2001, s 234(d). See 5.7.1.2 below for criticism of the provisions relating to 
standing in respect of the South African remedy. 
213 Corporations Act 2001, s 234(e)(i) and (ii). 
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remedy to the liquidation of companies on ‘just and equitable grounds’.214 The object 
of the remedy is to provide protection to members who are unable to exercise 
control over a company.215 However, the provision does not disqualify other 
members from utilising it.216  
                                                 
214 See 3.3 above and more specifically 3.3.2. For the position in England see 2.9 above and 4.8 
below for the Canadian position. See 5.2.2 and 5.8 below for the South African position. 
215 According to the court In the matter of Richardson & Wrench Holdings Limited [2013] NSWSC 
1990 [37]- [38] a shareholder may be a majority shareholder which may not necessarily have voting 
control over the company or the ability to exercise control over the company. See also International 
Hospitality Concepts Pty Ltd v National Marketing Concepts Inc (No 2) (1994) 13 ACSR 368, 370-
71 where the court held that in certain circumstances the minority may oppress the majority. A 
shareholder who holds 50% of the shares in a company may rely on the oppression remedy because 
such a shareholder does not have the power or control to prevent or end the alleged oppression. 
See Munstermann v Rayward [2017] NSWSC 133 [22].  
216 See Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [52]-[53] where the court also stated that because of 
this philosophy, conceptually, there is nothing that prohibits any member of the company who holds 
an equal shareholding of 50% in a company from relying on section 232. Contra Polyresins (Pty) 
Ltd, Re (1998) 28 ACSR 671 where the court based its decision on the fact that no authorities existed 
that entitled majority shareholders to rely on the oppression remedy. For criticism on Polyresins (Pty) 
Ltd, Re (1998) 28 ACSR 671 see RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles 
of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 708 and especially they discuss case law decided prior to 
Polyresins (Pty) Ltd, Re (1998) 28 ACSR 671 in which the courts granted relief to majority 
shareholders on the basis of the oppression remedy. The authors cite cases such as Marks v Roe 
(unreported, SC (Vic), Mandie J, 4066/1995, 28 May 1996, BC9602061) where the chairperson of 
the company failed to convene the necessary annual general meetings and to furnish the majority 
shareholders with information about the business activities of the company. The authors further cite 
the case of International Hospitality Concepts Pty Ltd v National Marketing Concepts Inc (No 2) 
(1994) 13 ACSR 368, 370-71 where the court held that circumstances may arise where the minority 
may oppress the majority. RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of 
Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 709 argue that situations may arise where the majority or 
controlling shareholder would be unable to neutralise the conduct complained of. See further Watson 
v James BC9903699 [1999] NSWSC 600. In Goozee v Graphic [2002] NSWSC 640 [40], [44] and 
[45] the court held that a sole shareholder could be subject to oppression because of the conduct 
the company’s directors. See also In the matter of Richardson & Wrench Holdings Limited [2013] 
NSWSC 1990 [39] where the court held that the remedy is not only available to a minority 
shareholder. According to the court such a reading of section 232 would introduce unjustified 
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The purpose of the remedy is to allow a court to intervene in the affairs of a 
company where a member or members do not have the power adequately to 
prevent or stop oppression or unfair prejudice that they are suffering.217 The last 
mentioned member’s or members’ position differs from that of majority members or 
shareholders in that majority members can use their control to prevent or stop the 
affairs of the company from being conducted oppressively.218 Control does not refer 
to the number of shares a member holds but to the majority of votes a member can 
exercise.219 Because a member who holds 50% of the shares of a company does 
not theoretically have the ability to exercise control over a company, such a 
shareholder can rely on the provisions of section 232.220 Therefore, the principle is 
that a member can rely on the provisions of section 232 when such a member does 
not have the ability to address the alleged oppression or unfair prejudice through 
the use of the member’s voting power in the company.221 
3.7.4 The capacity in which a member is prejudiced 
 
The capacity in which a member has suffered unfair prejudice is an important aspect 
of the remedy. Section 232(e) makes it clear that a member can rely on the remedy 
                                                 
restrictions into the interpretation of the wording of the section. The court held ‘[a]lthough one would 
not expect that a controlling shareholder would need recourse to the section the complexity of 
shareholders’ and/or directors’ relationships within corporate structures are such that I am not willing 
to rule out the possibility of such an event. I am of the opinion the section can accommodate such 
an applicant’. See 2.6.1 above for the position in England and 4.5 below for the position in Canada.  
217 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [53]. 
218 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [53]. See also Munstermann v Rayward [2017] NSWSC 
133 [22]. 
219 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [53]. 
220 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [52]-[53]. See also Munstermann v Rayward [2017] 
NSWSC 133 [22]. 
221 For a similar position in South Africa see 5.7.1.1 (e) below. 
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when the member suffered prejudice in his or her capacity as such or in any other 
capacity. Providing members with protection in capacities other than being a 
member of a company caters for those instances where the defence is raised that 
the member has not been prejudiced in his capacity as member because, for 
example, the member is rather prejudiced or affected by the conduct complained of 
in his capacity as a director.222 The fact that a member does not have to prove that 
he or she is prejudiced in his or her capacity as member of the company does not 
give a member an unqualified right to rely on section 232. Courts do require that a 
member should demonstrate some relationship between the capacity in which the 
member has been prejudiced and his or her capacity as member.223 
3.8 Groups of companies 
 
3.8.1 Introduction 
 
An important aspect relating to section 232 that deserves consideration is the 
application of the remedy in the context of company groups.224 Holding companies 
                                                 
222 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 725. 
223 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 726 explain that a member who is also an employee of a company cannot rely on the remedy 
when the member suffered oppression or is prejudiced because the employment of the member 
stands independently from his or her membership. A member may rely on section 232 in his or her 
capacity as an employee in circumstances where the member’s employment relationship forms an 
integral part of his benefits as member. See also Monster Tyson Pty Ltd v Harbinson [2014] VSC 
278 [67] where the court held that the termination of employment of a member did not affect him in 
his capacity as member as he was still entitled to participate in the affairs of the company in his 
capacity as a director. It should also be noted that the court found that the member’s employment 
was lawfully terminated based on his conduct. See 2.6 above for the position in England and 4.5 
below for the position in Canada. For the position in South Africa see 5.7.1.4 below. 
224 See 5.7.7 below for a discussion of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy within a group of 
companies. 
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often exercise substantial control over subsidiary companies.225 Control is exercised 
through the use of the voting rights which a holding company holds in a subsidiary 
and/or through the power of the holding company to appoint the majority of directors 
that serve on the board of the subsidiary. Thus, when the oppression remedy is 
applied within a group of companies it has to be determined whether the term 
‘affairs’226 of a company can cover the conduct of affairs of a holding company 
and/or its subsidiaries. In other words, it has to be determined whether it is possible 
to attribute the affairs of a subsidiary to that of the holding company and vice versa. 
A further question that arises is whether the nominee directors (nominated by the 
holding company) have a duty to protect the subsidiary company from the conduct 
of the holding company. 
Prior to the Corporations Act 2001 the court in Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty 
Ltd227 held that a member of a parent company (or holding company) cannot complain 
of the conduct of a nominee director serving on the board of a subsidiary. To be 
entitled to such relief the applicant had to be a member of the subsidiary company. It 
is not sufficient to be a member of the parent company, as the affairs of the subsidiary 
company cannot be attributed to the affairs of the parent company.228 The decision 
in Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd229 can be described as a narrow approach to 
the application of the oppression remedy within company groups, because the 
                                                 
225 Section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 defines a ‘holding company’ as ‘in relation to a body 
corporate of which the first body corporate is a subsidiary’. A ‘subsidiary’ is defined in terms of section 
9 as ‘in relation to a body corporate, means a body corporate that is a subsidiary of the first-
mentioned body by virtue of Division 6’. 
226 For a definition of ‘affairs’ section 9 should be read with section 53 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
227 (1987) 5 ACLC 222. 
228 Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 222, 234. 
229 Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 222. 
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implication of this case was that a person can only rely on the oppression remedy if 
he or she is a member of the particular company whose affairs are conducted in an 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial manner. This approach possibly exposed minority 
members of subsidiaries whose conduct of affairs was substantially dependent on 
the instructions, approach or policies (control) of the holding company. 
The Corporations Act 2001 does not expressly deal with this aspect of the 
oppression remedy and is silent on the issue. This leaves the interpretation and 
application of section 232 in the context of groups of companies to the courts. The 
judgments dealing with the application of section 232 in the context of a group of 
companies can be divided into different schools of thought, namely, the so-called 
broader approach230 and the narrow approach.231 The approach to the application 
of section 232 to groups of companies was adopted from English case law and 
considered by Australian courts.232 
3.8.2 The broader approach 
 
According to the broader approach, the conduct of the holding company or its 
directors can be imputed by default on its subsidiary because of the holding-
subsidiary relationship.233 Based on this approach and for purposes of the 
oppression remedy, no distinction is made between the affairs of the holding 
company and the subsidiary.234  
                                                 
230 See 3.8.2 below. 
231 See the reference to the Morgan case in 3.8.1 above together with a variation of this approach 
discussed in 3.8.3 below. 
232 For the position in England see 2.7 above. 
233 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324. 
234 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 342 
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The broader approach is justified on the basis that policies adopted by the 
holding (parent company) company determine the steps taken by the subsidiary 
company.235 The holding company exercises control over a subsidiary through the 
adoption and implementation of policies. This approach is further justified on the 
basis that the remedy should recognise the commercial realities within which 
business are conducted and that a strict legal-technical approach is not 
appropriate.236  
When a subsidiary company is formed for the purpose of conducting the 
same business as that of the holding company, a duty arises on the holding 
company to conduct its affairs fairly towards the subsidiary company.237 This is 
specifically the case when the subsidiary has an independent minority 
shareholding.238  
The significance of the broader approach is that it is not necessary to 
consider the conduct of the nominee directors to determine whether their conduct 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial in relation to the affairs of the subsidiary.239 The 
mere holding-subsidiary relationship is sufficient. 
 
                                                 
235 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 342. 
236 Fexuto (Pty) Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672. See also 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 343. 
237 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 343. 
238 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 343; Dernacourt 
Investments (Pty) Ltd, Re (1990) 20 NSWLR 588, 605; Cumberland Holdings Ltd, Re (1976) 1 ACLR 
361, 376; Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [506]. 
239 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [506]; Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 343. In this respect compare this approach to the 
approach discussed in 3.8.3 below. 
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3.8.3  Nominee directors and the narrow approach 
 
In accordance with this approach, the conduct of a holding company’s affairs cannot 
be attributed to the subsidiary by default without first considering the conduct of the 
nominee directors on the board of a subsidiary company that has an independent 
minority shareholding.240 According to this approach, there must be specific 
circumstances present to justify the attribution of oppressive conduct in the affairs 
of the holding company to the affairs of the subsidiary. This will be the case when 
the directors of the subsidiary failed to protect the interests of the subsidiary against 
the conduct of the holding company or when the directors of the subsidiary failed to 
disclose knowledge or information that is material to the minority shareholders of 
the subsidiary.241 This means that the holding-subsidiary relationship is not 
sufficient to attribute the conduct of the affairs of one company to another.242 A 
person relying on the oppression remedy must also establish some sort of a breach 
of duty of a director or directors serving on the board of the relevant company in the 
holding-subsidiary relationship. Such conduct may include the failure to act or 
disclose information243 or the failure to avoid a conflict of interests.244 
When serving on the board of the subsidiary company, nominee directors 
have a duty to the subsidiary and not the holding company.245 When the interests 
of a holding company and those of its subsidiary company are in conflict, the 
                                                 
240 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 361. 
241 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 362. 
242 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 347. See the discussion of 
the broader approach in 3.8.2 above. 
243 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 363. 
244 See 3.8.3.2 below. 
245 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 367. 
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nominee directors of the holding company serving on the board of the subsidiary 
find themselves in a position of impossibility.246 The conduct of nominee directors is 
not unfair when they have acted in the interests of the subsidiary.247 In the event of 
the nominee directors subordinating their duties to the subsidiary company in favour 
of the interests of the holding company, it may be argued that the affairs of the 
subsidiary company are or are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive.248 
The nominee directors on the board of the subsidiary company cannot argue that 
even if they would have taken measures to protect the affairs of the subsidiary 
company, these efforts or measures would not have had any effect on or altered the 
outcome that resulted from the conduct of the holding company.249 
3.8.4 The broad or narrow approach? – the position in Australia 
 
3.8.4.1 Introduction 
 
At first glance, Australian case law appears to be divided on the approach to the 
application of section 232 in the context of company groups. Neither the broader 
approach nor the narrow approach has been expressly rejected by Australian 
courts.250 The broader approach has not been rejected in favour of the narrow 
approach.251 This means that the affairs of a company are not confined to the 
conduct performed by the nominee or common directors to the boards of the 
                                                 
246 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 366. 
247 Re Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1964-5] NSWR 1648, 1662-1663. 
248 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 367. 
249 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 367. 
250 See Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [516] and [526] 
251 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [516] and [517]. See also 3.8.4.2 
below. 
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relevant companies.252 The broader approached as found in Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer253 was specifically approved in Cumberland 
Holdings Ltd, Re.254 
3.8.4.2 The rejection of the broader approach? 
The narrow approach was adopted in Norvabron Pty Ltd (No 2), Re.255 Although the 
case appears to have adopted the narrow approach, it is not authority for the 
rejection of the broader approach on the basis that the statement of claim in this 
case focused on the conduct of the directors.256 Although the court referred to 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer257 containing the adoption of 
the broader approach, it did not expressly reject the approach.258  
In Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd, Re259 the court held that the conduct of a 
holding company or some or all of its directors may be regarded as the affairs of the 
subsidiary.260 Also, the conduct of the subsidiary or all or some of its directors may 
be regarded as the conduct of its holding company.261 Because the court in 
Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd, Re262 did not find that the directors were not under 
a duty to act it cannot be treated as authority for the rejection of the broader 
                                                 
252 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [517]. 
253 [1959] AC 324. 
254 (1976) 1 ACLR 361, 376. 
255 (1986) 11 ACLR 279. 
256 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [520] and [522]. 
257 [1959] AC 324. 
258 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [520]. 
259 (1990) 20 NSWLR 588. 
260 Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd, Re (1990) 20 NSWLR 588, 615. 
261 Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd, Re (1990) 20 NSWLR 588, 615. 
262 (1990) 20 NSWLR 588. 
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approach.263  
3.8.4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is no authority restricting courts to the narrow approach in the 
application of the oppression remedy within a group of companies.264 What is clear 
from the application of section 232 to companies within a group, is that it is a 
commercial reality that companies conduct their business within a group. 
Circumstances may demand that the conduct or activities of one group member 
(company) can and must be attributed to other companies within the group.265 
3.9 The relief 
 
Only when the jurisdictional facts of section 232 are proven, may a court grant relief 
in terms of section 233.266 Section 233 of the statutory oppression remedy sets out 
a list of possible orders that a court can make. A court has a broad discretion to 
provide relief and is not restricted to the orders listed in the section.267 The wide 
power or broad discretion entrusted to a court provides the necessary flexibility in 
                                                 
263 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [525]. 
264 Ubertini v Saeco International Group SpA (No 4) [2014] VSC 47 [528]. 
265 DD Prentice ‘The Theory of the Firm: Minority Shareholders Oppression: Section 459-461 of the 
Companies Act 1985’ (1988) 8 Oxford J of Legal Stud 55. 
266 North East Equity Pty Ltd v Sirmans [2018] FCA 1042 (9 July 2018) [13]; In the matter of the New 
South Wales Bar Association [2014] NSWSC 1695 [24]; Hua Cheng Property Pty Limited, Re [2014] 
NSWSC 533 [4] and [40]; Hunter v Organic & Natural Enterprise Group Pty Ltd & Ors [2012] QSC 
383 [142]. As regards the discretion to grant relief the court in Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] 
NSWSC 1088 [304] clearly stated that ‘[t]here is no automatic right to obtain a remedy where a 
breach of s 232 is established’. 
267 Dr Leo Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088  [304]; Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 
446 [50]; McLaughlin v Dungowan Manly Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 215 [55]; Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver 
Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [77]. 
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tailoring relief that it considers fit268 to the particular circumstances of a case.269 It is 
not a requirement that the relief should be just and equitable.270 The main purpose 
of relief in terms of section 233 is to end the oppression or unfair prejudice suffered 
by an applicant.271 The form of relief must not be more intrusive than necessary to 
end the conduct complained of.272 
 
                                                 
268 Vadori v AAV Plumbing [2010] NSWSC 274 [218]; Pastizzi Cafe Pty Ltd v Hossain (No 4) [2011] 
NSWSC 808 [73]. In Remrose Pty Ltd v Allsilver Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 251 [78] the 
court stated that the court will first consider a remedy that is the least intrusive but the remedy must 
be able to terminate the conduct complained of. See also Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic 
v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [44]. 
269 Falkingham v Peninsula Kingswood Country Golf Club Ltd [2015] VSCA 16 [79]; McLean v DID 
Piling Pty Ltd & ORS [2014] SASC 76 [70]; William McCausland v Surfing Hardware International 
Holding Pty Ltd ACN 090 252 752 (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 163 [45]; Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; 
Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 
[43]. 
270 Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158 [139]. It is important that the remark of 
the court that the relief must be just and equitable in the circumstances of the particular case must 
be understood to mean that the relief must be fair and reasonable and not that the conduct 
complained of must justify the winding-up and liquidation of a company on ‘just and equitable’ basis. 
See also Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210 [136]. See 3.9.1 below for a discussion of relief in the 
form of a winding-up and liquidation order in the context of oppression proceedings. 
271 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [121-2]. See also Bull v The 
Quarter Horse Association [2014] NSWSC 1665 [335] where the court referred to authority stating 
that the purpose of remedies for oppression is firstly to bring the conduct causing the oppression to 
an end and secondly to provide for compensation. See also Vadori v AAV Plumbing [2010] NSWSC 
274 where the court held that the relief must place the applicant as far as possible in the position as 
if there were no oppression. See further Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global 
Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [39]; Vigliaroni & Ors 
v CPS Investment Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] VSC 428 [64] the court held that the purpose of 
relief is to eliminate the oppression complained of as well as any future oppression. 
272 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [121]. See also Fexuto Pty Ltd v 
Bosnjal Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 688, 742; Dernacourt Investments (Pty) Ltd, Re (1990) 20 
NSWLR 588, 620; Martin v Australian Squash Club Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 452, 475. 
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3.9.1 Winding-up of a company 
3.9.1.1  Introduction 
The court may grant relief in terms of which the company may be wound up.273 Such 
winding-up is regulated in terms of section 461.274 An application for or granting a 
winding-up order may in some instances be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to 
members other than the applicant.275 Therefore the granting of a winding-up order 
must be carefully considered especially in light of the fact that the relief must be as 
less intrusive as possible276 and that the statutory oppression remedy provides 
alternative forms of relief to the winding-up of companies.277 
3.9.1.2  The difference in wording 
The interrelationship between the winding-up of a company based on the 
oppression remedy and section 461(1)(k) must be considered to the establish the 
scope of application of these two remedies. Although both section 233 and section 
461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act 2001 provide for the winding-up of companies, 
there are differences in the formulation of the grounds which can be relied on for 
such orders.  
Section 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act 2001 provides for the liquidation of 
a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds. This difference must also be considered 
in light of the fact that the purpose of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy is to 
                                                 
273 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(a). 
274 See specifically the Corporations Act 20011, s 461(1)(e)-(f).  
275 See Corporations Act 2001, s 467(4). See 3.9.1.3 below. 
276 See 3.9 above. 
277 See 3.3 and specifically 3.3.2.2 above. See also 3.9.1.3 below. 
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create an alternative remedy to the liquidation of a company on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds.278 If an identical approach were taken to applications in terms of section 
232 as with applications for the liquidation of a company on ‘just and equitable’ 
circumstances, the attempt of the legislature to provide for an alternative remedy in 
section 232 may be neutralised.279 
3.9.1.3  A remedy of ‘last resort’ or an ‘extreme step’ 
There is no principle that bars the liquidation of a company if the applicable 
legislative criteria are met.280 However, the words ‘just and equitable’ are indicative 
of the intention of the legislature to empower a court to subject the rights of an 
applicant to equitable considerations.281  
Equitable considerations come into play especially when the liquidation of a 
solvent and viable company is considered as the liquidation of a company is a 
remedy of last resort.282 The winding-up of a solvent company does not only affect 
the interests of the parties to a dispute but also impact on the investments of other 
members and job security of the employees of the company concerned.283 When 
considering relief in the form of a winding-up order in terms of section 233 the 
                                                 
278 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [121]. See also 3.3 and specifically 
3.3.2.2 above regarding the need for a remedy as an alternative to an order for liquidation on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds.  
279 Tomavic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [177]. 
280 The court in Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holding Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 
48 [46] specifically stated that there is no presumption against the winding-up of companies, but 
noted that the winding-up of a solvent company is an ‘extreme step’. See also Hillam v Ample Source 
International Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 73; (2012) 202 FCR 336 [70]. 
281 Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [111]. 
282 Amazon Pest Control Pty Limited, Re [2012] NSWSC 1568 [31]-[32]. 
283 Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holding Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 48 [46]. 
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provisions of section 467(4) should also be applied.284 Section 467(4) provides that: 
‘Where the application is made by members as contributories of the 
ground that is just and equitable that the company should be wound up or 
that the directors have acted in a manner that appears to be unfair or 
unjust to other members, the Court, if it is of the opinion that: 
(a) the applicants are entitled to relief either by winding up the company 
or by some other means; and 
(b) in the absence of any other remedy it would be just and equitable 
that the company should be wound up; 
must make a winding up order unless it is also of the opinion that some 
other remedy is available to the applicants and that they are acting 
unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of 
pursing that other remedy.’ 
The criterion is not whether the liquidation order is an order of last resort but the test 
is rather whether the remedy is adequate in appropriately addressing the conduct 
complained of in the circumstances of the case.285 This will require a court to 
consider the availability of other remedies which could remedy the conduct 
complained of.286 In this regard a court would seriously consider the ability of parties 
to transfer their minority shareholding287 and would favour the postponement of 
proceedings to afford the parties an opportunity to negotiate such a buy-out.288 
 
                                                 
284 Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holding Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 48 [63]. 
285 Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holding Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 48 [46]. See 
Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjal Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 688, 742 where the court emphasised 
that the winding-up of a solvent company is a remedy of last resort. This principle was not overturned 
by the Court of Appeal in Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 
ACSR 672. 
286 Asia Pacific Joint Mining Pty Ltd v Allways Resources Holding Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 48 [46] and 
[57]. 
287 Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [116]. 
288 Australian Institute of Fitness (Pty) Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic)/Tas) Pty Limited 
(No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639 [115]; In the matter of Calabria Community Club Ltd [2013] NSWSC 998 
[128]. 
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3.9.1.4 Irreconcilable differences and the winding-up of a company on ‘just 
and equitable’ grounds 
An understanding of the application of section 232 and the liquidation of a company 
on ‘just and equitable’ grounds to circumstances where an irreconcilable breakdown 
took place between a member and other members of a company, helps to 
understand the scope of application of the two remedies. In principle, a member 
cannot rely on section 232 for relief based on an irreconcilable breakdown in the 
relations between the applicant (member) and other members of a company.289 
Despite the fact such a member cannot rely on section 232 for relief, the 
irreconcilable breakdown in relations may justify the liquidation of a company on 
‘just and equitable’ grounds.290 In terms of section 491 of the Corporations Act 2001, 
a company can voluntarily be wound-up when a special resolution to that effect is 
adopted. Because liquidation affects the interests of all members in a similar manner 
the adoption of a special resolution to initiate the liquidation process cannot be seen 
as fair or unfair as it ‘does not involve the destruction of one interest to the 
advantage of anotherʼ.291 
                                                 
289 See 3.6.7.4 above. 
290 See Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86; (2008) 66 ACSR 
325 [119] where the court noted that ‘[w]inding up is the characteristic remedy in circumstances where 
a working relationship predicated on mutual co-operation, trust and confidence has broken down. 
Equity would not ordinarily order the continuation of such an association where it would be a futility, 
would require continuing supervision or would be tantamount to specific enforcement of a contract of 
personal services’. See also Knights Quest Pty Ltd v Daiwa Can Company & Anor [2018] VSC 426 
[157]-[160] for an example where the court found that no grounds for oppression existed but ordered 
the winding-up and liquidation of a company in terms of section 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act 2001 
based on the existence of a deadlock and the inability of the board to function properly. See further In 
the matter of Pure Nature Sydney Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 914 [70]. 
291 See Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [94] 
-[96]. 
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3.9.2  Modification of constitution 
An applicant may approach the court in terms of section 232 for an order that the 
existing constitution of the company be modified or repealed.292 This form of relief 
deviates from the normal procedures in the Corporations Act 2001 in terms of which 
the constitution of a company can be modified.293  
3.9.3 Regulation of future affairs 
The court may order the regulation of the future affairs of a company.294 Such an 
order is aimed at the prevention of a repetition of the affairs complained of or to 
direct a specific course of action in relation to the conduct of the future affairs of a 
company. In case of an order to regulate the future affairs of a company to end or 
prevent the conduct complained of, consideration should be given to terminating the 
association of the members of a company by way of a buy-out or purchase order.295  
3.9.4  Orders for the purchase of shares 
 
3.9.4.1 Introduction 
 
An order for the purchase of shares is one of the most practical and useful forms of 
relief that a court may grant in terms of section 232 read with section 233(1)(d) of 
the Corporations Act 2001.296 The practical value and object of such an order is to 
                                                 
292 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(b). 
293 The prescribed procedure for the amendment of the constitution by a special resolution is 
described in section 136 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
294 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(c). 
295 See in this regard Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 688, 742. See 
3.9.4 below for a discussion of buy-out or purchase orders. 
296 See also Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(e).  
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terminate the association between members.297 The object of the order is not to 
compensate a shareholder for any loss, but to end the oppression complained of.298 
Further, the remedy cannot be used to force a buy-out in contravention of the terms 
contained in the Memorandum and Articles of Association.299 Usually, the majority 
members would be ordered to buy the shares of minority members.300 In exceptional 
circumstances it may be ordered that the minority member (or members) purchase 
the shares of the majority.301 
An order for the purchase of shares can be made in terms of section 
233(1)(d) and section 233(1)(d) of the Corporations Act 2001. It is important to note 
that an order in terms of section 233(1)(d) has the effect that purchase of the 
                                                 
297 Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [122]. It is important to note that 
an order for the purchase of a member’s shares usually is an appropriate alternative to the winding-
up of a company which is discussed in 3.9.1 above  
298 See Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [122]-[123] especially where 
the court stated that the purpose of the relief in the form a purchase order is not to compensate a 
shareholder although the order may have such effect. See also Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 
446 [198]. However, see Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; BC200200074 (Shirim) 
[12] where the court did hold that one of the purposes of the purchase order is to compensate the 
oppressed shareholder. See further Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [39] where 
the court noted that ‘[a]t the heart of these principles is that the price to be paid is compensatory in 
nature and is aimed at redressing the wrong done (the oppressive conduct)’. In Re Hollen Australia 
Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 95 [84] the court held that relief in terms of section 233 has the objective of 
compensating a member for oppression suffered is a relevant factor for a court to consider when 
deciding whether relief in the form of a purchase order or in the form of a winding-up order should 
be made. See further Rankine v Rankine (1995) 124 FLR 340, 345 where the court remarked that 
relief in the form of a purchase or buy-out order has the effect of compensating the member who has 
suffered oppression. For a discussion of the adjustments a court can make see 3.9.4.2 (b) below. 
299 Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (No 3) [2004] SASC 242 [80]. 
300 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [199]. 
301 Patterson v Humfrey [2014] WASC 446 [199]. See also Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty 
Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [122] where the court noted, that although it would be unusual, it can be 
ordered in terms of section 233(1)(d) that ‘the oppressor sell to the oppressed’.  
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relevant shares be transferred between the parties to the dispute. Such a purchase 
or transfer of shares does not affect the capital of a company in the sense that that 
assets are transferred or distributed to a member. An order in terms of section 
233(1)(e) does affect the capital of company as the reduction of capital takes places 
as a result of the company being compelled to purchase the relevant shares from a 
member or members. 
3.9.4.2 The valuation of shares subject to purchase orders 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
As discussed, a court has the power in terms of section 233 to make an order in 
terms of which the shares of a member be purchased by either the company302 or 
other members of the company.303 Section 233 does not prescribe the terms on 
which such a purchase of shares should take place.304 The section is also silent on 
the manner in which the value of shares is to be determined.305  
The terms and valuation of shares in terms of which the purchase of shares will 
take place is thus left to the discretion of a court. A court will have regard to the 
traditional methods of valuing the shares of a member of a company.306 It is the duty 
of a court to formulate a purchase order that is fair based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.307 
                                                 
302 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(e). See also 3.9.5 below. 
303 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(d). 
304 United Rural Enterprises v Lopmand [2003] NSWSC 910 [36]. 
305 United Rural Enterprises v Lopmand [2003] NSWSC 910 [36]. 
306 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [39]. 
307 See 3.9 above. See also Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an 
Oppression Context – a Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 101, 114. 
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It may be argued that the legislature has deliberately chosen not to regulate the 
valuation of shares or stipulating the terms that will apply to purchase orders. The 
adoption of this approach is to ensure that the exercise of a court’s discretion is not 
unnecessarily limited or restricted.308 The discretion of a court is only bound to the 
principle that this discretion should be exercised judicially and that the order is fair 
in light of the facts and circumstances of each case.309 Fairness is thus the 
determining factor in the determination of the terms and conditions of a purchase 
order. 
As previously explained, the value set for the purchase of the shares in terms 
of a buy-out order must be fair in the context of all the circumstances of the case.310 
A court has a discretion to set a price for the sale of the shares that will not 
necessarily reflect the actual value or real worth of the shares in the open market.311 
A court in the exercise of its discretion will have regard to factors such as the need 
to make any adjustments to compensate for the effect of the conduct complained 
of,312 the date to be used as basis for the valuation,313 the possible application of a 
minority discount,314 the procedures in the constitution of a company pertaining to 
                                                 
308 See 3.5 above where it is pointed out that the provisions of the oppression remedy are interpreted 
to enhance the remedy and that they should not be interpreted in such a way as to introduce 
restrictions unjustifiably. See also 3.9 above. See Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority 
Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – a Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 
101, 114 who emphasises that a court has a broad discretion in determining the value of shares for 
purposes of the oppression remedy. 
309 United Rural Enterprises v Lopmand [2003] NSWSC 910 [36]. 
310 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No 2) [2013] VSC 381 [46]. 
311 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No 2) [2013] VSC 381 [39] and [46]. 
312 See 3.9.4.2 (b) below. 
313 See 3.9.4.2 (c) below. 
314 See 3.9.4.2 (d) below. 
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the valuation of shares a company315 and any other relevant factor.316 
(b)  Adjustments to the value of the shares of a member 
The problem with using ordinarily principles of valuation is that it does not take into 
account the necessary adjustments that have to be made to determine the fair value 
of the relevant shares in light of the circumstances of each case.317 The value that 
a court will place on the value of shares subject to a buy-out order does not 
necessarily reflect the market or actual value of the shares, but in some 
circumstances may include compensation or any other adjustment that is fair.318 
The purpose of compensation in this form is to neutralise the effect of the unfair 
prejudicial conduct or consequences suffered by the member as a result thereof.319 
(c) The date of valuation 
Usually the date of the commencement of legal proceedings is used as the date for 
the valuation of the shares that are subject to a purchase order.320 However, the 
                                                 
315 See 3.9.4.2 (f) below. 
316 See 3.9.4.2 (e) below. 
317 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No 2) [2013] VSC 381 [44]. See Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty 
Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; BC200200074 (Shirim) [13] where the court held that the ordinary principles 
of valuation are inadequate in the context of the oppression remedy. 
318 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No 2) [2013] VSC 381 [39]. See also Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty 
Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; BC200200074 (Shirim) [12]. See further 3.9.10 below for a discussion of a 
court’s power to order the payment of compensation.  
319 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [39]; In the matter of North Coast Transit Pty 
Limited [2013] NSWSC 1119 [24]. See Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 [329] where 
the court held that the assessment of the value of shares must be done on the basis that the 
oppressive conduct did not occur.  
320 Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; BC200200074 (Shirim) [14]. The approach 
is supported by Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an Oppression Context 
– a Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 101, 120-121 and Steven Sirianos 
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date to be used as basis for the valuation of the relevant shares must be just and 
fair to parties involved.321 This means that the date is dependent on the 
circumstances of each case.322 
(d) Minority discount 
 
The general principle is that a minority discount is not applied to value of the shares 
of a minority shareholder whose shares are subject to a buy-out order.323 The 
advantage of this approach is that oppressive conduct on the part of the majority 
shareholders is not incentivised.324 The second reason why a minority discount 
should be applied is that the share in question is not sold voluntarily.325 In 
appropriate circumstances a court may apply a discount to the value of the shares 
                                                 
‘Problems of Share Valuation under Section 260 of the Corporations Law’ (1995) 13 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 88, 106. 
321 Grego v Copeland & Ors [2011] VSC 521 [62]; Short v Crawley (No 30) [2007] NSWSC 1322 
[1237]. See Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – 
a Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 101, 121 who argues that courts rejected 
the notion that the date of valuation of shares subject to a buy-out order must be done with reference 
to the date of the commencement of the legal proceedings in terms of the oppression remedy. This 
is evident from the case law accepting alternative dates as a basis for the valuation of shares for 
purposes of a buy-out order. 
322 Grego v Copeland & Ors [2011] VSC 521 [62]; Foody v Horewood & Ors (2007) 62 ACSR 576. 
See also Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – a 
Contemporary Review 2012 (24) 2 Bond Law Review 101, 122. 
323 In the matter of North Coast Transit Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1119 [23]; Mopeke Pty Ltd v 
Airport Fine Foods Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 153 [96]. See, however, Roberts v Walter Developments 
Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 882, 906 where the court did apply a discount to a minority shareholding, 
but remarked that the application of a minority discount will normally be inappropriate.  
324 Steven Sirianos ‘Problems of Share Valuation under Section 260 of the Corporations Law’ (1995) 
13 Company and Securities Law Journal 88, 103. Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority 
Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – a Contemporary Review (2012:24 2 Bond Law Review 
101, 115. 
325 Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – a 
Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 101, 123. 
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subject to a buy-out order.326 This will usually be the case where the conduct of the 
minority shareholder caused a reduction in the value of the company.327 
(e) Other factors taken into consideration in determining fair value 
 
In determining a fair value of shares, a court may consider the nature of the 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct, the nature of the relationship between the 
parties, the reason for the breakdown of the relationship, the expectations a party 
had in relation to playing an active role in the management of the company and the 
restrictions that are placed on a party to divest its interest in the company.328 To 
ensure that a party is fairly compensated a court may also take into consideration 
the profits, remuneration or dividends that a party had been entitled to by virtue of 
its membership.329 To determine a price that is fair a court must consider the 
intention of the parties at the formation of the company and any prior conduct of any 
of the parties.330  
(f) The valuation of shares and the constitution of a company 
 
The discretion of the court pertaining to the valuation of shares is wide and only 
subject to the principle that it has to be exercised judicially.331 This is demonstrated 
by the fact that a court may even deviate or ignore methods or procedures agreed 
                                                 
326 In the matter of North Coast Transit Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1119 [23]. 
327 Richard Brockett ‘The Valuation of Minority Shareholdings in an Oppression Context – a 
Contemporary Review (2012) 24:2 Bond Law Review 101, 123. 
328 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [43]. 
329 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [44]. 
330 Wain & Ors v Drapac & Ors (No. 2) [2013] VSC 381 [47]. 
331 United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 910; (2003) 47 ACSR 514 
[36]. 
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to in the constitution or articles of association of a company.332 This may be because 
the sale of the particular shares is not voluntary and may be inappropriate in the 
context of the specific case. 
3.9.5 Reduction of a company’s share capital 
 
Section 233(1)(e) provides for an order in terms of which a reduction of the 
company’s share capital can be made.333 
3.9.6 A member seeking an order to institute or intervene in legal 
proceedings on behalf of a company 
3.9.6.1 Introduction 
The provisions of section 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 makes it possible for a 
member to approach a court to seek relief in the form of an order authorising a 
member to institute or intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of a company. This 
relief should be considered in light of the traditional approaches to the oppression 
(or unfair prejudice) remedy and the derivative action.  
3.9.6.2 The traditional approach to the statutory personal remedy and 
statutory derivative claim  
Originally the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy was aimed at the protection of 
the personal rights and interests of members. The derivative claim or action was 
aimed at protecting the rights of the company. The distinction between these two 
remedies was often justified on the basis that a company is a legal entity separate 
                                                 
332 In the matter of North Coast Transit Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1119  [23]. 
333 See 3.9.4.2 above for an explanation of the difference of an order in terms of section 233(1)(d) 
and (e). 
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and distinct from its members.334 The implication was that when a wrong was 
committed against a company (or when the rights of a company were infringed), the 
cause of action vested in the company.335 This meant that only the company could 
enforce its rights against the wrongdoer. The members of a company cannot 
enforce the rights of a company as these rights do not belong to or vest in them.336  
When the statutory personal action and the statutory derivative action are 
viewed as two distinct actions (or remedies), each having its own functions in terms 
of the Corporations Act 2001, it could be argued that one remedy cannot replace or 
usurp the functions of the other.337 In short, the argument is that the provisions of 
the one should not be interpreted in such a manner as to circumvent the specific 
requirements of the other. The argument places further emphasis on the proposition 
that a clear distinction must be maintained between the statutory derivative action 
and the statutory personal remedy.338  
 
 
                                                 
334 From a theoretical perspective, section 237 enforces the separate legal personality of a company. 
335 For example, where a director’s duty is breached the cause of action belongs to the company and 
it is the company that should institute legal proceedings based on such a breach, provided that it is 
in the best interests of the company. Although the duties of directors are owed to the company, a 
breach of such a duty does not only prejudice a company but may also have a prejudicial effect on 
the interests of the members of a company. When a duty owed to the company is breached the 
cause of action resides with the company and therefore it is the company that should seek redress. 
A member cannot rely on the cause of action belonging to the company to obtain relief.  
336 See also 3.2.2 above for a discussion of a company as a body corporate. 
337 See 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 above for a discussion of previous provisions dealing with the statutory 
personal remedy and the criticism against making provision for the institution of legal proceedings 
on behalf of the company in terms of the personal remedy. 
338 See 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 above. 
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3.9.6.3 The statutory approach to the statutory personal remedy and 
statutory derivative claim 
 
(a) Introduction 
The fact that section 233(1)(g) of the Corporations Act 2001 now expressly provides 
for relief in the form of authorising a member to institute or defend legal proceedings 
on behalf of a company blurs the distinction between the personal remedy and the 
derivative claim. This provision creates an overlap between the statutory personal 
action in section 232 read with section 233 and the statutory derivative action in 
section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001.339 This approach by the legislature 
creates doubt as to whether the traditional distinction between the two remedies is 
maintained for purposes of the Corporations Act 2001. This doubt is reinforced by 
the fact that it can be argued that the position in Foss v Harbottle340 has been 
abolished specifically to overcome the problems and uncertainty created by the 
principles set out in this judgment.341 
(b) The abolishment of the rule in Foss v Harbottle342 
The abolishment of the principles in Foss v Harbottle343 and the replacement thereof 
by statutory provisions have important implications for those who wish to rely on the 
                                                 
339 From a practical point of view, the same conduct may justify relief in terms of section 232 read 
with section 233 (‘the statutory personal action’) and sections 237 and 237 (‘statutory derivative 
action’). 
340 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
341 See Fexuto Pty Limited v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Limited & Ors [2001] NSWCA 97 [131] where the 
court accepted the statement made in Saul D Harrison & Sons plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18 that 
statutory reform aimed to ‘outflank’ the position resulted from the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 
Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
342 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
343 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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statutory derivative claim in section 237. Prior to the statutory personal remedy and 
the statutory derivative action, the principles and rules as contained in Foss v 
Harbottle344 also applied to company law in Australia.345 Section 236 now expressly 
provides that ‘[t]he right of a person at general law to bring, or intervene in, 
proceedings on behalf of the company is abolished’.346 The effect of this provision 
is that the derivative action is now only regulated by statute.347  
(c) The provisions of section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 
In order fully to appreciate the implications of the overlap between section 232 read 
with 233 and section 237 the basic provisions regarding the statutory derivative 
claim need to be outlined. A court may authorise a person to bring, or intervene in, 
proceedings on behalf of a company only if the requirements of section 237(2) are 
met. Section 237(2) provides that the court ‘must’ grant an order authorising a 
person to bring, or to intervene in, proceedings of a company if it is satisfied that the 
company itself will probably not bring the proceedings.348 Further, the court needs 
to be convinced that the member is acting in good faith349 and that it is in the best 
interests of the company that the member is authorised to commence with, defend 
or intervene in legal proceedings.350 To assist the court, section 237(3) creates a 
rebuttable presumption of when it will not be in the best interests of the company to 
                                                 
344 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
345 Fexuto Pty Limited v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Limited & Ors [2001] NSWCA 97 [131]. 
346 Corporations Act 2001, s 236 (3). See 5.9.15 below for the South African position. 
347 For the position relating the principles in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 in 
England see Chapter 2 above.  
348 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(a). 
349 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(b). 
350 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(c). 
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authorise a member to bring or intervene in proceedings on behalf of the company. 
The subject matter of the application must also relate to a ‘serious question to be 
tried’.351 Before a court will make such an order the applicant must show that he or 
she has at least 14 days before the application was made, given written notice to 
the company of the intention to bring such an application.352 This notice must further 
state the reasons for his or her intention to apply for relief in terms of section 237.353 
If the applicant has not given written notice to the company, the member must satisfy 
the court that it is ‘appropriate’ to grant relief despite non-compliance with section 
237(2)(i).354 
Section 239 expressly deals with the availability of the derivative action in the 
event of the ratification or approval of conduct that would otherwise have been 
actionable in terms of the statutory derivative action.355 Section 239 states that the 
ratification or approval of conduct does not disqualify an applicant in terms of section 
237, with leave of a court, from commencing or intervening in proceedings involving 
the company.356 However, the ratification of conduct would be taken into 
consideration when a court has to adjudicate a matter brought on behalf of the 
company in terms of section 237.357 When a court has to consider the effect of the 
ratification of conduct that may be subject to legal proceedings, it will consider 
                                                 
351 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(c). 
352 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(e)(i). 
353 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(e)(i). 
354 Corporations Act 2001, s 237(2)(e)(ii). 
355 In terms of the principles in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 a member would have 
been unable to institute proceedings on behalf of a company if the members of the company ratified 
or approved the conduct complained of. 
356 Corporations Act 2001, s 239(1)(a). 
357 Corporations Act 2001, s 239(2). 
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whether the members where properly informed about the details of the conduct that 
is proposed to be ratified or approved by the members of a company.358 The court 
must further consider whether the members that ratified or approved the relevant 
conduct were ‘acting for proper purpose’.359 
(d) The overlap between the statutory personal action and the derivative 
claim 
A reading of section 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 shows that the relationship 
between the oppression remedy and the derivative claim has now changed. An 
interesting feature of section 233 is that it expressly empowers a court to grant relief 
to authorise a member to institute proceedings on behalf of a company.360 One of 
the concerns regarding this legislative approach is that section 233(1)(g) will make 
section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 redundant or alternatively that section 
233(1)(g) may be abused to bypass the requirements of section 237. Australian 
courts held that the fact that a particular course of action is actionable by a company 
does not exclude relief in terms of sections 232 read with 233.361 Companies are 
protected from the abuse because the jurisdictional requirements of section 232 
have to be proven before a court has a discretion to order relief in terms of section 
233(1)(g). A court will also consider alternative remedies and take into account the 
relationship between the grounds upon which a member relies and the nature of the 
                                                 
358 Corporations Act 2001, s 239(a). 
359 Corporations Act 2001, s 239(b). 
360 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(g). The section specifically provides: 
‘(g)  authorising a member, or a person to whom a share in the company has been 
transmitted by will or operation of law, to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue 
specified proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company.’ 
361 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [51]-[53]. 
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relief sought.362 Other discretionary factors include the desirability to involve the 
company in protracted litigation.363 Even when proceedings are brought in terms of 
sections 236 and 237 the court will take consideration other available remedies such 
as an order in terms of section 233(1)(f).364 This is an indication that the strict 
division between the personal remedy and the derivative claim is not maintained. 
These remedies are further not mutually exclusive. 
3.9.7 Aspects of the payment of compensation in terms of section 233 
A court may order that compensation is payable in terms of the statutory oppression 
remedy. For purposes of relief it is important to differentiate between compensation 
payable to a member and compensation payable to the company. 
3.9.7.1 Relief (compensation) for the company 
Obtaining relief for a company in the form of compensation based on the oppression 
or unfair prejudice remedy is an issue closely related to the question whether the 
application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy or statutory derivative action is 
mutually exclusive.365 Section 233 entrusts a court with a very wide discretion in 
tailoring appropriate relief in the context of the facts and circumstances of each 
case. However, section 233 does not expressly include an order in terms of which 
a member can seek relief in the form of the payment of compensation by third 
                                                 
362 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [53]. 
363 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [53]. 
364 In terms of this section the company can be ordered to ‘institute, prosecute, defend, or discontinue 
specified proceedings’. See LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] 
QSC 225 [53]. 
365 See also 3.9.6 above for a discussion of the interrelationship between the statutory oppression 
remedy and the statutory derivative action. 
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parties to the company.366 This may imply that section 237 limits the scope of relief 
that may be granted in terms of section 233.367 To allow applicants to rely on 
sections 232 and 233 to apply for relief for a company may have the effect that 
section 237 is circumvented.368 It can be argued that the payment of compensation 
to a company in terms of section 233 cannot be been seen as a circumvention of 
the statutory derivative action.369 Such an approach does not necessarily expose a 
company to frivolous litigation because the jurisdictional grounds in section 232 
                                                 
366 In Mio Art Pty Ltd v BMD Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] QSC 55 the court held [73] that section 
233 does not create a freestanding right to seek compensation against third parties for causes of 
action that vest in a company. Although section 233 does not expressly provide for relief in the form 
of compensation it does not mean that relief may not include an order for the compensation for losses 
suffered as a result for the conduct complained of [88]. According to the court [87] the discretion of 
a court under section 233 is not boundless and is limited by the grounds in section 232 and the 
persons who in terms of section 234 may apply for relief. The court held [88] that oppressive ‘conduct 
does not create a free standing right to compensation against third parties not involved in the 
company’s internal affairs who are otherwise not obliged to refrain from the conduct or responsible 
for the alleged detriment or loss’.  
367 A similar argument was raised in LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor 
[2013] QSC 225 [39]. However, the court [43] refused to accept that the scope of a court’s powers 
under section 233 is limited by the provisions of the statutory derivative action in sections 236 and 
237. The availability of the statutory derivative action is merely a factor [43] that would be taken into 
consideration when exercising its discretion in terms of section 233. 
368 See however Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 [119] where the 
court emphasised that the provisions of section 232 read with section 233 should not be applied in 
a manner that will make the provisions of sections 236 read with 237 redundant, but is must be noted 
that the provisions of section 233 are wide enough for a court to order relief for the benefit of a 
company. See also LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 
225 [52] where the court took the stance that although a company will benefit from the proceedings 
it does not mean that the legal proceedings where brought on behalf of the company. 
369 For a similar argument see LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] 
QSC 225 [39]. The court in LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] 
QSC 225 [51] held that a member must prove the requirements of section 232 and thereafter a court 
has a wide discretion in terms of section 233. An award for compensation would not be granted if 
other forms of relief are more appropriate than an action in terms of section 237. 
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have to be established before an order in terms of section 233 can be made.370 
Secondly, reliance on section 232 read with section 233 is not proceedings 
instituted or brought on behalf of the company.371 The only effect of such an order 
is that the company, in relation to which the proceedings are brought, benefits from 
the order.372 
3.9.7.2 Relief (compensation) for members 
To make an order for compensation to be payable in terms of section 233 directly 
to a member or members is problematic.373 The question is specifically relevant in 
the context of the application of section 232 read with section 233 when a breach 
of a director’s duties took place. As the court described, a compensation order which 
is partly payable directly to shareholders and partly directly to the company would 
in essence entitle a member to a share of compensation which in actual fact should 
have been paid to the company. Such a direct payment to shareholders would 
unjustifiably prejudice the interests of the creditors of a company.  
Further, an order for the direct payment of compensation to shareholders has 
the effect of contravening a number of the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001. 
These provisions include the provisions regulating the distribution of assets, the 
payment of liabilities during the winding-up process, provisions dealing with the 
                                                 
370 See also LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [51]. 
371 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [52]. 
372 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [52]. 
373 See LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [42] where 
it was argued by one of the parties that compensation cannot be awarded directly to a member in 
terms of section 233. See also the obiter remarks of the court [54] where it expressed the opinion 
that it is not convinced that the direct payment of compensation to shareholders for loss suffered by 
the company is the generally accepted legal position. 
 258 
 
reduction of capital and with distributions in general. The aim of these provisions is 
to ensure that the rights and interests of the company’s creditors are protected and 
treated equally.  
When the claim is based upon a cause of action that is only available to the 
shareholder or member and not the company, a court would be justified to make an 
order for the direct compensation of the shareholder as the shareholder has 
suffered a loss separately and distinct from the company.374 In the exercise of its 
discretion in terms of section 233 to order the winding-up of a company or to order 
a compulsory buy-out, a court will take into consideration the need to compensate 
a shareholder or shareholders.375 
3.9.8 Appointment of a receiver 
 
The appointment of a receiver or a receiver and manager of all of some of the 
company’s property may also be sought as a form of relief.376 In MacLean v 
MacLean377 a receiver was appointed as an interim measure to stabilise the 
management of the affairs of a company pending the resolving of the disputes 
between the shareholders of a company during a subsequent trial.378 The 
                                                 
374 LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [58]. 
375 See the reference of Hollen Australia Pty Ltd, Re [2009] VSC 95 [84] in LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty 
Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo & Anor [2013] QSC 225 [57]. 
376 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(h). See also RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and 
Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 729. 
377 [2017] FCA 194. 
378 MacLean v MacLean [2017] FCA 194 [47]. In this case four family members held all the shares 
in the company. Each family member held 25% of the shares. One of the shareholders was the sole 
director of the company. This shareholder was the husband of one of the other three shareholders 
and the father of the other. The marriage relationship between the director-shareholder and his wife 
became strained to such a degree that he allegedly assaulted her and caused her to obtain various 
domestic violence orders. Initially the day-to-day management of the company was conducted by 
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advantage of such an order is that it would place the management of the affairs of 
the company in independent hands.379 The appointment of a receiver must be 
carefully considered as it may be regarded as an act of default for the purposes of 
certain security agreements.380 
3.9.9 Restraining order 
 
A court may issue an order that prohibits specific conduct.381 
3.9.10 Order to compel specific conduct 
 
In terms of section 233(1)(j) a court may order the payment of money as 
compensation to a shareholder.382 
3.10 Fair offers 
3.10.1 Introduction 
 
The making of fair offers for the purpose of settling disputes plays an important role 
in oppression or unfair prejudice proceedings. The refusal of a reasonable buy-out 
offer may be detrimental to the case of the applicant.383 The effect of such an offer 
                                                 
the three shareholders who were not directors of the company. Only later the director-shareholder 
become involved. His involvement in the management of the company was described as disruptive. 
Amongst others he frustrated the payments of due and payable accounts. He further did not take 
steps to implement an agreement to appoint all other shareholders as directors of the company. See 
also section 420 of the Corporations Act 2001 for the powers of a receiver. 
379 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 729. 
380 RP Austin and IM Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 
2018) 729. See also Lukaszewicz v Polish Club Ltd [2019] NSWSC 446 [287] where the court stated 
[286] that the appointment of a receiver should be regarded as a remedy of last resort. 
381 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(i). 
382 Shanahan v Jatese Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1088 [324]-[325]. See also 3.9.7 above 
383 Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer 
v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152 [42]. For a discussion of a reasonable offer see 3.9 below. 
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may impact on a finding on whether or not the complainant has suffered oppression 
or was unfairly prejudiced.384 Further, the offer may impact on the cost order that a 
court is prepared to grant.385 Fair offers are an important factor to consider when 
members wish to end their association with the minority members.  
3.10.2 The offer 
When a court has to determine whether or not conduct is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to a member or members of a company, it may take into consideration 
any reasonable or fair offers that have been made to resolve the dispute between 
the parties. However, it must be stressed that the wording of the Corporations Act 
2001 remains the primary source of the cause of action based on oppression.386 
The absence of a reasonable or fair offer does not form part of the components or 
elements of oppression.387 A fair offer is only one of the factors that a court takes 
into account to determine whether the conduct complained of is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial.388 The elements of a reasonable offer are now briefly 
discussed.389 
                                                 
384 See Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342; (2009) 71 ACSR 343. 
The exclusion of a member from the management of a company in light of the arrangement or 
understanding that the applicant will be entitled to participate in the management of the company is 
not per se oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. Such exclusion will only be found to be oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial if it took place in the absence of a reasonable offer to buy the shares of the 
minority member or members at fair value. 
385 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104. 
386 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [234]. 
387 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [235]. 
388 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [234]. 
389 The principles in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092 were influential in the approach of Australian 
courts to fair offers in oppression or unfair prejudice proceedings. See RP Austin and IM Ramsay 
Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th ed, 2018) 719-20. 
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3.10.3 The components of a fair offer 
(a)   Invitations to settlement negotiations  
A fair offer does not have to take the form of an effective buy-out of the applicant’s 
shares.390 The parties may negotiate a fair settlement in a form other than that of a 
buy-out.391 The offer does not have to be an offer in a legal-technical sense in that 
it will upon unconditional acceptance constitute a binding contract.392 An offer may 
also take the form of a willingness to negotiate an exit mechanism.393 An offer can 
take the form of an invitation to enter negotiations to structure a reasonable 
approach upon which an applicant can exit from a company based on a mutual 
agreement.394 The fact that the nature of an offer is such that it will not lead to a 
legally binding contract may, however, affect the weight that may be attributed to 
such an offer as a factor to determine unfairness.395  
(b) Exit provisions in the constitution of a company 
The constitution of a company may contain procedures that regulate the position 
                                                 
390 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [101]. 
391 See Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [101] where the court 
emphasised that a fair offer can take the form of a buy-out settlement or an alternative arrangement 
can be made as long as such alternative arrangement is fair. 
392 Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342; (2009) 71 ACSR 343 [103]. 
393 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [242]; Nassar v 
Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [103]. 
394 Belgiorno-Zegna v Exben Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 884; (2000) 35 ACSR 305 [139]. See also 
Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342 [105]-[106] where the court held 
that a failure to provide a detailed and fair offer meeting the requirements of the criteria in O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] WLR 1092 does not automatically translate into conduct that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial. 
395 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [242]. 
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when a member wishes to withdraw his or her investment from a company.396 The 
provisions may describe the circumstances under which a member may disinvest 
from the company. The constitution may further contain provisions on the 
procedures that such a member has to follow. One of the important aspects of a 
member withdrawing his or her investment from a company is the valuation of the 
shares held by the member. Usually, such shares are repurchased by the company 
or alternatively, depending on the provisions of the company’s constitution, are 
bought by existing shareholders of the company. Although such provisions will be 
enforced the enforcement of such provisions and procedures must be fair in the 
circumstance of the case.397 The enforcement of exit provisions in the constitution 
of a company must be fair and constitute a fair arrangement.  
3.10.4 An Australian perspective on the application of the principles in 
O’Neill v Phillips398  
 
The approach in O’Neill v Phillips399 was criticised in Tomanovic v Global Mortgage 
Equity Corporation Pty Ltd.400 According to the court, the ‘two-step reasoning 
process’ is not an acceptable approach in determining oppression or unfair 
prejudice.401 The court further emphasised that the wording of section 232 is the 
criterion that must be used to establish oppression or unfair prejudice.402 The obiter 
                                                 
396 See, for example, Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342. 
397 See also 3.9.4.2 (f) above. 
398 [1999] WLR 1092. 
399 [1999] WLR 1092. 
400 [2011] NSWCA 104. 
401 See Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [228] where 
the court held that ‘[r]ather, one decides whether the conduct of the affairs of the two relevant 
companies is oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against the Tomanovic 
interests as a single exercise in evaluation’. 
402 Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [228]. 
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remarks in O’Neill v Phillips403 mainly apply to cases where the conduct complained 
of is the exclusion of the applicant from the management of a company.404  
3.11 Arbitration 
 
3.11.1 Introduction 
 
Alternative dispute resolutions mechanisms, such as arbitration, are internationally 
recognised405 mechanisms to resolve commercial disputes expeditiously406 and 
cost effectively.407 Arbitration proceedings further provide parties with an 
opportunity to ventilate issues relating to a dispute privately, especially when issues 
of a commercially sensitive nature arise.408 Parties to commercial disputes are 
encouraged to make use of arbitration proceedings when available and 
applicable.409 This philosophy is also clear when the Commercial Arbitration Act 
2011 and Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 are compared.410  
                                                 
403 [1999] WLR 1092. 
404 In Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104 [237] the court 
emphasised that O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092 dealt with a matter where the only conduct 
complained of was the exclusion of a member from the management of a company. 
405 See, for example, the International Arbitration Act 1974. 
406 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [226]. 
407 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [227]. The court further [245] considered the 
International Arbitration Act 1974 and the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) and held that the 
International Arbitration Act 1974 does not exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of the domestic 
legislation of a state. 
408 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [219] and [220] where the court remarked that 
the private nature of arbitration proceedings may be a consideration when making an order to that 
effect. This was not an issue in the matter before the court. 
409 See section 2D(a) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). 
410See Brazis & Ors v Rosati & Ors [2014] VSCA 264 [32] where the court noted that the discretion 
of the court to refuse stay of proceedings under section 53(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 
had been replaced with a new regime in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 where the court does 
not have a discretion to stay proceedings. See also Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 
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3.11.2 The role of public policy in arbitration proceedings  
 
The disputes that may be susceptible to arbitration are only restricted by the 
principle of arbitrability. The principle of arbitrability entails that a dispute must be 
able to be subjected to arbitration and that the dispute does not involve issues of 
public policy.411  
3.11.3 The prerequisites for arbitration 
 
Arbitration proceedings are dependent on the consensual agreements of parties to 
a dispute.412 Therefore, before a dispute is referred to arbitration it needs to be 
established whether the particular dispute or matter is covered by the applicable 
arbitration agreement or clause.413 To determine whether a dispute falls with the 
ambit of an arbitration agreement, the formulation of the arbitration agreement or 
clauses must be carefully constructed.414  
3.11.4 Arbitration clauses and the right to approach a court 
 
Tension may arise between the right of a party to approach a court to adjudicate a 
dispute and the enforcement of an arbitration clause that forms part of a voluntary 
                                                 
896 [243] on section 53 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 where the discretion of the court was 
emphasised. 
411 See Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [192] where the court noted that the fact 
that a dispute arises under the Corporations Act does not necessary mean that public policy prevents 
the dispute fom being arbitrated. 
412 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [195]. 
413 See Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [195] where the court found that some of 
the disputes between the parties were not covered by the relevant arbitration agreement. 
414 In CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Rizzani De Eccher Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1798 [85] the 
court held that arbitration agreements or clauses must be interpreted by considering the wording of 
the clause or agreement. No special rules or liberal approaches of interpretation apply in favour of 
arbitration. See also Four Colour Graphics Australia Pty Ltd v Gravitas Communications Pty Ltd 
[2017] FCA 224 [23] and [24].  
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agreement between the parties.415 When a court refuses to enforce an arbitration 
clause or agreement between the parties, it does not have the power to subject a 
party who wishes to rely on the arbitration clause to any other form of proceedings 
save for court proceedings.416 
3.11.5 The nature of an arbitrator’s powers and the reference to a ‘court’ 
in the Corporations Act 2001 
The nature of the jurisdiction and powers of an arbitrator are contractual.417 An 
arbitrator cannot adjudicate on the validity of arbitration agreements as the validity 
of an arbitration agreement or clause strikes directly at the source of the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction.418 The contractual nature of an arbitrator’s power has important 
implications for the enforcement of orders and awards. The main difference 
between a court order and an arbitration award in terms of a statutory provision lies 
in the enforcement of such an order or award. A court can enforce its own order 
while an arbitration award only has contractual force between the parties to the 
agreement or contract and cannot directly be enforced by a court.419 
When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration clause in the context of section 
232 of Corporations Act 2001 an interesting interrelationship is created between 
sections 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 and section 8 of the Commercial 
                                                 
415 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [202] where the court held that the parties to 
an agreement may define which disputes may be subjected to arbitration and confirmed that case 
law in Australia confirms the enforcement of agreements relating to arbitration. 
416 See Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [208] where the court made reference to 
section 7 of the International Arbitration Act. 
417 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [179]; Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime 
Carriers Inc (No5) (1998) 90 FCR 1, 14. 
418 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [186] and [187].  
419 Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No5) (1998) 90 FCR 1, 14. 
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Arbitration Act 2011.420 Both sections 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 
refer to the orders a court can make. This raises the question whether an arbitrator 
can exercise a power that appears to be specifically allocated to a court in terms of 
legislation.  
Section 233 provides examples of the orders a court may make. Because 
section 233 expressly entrusts a court with broad and wide powers, it may be argued 
that the relief may only be granted by a court. However, in Acd Tridon v Tridon 
Australia421 the court made an obiter remark that the power contained in a particular 
statutory provision of the Corporations Act 2001 is not necessarily and exclusively 
a function of a court.422 It is further within the prerogative of the parties to agree that 
an arbitrator is empowered to exercise the same powers and functions of a court 
under a specific statutory provision.423 Therefore, parties may agree that a dispute 
may be determined in accordance with the powers and functions that may be 
                                                 
420 Section 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 provides:- 
‘(1) A court before which an is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration 
agreement must, if a party so requests not later than when submitting the party’s 
first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless 
if finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. 
 Where an action referred to in subsection (1) has been brought, arbitral 
proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be 
made, while the issue is pending before the court.’ 
421 [2002] NSWSC 896 [193]. 
422 See also 700 Form Holdings Pty Ltd, Re [2014] VSC 385 [74], [75] and [76]; Robotunits Pty Ltd 
v Mennel [2015] VSC 268 [66]. In WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd; In the 
Matter of Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1164 [192] the court stated that ‘[h]owever, I would 
not regard these public policy considerations as preventing parties to a dispute from referring 
questions to arbitration merely because those questions arise under the Corporations Act. I see 
nothing special about the Corporations Act that would distinguish it, as a whole, from other legislation 
such as the Trade Practices Act’. 
423 700 Form Holdings Pty Ltd, Re [2014] VSC 385 [74]; Robotunits Pty Ltd v Mennel [2015] VSC 
268 [66]. 
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exercised by a court under the Corporations Act 2001.424 The powers that a court 
enjoys under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 are powers that can be 
exercised by a court under general law.425 These powers are not of such a special 
nature that the exercise thereof must be measured against the criterion of the public 
interest, such as the power to order the winding-up of a company.426  
It is possible for an arbitrator to determine the factual issues of a dispute and 
then to refer the matter to a court to make an order specific and appropriate to the 
findings of the arbitrator.427 Some forms of relief may not be granted by an arbitrator 
due to public policy considerations.428 For example, an arbitrator does not have the 
power to make an order for the winding-up and liquidation of a company based on 
public policy considerations.429  
3.12 Conclusion 
 
3.12.1 The relevance of the English law in the development of the 
Australian statutory oppression remedy 
 
The development of the Australian statutory oppression remedy shares many 
                                                 
424 In the matter of Infinite Plus Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 470 [63]; Robotunits Pty Ltd v Mennel [2015] 
VSC 268 [66]. See also Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [180] and [181]. 
425 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [193]. 
426 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [193]; WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox 
Holdings Pty Ltd; In the Matter of Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1164 [193]. 
427 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [216]. See also Rinehart v Welker [2012] 
NSWCA 95 [170]. 
428 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [192].  
429 Acd Tridon v Tridon Australia [2002] NSWSC 896 [192]. According to the court, relief [196] of an 
‘in rem nature’ such as the rectification of a share register cannot be granted by an arbitrator. See 
also WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd; In the Matter of Hydrox Holdings Pty 
Ltd [2016] FCA 1164 [192] and [194]; Rinehart v Welker [2012] NSWCA 95 [172]; A Best Floor 
Sanding Pty Ltd v Skyer Australia Pty Ltd  [1999] VSC 170 [18].  
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similarities with the South African statutory unfair prejudice remedy. Both the 
Australian and South African remedy were significantly influenced by the statutory 
oppression or unfair prejudice remedy in England.430  
Initial forms of the statutory oppression remedy introduced in Australia 
closely followed statutory forms of the equivalent remedy in England.431 English law 
did not only have a direct influence on the statutory development of the oppression 
remedy, but also substantially influenced the approach of Australian courts in the 
application of the remedy. Many examples can be found where Australian courts 
relied on prominent English judgments pertaining to the statutory oppression 
remedy in seeking guidance on the interpretation and application of the Australian 
equivalent of the remedy.432 Therefore an understanding of the English statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy is imperative to form a proper comprehension of the current 
form and application of the Australian oppression remedy.433  
3.12.2 The continued use of the term ‘oppressive’ 
The statutory development of the Australian statutory oppression remedy shows 
that the legislature initially described the conduct at which the remedy was directed 
as oppressive.434 Despite the criticism of this term in the predecessors of section 
                                                 
430 See 3.3 above for the development of the Australian oppression remedy. See 5.2 below for the 
development of the South African unfair prejudice remedy.  
431 See 3.3 above and more specifically 3.3.2 above. 
432 For example, see 3.6.5 above for the clean hands principle; 3.6.7 above with regard to the 
protection of legitimate expectations; 3.8 above as to the application of the oppression remedy within 
a group of companies; 3.9.4.2 regarding the valuation of shares for purposes of a purchase order; 
3.10 above in respect of the relevance of fair offers in oppression proceedings. 
433 For a detailed analysis of the English unfair prejudice remedy (or oppression remedy) see Chapter 
2 above. 
434 See 3.5 above. 
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232 of the Corporations Act 2001, it is notable that the term has been retained in 
the current form of the Australian oppression remedy.435 Despite the retention of 
this term, it is significant to note that additional terms or concepts were introduced 
to describe the conduct that may trigger relief in terms of the statutory oppression 
remedy.436 It should be noted that while the oppression remedy in the jurisdictions 
of Australia,437 Canada438 and South Africa439 refer to both oppressive and unfair 
prejudicial conduct as grounds for relying on the oppression remedy, the English 
legislature omitted the oppression concept in its entirety.440 
In the development of the oppression remedy, the legislature expanded the 
nature of conduct that could be subject to relief for purposes of the remedy.441 The 
result of this reform was that a member could rely on conduct that is either 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that is unfairly discriminatory or alternatively if the 
conduct is ‘contrary to the interests of the members as a whole’.442 This 
development can be ascribed to the criticism to which the concept oppressive was 
subjected.443 To prevent the remedy from being interpreted too restrictively the 
                                                 
435 See 3.3.5 above where it is explained that the term oppressive or oppression was seen as a 
restrictive term that did not enhance the application the remedy. Compare with 2.3.3.4 read with 
2.6.3.2 above containing a discussion of the use of the terms oppressive or oppression to describe 
conduct to which unfair prejudice (or oppression) remedy applies. 
436 See 3.5.1 read with 3.5.5 above. 
437 See for the position in Australia in section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 as discussed in 3.4 
and 3.5 above. 
438 For the position in Canada see 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-
44) as discussed in 4.7 below. 
439 For the position in South Africa see section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as discussed 
in 5.3 read with 5.7.2 and 5.7.3 below. 
440 See 994 of the Companies Act 2006 read with 2.6.3.2 above for the position in England. 
441 See 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 above. For the current position see 3.4 – 3.6 above. 
442 See 3.5 above. 
443 For similar criticisms in the context of the English unfair prejudice remedy see 2.3.3.4 above. 
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legislature had to make its intention in relation to the scope of application of the 
remedy clear.  
3.12.3 Alternative forms of relief 
 
The one major drawback to previous versions of the statutory oppression remedy 
was that a direct link existed between the grounds for relief in the form of the 
winding-up of a company and the grounds for relief on the basis of oppressive 
conduct.444 The statutory development of the oppression remedy demonstrated that 
the winding-up of companies based on oppressive grounds is not appropriate in all 
circumstances. It should be noted that relief in the form of the winding-up of a 
company remains expressly listed as a form of relief that a court may grant.445 
However, courts are reluctant to wind-up a sustainable company where there are 
other forms of relief available that would adequately remedy the conduct 
complained of.446  
It is further important that although the grounds for the winding-up a company 
on ‘just and equitable’ grounds447 and the winding-up of a company in terms of the 
statutory oppression remedy may overlap, there are important differences between 
the grounds for the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds and 
the winding-up of a company based on oppression.448 The Corporations Act 2001 
makes it clear that the existence of the statutory oppression remedy does not bar a 
member from obtaining an order for the winding-up of a company based on 
                                                 
444 See 3.3 above. 
445 See 3.9.1 above. 
446 See 3.9.1.3 above. 
447 See Corporations Act 2001, s 461(1)(k). 
448 See 3.9.1.2 above. 
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commercially unfair conduct or conduct that is ‘contrary to the interests of the 
members as a whole’449. This is evident from section 461 of the Corporations Act 
2001. However, a court must in the exercise of its discretion to wind-up a company 
in terms of section 233 carefully consider whether relief in the form of the winding-
up and liquidation of a company would rectify the conduct complained of. When a 
court exercises its discretion in terms of section 461450 consideration should be 
given to the appropriateness of alternative forms of relief.451 This is especially 
important in light of the fact that a winding-up order would affect the interests of 
other members that may not necessarily be parties to the proceedings before the 
court. 
3.12.4 Relief against future and threatening conduct 
 
It is also important that early versions of the Australian oppression remedy did not 
only provide relief of a reactive nature but also forms of relief of a proactive nature 
such as the order regulating the future affairs of the company and orders for the 
amendment of the constitution of a company.452 Further, the statutory oppression 
remedy was made expressly applicable to actual or proposed conduct or 
resolutions.453 
3.12.5 The oppression remedy as stepping stone for derivative 
proceedings 
 
Another important progressive step in the development of the oppression remedy 
                                                 
449 Corporations Act 2001, s 232(d). 
450 See Corporations Act 2001, s 461(1)(e)-(f). 
451 See Corporations Act 2001, s 467(4). 
452 See 3.3 above.  
453 See 3.3.3 above. For the current position see 3.5 and in particular 3.5.3 above. For criticism 
against the South African position in this regard see 5.9.2.3 and 5.9.2.4 below. 
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in Australia was the introduction of relief in the form of authorising a member to 
institute, intervene in or defend legal proceedings on behalf of the company.454 This 
approach was taken in direct reaction to problems associated with the application 
of the common law principles in Foss v Harbottle.455 The discussion of the overlap 
between the statutory oppression remedy and the statutory derivative action 
revealed that from a practical perspective it may at times be very difficult to 
distinguish between conduct that prejudiced the interests of a company when the 
same conduct also prejudiced the interests of the members of a company.456 This 
is especially the case when the company suffered harm as a result of the conduct 
of its directors which will hold the power to avoid that the company institutes legal 
proceedings against them.  
The introduction of the ground that reliance can be placed on the statutory 
oppression remedy when conduct or a resolution complained of is ‘contrary to the 
interests of the members as a whole’457 establishes a theoretical basis which 
enables a member to seek relief in the form of authorisation to conduct legal 
proceedings on behalf of a company as a form of personal relief.458 This aspect was 
lacking from previous drafts of the statutory oppression remedy and was also clearly 
lacking form the application of the legal principles in Foss v Harbottle.459 
It is significant that section 233 provides for the authorisation of a member to 
                                                 
454 See 3.9.6 above. 
455 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See 3.9.6 above. 
456 See 3.9.6 above. 
457 See 3.9.6 above. 
458 See 3.9.6 above. 
459 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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institute, intervene in or defend legal proceedings on behalf of a company.460 
According to the courts this was done to ‘outflank’ a technical application of the 
principles in Foss v Harbottle.461 This approach further acknowledges that in some 
instances it will be extremely difficult to distinguish between the interests of a 
member and the company. There is no real risk for the abuse of this form of relief 
as the jurisdictional grounds first have to be proven and even then a court still has 
a wide discretion regarding the nature and form of relief to be granted, if at all.462 
The fact that relief is granted to the benefit of the company based on the oppression 
remedy is not indicative of proceedings of a derivative nature.463 
3.12.6 Aspects relating to the formulation of the statutory oppression 
remedy 
The current form of the statutory oppression remedy is formulated broadly to cover 
a wide range of conduct. Although the remedy is formulated in wide terms the 
provisions relating to the statutory oppression remedy are articulated in a simple 
and logical manner. The first part of section 232 clearly states the type and nature 
of conduct that is covered by the remedy.464 Primarily it covers conduct in relation 
to a company’s affairs but includes conduct on behalf of the company.465 Actual and 
proposed conduct and/or actual or proposed resolutions are also expressly included 
for purposes of section 232.466 In order to quality for possible relief, the conduct 
                                                 
460 Corporations Act 2001, s 233(1)(g). See also section 233(1)(f) in terms of which a court can 
directly order a company to institute or defend legal proceedings. 
461 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See 3.9.6.3 above. 
462 See 3.9.6.3 above. 
463 See 3.9.6.3 above. 
464 See 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 above read with 3.5.5 above. 
465 See 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 above. 
466 See 3.5.3 above. 
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described in section 232(a)-(c) must be either contrary to the interests of the 
members of the company as a whole or commercially unfair.467 This clearly states 
the criteria against which the result of effect of the conduct complained of would be 
scrutinised before a court can consider appropriate relief where necessary.468 This 
implies that there must be a causal link between the conduct and the effect thereof. 
To determine whether conduct is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
discriminatory the concept of commercial unfairness is used as criterion. 469 The 
conduct must be objectively evaluated in the corporate law context.470 Whether 
conduct is commercially unfair or not is not dependent on whether the conduct is 
unlawful or not.471  
The tense in which section 232 is formulated is indicative of the nature of 
conduct that is covered by the section and is not necessarily prescriptive of the time 
at which the conduct complained of had to present.472 As in other jurisdictions 
section 232 covers the protection of reasonable or legitimate expectations.473 
3.12.7 Standing 
 
To rely on the provisions of the statutory oppression remedy a shareholder must be 
a registered member.474 Section 234 does provide for instances where a 
shareholder is not required to be a registered member of the company to be enable 
                                                 
467 See 3.5.1 read with 3.5.5 above. 
468 Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations (Pty) Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55 [9]. 
469 See 3.5.5. above. 
470 See 3.5.5 read with 3.6 above. 
471 See 3.5.5 above. 
472 See 3.5.2 above. 
473 See 3.6.7 above. 
474 See 3.7 above. 
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to rely on the provisions of the remedy.475 It is further important to note that a 
member may rely on section 232 in circumstances where he or she has been 
oppressed in capacities other than that of a member provided that the capacity in 
which the member suffered from oppressive conduct is closely related to his or 
capacity as member.476 Controlling members in the company may also rely on the 
provisions of section 232.477 The fact that a member is a controlling member may 
have a bearing on the question whether the particular member suffered 
oppression.478 
3.12.8 Purchase or buy-out orders 
 
As regards the relief that a court may grant in terms of earlier versions of the 
oppression remedy, it became clear at a very early stage in the development of the 
remedy that the winding-up of a company may often be inappropriate. Therefore 
alternative forms of relief were introduced such as an order to purchase the shares 
of a member by the company or other members of a company.479  
As with its predecessors, section 233 makes specific provision for ordering a 
transfer of the shares of a member.480 It may be ordered that a member’s shares be 
purchased by other members of the company481 or by the relevant company itself.482 
This is the most often used form of relief. The only contentious part of this form of 
                                                 
475 See 3.7.2 above. 
476 See 3.7.4 above. 
477 See 3.7.3 above. 
478 See 3.7.3 above. 
479 See 3.3.2.2 above and 3.12.7 below. 
480 See 3.9.4 above. 
481 See 3.9.4 above. 
482 See 3.9.5 above. 
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relief is the valuation of shares. Many factors and principles influence the valuation 
of shares. The main principle is that it is the duty of a court to determine a fair value 
of the relevant shares in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case.483 Although the primary object of such an order is to end the association of a 
member with a company and other members of a company, the effect thereof would 
be to compensate a member.484 This is because adjustments have to be made to 
the value a member’s shares to neutralise the effect of the conduct complained 
of.485 Although the court has a discretion to order the payment of compensation, a 
member does not have a freestanding right for the payment of compensation.486 
3.12.9 Company groups 
 
The question of whether and when the oppression remedy can be applied in the 
context of a group of companies also arose. Both a broad and narrow approach can 
be found in Australian case law.487 Although some judgments favour the narrow 
approach to the application of the oppression remedy in a group company structure, 
none of these cases rejected the broad approach.488 The application of the broad 
approach is supported as it is aligned with the commercial realities of business and 
does not introduce judicial restrictions which are not provided for by the statutory 
oppression remedy as found in the Corporations Act 2001. According to the broader 
approach the oppression remedy can be applied based solely on the fact that 
                                                 
483 See 3.9.4.2 above. 
484 See 3.9.4.2 (a) above 
485 See 3.9.4.2 (a) and (b) above 
486 See 3.9.4.2 (b), 3.9.7 and 3.9.10 above. 
487 See 3.8.2 and 3.8.3 above. 
488 See 3.8.3 read with 3.8.4.2 above. 
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companies are in a holding-subsidiary relationship.489 
3.12.10 Reasonable offers 
 
As with other jurisdictions, the rejection of a reasonable offer plays an important role 
in the exercise of a court’s discretion in terms of the oppression remedy. The 
rejection of a reasonable offer may affect the finding of a court whether there is any 
oppression suffered and/or the making of appropriate cost orders.490 In some 
instances, a rejection of a fair value may also possibly impact on the valuation of 
shares to determine the fair value of a member’s shares in a company for purposes 
of a purchase or buy-out order. The well-known English case of O’Neill491 received 
attention from Australian cases. The Australia courts acknowledge many of the 
principles in O’Neill,492 but found its application to be limited.493 According to 
Australian courts the principles in O’Neill494 are often only relevant in the context of 
cases where the making of a purchase order would qualify as appropriate relief. As 
with other jurisdictions the reasonable offer does not have to take the form of a 
formal legally binding offer.495 The reasonableness of such an offer will be 
determined in light of the context of the specific case. Where possible parties to an 
oppression dispute must be given the opportunity to negotiate an appropriate form 
of relief such as the exit or withdrawal of one or more members from a company. 
  
                                                 
489 See 3.8.2 and 3.8.4 above. 
490 See 3.10.2 above. 
491 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
492 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
493 See 3.10.4 above. 
494 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
495 See 3.10.3 above. 
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3.12.11 Arbitration 
The application of the oppression remedy in alternative dispute resolution 
proceedings such as arbitration has also been considered. Those who object to the 
arbitration of oppression disputes argue that arbitration agreements deny parties 
the right to access to courts and that oppression disputes involve issues of public 
policy.496 The Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 is clear that parties are well within 
their rights to agree that disputes between themselves be referred to arbitration as 
long as the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement and the dispute does not 
raise issues of public policy.497 As a rule, the statutory oppression remedy does not 
raise issues of public policy and the powers exercised by a court in terms of sections 
232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 are of such a nature that they can be 
exercised by a court as a general rule.498 Further the reference to a ‘court’ in the 
statutory oppression remedy does not exclude disputes from being subjected to 
arbitration.499 However, the courts did point out that an arbitrator does not have the 
power to award relief in the form of a winding-up order as relief of such a nature 
raise issues of public policy.500 
 
 
                                                 
496 See 3.11.2 above. 
497 See 3.11.3 above. 
498 See 3.11.5 above. 
499 See 3.11.5 above. 
500 See 3.11.5 above. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Canada Business Corporations Act RSC, 1985, c C-44 applies throughout 
Canada.1 One of the purposes of the Canada Business Corporations Act2 is to 
reform and revise the law that applies to businesses in Canada.3 It is a further 
purpose of the Act to achieve uniformity in the laws pertaining to business 
corporations in Canada.4 
 The statutory form of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy is contained in 
section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.5 Because section 241 of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act6 is formulated in almost identical terms to 
section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the judicial interpretation and 
application of the first mentioned provision are of crucial importance in the critical 
evaluation of the latter.7 As is pointed out later in this chapter, the Canadian 
approach to the unfair prejudice remedy can be commended in many respects, but 
one has to be conscious of some important differences between the Canadian 
remedy and the equivalent of the remedy in other jurisdictions. This chapter contains 
a critical evaluation of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy.  
 
                                                 
 ⃰ Reference to case law is mainly made to the neutral citations of cases. For convenience the 
reported citation of a case is also provided and the Westlaw database citation is cited for readers 
who have access to the database. 
1 Psychogios v Condia 2013 QCCS 4299, 2013 CarswellQue 9005 (QCCS) [44]. 
2 RSC 1985 c C-44. 
3 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 4. 
4 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 4. 
5 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
6 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
7 An evaluation of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is provided in Chapter 5 below. 
 284 
 
 This Chapter mainly focuses on the federal law in Canada. Occasionally 
reference is also made to the law pertaining to similar remedies in some of the 
Canadian provinces. This is especially the case where a specific legal position 
pertaining to the statutory unfair prejudice remedy has not yet been developed or 
considered to such an extent as to provide adequate guidance on the possible 
interpretation and application of the relevant federal law. In most case this is 
possible as the formulation of the statutory unfair remedy in many of the Canadian 
provinces is similar to the statutory unfair prejudice remedy contained in the Canada 
Business Corporations Act.8  
4.2 The development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in 
Canada – a brief overview 
 
British Columbia adopted the first Canadian version of the oppression remedy in 
1960.9 It followed a similar wording to that of section 210 of the Companies Act 
1948.10 Section 185 of the Companies Act RSBC 1960, c 67 provided that: 
‘(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the 
company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part 
of the members (including himself) or in a case falling within section 
183 of this Act, the inspector, may make an application to the Court 
by petition for an order under this section. 
(2) If on any such petition the Court is of opinion 
(a) that the company’s affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; 
and  
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice that part 
of the members, but otherwise the facts would justify the 
marking of a winding-up order on the ground that is was just 
                                                 
8 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
9 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-2. See also Keho 
Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [14]. 
10 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-2. See also Keho 
Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [14]. See 
further 2.3.3 above for a discussion of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. 
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and equitable that the company should be wound up, the 
Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters 
complained of, make such order as it thinks fit, whether for 
regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in future or for 
the purchase of the shares of any members of the company 
by other members of the company or by the company, for the 
reduction accordingly of the company’s capital or otherwise.’ 
The introduction of the oppression remedy was not welcomed in all the provinces of 
Canada.11 In 1967 the introduction of the oppression remedy in Ontario was rejected 
on the basis that it invited unnecessary court intervention in the affairs of a 
corporation and the Ontario Business Corporations Act12 was introduced in 1970 
without making provision for the oppression remedy.13  
 However, the oppression remedy was introduced on a federal level with the 
adoption of the Canada Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76, c33.14 The 
oppression remedy in the Canada Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76, c33 
differed from its British predecessor and its equivalent provision in British Columbia. 
Section 234(2) of the Canada Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76, c33 
provided that a complainant may be entitled to relief if ‘the court is satisfied that in 
respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates  
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects 
a result, 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are 
or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or  
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
are or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security 
holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to 
rectify the matters complained of’. 
                                                 
11 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-2. 
12 RSO 1970 c 53. 
13 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-2. 
14 See specifically section 234. See also DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression 
Remedy (2004) 1-3. See further Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 
CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [14]. 
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The Canada Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76, c3315 extended the remedy 
to complainants other than shareholders.16 Further, an additional ground was 
introduced to cover conduct that unfairly disregarded the interests of the 
complainant.17 The enactment of the Canada Business Corporations Act SC 1974-
75-76, c33 led to the introduction of similar provisions in all other provinces in 
Canada except for Quebec and Prince Edward Island.18 
4.3 The basics of corporations law in Canada 
 
Corporations are juristic persons separate from their directors and shareholders.19 
One of the consequences of separate juristic personality is that when a wrong is 
committed against a corporation it is the corporation that must institute legal 
proceedings against the wrongdoer.20 Another consequence of the separate legal 
personality of a corporation is that a corporation is supervised and managed by its 
directors.21 The statutory power and duty of directors to supervise and manage a 
corporation means that the shareholders of a corporation cannot dictate to the board 
of a corporation.22 The duty of each director of a corporation is to supervise and 
manage the corporation by acting honestly and in good faith in the best interests of 
                                                 
15 Proclaimed into force on 15 December 1975. 
16 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-3. 
17 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-3. 
18 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-3. 
19 Cogeco Câble Inc c CFCF Inc [1996] RJQ 1360, [1996] AQ No 1069, 1996 CarswellQue 672 
(QCCS). See 5.4.3.2 below for a similar position in South Africa. 
20 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See also 2.3.1 above for a discussion of the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
21 Canada Business Corporation Act RSC 1985 c C-44, s 102. See 5.4.3.2 and 5.4.3.3 below for a 
similar position in South Africa. 
22 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd [1991] OJ No 266, 1991 3 BLR (2d) 113, 123, 1991 
CarswellOnt 142 (ONCJ.GD) [102]; Teck Corp v Millar [1972] BCJ No 566, 1972 33 DLR (3d) 288, 
1972 CarswellBC 284 (BCSC) [85].  
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the corporation.23 A director must further discharge his or her powers or duties with 
the care, diligence and skill that a reasonable prudent person would in comparable 
circumstances.24 The principle of majority rule is one of the cornerstones of the 
efficient management of a corporation.25 However, this principle is subject to the 
conduct of the majority being fair and honest.26  
4.4 The purpose and objective of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
4.4.1 The balancing of various rights and interests 
 
The purpose of the oppression remedy has been described as to create a balance 
between the rights of shareholders vis-a-vis the corporation, while maintaining the 
ability of the corporation efficiently to conduct its business and management.27 In 
                                                 
23 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 122(1)(a). See 5.4.3.2 below for a similar 
position in South Africa. 
24 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 122(1)(b). See 5.4.3.2 below for a similar 
position in South Africa. 
25 See Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill 1974 54 DLR (3d) 672, 1974 7 OR (2d) 216, 1974 CarswellOnt 871 
(ONCA) [32] where the court stressed the importance of the principle that corporations are governed 
by majority rule. Of equal importance is that the majority should act fairly and honestly. The court 
[32] further described fairness as ‘the touchstone of equitable justice and when the test of fairness 
is not met, the equitable jurisdiction of the court can be invoked to prevent or remedy the injustice 
which misrepresentation or other dishonestly has caused’. See 5.4.3.2 below for a similar position in 
South Africa. 
26 Goldex Mines Ltd c Revill 1974 54 DLR (3d) 672, 1974 7 OR (2d) 216, 1974 CarswellOnt 871 
(ONCA) [32]. 
27 See DH Petersen Shareholder Remedies in Canada (1989) 18.1 as quoted by the court in Loewen, 
Ondaatje, McCutcheon & Co c Sparling [1992] 3 SCR 235, 1992 97 DLR (4th) 616, 1992 CarswellQue 
126 (SCC) [40]. See also Cogeco Câble Inc c CFCF Inc [1996] RJQ 1360, [1996] AQ No 1069, 1996 
CarswellQue 672 (QCCS). See further First Edmonton Place Ltd v 315888 Alberta Ltd [1988] AWLD 
1140, 1988 40 BLR 28, 1988 CarswellAlta 103 (ABCQB) [36] where the court held in relation to 
section 234 of the Business Corporations Act SA 1981 c B-15 (also known as the Alberta Business 
Corporations Act), that the legislature attempted to balance the interests of minority and majority 
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the application of the remedy the rights and interests of other stakeholders must 
also be considered.28  
 The objective of a court in applying the oppression remedy is aimed at 
‘[a]chieving a rational and equitable balance between the often differing and 
conflicting interests of the various participants’.29 The remedy is wide and broad 
enough to subject any corporate conduct to judicial scrutiny.30 The remedy must be 
interpreted to give effect to its purpose31 and should not be given an unduly 
                                                 
shareholders. The court [36] further confirmed that the principle of majority rule remains a 
fundamental principle of corporate law. However, the conduct of the majority must be fair.  
28 Cogeco Câble Inc c CFCF Inc [1996] RJQ 1360, [1996] AQ No 1069, 1996 CarswellQue 672 
(QCCS) [85]. A liberal approach to the interpretation of the remedy against unfairly prejudicial or 
oppressive conduct is preferred. See Abraham and inter Wide Invt Ltd, Re 1985 20 DLR (4th) 267, 
1985 30 BLR 177, 1985 CarswellOnt 145 (OntHCJ); Stech v Davies [1987] 5 WRR 563, 1987 53 
Alta LR (2d) 373, 1987 CarswellAlta 175 (ABCQB). The court in Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 
ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [19] emphasised that the internal 
disputes of a corporation must be resolved on the principles of equity rather than the enforcement of 
strict legal rights. See also Astral Enterprises Inc v DMSC Medcorp Inc 2003 CarswellQue 3302 
(QCCS) [25]; Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [39].  
29 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-5. 
30 In Besner c JA Besner & Sons (Can) Ltd [1993] RJQ 1759, 1993 15 BLR (2d) 261, 1993 
CarswellQue 29 (QCSC) [54] it was found that although the initial application of the oppression 
remedy was to resolve disputes between majority and minority shareholders, based on its 
formulation and wording, the remedy is not necessarily restricted to such disputes. The wide and 
open terms of the remedy enables it to keep abreast with the dynamic nature of the duties and 
responsibilities of directors and shareholders. It is the function of the courts to determine whether 
there was oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct or unfair disregard of interests. This is to focus 
the court on enforcing the ‘real object of the lawʼ as opposed to enforcing mere ‘democraticʼ 
structures. See also Robert WV Dickerson Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for 
Canada (Volume 1, 1971) 158-59. 
31 Canada (Director appointed under s 252 of Canada Business Corporations Act) v Royal Trustco 
Ltd [1984] OJ No 3129, 1984 1 OAC 279, 1984 CarswellOnt 90 (OAC) [39] and [41]. See also 
Canada (Director appointed under s 252 of Canada Business Corporations Act) v Royal Trustco Ltd 
[1986] 2 SCR 537, 1986 18 OAC 156, 1986 CarswellOnt 1488 (SCC).  
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restrictive interpretation.32 It is not the purpose of the oppression remedy to put the 
court or the minority shareholders of a corporation in charge of the corporation.33 A 
court must be cautious in exercising its power merely because a decision 
legitimately adopted by the majority is unpopular with the minority.34  
4.4.2 Section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act35 as a right  
 
It’s important to note that section 241 does not create rights which the complainant 
does not already enjoy.36 The section only creates a remedy to protect 
shareholders, in particular minority shareholders, from unjust treatment.37 In 
exercising the remedy, a court must be cautious not to assume the function of the 
board of directors or interfere with the legitimate exercise of control by the majority 
in the corporation.38 In short the remedy is the right to be treated on an equitable 
basis.39 
                                                 
32 Canada (Director appointed under s 252 of Canada Business Corporations Act) v Royal Trustco 
Ltd [1984] OJ No 3129, 1984 1 OAC 279, 1984 CarswellOnt 90 (OAC) [39] and [41]. Canada 
(Director appointed under s 252 of Canada Business Corporations Act) v Royal Trustco Ltd [1986] 
2 SCR 537, 1986 18 OAC 156, 1986 CarswellOnt 1488 (SCC). See also Ferguson and Imax 
Systems Corp [1983] OJ No 3156, 1983 150 DLR (3d) 718, 1983 CarswellOnt 926 (ONSC) [28]; 
Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [19].  
33 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 1-8. 
34 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc [1987] CLD 1054, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [79]. 
35 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
36 Kruco Inc v R [1998] 3 CTC 2319, 1998 79 ACWS (3d) 1071, 1998 CarswellNat 629 (Tax Court 
of Canada) [31]. 
37 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc [1987] CLD 1054, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [78]. 
38 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc [1987] CLD 1054, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [78].  
39 Kruco Inc v R [1998] 3 CTC 2319, 1998 79 ACWS (3d) 1071, 1998 CarswellNat 629 (Tax Court 
of Canada) [31]; BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [82]. See also Dubois v Lucid 
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4.5 The statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
The unfair prejudice remedy is found in Part XX that deals with the remedies, 
offences and punishment under the Canada Business Corporations Act40. Section 
241 of the Act41 provides as follows: 
‘(1)  A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section. 
(2)  If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that 
in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates 
(a)  any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
effects a result, 
(b)  the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or 
(c)  the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may 
make an order to rectify the matters complained of.’ 
4.6 Standing  
 
Only a complainant may rely of the provisions of section 241 of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act.42 For purposes of section 241 of the Act,43 a 
complainant is defined in section 238.44 The remedy is usually relied on by minority 
                                                 
Distributors Inc 2018 BCSC 1582, 2018 298 ACWS (3d) 754, 2018 CarswellBC 2456 (BCSC) [58] 
where the court held that the remedy against oppression is ‘an equitable remedy. It seeks to ensure 
fairness-what is “just and equitable”. It gives a court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just 
what is legal but what is fair’. See further 4.4.1 above. 
40 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
41 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
42 RSC, 1985, c C-44. See Likhatchev c. Karnasfrooshan 2019 QCCS 1386, 2019 CarswellQue 3160 
[31]. 
43 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
44 In section 238 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44) a ‘complainant’ is 
defined as: 
‘(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial 
owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates, 
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shareholders (or security holders).45 This does not imply that only minority 
shareholders can rely on the remedy. The remedy can find application in situations 
where all the shareholders hold equal shares in a corporation.46 The remedy is 
available to majority security holders.47 However, a majority security holder may find 
it difficult to convince a court that he or she is prejudiced by oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial conduct.48 This is based on the ability of a majority security holder to use 
its control in the corporation to protect him- or herself from the alleged conduct.49 
 
                                                 
(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates, 
(c) the Director, or 
(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an 
application under this Part.’ 
45 In section 2(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44) a ‘security’ is defined 
as ‘a share or any class or series of shares or a debt obligation of a corporation and includes a 
certificate evidencing such a share or that obligation’. The same section defines a ‘debt obligation’ 
as ‘a bond, debenture, note or other evidence of indebtedness or guarantee of a corporation, whether 
secured or unsecured’. See 5.7.1.1 below where the point is made that the oppression or unfair 
prejudice remedy in South Africa is limited to shareholders and not the holders of securities as is the 
case in Canada. 
46 152581 Canada Ltd v Matol World Corporation [1996] QJ No 4017, [1997] RJQ 161, 1996 
CarswellQue 1211 (QCCS) [85]-[86]. 
47 See M Rice ‘The Availability of the Oppression Remedy to Majority Shareholders in Ontario’ (1989) 
16 Can Bus LJ 58, 64-65 who cautions against the availability of the oppression remedy to majority 
shareholders. The author suggests that a court should consider the alternative remedies available 
to a majority shareholder relying on the oppression remedy. Compare to the position in England as 
discussed in 2.6.1.2 above. 
48 152581 Canada Ltd v Matol World Corporation [1996] QJ No 4017, [1997] RJQ 161, 1996 
CarswellQue 1211 (QCCS) [85]-[86]. See also Gandalman Investments Inc v Fogle 1985 22 DLR 
(4th) 638, 1985 33 ACWS (2d) 467, 1985 CarswellOnt 1628 (OntHCJ) [8]. For a contrary point of 
view see Vedova v Garden House Inn Ltd 1985 29 BLR 236, 1985 31 ACWS (2d) 102, 1985 
CarswellOnt 140 (Ont HC) [8] where the court held that the oppression remedy should be used ‘as 
a method of mediating between opposing groups of shareholders acting from a position of equality’.  
49 See 5.7.1.1 (e) below for the position of controlling shareholders in South Africa. 
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4.6.1 Registered holders and beneficial owners 
 
A reading of section 238 reveals that the remedy is available to a registered holder 
or beneficial owner50 of a security holder of the corporation or any of its affiliates.51 
This definition further includes a former registered holder or beneficial owner of a 
security of the corporation or any of its affiliates.52  
4.6.2 Directors and other officers 
 
The remedy is also extended to a director53 or officer54 or former director or officer 
of a corporation or any of its affiliates.55 The incorporation of a director in the unfair 
prejudice remedy is to cover situations where it is argued that the conduct 
complained of affected the complainant in his or her capacity as director and not as 
                                                 
50 In section 2(1) the term ‘beneficial ownership’ is defined as ‘ownership through any trustee, legal 
representative, agent or mandatary, or other intermediary’. See also Psychogios v Condina 2013 
CarswellQue 9005 [44] where the court held that a person is a beneficial owner of shares, if that 
person has the right to be registered as the owner of the shares and therefore can act as a 
complainant in terms of section 238(a). See further Léger c Garage Technology Ventures Canada 
Lp (Capital st-Laurent, lp) 2012 QCCA 1901, [2012] RJQ 2030, 2012 CarswellQue 15066 (QCCA) 
[49]. See 2.6.1.1 above for the position in England regarding the standing of beneficial shareholders. 
51 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(a). Compare to the position in South 
Africa as discussed in 5.7.1.1 below. The oppression or unfair prejudice remedy is restricted to a 
shareholder whose name appears on the register of securities. 
52 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(a). In contrast with the Canadian 
position beneficial owners do not enjoy standing in terms of the provisions of section 163 of the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008. See 5.7.1.2 below. 
53 In section 2(1) a ‘director’ is defined as ‘a person occupying the position of director by whatever 
name called and “directors” and “board of directors” includes a single director’. 
54 An ‘officer’ is defined in section 2(1) as ‘an individual appointed as an officer under section 212, 
the chairperson of the board of directors, the president, a vice president, the secretary, the treasurer, 
the comptroller, the general counsel, the general manager, a managing director, of a corporation, or 
any other individual who performs functions for a corporation similar to those normally performed by 
an individual occupying any of those offices’. 
55 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(b). See 5.7.1.3 below for a discussion 
of the standing of a director in terms of the South African oppression or unfair prejudice remedy.   
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shareholder. This argument is countered by the recognition in the statute that 
conduct that affect the interests of a director or directors may in some circumstances 
justify relief. This approach will particularly find application when the directors are 
also shareholders of a corporation. The facts of each case must be carefully 
considered when deciding whether conduct affecting a director also unfairly 
prejudices the interests of a shareholder.56 
4.6.3 The director 
 
The director also has standing to be a complainant in terms of section 241.57 In 
terms of 2(1) the ‘Director’ is defined as ‘the Director appointed under section 260’. 
Section 260 provides that ‘[t]he Minister may appoint a Director and one or more 
Deputy Directors to carry out the duties and exercise the powers of the Director 
under this Act’. 
4.6.4 Other persons 
4.6.4.1 A proper person 
Besides the persons defined as complainants in section 238, a court may exercise 
its discretion by extending standing to any ‘other person’ to make an application in 
                                                 
56 In Miller v F Mendel Holdings Ltd [1984] 2 WWR 683, 1984 26 BLR 85, 1984 CarswellSask 110 
(SKQB) [47] the court held that the removal of a complainant as director of the board does not 
necessarily mean that the complainant is entitled to relief in terms of the unfair prejudice or 
oppression remedy. This is because the complainants were not entitled to be directors of the 
corporation. The plaintiffs could further prove that they were prejudiced in their capacity as 
shareholders. However, the court noted that the removal as directors of a corporation could be taken 
into consideration when the circumstances of the case are viewed as a whole to determine whether 
the affairs of the corporation or company are conducted in a manner that ‘is oppressive or unfair to 
the plaintiffs as shareholders’. 
57 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(c). 
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terms of section 241.58 Thus, the provisions of section 238(d) read with section 241 
allow persons other than shareholders, directors or officers of the company to act 
as a complainants of oppressive and/or unfair prejudicial conduct.59  
4.6.4.2 A creditor 
A creditor is not specifically defined as a complainant in section 238. Therefore, a 
creditor does not by default enjoy standing for purposes of section 241.60 It is 
important to note that section 241(2)(c) specifically recognises that a corporation’s 
affairs can be conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of a creditor. The interests of a creditors 
become more prominent as the financial position of a corporation deteriorates61 and 
in light of the fact that the directors of a corporation do not have a specific fiduciary 
duty to the creditors of a corporation.62  
 For a creditor to be able to rely on the provisions of section 241 it has to 
convince a court that it is ‘a proper person’ for purposes of section 238.63 A court 
                                                 
58 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(d). See also Likhatchev c. 
Karnasfrooshan 2019 QCCS 1386, 2019 CarswellQue 3160; Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 
QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 364 (QCCS) [33]. 
59 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [34]; Psychogios v Condina 2013 CarswellQue 9005 (QCCS) [41]. 
60 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [34].  
61 People’s Department Stores Ltd, (1992) Inc, Re 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 
CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) [49]. 
62 People’s Department Stores Ltd, (1992) Inc, Re 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 
CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) [51] and [53]. The judgment in People’s Department Stores was based on 
the availability of other remedies contained in the Act that specifically protect the interests of 
creditors. 
63 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 238(d). For cases dealing with the 
recognition of a creditor as a complainant see People’s Department Stores Ltd, (1992) Inc, Re 2004 
SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) [48]-[51] and Nortel Networks Corp, Re 
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has a discretion to grant standing to a creditor, provided that it is satisfied that the 
creditor has a sufficient interest in the affairs of corporation.64 The purpose of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act65 is to protect complainants from prejudicial 
conduct that affects the corporation of which the complainant is a shareholder or 
creditor.66 To determine whether a creditor is a proper person for purposes of 
section 238(d), a court will consider the conduct complained of in light of the 
                                                 
2014 ONSC 6973, 2014 248 ACWS (3d) 21, 2014 CarswellOnt 17291 (ONSC) [349]. It is important 
to note that a creditor may qualify as a security holder or owner for purposes of section 238(a) of 
Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44). See Casurina Ltd Partnership v Rio Algom 
Ltd [2002] OJ No 3229, 2002 115 ACWS (3d) 9832002 CarswellOnt 2746 (ONSC) [96] where the 
court held that a security of a corporation includes ‘debt obligations of the corporation’. In Apotex Inc 
v Laboratories Fournier SA 2006 153 ACWS (3d) 200, 2006 54 CPR (4th) 241, 2006 CarswellOnt 
7164 (ONSC) [38] the court held that a creditor should have been a creditor of the corporation at the 
time of the alleged or complained conduct. This is especially important in light of the potential 
argument that the complainant has become a creditor as result of oppressive conduct. See also 
Awad v Dover Investments Ltd [2004] OJ No 3847, 2004 47 BLR (3d) 55, 2004 CarswellOnt 3805 
(ONCJ.GD) [46] and [48]. According to the court in Apotex Inc v Laboratories Fournier SA 2006 153 
ACWS (3d) 200, 2006 54 CPR (4th) 241, 2006 CarswellOnt 7164 (ONSC) [42] to have held otherwise 
would have created the possibility that any person would have qualified as a complainant for 
purposes of the oppression remedy based on a breach of contract or conduct that constituted a tort. 
Such an approach would extend the oppression remedy beyond its purpose or objective. 
64 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [34]; C3F Consultants inc v Nokia Siemens Networks Canada Inc/Nokia Siemens 
Reseaux Canada inc 2012 QCCA 978, [2012] RJQ 1013, 2012 CarswellQue 5179 (QCCA) [25]. The 
court held in Standal’s Patents Ltd v 160088 Canada Inc [1993] JQ No 2223, 1993 45 ACWS (3d) 
425, 1993 CarswellQue 2070 (QCSC) [243] that a creditor does not have to take judgment against 
the corporation to qualify as a creditor for purposes of section 241. See also Apotex Inc v 
Laboratories Fournier SA 2006 153 ACWS (3d) 200, 2006 54 CPR (4th) 241, 2006 CarswellOnt 7164 
(ONSC) [38] where the court rejected the argument that a creditor should be a judgment creditor to 
able to be afforded standing for purposes of the oppression remedy. The court remarked [39] that a 
person does not qualify as a complainant in the form of a creditor, ‘at the time of the oppressive 
actions that are being complained about’. 
65 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
66 Nortel Networks Corp, Re 2014 ONSC 6973, 2014 248 ACWS (3d) 21, 2014 CarswellOnt 17291 
(ONSC) [358]. 
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reasonable expectations of the creditor.67 The mere allegation that the company 
owes a debt, which it fails to pay, to the creditor is not sufficient to grant a person 
standing in terms of section 238(d) as a creditor for purposes of section 241 of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act.68 
4.6.4.3 Employee 
The oppression or unfair prejudice remedy is primarily aimed at the protection of the 
interests of security holders, directors or officers of the corporation.69 The remedy 
is not available to employees to cover instances of wrongful dismissal.70 However, 
there may be circumstances that justify the application of the remedy in instances 
where the complainant is wrongfully dismissed from his or her employment.71 A 
complainant can rely on the unfair prejudice remedy in the event of dismissal, if the 
termination of an employee’s employment is designed to or formed part of a pattern 
                                                 
67 Likhatchev c. Karnasfrooshan 2019 QCCS 1386, 2019 CarswellQue 3160 [39]; Manufactures Life 
Insurance Co v AFG Industries Ltd 2008 163 ACWS (3d) 750, 2008 44 BLR (4th) 277, 2008 
CarswellOnt 171 (ONSC) [31]. 
68 RSC, 1985, c C-44. In Likhatchev c. Karnasfrooshan 2019 QCCS 1386, 2019 CarswellQue 3160 
[45] the court found that the failure to pay a debt is not necessarily oppressive or a breach of a 
reasonable expectation. 
69 Mohan v Philmar Lumber (Markham) Ltd [1991] OJ No 3451, 1991 50 CPC (2d) 164, 1991 
CarswellOnt 445 (ONCJ.GD) [2]. 
70 Beaubien v Campbell 2003 SKQB 213, [2003] 11 WWR 638, 2003 CarswellSask 313 (SKQB). 
[90]; Clitheroe v Hydro One Inc 2002 21 CCEL (3d) 197, 2002 118 ACWS (3d) 193, 2002 
CarswellOnt 3919 (ONSC) [25]. See also Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd [1993] OJ No 1756, 1993 
11 BLR (2d) 218, 1993 Carswell 157 (ONCJ.GD) [113]. See further Welichka v Bittner Investments 
Ltd [1988] AWLD 844, 1988 90 AR 224, 1988 CarswellAlta 528 (ABCQB) [7] where the court noted 
that a wrongful dismissal of an employee is not necessarily oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct.  
71 Clitheroe v Hydro One Inc 2002 21 CCEL (3d) 197, 2002 118 ACWS (3d) 193, 2002 CarswellOnt 
3919 (ONSC) [27] where the court described these circumstances or situations as ‘rare’. See also 
Mohan v Philmar Lumber (Markham) Ltd [1991] OJ No 3451, 1991 50 CPC (2d) 164, 1991 
CarswellOnt 445 (ONCJ.GD) [3]. 
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of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. This will be the case when the 
employment of the complainant is closely connected to his or her capacity as 
shareholder, officer or director of the corporation.72  
4.7 The statutory grounds in section 241 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
Section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44) embodies 
the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in terms of which a complainant can apply to court 
for relief. The grounds on which a complainant may rely are stated in section 241(2). 
4.7.2 Section 241(2)(a) 
 
The first ground on which reliance can be placed, is that any act or omission of the 
corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result that is ‘oppressive’ or ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ to, or ‘unfairly disregards’ the interests of any security holder, creditor, 
director or officer.73  
4.7.3 Section 241(2)(b) 
 
In terms of section 241(2)(b) a complainant can prove that the business or affairs of 
the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a 
                                                 
72 Benedetti v North Park Electronics (1980) Ltd [1997] OJ No 597, 1997 69 ACWS (3d) 82, 1997 
CarswellOnt 559 (ONCJ.GD) [51]; Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd [1993] OJ No 1756, 1993 11 
BLR (2d) 218, 1993 Carswell 157 (ONCJ.GD) [113] and [125]. In Mohan v Philmar Lumber 
(Markham) Ltd [1991] OJ No 3451, 1991 50 CPC (2d) 164, 1991 CarswellOnt 445 (ONCJ.GD) [1] 
the court specifically noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate ‘an intertwining of his employment 
and his interests in the corporation as an undivisible package’. 
73 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(2)(a). See 4.6 above for a 
discussion of the standing of a complainant for purposes of section 241. Compare with section 
163(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as discussed in 5.7.2.2 (a) below. 
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manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of any security holders, creditor, director or officer.74  
4.7.4 Section 241(2)(c) 
 
Section 241(2)(c) provides for those circumstances where the powers of the 
directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer.75  
4.7.5 The differences between the statutory grounds in section 241(2)  
 
Section 241(2)(a) focuses on the result flowing from the conduct complained of while 
section 241(1)(b) and (c) emphasises the manner with which the conduct has been 
carried out.76 Although the grounds are set out in three separate subsections, the 
differences between these sections are for all practical purposes insignificant.77 The 
only difference is, that should a complainant be unable to prove a result or effect for 
purposes of section 241(2)(a), the complainant should rather rely on section 241(2)(b) 
and (c). Section 241(2)(b) and (c) speaks to the manner with which the acts 
complained of were conducted and does not require that a result must be proven.78 
 
                                                 
74 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(2)(b). Compare with section 
163(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as discussed in 5.7.2.2 (b) below. 
75 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(2)(c). Compare with section 
163(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as discussed in 5.7.2.2 (c) below. 
76 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [31] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the CBCA. 
77 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 
CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [31]. 
78 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 
CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [31]. 
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4.7.6 Establishing the meaning of conduct that is ‘oppressive’, ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ or ‘unfairly disregards the interests’ of a complainant 
 
4.7.6.1 Introduction 
 
The onus rests upon the complainant to prove that he or she is entitled to relief in 
terms of section 241.79 For a complainant to rely on the remedy the complainant 
has to prove ‘in equity, wrongful conduct, causation80 and compensable injury’.81 
As pointed out above, a complainant can only succeed with a petition in terms 
of section 241 if it can prove that the conduct he or she complains of is oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly disregards the interests of a security holder, 
creditor, director or officer. Before a court can apply the provisions of section 241, 
the meaning of the concepts ‘oppressive’, ‘unfairly prejudicial’ and ‘unfairly 
disregards’ must be determined.82  
 
                                                 
79 See Astral Enterprises Inc v DMSC Medcorp Inc 2003 CarswellQue 3302 (QCCS) [29] 
80 Hercules Management Ltd v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165, [1997] 8 WWR 80, 1997 
CarswellMan 198 (SCC) [37]. 
81 See BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [90] read with [92]-[93] where the court 
described oppressive conduct as ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’, ‘a visible departure from the 
standards of fair dealing’ and an ‘abuse of power’. According to the court, the addition of terms such 
as unfair prejudice and unfair disregard of the interests of a complainant is indicative of the fact that 
the remedy is not aimed at conduct of the most serious nature. See further Besner c JA Besner & 
Sons (Can) Ltd [1993] RJQ 1759, 1993 15 BLR (2d) 261, 1993 CarswellQue 29 (QCSC) [56] where 
the court also held that the remedy is not limited to conduct that is ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’ 
as the function of the remedy is to consider and adjudicate disputes based on the fairness of the 
conduct complained of. The court further explained [56] that the concept of unfairly disregards is 
wider than oppression and refers to a disregard of a person’s interests without cause or not to pay 
attention to the interests of the particular complainant. 
82 See Esierman v Ara Farms [1988] 5 WWR 97, 1988 52 DLR (4th) 498, 1988 CarswellSask 294 
(SKCA) [14] where the court remarked that the terms ‘unfairly prejudicial’ and ‘unfairly disregards’ 
do not originate from English legislation. 
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4.7.6.2 Oppressive conduct 
 
The term ‘oppressive’ did not originate from Canadian legislation, but is derived from 
the English Companies Act 1948.83 The term was first introduced in Canadian 
company law in 1960 by the Companies Act of British Columbia.84  
 Prior to the proclamation of the Canada Business Corporations Act 1974-75-
76 (Can) c 33 on 15 December 1975, the evaluation of conduct against the 
oppression standard was not generally available throughout Canada.85 The term 
‘oppressive’ was described to mean ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’.86 This 
meaning implied conduct that was abusive and suggested bad faith.87 This was 
                                                 
83 Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [14]. 
See also Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 
CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [33] where the court stated that ‘[i]n considering whether conduct is 
“oppressive”, one can appropriately look to the English cased decided before 1980 which defined that 
word in a similar context. Adopting the definition applied by Lord Simonds in the Scottish Co-operative 
case [at p 71 All ER] – namely, “burdensome, harsh and wrongful” – it is unlikely that an act could be 
found to be oppressive without there being an element of bad faith involved. However, in considering 
the alternative question of whether any act is unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interests 
of one of the protected persons or groups, I am of the view that a requirement of lack of bona fides 
would unnecessarily complicated the application of the provision and add a judicial gloss that is 
inappropriate given the clarity of the words used’. See 2.3.3 above for a discussion of section 210 of 
the Companies Act 1948. See 4.2 above. For a discussion of the use of the term ‘oppressive’ in the 
context of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 see 5.7.3.2 below. 
84 Companies Act RSBC 1960 c 67, s 185. See Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] 
AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [14].  
85 Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) 
[14]. 
86 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All ER 66, 71 and 86; [1959] AC 
324 (HL). This case decided in terms of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. See 2.3.3 above 
for a discussion of section 210 of the Companies Act 1948. 
87 BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [67]. See also Standal’s Patents Ltd c 160088 
Canada inc [1991] RJQ 1996, 1991 Carswell 1837 (QCCS) [19] where the court held that a 
complainant does not have to prove bad faith on the part of the oppressor successfully to rely on 
section 241. See further 152581 Canada Ltd v Matol World Corporation [1996] QJ No 4017, [1997] 
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specifically the case prior to 1980. The approach of the courts to ‘oppressive’ 
conduct changed with the introduction of the phrase ‘unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of some part of the members’.88 After the incorporation of the term unfairly 
prejudicial, proof of bad faith was no longer required.89 In Canada the terms 
‘oppressive’ and ‘oppression’ are also regarded as conduct marked by abuse or bad 
faith.90 Oppressive conduct refers to a very specific type of conduct. The prejudice 
or injury flowing from ‘oppressive’ conduct can be described as a ‘wrong of the most 
serious sort’.91 
4.7.6.3 Unfair prejudicial conduct 
In contrast with the term ‘oppressive’ – especially prior to 1980 – it is not required 
by the complainant to prove that the conduct complained of was committed in bad 
                                                 
RJQ 161, 1996 CarswellQue 1211 (QCCS) [82]-[83]; Brant Investments Ltd v Keeprite Inc 1991 1 
BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA). In Vedova v Garden House 
Inn Ltd 1985 29 BLR 236, 1985 31 ACWS (2d) 102, 1985 CarswellOnt 140 (Ont HC) [8] the court 
described oppression as referring to an inequality of bargaining power or authority while unfairness 
refers to a duty to act equitably or impartially in the exercise of power. See also Banque Nationale 
du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [43] where it was held that intent or bad faith 
does not need to be proven.  
88 See Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 
CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [26]. See also section 459(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) as 
discussed in 2.3.5 above. 
89 See Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 
CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [33] where the court cited Palmer v Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada 
Ltd 1989 32 OAC 113, 1989 56 DLR (4th) 128, 1989 CarswellOnt 119 (ONDC) as an example where 
relief can be granted in terms of the oppression remedy despite the absence of bad faith on the part 
of the persons whose conduct was the subject of the complaint. The court in Brant [47] held that a 
complainant does not have to prove bad faith to obtain relief. 
90 BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [67]. See also Menlin v Menlin 2018 ABQB 1056; 
2018 CarswellAlta 3186 [58]. 
91 BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [92]. 
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faith to establish that the conduct is or was unfairly prejudicial.92 When evaluating 
whether conduct is unfairly prejudicial, the use of the term can be regarded as 
making reference to ‘a less culpable state of mind, that nevertheless has unfair 
consequences’ in comparison to what is required to find that conduct is 
‘oppressive’.93 However, bad faith as motive could be relevant to find that the 
conduct complained of is unfair.94 Conduct can be unfairly prejudicial in the absence 
of bad faith.95 In Brant96 the court confirmed the latter approach by referring with 
approval to the following comment made in Gillespie:97 
‘Obviously, not every adverse consequence to the complaint from conduct 
of the majority will give rise to relief under s 247. The term “unfairly” as 
much as the term “oppressive” invites and requires consideration of the 
                                                 
92 See Palmer v Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd 1989 CarswellOnt 119 (ONDC) [46] where 
the court held in relation of section 247 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, SO 1982, c 4 that 
a complainant does not have to prove bad faith for purposes of an ‘oppression case’ before a court 
may grant relief.  
93 BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [67]. See also Menlin v Menlin 2018 ABQB 1056; 
2018 CarswellAlta 3186 [58]. 
94 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [33] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act 1974-75-76 (Can) c 33. 
95 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [31] and [47] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of 
the Canada Business Corporations Act, SC 1974-75-76, C 33. In Low v Ascot Jockey Club Ltd [1986] 
BCWLD 1498, 1986 1 BCLR (2d) 123, 1986 CarswellBC 54 (BCSC) [30] the court, while dealing 
with section 224(1) of the British Columbia Company Act, RSBC 1979, c 59 held that an investigation 
into the motive or intent of the parties whose conduct is complained of is unnecessary. The essence 
of the inquiry is the effect of the conduct. The court [30] specifically stated ‘[t]he best way to put my 
opinion is to say that malice or intent on the part of the respondents to do harm is not necessary 
ingredient of the petitioner’s case at least in the circumstances such as those now before me. I do 
not doubt that there might be cases in which the purpose of the acts complained of would be relevant 
to determining whether it was oppressive’. 
96 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [38] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act, SC 1974-75-76, C 33. 
97 Gillespie v Overs [1987] CLD 1217, [1987] OJ No 747, 1987 CarswellOnt 3404 (OntHCJ) [142]. 
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quality of the acts of the alleged wrong doer and not merely of the adverse 
effects of those acts upon the interests of the complainant. Although the 
thresholds are clearly different for oppression and for what Anderson J 
referred to ... as the “wider range of conduct” and the theory more modern 
statutory provisions and are probably different as between “conduct 
unfairly prejudicial” and “conduct unfairly disregarding” ... the court is 
required to have regard to the propriety of the conduct complained of 
where the complaint involves any of the three categories.’ 
To broaden the scope of application of the ‘oppression remedy’, the phrases or 
concepts ‘unfair prejudice’ and ‘unfair disregard’ were added to the provision.98 In 
Mason v Intercity Properties Ltd99 the court stated that ‘[r]elief may be given to a 
minority shareholder upon proof of unfair prejudice to or disregard of his or her 
interests, both of which is less rigorous grounds than oppression’. 
4.7.6.4 Unfair disregard of interests  
A complaint may also be brought against conduct that unfairly disregarded or 
disregards the interests of the complainant. An unfair disregard of the interests of a 
complainant means that the interests of the complainant are ignored or not 
considered.100  
                                                 
98 BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [93]. The court provided the following examples 
which according to the court is not oppressive conduct but may be found to be unfairly prejudicial: 
‘[S]queezing out a minority shareholder, failing to disclose related party transactions, changing 
corporate structure to drastically alter debt ratios, adopting a “poison pill” to prevent a takeover bid, 
paying dividends without a formal declaration, preferring some shareholders with management fees 
and paying directors’ fees higher than the industry norm.’ 
99 1987 CarswellOnt 134 (ONCA) [13].  
100 Alharayeri v Black 2014 QCCS 180, 2014 CarswellQue 419 (QCCS) [41]; BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 
69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [67]. In 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 
2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [94] the court cited examples such as the improper reduction of the 
shareholders’ dividend or the failure to deliver property belonging to the complainant. See also Stech 
v Davies 1987 CarswellAlta 175 (ABCQB) [17] where the court found the term ‘unfair disregard’ for 
purposes of sections 207 and 234 of the Business Corporations Act, SA 1981, cB-15 to mean ‘to 
unjustly and without cause pay no attention to, ignore or treat as of no importance the interests of 
security holders, creditors, directors, or officers of a corporation’. 
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 In BCE Inc, Re101 the court described the unfair disregard of interests as 
‘ignoring an interest as being of importance, contrary to the stakeholders’ 
reasonable expectations’.102 The use of the concepts of unfair prejudice in 
conjunction with the term oppression can be regarded as a ‘relaxation’ of the latter 
term.103 
4.7.6.5 Unfairness (or fairness) as a criterion for unfair prejudicial conduct 
 
To establish whether a complainant is entitled to relief in terms of section 241 three 
interpretational approaches to section 241(1) can be identified from case law.  
(a) The first interpretational approach 
 
According to the first approach the concepts of oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and 
unfairly disregard of the interests of the complainant are interpreted as individual 
concepts.104 The weakness of this approach is that the terms or concepts cannot 
                                                 
101 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC). 
102 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [67]. The court 
[94] cited conduct such as ‘favouring a director by failing to prosecute claims, improperly reducing a 
shareholders’ dividend, or failing to deliver property belonging to the claimant’. 
103 See Mason v Intercity Properties Ltd [1987] OJ No 448, 1987 22 OAC 161, 1987 CarswellOnt 
134 (ONCA) [6] where the court noted that ‘[r]elief may be given to a minority shareholder upon proof 
of unfair prejudice to, or a disregard of his or her interests, both of which is less rigorous grounds 
than oppression’. See also No 20 CR Ventures Ltd v Andrex Developments (1985) Ltd 2019 BCSC 
405, 2019 CarswellBC 617 [45] decided in terms of the Business Corporations Act SBC 2002 c 57, 
where the court stated that unfair disregard of interests is of a less serious nature than conduct that 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. It is interesting to note that the court in BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 
69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [94] described the ‘unfair disregard’ of the 
interests of a complainant ‘as the least serious of the three injuries, or wrongs, mentioned in s 241’. 
104 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [54] the court 
cautioned that these concepts cannot be placed in individual compartments and do not provide 
principles which can provide guidance as to when court intervention is justified. In Diligenti v RWMD 
Operations Kelowna Ltd [1976] BCJ No 38, 1976 1 BCLR 36, 1976 CarswellBC 3 (BCSC) [35] the 
court explained that the term ‘oppressive’ cannot be equated to ‘unfairly prejudicial’ as the latter term 
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be compartmentalised or specifically defined.105 The terms and concepts are rather 
descriptive of each other, but this does not assist in the formulation of principles to 
determine whether conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.106 
(b) The second interpretational approach 
 
The second approach is to interpret the individual concepts in such a manner as to 
form a composite whole whereupon cases will then be adjudicated upon 
principles.107 This is because the terms and concepts in section 241 overlap to some 
degree.108 
(c) The third interpretational approach 
 
A third approach is to consider the principles that underpin the remedy and in 
particular the reasonable expectations of the complainant is of critical importance.109 
Once it is found that a reasonable expectation had been breached one has to 
consider whether such a breach is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
disregards the interests of the complainant.110 
 
                                                 
was specifically incorporated by the legislature with the intention that ‘the court should give those 
qualifying or defining words an effect different from and going beyond that given to the word 
“oppressive” if not, the expression used would have been the same’. 
105 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [54]. 
106 See M Koehnen Oppression and Related Remedies (2004) 79-80 and 84 as quoted in BCE Inc, 
Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [54]. 
107 See BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [90]-[91]. 
108 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [91]. 
109 Ordinary remedies are available to enforce rights and duties, but specific remedies need to be 
created to protect and enforce reasonable expectations. See BCE Inc, Re 2008 CarswellQue 12596 
(SCC) [56]. 
110 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [56], [68] and 
[95] for a summary of the inquiry into oppressive conduct.  
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(d) Fairness as criterion for unfair prejudicial conduct 
 
The use of the notion of unfair prejudicial conduct or unfair disregard of the interests 
of a complainant together with the concept ‘oppression’ emphasises that the 
conduct complained of must be considered in the light of fairness. The unfair 
prejudice remedy is an equitable remedy, with the aim to enforce not only legal 
rights but to ensure fairness.111 Fairness is, amongst others, determined with 
reference to the business realities applicable to the facts and circumstances of each 
case.112 This has the result that the fairness of the conduct complained of will 
depend on the facts of each case.113  
 The purpose of the remedy is to address unfairness that resulted from 
oppressive conduct.114 This implies that a complainant can rely on the unfair 
prejudice remedy even in circumstances where the conduct is lawful or committed 
in good faith.115 The availability of the remedy is not dependent on the intent of the 
alleged transgressors or the legality of the conduct.116 
                                                 
111 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [58]. See also 
Wright v Donald S Montgomery Holdings Ltd 1998 39 BLR (2d) 266, 1998 51 OTC 241, 1998 
CarswellOnt 370 (ONCJ.GD) [20]; Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 1987 ABCA 84, [1987] AWLD 859, 
1987 CarswellAlta 107 (ABCA) [19]. 
112 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [58]. The court 
[59] pointed out the fact that the determination of oppression is fact specific. 
113 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [58]-[59]. 
114 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [42]. 
115 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [42]. When the principles of fairness are breached, the court’s equitable jurisdiction is 
triggered to prevent or remedy injustice. See in this regard Goldex Mines Ltd c Revill 1974 54 DLR 
(3d) 672, 1974 7 OR (2d) 216, 1974 CarswellOnt 871 (ONCA). 
116 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [42]. 
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 To determine whether the conduct complained of falls within the ambit of 
section 241 will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.117 A 
complainant will be entitled to relief in terms of section 241 when it can prove ‘a 
visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions 
of fair play’.118 
 Section 241 does not only aim to enforce legal rights but to enforce and 
protect what is fair.119 The conduct complained of does not necessarily have to be 
unlawful for section 241 to apply.120 The conduct of the complainant may in certain 
                                                 
117 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC). In Guerrera v 
Damiani 2012 QCCA 2007, 2012 232 ACWS (3d) 673, 2012 CarswellQue 11929 (QCCA) [9] it was 
confirmed that a court hearing a petition in terms of section 241 has a wide discretion. The question 
whether or not conduct is oppressive will depend on the facts of each case. In dealing with the 
position of an oppressed creditor, the court held in Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 
2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 364 (QCCS) [40]-[41] that the reasonable expectations 
of a creditor will be considered together with all the relevant circumstances of the case. The nature 
and history of the corporation and the relationship between the corporation and the oppressed 
creditor will be taken into consideration. In Sweibel v Futi 2013 QCCS 2029, 2013 CarswellQue 4611 
(QCCS) the court found that the misappropriation of funds, unilateral changes to the directors of a 
corporation and the unilateral borrowing of money may trigger relief in terms of section 241. See also 
Georges S Petty Management Ltd v Repap Enterprises Inc 1998 CarswellQue 3808 (QCCS) [170]. 
118 Basha v Singh 2016 QCCS 1564, 2016 CarswellQue 2981 (QCCS) [71]. 
119 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [58] it was 
emphasised that the oppression remedy is an equitable remedy primarily aimed at achieving fairness 
which can be equated to what is just and equitable within a particular set of circumstances. The only 
difference is that the court has a much wider discretion in tailoring relief. A court [58] should not only 
consider the legal rights at play but also the relevant commercial realities. In Léger c Garage Technology 
Ventures Canada Lp (Capital st-Laurent, lp) 2012 QCCA 1901, [2012] RJQ 2030, 2012 CarswellQue 
15066 (QCCA) [55] the court held that disputes in terms of section 241 should be adjudicated based on 
the principles of fairness. The application of section 241 is not dependent upon the lawfulness of the 
conduct but is rather evaluated against the notion of fairness. See in this regard Desjardines Ducharme 
Stein Monast v Empress Jewellery (Canada) Inc [2004] RJQ 1243, 2004 CarswellQue 939 (QCCS) [39]. 
See also 4.4.2 above. See further 4.8 below for a discussion of ‘interests’. 
120 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [71]. See also 
1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2014 CarswellBC 1906, 2014 244 ACWS 
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circumstances impact on the fairness of the conduct.121  
4.7.6.6 The evaluation of the conduct of directors  
(a) The fiduciary duty of directors and the duty to act fairly 
 
The directors of a corporation have the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of 
a corporation. The duty is primarily owed to the corporation. The duty further 
includes the duty to treat stakeholders fairly.122  
To evaluate whether directors complied with their duty to act in the best 
interests of the corporation it must be kept in mind that ‘the best interests of the 
corporation’ is a broad and contextual concept.123 The duty should not be confined 
the pursuit of short-term profit but to create share value in the long term, especially 
when the corporation is a going concern.124 In considering the best interests of the 
corporation it may in some circumstances be appropriate for directors to consider 
                                                 
(3d), 2014 CarswellBC 1906 (BCCA) [59] in the consideration of section 227 of the Business 
Corporations Act, which is similar to the oppression remedy in the Canada Business Corporations 
Act RSC 1985, c C-44 where the court explained that ‘[t]he remedy the court may grant is an 
equitable one. It has a broad equitable jurisdiction to do not what is legal, but what is fair, and should 
consider business realities, not narrow legalities’. 
121 According to Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [39] the 
court will take into consideration whether the conduct complained of has been pre-empted by the 
complainant or whether the complainant repudiated terms of an agreement to which the complainant 
has freely and voluntarily agreed to, or to force a purchase of shares. A shareholder will not be 
successful in relying on the grounds in section 241 when there is a difference in approach regarding 
the commercial objectives and operations of the corporation and when such differences are 
legitimate and the results are not prejudicial to the complainant. 
122 In People’s Department Stores Ltd (1992) Inc, Re  2004 CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) (SCC) [42] the 
court held that directors may consider the interests of various groups of stakeholders in determining 
what is the best interests of the corporation. 
123 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [38]. 
124 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [38] and [102]. 
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the impact of a corporate decision on shareholders or any other particular group of 
stakeholders.125 Narrowly viewed the fiduciary duty of directors entails that the 
corporation must at least comply with all its statutory duties.126 Fiduciary duties arise 
between parties or persons by agreement or as a result of particular circumstances 
or the nature of the relationship between parties or relevant persons.127 Usually, the 
beneficiary of a duty must enforce the duty.128  
(b) Conflicting stakeholder interests 
 
The interests of various stakeholders may potentially come in conflict. Because only 
shareholders usually hold voting rights, in contrast with other stakeholders, this may 
lead to unsatisfactory results in some instances.129 However, stakeholders should 
be protected against corporate conduct that attempts to resolve conflicts between 
stakeholders in a manner that ‘abusively or unfairly maximize a particular group’s 
interest at the expense of other stakeholders’.130 From this perspective, a 
corporation is unique. Firstly, the corporation, as the beneficiary of the fiduciary 
duties of directors, will in some instances be unable to enforce such duties against 
directors.131 Further, the activities of the corporation impacts on a variety of 
                                                 
125 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [40]; People's 
Department Stores Ltd (1992) Inc, Re 2004 CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) [42]. 
126 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [38]. 
127 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [18] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the CBCA. 
128 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [41]. See the 
discussion of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy and the statutory derivative claim in 4.12 below. 
129 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [41] the court 
remarked that the exercise of voting rights is a form of control that shareholders can exercise over a 
corporation. 
130 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [64]. 
131 See 4.12 below. 
 310 
 
stakeholders who are not necessarily shareholders who hold voting rights in the 
company. For these reasons, the legislature has introduced statutory remedies to 
protect shareholders and other stakeholders of a corporation. The breach of a 
fiduciary duty in the context of section 241 must be considered in a broader context 
and in light of the wide formulation of the provision.132  
 In some circumstances an overlap may exist between the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders, but when a conflict of interests exists between the 
various stakeholders the duty owed by the directors to the corporation takes 
preference.133 The directors of a corporation do not owe separate fiduciary duties to 
the individual stakeholders of a corporation.  
 The business judgment rule acknowledges that the interests of other 
stakeholders may be considered during corporate decision-making.134 This duty of 
directors includes the duty to treat stakeholders fairly.135 Section 241 does not 
                                                 
132 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [18] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the CBCA. 
133 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [81] and [82] 
the court held that the interests of various stakeholders of the corporation may often come into 
conflict with each other. In some instances, a conflict may arise between the interests of the 
stakeholders and the interests of the corporation. Once the interests of the corporation are affected 
or impacted upon, the directors should resolve the conflict in a manner that is in the best interests of 
the corporation. This fiduciary duty of directors includes the duty to deal ‘equitably and fairly’ with the 
stakeholders of the corporation. This approach is in line with the duty of a corporation to be seen as 
‘a responsible citizen’. 
134 See BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [84]. The 
court [86] in BCE further stated that other considerations come into play when the company will not 
continue as a going concern. See also Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 
10132 (QCCS) [40]. See also 4.7.6.6 (c) below. 
135 In Levenzon v Korres 2014 QCCS 258, 2014 CarswellQue 592 (QCCS) [70] it was held that the 
wording of section 241 is wide enough to provide protection to a security owner and therefore it is 
not necessary to establish whether a fiduciary duty towards the security owner is breached. 
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create a separate legal duty towards individual stakeholder groups.136 To impose 
such a duty on directors to all the various stakeholders of a company may place the 
directors in an impossible situation. When acting in the best interests of a 
corporation, it is recognised that the directors may have to act in the interests of one 
group of stakeholders at the cost of other stakeholders.137 
(c) The best interests of a corporation and the business judgment rule 
To determine whether a director has exercised his or her power or discretion in the 
best interests of the corporation one needs to be mindful of the business judgment 
rule. This rule gives effect to the judgement of directors as long as it is exercised 
within a range of reasonable alternatives.138 The rule is based on the notion that the 
directors of a corporation are in the best possible position to determine the best 
interests of the corporation, and based on the fact that directors carry the duty to 
manage the business and affairs of a corporation.139 
                                                 
136 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [16] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76 c 33. 
137 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [17] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76 c 33. 
138 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [40]. In CW 
Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International Communications Ltd [1998] OJ No 1886, 1998 160 
DLR (4th) 131, 1998 CarswellOnt 1891 (ONCJ.GD) [57]-[59] the court explained that the business 
judgment rule protects the decisions of the board against court intervention provided that the decision 
was made honestly in good faith and on reasonable grounds. 
139 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [40] the court 
stated in relation to the business judgment rule that ‘[i]t reflects that directors, who are mandated 
under s 102(1) of the CBCA to manage the corporation’s business and affairs, are often better suited 
to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation. This applies to decisions on 
stakeholders’ interests, as much as other directorial decisions’. 
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 Often a court does not have the background knowledge or expertise of the 
directors who have had to consider and decide on the matter.140 A court should be 
slow to interfere with the discretion of the directors, unless it is clear that such an 
exercise of discretion is abusive, unreasonable or exercised in a non-judicial 
manner.141 When a court assess the business judgment of directors, it should be 
taken into consideration that a court is considering the relevant matter or exercise 
of power or discretion at a different time and place.142 However, this does not imply 
that the courts do not have the ability to provide an objective assessment of the 
                                                 
140 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [75] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the CBCA. 
See also UPM-Kymmene v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc 2002 214 DLR (4th) 496, 2002 27 BLR 
(3d) 53, 2002 CarswellOnt 2096 (ONSC) [152].  
141 Trackcom Systems Inc v Trackcom Systems International Inc 2014 QCCA 1136, 2014 
CarswellQue 5192 (QCCA) [36]; Spitzer v Magny 2012 QCCA 2059, 2012 232 ACWS (3d) 230, 2012 
CarswellQue 12282 (QCCA) [3]. When considering complaints in terms of the unfair prejudice 
remedy, a court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the normal principles of corporate 
law. Firstly, it should be recognised that it is the function of the board of directors to manage the 
company. Secondly, corporations are governed by the principle of majority rule. A court must be 
cautions not to usurp the powers of the board of directors or unjustifiably to intervene in the legitimate 
exercise of power within the company. See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 
1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS (3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [78] where this principle 
was confirmed. In Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [40] the 
court held that a court ‘should not intervene in the operations of a Company unless the conduct 
complained of has resulted in a prejudice, injury, detriment, or damage of the complainant’. The court 
in Budd v Gentra Inc 1998 111 OAC 288, 1991 43 BLR (2d) 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 3069 (ONCA) 
[32] described the oppression remedy as a form of judicial control in circumstances where the 
corporate powers in a corporation are abused. It empowers the court to intervene in the affairs of a 
corporation and to override the decisions of those responsible for the corporate governance of a 
corporation. 
142 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [75] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76 c 33. 
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facts relevant to provisions of the unfair prejudice remedy.143  
 The decisions of the board or director will not be subjected to a ‘microscopic’ 
examination.144 The court in BCE Inc, Re145 held that ‘[p]rovided that, as here, the 
directors’ decision is found to have been within the range of reasonable choices that 
they could have made in weighing conflicting interests, the court will not go on to 
determine whether their decision was the perfect one’.146 A court will not substitute 
the decision of the directors with its own, even when consequences or events 
transpired that create doubt regarding the correctness of a decision of the board.147 
4.8 ‘Interests’ and ‘reasonable expectations’  
4.8.1 Interests 
 
The aim of section 241 is the protection of ‘interests’.148 Interests for purposes of 
section 241 are not confined to legal interests.149 Interests include the reasonable 
                                                 
143 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [75] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76 c 33. 
144 See in this regard Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc 1991 1 BLR (2d) 225, 1991 26 ACWS 
(3d) 1261, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (ONCA) [76] regarding the wording of section 234(2) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act SC 1974-75-76 c 33. 
145 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC). 
146 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [112].  
147 Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp [1998] OJ No 4142, 1998 42 OR (3d) 177, 
1998 CarswellOnt 4035 (ONCA) [36].  
148 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [45] the court 
stated that the remedy does not only protect legal rights but also aims to protect the equitable 
interests of stakeholders that are affected by oppressive conduct originating from the corporation or 
its directors. See 5.7.4 below for a discussion of interests in the context of the South African 
oppression- or unfair prejudice remedy. 
149 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [45] and [102]. 
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expectations150 of a complainant. The interests of a stakeholder do not necessarily 
have to be contained in a contract or be of a contractual nature.151  
 Section 241 protects the legal and equitable interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders.152 It is further important that the interests of the various potential 
complainants should be distinguished from one another and not limited or restricted 
to the protection of the rights and interests of shareholders.153 For example, to 
establish the interests of a shareholder, the nature of a share and the rights attached 
thereto are of specific importance to determine the interests of a shareholder.  
 Directors may consider the interests of stakeholders when exercising their 
powers or adopting resolutions.154 The interests of shareholders, the corporation and 
other stakeholders should not be conflated. While rights and obligations are protected 
and enforced without the need to resort to special remedies, the ‘oppression remedy’ 
is concerned with the protection of the expectations of stakeholders.155  
 Stakeholders of a corporation should acknowledge that the shareholders are 
entitled to maximise profit and shareholder value.156 However, this may not be done 
by engaging in unfair conduct towards other stakeholders of the corporation.157 The 
duty to act in the best interests of the corporation is owed exclusively to the 
                                                 
150 See 4.8.2 below. 
151 See 4.8.2 below. 
152 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [45]. 
153 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [45]. 
154 See 4.7.6.6 above. 
155 BCE Inc, Re v 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [61]. See 4.8.2 
below for a discussion of ‘reasonable expectations’. See further 4.7.6.6. (b) and (c) above for a 
discussion in the consideration of stakeholder interests by directors. 
156 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [64]. 
157 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [64]. 
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corporation.158 The fact that the directors took a decision or exercised a power which 
benefits one group of stakeholders above the other or has as consequence the 
prejudice of a particular portion of stakeholders does not necessarily mean that the 
directors have acted in breach of their fiduciary duty.159  
4.8.2 Reasonable expectations 
 
Reliance may be placed on section 241 to obtain relief when the conduct of a 
corporation or its directors unfairly violates the interests of shareholders or breaches 
the reasonable expectations of stakeholders.160 To prove such a reasonable 
expectation, the evidence placed before a court must support the existence of an 
expectation.161 Representations, made over a period, may create a reasonable 
expectation with a particular stakeholder.162  
 Once a violation or breach of an expectation is proven, it has to be 
determined whether the violation or breach falls within the ambit of section 241.163 
                                                 
158 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [37]. See also 
People’s Department Stores Ltd (1992) Inc, Re 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 CarswellQue 
2862 (SCC) [43]. See 4.7.6.6 (a) and (b) above. 
159 See 4.7.6.6 above. See also People’s Department Stores Ltd (1992) Inc, Re 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 
3 SCR 461, 2004 CarswellQue 2862 (SCC) [109] where the court held that because the oppression 
remedy is based on the notion of equity, it applies to a broader range of situations compared with 
the fiduciary duties of a director and the standard of care required by section 122(1) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act. 
160 In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [71]. The court 
further noted that not all harmful or prejudicial conduct will qualify as oppressive conduct for purposes 
of section 241. See 5.7.6 below for a discussion of the protection of reasonable expectations in the 
South African context. 
161 Caughlin v Canadian Payroll Systems Inc 2019 MBQB 6; 2019 CarswellMan 14 [46]-[47]. 
162 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [79]. 
163 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [68]. The court 
summarised the enquiries into a claim for oppression as follows: ‘(1) Does the evidence support the 
reasonable expectation asserted by the claimant? and (2) Does the evidence establish that the 
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This is done by taking into account the totality of the evidence before the court and 
circumstances of each case. It is important to note that the remedy protects 
reasonable expectations and not the subjective wishes of a shareholder and that 
not every failure to meet a reasonable expectation will result in oppressive or unfair 
prejudicial conduct.164 
 The court takes various factors into account to establish whether a breach of 
a reasonable expectation is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards 
the interests of the complainant.165 Amongst these factors, the court will consider 
prevailing commercial practices to determine whether there is a departure from 
normal practices or a frustration of legal rights.166 The size and nature of a 
                                                 
reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppression”, “unfair prejudice” 
or “unfair disregard” of the relevant interest?’. The expectations of shareholders are often intertwined 
with the interests of shareholders. See also Tri-Mac Holdings Inc v Ostrom 2018 NSSC 177, 2018 296 
ACWS (3d) 160, 2018 CarswellNS 557 (NSSC) [24]; Alharayeri v Black 2014 QCCS 180, 2014 
CarswellQue 419 (QCCS) [39]-[41]; Mennillo v Intamodal inc 2016 SCC 51, [2016] 2 SCR 438, 2016 
CarswellQue 10615 (SCC) [9]. However, it should be noted that not all expectations are protected by 
the remedy save for those that can be considered as part of the shares held by the shareholders. See 
in this regard 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd [1991] OJ No 266, 1991 3 BLR (2d) 113 at 
123, 1991 CarswellOnt 142 (ONCJ.GD) [129]; 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western 
Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [60]-[61]. See further Toor 
v 1176520 Alberta Ltd 2018 ABQB 483, [2018] AWLD 2720, 2018 CarswellAlta 1201 (ABQB) [30] in 
the context of section 242 of the Business Corporations Act, RSA 2000, c B-9. 
164 McKinstry v York Condominium Corp No 472 [2003] OJ No 5006, 2003 68 OR (3d) 557, 2003 
CarswellOnt 4948 (ONSC) [33]. See also Noble v North Halton Golf and Country Club Limited 2018 
ONSC 3565, 2018 297 ACWS (3d) 314, 2018 CarswellOnt 12170 (ONSC) [126]. 
165 See Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [45] where the court 
stated that reliance may also be placed on section 241 when there is a breach of a reasonable 
expectation; a breach of a trust relationship based on confidence between shareholders; where the 
shareholders lost confidence in the management of the company’s affairs; or where a deadlock 
exists between the shareholders due to an irreconcilable conflict between shareholders.  
166 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [73]. See also 
Gallagher Holdings Limited v Unison Resources Incorporated 2018 NSSC 251, 2018 CarswellNS 
779 (NSSC) [438]. 
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corporation are also considered in some instances.167 In smaller corporations a 
deviation from formalities may be more acceptable than in bigger corporations.168  
 The nature of the relationship between the parties also needs to be carefully 
considered.169 Different considerations apply to personal relationships in contrast 
with relationships at an arm’s-length or strict commercial relationships.170 The 
relationship between the parties is considered over and above their legal rights.  
 A complainant may rely upon past practices to establish that it had a particular 
reasonable expectation and that a deviation from past practices may entitle the 
complainant to relief in terms section 241.171 However, such practices and 
expectations may change over a period of time as long as a valid commercial reason 
exists and as long the rights of the complainant are not undermined.172 To determine 
whether a breach of an expectation of a stakeholder is unfairly prejudicial, a court will 
take into account the steps that the stakeholder could have taken to protect him- or 
                                                 
167 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [74]. See also 
Gallagher Holdings Limited v Unison Resources Incorporated 2018 NSSC 251, 2018 CarswellNS 
779 (NSSC) [438]; Noble v North Halton Golf and Country Club Limited 2018 ONSC 3565, 2018 297 
ACWS (3d) 314, 2018 CarswellOnt 12170 (ONSC) [129]. 
168 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [74]. 
169 Dubois v Lucid Distributors Inc 2018 BCSC 1582, 2018 298 ACWS (3d) 754, 2018 CarswellBC 
2456 (BCSC) [59]. 
170 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [75]. 
171 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [76]. See also 
Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [44].  
172 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [77]. See also 
Noble v North Halton Golf and Country Club Limited 2018 ONSC 3565, 2018 297 ACWS (3d) 314, 
2018 CarswellOnt 12170 (ONSC) [130]. 
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herself against the prejudice that forms the subject of the complaint.173 
 The protection of reasonable expectations is recognised as the theoretical 
basis for the remedy.174 Reasonable expectations are determined objectively and 
with reference to the context and facts of each case.175 This entails that the actual 
expectation of the stakeholder is not decisive, and would be considered only as a 
factor together with the relationship between the parties and any contradictory 
claims and expectations.176  
 Contradictory expectations amongst stakeholders create the problem that 
directors or officers of a corporation may, in some circumstances, attempt to resolve 
this conflict by abuse whereby the interests of a group are promoted unfairly at the 
expense of another.177 The directors should resolve the conflict of interests between 
stakeholders in a fair manner to serve the best interests of the company.178 It is a 
reasonable expectation of a stakeholder to be treated fairly. In the context of a 
corporation stakeholders form relationships and in specific circumstances these 
                                                 
173 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [78]. See also 
First Edmonton Place Ltd v 315888 Alberta Ltd [1988] AWLD 1140, 1988 40 BLR 28, 1988 
CarswellAlta 103 (ABCQB) [57]-[58] regarding the position of a creditor.  
174 See BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [89]. 
175 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [62]. See also 
Rees v Fond 2018 NLCA 60, 2018 299 ACWS (3d) 89, 2018 CarswellNfld 400 (NLCA); Surry Knight 
Junior Hockey League 2018 BCSC 1748, 2018 299 ACWS (3d) 19, 2018 CarswellBC 2703 (BCSC) 
[108]; Dubois v Lucid Distributors Inc 2018 BCSC 1582, 2018 298 ACWS (3d) 754, 2018 CarswellBC 
2456 (BCSC) [251]; Vancouver Island Junior Hockey League Society v British Columbia Amateur 
Hockey Association 2018 BCSC 2289; 2018 CarswellBC 3471 [116]. 
176 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [62]. 
177 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [62]. In Basha v 
Singh 2016 QCCS 1564, 2016 CarswellQue 2981 (QCCS) [74] the court took in consideration that 
the defendants in the case did not do anything to obtain an advantage to the detriment of the 
complainant.  
178 BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [111]. 
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relationships may create certain expectations. The reasonableness of the 
expectations of the complainant must be established with reference to the nature of 
the corporation, the various parties, representations and agreements.179 
4.9 Alternative relief 
 
4.9.1 Introduction 
 
An interesting feature of the Canadian Business Corporations Act180 is section 214. 
Section 214(1) specifically provides for relief in the form of an order for the 
liquidation and dissolution of a corporation or any of its affiliates. A court may grant 
such an order based on the grounds set out in section 214(1)(a) and (b). 
4.9.2 Section 214(1)(a) 
Section 214(1)(a) provides that a court may grant an order for the liquidation and 
dissolution of a corporation or any of its affiliated on application of a shareholder: 
‘(a)  if the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates  
(i) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
effects a result, 
(ii) the business or affiliates of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a 
manner, or  
(iii) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer.’ 
                                                 
179 Levenzon v Korres 2014 QCCS 258, 2014 CarswellQue 592 (QCCS) [71]. In BCE Inc, Re 2008 
SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [79] the court explained that shareholder 
agreements and certain representations in marketing material, prospectuses, offering circulars and 
other communications can be regarded as sources of reasonable expectations. See also 10443325 
Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 4927, 2016 
CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [55] where it was held that the source of reasonable expectations may be a 
combination of statutory provisions, articles or bylaws, contracts and family and personal relationships. 
180 RSC 1985 c C-44. 
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It is important to note that section 214(1)(a) empowers a court to grant an order for 
the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation or any of its affiliates on the same 
grounds that a complainant may apply for relief in terms of section 241.181 The main 
form of relief in terms of section 214 is an order for the liquidation and dissolution of 
a corporation or its affiliates. However, section 214(2) provides for the power of a 
court grant alternative relief in the form of an order in terms of section 241.182 It is 
interesting to note that section 241(3)(l) also makes specific provision for relief in 
the form of an order for the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation. 
 Section 214 is a duplication of the wording of section 241.183 The main 
difference between these two sections is that section 214 specifically prescribes an 
order for liquidation and dissolution of a corporation as a form of relief. Such order 
may be made on grounds similar to those found in section 241.184  
 
                                                 
181 Compare section 214(1)(a) with section 241(2) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 
1985 c C-44). 
182 The court may make such an order or orders irrespective of whether the application is brought in 
terms of section 214(1)(a) or (b) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44). 
183 Section 214(1) provides that: 
‘A court may order the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation or any of its affiliated 
corporations on the application of a shareholder, 
(a) If the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates 
(i) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effect a result, 
(ii) the business or affairs of the corporation of any of its affiliate are or have 
been carried on or conducted in a manner, or  
(iii) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or 
have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any 
security holder, creditor, director or officer’. 
184 Section 241(2) provides:  
‘On an application under this section, a court may make such order under this section or 
section 241 as it thinks fit.’ 
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4.9.3 Section 214(1)(b) 
 
A court may also grant an order for the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation 
or any of its affiliates in terms of section 214(1)(b): 
‘if the court is satisfied that  
(i) a unanimous shareholder agreement entitles a complaining 
shareholder to demand dissolution of the corporation after the 
occurrence of a specified event and that event has occurred, 
or  
(ii) it is just and equitable that the corporation should be liquidated 
and dissolved.’ 
 
As a further alternative ground a court should be convinced that it is just and 
equitable that the corporation be liquidated and dissolved.185 The power of a court 
to order the winding-up of the company on just and equitable grounds is regarded 
as an equitable remedy that cloaks the court with a wide discretion.186 Such 
discretion should be exercised judicially by considering and balancing the rights 
between the petitioner, the remaining shareholders and any other interested party 
that may be affected by such an order.187 The courts have historically been tasked 
to order the liquidation of companies on just and equitable grounds when situations 
such as a deadlock exists between shareholders, when confidence in the 
management of the corporation is lost, based on grounds similar to that of 
partnerships, and when a company lost its substratum.188 This remedy is not only 
available when there is no other appropriate remedy available.189 The remedy 
                                                 
185 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(1)(b)(ii). 
186 Lutfy v Lutfy 1996 CarswellQue 510 (QCSC) [36]. 
187 Lutfy v Lutfy 1996 CarswellQue 510 (QCSC) [37]. 
188 Lutfy v Lutfy 1996 CarswellQue 510 (QCSC) [38]. 
189 See Lutfy v Lutfy 1996 CarswellQue 510 (QCSC) [36] where the court held that ‘[t]he judicial 
remedy of winding-up is an equitable remedy and confers upon this Court a wide discretion in 
 322 
 
should not be used by minority shareholders to oppress majority shareholders.190 
 Alternatively, it should be proven that the shareholder relies upon a 
unanimous shareholder agreement in terms of which a specific event occurred that 
entitled the shareholder to an order for liquidation and dissolution of the 
corporation.191  
4.9.4 Alternative orders 
 
Section 214(2) specifically provides that a court is not limited to grant relief in the 
form of a liquidation order, but may grant relief in terms of section 241 as it thinks 
fit.192 Section 214(3) specifically provides that section 242 applies to applications in 
terms of section 214.193 It is submitted that an order for the liquidation and winding-
up of a company is a measure of last resort and that the objective of the legislature 
with the incorporation of section 241 was as far as possible to provide an alternative 
remedy to a liquidation order.194 
                                                 
deciding whether a wind-up is just and equitable in the circumstances. It is essentially a question of 
fact and is not subordinate to the absence of another or more appropriate remedy’. 
190 Mason v Intercity Properties (1987) 59 OR (2d) 631, 697-98. 
191 Section 241(1)(a) read with (b)(i). Historically the courts have been tasked to order the liquidation 
of companies on just and equitable grounds when situations such as a deadlock existed between 
shareholders, the confidence in the management of the corporation was lost, based on grounds 
similar to that of partnerships, and when a company lost its substratum. See Lutfy v Lutfy 1996 
CarswellQue 510 (QCSC) [38] where the court pointed out that these grounds are not an exhaustive 
list. 
192 It is interesting to note that section 241(7) provides that an applicant may seek relief in terms of 
section 214 as alternative to the relief available in terms of section 241. 
193 See 4.9.2 above. 
194 Robert WV Dickerson Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (1971) 164. See 
further Anor Management Ltd c Brooklo Industries Ltd [1978] CS 731, 1978 CarswellQue 984 (QCCS) 
[21] with reference to section 234 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, where the court explained 
that the common object of the oppression remedy is to provide relief that is fair in the circumstances of 
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4.10 Groups of Companies 
 
The application of the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy within a group of 
corporations is a topic with which many jurisdictions have grappled or are grappling 
with. This problematic issue arises because in many instances the relevant 
jurisdiction’s statutory unfair prejudice remedy does not specifically speak to 
corporations operating in a group context. This creates uncertainty as to whether 
the statutory unfair prejudice remedy can apply to company groups. 
As section 241 specifically provides for the application of the remedy to a 
corporation and its affiliates this problem does not arise as acutely in Canada. An 
affiliate refers to a body corporate195 as defined in section 2(2). A body corporate is 
an affiliate of another body corporate, when such a body corporate is a subsidiary 
of the other or when both body corporates are the subsidiaries of the same body 
corporate.196 Body corporates are also affiliates when each of them is controlled by 
the same person.197 Body corporates are also affiliates of each other when they are 
affiliates of the same body corporate at the same time.198 
                                                 
the particular case without issuing an order for the liquidation of the corporation. See also Vedova v 
Garden House Inn Ltd 1985 29 BLR 236, 1985 31 ACWS (2d) 102, 1985 CarswellOnt 140 (Ont HC) 
[8] where the court stated that ‘[t]he relief available is to be determined by tests less stringent than 
those which traditionally had to be met in order to procure an order for winding-up’. See also Marot v 
Marot 2019 ONSC 866, 2019 CarswellOnt 1531 [50] where the court stated that an order for the 
winding-up of a company is not appropriate when a company can continue to be operate profitably and 
that a court in such circumstances has a duty to consider less restrictive alternative remedies when 
available. See 5.8 below for a discussion of the South African oppression or unfair prejudice remedy 
as a form of alternative relief to the winding-up and liquidation of companies. 
195 A ‘body corporate’ is defined in section 2(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 
c C-44) as ‘a company or other body corporate wherever or however incorporated’. 
196 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 2(2)(a). 
197 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 2(2)(a). 
198 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 2(2)(b). 
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A reading of section 241(2)(a)-(c) reveals that the relief in terms of the section 
can be directed at the conduct or the effect of the conduct of a corporation or its 
affiliates. This confirms that the remedy in section 241 finds application in the 
context of a groups of companies or corporations.199 
4.11 The relief 
 
4.11.1 Introduction 
 
The strength of section 241 is that it provides the court with the power and discretion 
to grant a wide variety of relief.200 Most importantly, section 241 provides an 
alternative to the liquidation and dissolution of corporations.201 The relief a court 
may grant is contained in section 241(3). This provision stipulates that: 
‘(3)  In connection with an application under this section, the court may 
make any interim or final order it thinks fit including, without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, 
(a)  an order restraining the conduct complained of; 
(b)  an order appointing a receiver or receiver-manager; 
(c)  an order to regulate a corporation’s affairs by amending the 
articles or by-laws or creating or amending a unanimous 
shareholder agreement;  
(d)  an order directing an issue or exchange of securities; 
(e)  an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or 
any of the directors then in office; 
(f)  an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or 
any other person, to purchase securities of a security holder; 
(g)  an order directing the corporation, subject to subsection (6), 
                                                 
199 See 5.7.7 below for a discussion of the South African position relating the application of the 
oppression remedy within company groups. 
200 Black c Alharayeri 2015 QCCA 1350, 2015 53 BLR (5th) 43, 2015 CarswellQue 13380 (QCCA) 
[68]. For a similar approach see 6725392 Canada Inc c Summit-Tech Multimedia Communications 
Inc 2019 QCCS 512, 2019 CarswellQue 1213 [43]. 
201 See 4.9 above. 
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or any other person to pay a security holder any part of the 
monies that the security holders paid for securities; 
(h)  an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to 
which a corporation is a party and compensating the 
corporation or any other party to the transaction or contract; 
(i)  an order requiring a corporation, with in a time specified by the 
court, to produce to the court or an interested person financial 
statements in the form required by section 155 or an 
accounting in such other form as the court may determine; 
(j)  an order compensating an aggrieved person; 
(k)  an order directing rectification of the registers or other records 
of a corporation under section 243; 
(l)  an order liquidating and dissolving the corporation; 
(m)  an order directing an investigation under Part XIX to be made; 
and 
(n)  an order requiring the trial of any issue’. 
 
4.11.2 The purpose of relief 
 
The purpose of relief in terms of section 241 is to ‘rectify the matters complained 
of’.202 In terms of section 241(3) a court clearly has a wide discretion in relation to 
the relief it may grant.203 The section provides that a court may make an order that 
                                                 
202 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(2). See also Basha v Singh 2016 
QCCS 1564, 2016 CarswellQue 2981 (QCCS) [42]. See also Caughlin v Canadian Payroll Systems 
Inc 2019 MBQB 6; 2019 CarswellMan 14 [69] and [70]-[71]; Pohl v Palisca 2019 ONSC 16, 2019 
CarswellOnt 3 [140]. According to Wilson v Alharayeri 2017 SCC 39, [2017] 1 SCR 1037, 2017 
CarswellQue 5230 (SCC) [27] the purpose of relief granted in terms of section 241(3) is corrective 
to address ‘inequities between private parties and “solely” to rectify the matters complained of’. In 
Menlin v Menlin 2018 ABQB 1056; 2018 CarswellAlta 3186 [69] it was held that court intervention 
must be more than what is necessary in the circumstances ‘to address the imbalance or the conduct 
subject of complaint’. See also Kulhawy v Commerx Holdings LLC 2018 ABQB 986; 2018 
CarswellAlta 2902 [26]. See also JG MacIntosh ‘The Retrospectivity of the Oppression Remedy’ 
(1987) 13 Can Bus LJ 219, 225 who states that the function of the unfair prejudice remedy is to 
restore balance between private parties and that it does not have a punitive function. 
203 Alharayeri v Black 2014 QCCS 180, 2014 CarswellQue 419 (QCCS) [154]. In 152581 Canada 
Ltd v Matol World Corporation [1996] QJ No 4017, [1997] RJQ 161, 1996 CarswellQue 1211 (QCCS) 
[79] the court held that relief can only be granted once the jurisdictional requirements of section 241 
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it ‘thinks fit’.204 A court is not restricted to the relief listed in the provision.205 Section 
241(3) only provides examples of the type of relief a court may grant but a court is 
not limited to the relief listed in this particular subsection. 
4.11.3 Interim orders 
 
Relief may also take the form of interim orders. It is interesting to note that an 
application for an interim order in terms of section 241(3) does not necessarily have 
to be made by the complainant(s) in the main application or a complainant as 
                                                 
have been met and not because the relief would be in the best interest of the corporation. In Banque 
Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [46] the court held that the 
appropriateness of the relief depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and is not subject 
to the availability of alternative remedies. In Wilson v Alharayeri 2017 SCC 39, [2017] 1 SCR 1037, 
2017 CarswellQue 5230 (SCC) [27] the court held that relief granted in in terms of section 241(3) 
‘should go no further than necessary to correct the injustice or unfairness between the parties’. See 
also Jeffrie v Hendriksen 2013 NSSC 153, 2013 228 ACWS (3d) 652, 2013 CarswellNS 315 (NSSC) 
[137] where the court held that an appropriate remedy is aimed at redressing the conduct complained 
of without unnecessarily interfering in the company’s affairs. See further 63833 Manitoba Corporation 
v Cosman’s Furniture (1972) Ltd et al 2018 MBCA 72, [2018] 11 WWR 232, 2018 CarswellMan 273 
(MBCA) [43]-[44]. 
204 The court in Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd (1995) 23 BLR (2d) 286, 1995 23 OR (3d) 481, 
1995 CarswellOnt 1207 (Ont CA) [19] held that the nature of the reasonable expectations to be 
protected has an important bearing on the relief that a court may grant. The nature of the reasonable 
expectations refers to whether the relationship between the shareholders is purely commercial or 
whether the corporation is a family business. See also Bloom v Grynwald 2002 CarswellQue 1257 
(QCCS) [112] and [130] where the court pointed out that a court’s discretion when granting relief 
should be guided by what is appropriate in the circumstances of each case. The relief that a 
complainant may obtain in terms of section 241 has on an occasion been described as sui generis. 
See also Gruber v Greenberg [2003] QJ No 21414, 2003 CarswellQue 3328 (QCCS) [22] where the 
court described the relief a court may grant in terms of section 241 as sui generis. 
205 Alharayeri v Black 2014 QCCS 180, 2014 CarswellQue 419 (QCCS) [154]; Desjardines 
Ducharme Stein Monast v Empress Jewellery (Canada) Inc [2004] RJQ 1243, 2004 CarswellQue 
939 (QCCS) [24]; Burnett v Axxa Realities [2004] QJ No 10701, 2004 CarswellQue 2927 (QCCS) 
[17]. 
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defined in section 238.206 A person will have standing to apply for an interim order 
as long as such an application is ‘in connection with’ the main application.207 
 When considering the issue of an interim order a court must first establish 
whether the applicant or petitioner has a quality right and that such an order is 
necessary to prevent serious or irreparable harm or injury.208 The quality of the right 
of the petitioner refers to the likelihood that the petitioner will succeed with his or 
her legal action on the merits.209 A court must further weigh the inconvenience that 
such an interim order may have on the defendant against the harm that the 
petitioner will suffer if such an order is not made.210 
4.11.4 Restraining order211 
 
The court may grant relief in the form of a restraining order.212 The order is often 
granted in the form of interim relief to preserve the rights of a party pending the 
resolving of a dispute.213 To grant such an interim order a court must be satisfied 
that it is necessary and that there are prima facie grounds of oppressive or unfairly 
                                                 
206 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [32]. 
207 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [32]. 
208 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [42]. 
209 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [42]. 
210 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [42]. See 5.9.2 below for the South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
211 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(a). 
212 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-18 to 6-20. 
213 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-18 to 6-20. 
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prejudicial conduct present.214 Further such an order would only be made when the 
harm or potential harm that a complainant may suffer cannot be rectified by an order 
for compensatory damages.215 
 A restraining order is of specific relevance in the event of conduct that is in 
breach of the articles or objects a corporation.216 Restraining orders play an 
important role in the provision of alternative relief. Usually it would be inappropriate 
to seek the dissolution of a corporation based on the fact that a corporation acted 
beyond the objects and restrictions stated in its articles.217 
4.11.5 Appointment of a receiver or receiver manager218 
 
The appointment of a receiver is justified in circumstances where the complainant 
can prove that his or her rights are placed at risk due to the poor administration or 
insolvency of the corporation.219 The complainant must demonstrate the necessity 
for such an appointment and that the board is unable to manage the corporation 
                                                 
214 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-18 to 6-20. See 
also 4.11.3 above. 
215 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-18 to 6-20. See 
also 4.11.3 above. 
216 Robert WV Dickerson Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (1971) 151. 
217 Robert WV Dickerson Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (1971) 151. 
See 4.9 above. 
218 See Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(b). See also Distribution 
Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 364 (QCCS). 
See further Standal’s Patents Ltd c 160088 Canada inc [1991] RJQ 1996, 1991 Carswell 1837 
(QCCS). 
219 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [47]. The complainant should prove prejudice and that such an appointment is an 
‘urgent necessity’. See also Chagnon v Sayegh 2011 QCCS 2172, 2011 202 ACWS (3d) 568, 2011 
CarswellQue 4773 (QCCS) [21]. 
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properly.220 A court will only make an order for the appointment of a receiver in 
exceptional circumstances.221  
 Before a court will order the appointment of a receiver, factors that need to 
be considered include the ability of the directors to manage the company properly; 
the impact such an appointment will have on the goodwill and value of the 
corporation; and the interests of and motivation for the parties seeking such an 
appointment.222 The appointment of a receiver as an interim measure will not lightly 
be considered by a court. Such form of relief is regarded as an exceptional measure 
that will only be granted when no other remedy is available to address the 
oppression suffered by the complainant.223 A receiver will not be appointed to 
determine whether the conduct complained of took place.224 The order will only be 
made if oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct is proven.225 
4.11.6 Regulation of a corporation’s affairs 
 
The directors conduct the business and affairs of a corporation.226 The shareholders 
of a corporation are only allowed to intervene in the management of the affairs of 
                                                 
220 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [47]. 
221 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [49]. 
222 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [49]. 
223 Distribution Fomazz inc c Farias 2014 QCCS 150, 2014 238 ACWS (3d) 627, 2014 CarswellQue 
364 (QCCS) [50]. 
224 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-20 and 6-21. 
225 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-20 and 6-21. 
226 Section 102(1) provides that ‘[s]ubject to any unanimous shareholder agreement, the directors 
shall manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of a corporation’. See 5.9.5 
below for the South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
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the corporation as far as the constitution allows.227 Courts are often reluctant to 
interfere with the affairs of a corporation. The reason for this reluctance are that the 
directors are regarded as experts and is in a much better position to manage the 
affairs of the corporation and to consider the best interests of a corporation.228 Often 
aspects of the affairs of a corporation are regulated in the articles of incorporation229 
and unanimous shareholder agreements.230 Relief in terms of the statutory unfair 
prejudice remedy may take the form of an order for the amendment of a 
corporation’s articles of incorporation and unanimous shareholder agreements. 
4.11.6.1 Creation or amendment of articles of incorporation 
Section 241(3)(c) states that the regulation of a company’s affairs may take the form 
of an amendment to the articles of incorporation or its bylaws.231 Further, the order 
may include the creation or amendment of a unanimous shareholder agreement.232 
When a court makes an order for the amendment to the articles or by-laws of a 
corporation, a shareholder would not be entitled to exercise his or her rights of 
dissent in terms of section 190. However, a court will also be cautious to exercise 
the power to amend the constitution and/or by-law of a corporation based on the 
                                                 
227 See 4.3 above. 
228 Banque Nationale du Canada c Titley 2004 CarswellQue 10132 (QCCS) [40]. 
229 See 4.11.6.1 below. 
230 See 4.11.6.2 below. 
231 Section 241(5) specifically provides that a shareholder cannot exercise his or her rights in terms 
of section 190 when an amendment is affected in terms of a court order. See further section 241(4) 
that places a duty on the directors of a company to comply with section 191(4) of the Act in the event 
of a court order amending order varying the articles of a corporation or its bylaws. Subsequent to an 
order varying or amending the articles of a corporation no further amendment may be made unless 
the consent of the court has been obtained or it has ordered otherwise. 
232 See 5.9.5.3 below for the South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
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principle that parties should be kept to agreements voluntary made.233 
4.11.6.2 Unanimous shareholder agreement 
A ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’ is defined as an agreement as described in 
subsection 146(1) or a declaration of a shareholder described in subsection 
146(2).234  
(a) Section 146(1) 
Section 146(1) describes a ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’ as a lawful 
agreement between all the shareholders of a corporation. It may also include an 
agreement between all the shareholders and one or more persons who are not 
shareholders of a corporation.235 Such unanimous shareholder agreement has the 
characteristic of placing a restriction on the powers and/or supervision of the 
directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.236 
(b) Section 146(2) 
For purposes of section 146(2) a ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’ is a written 
declaration whereby the power or supervision of directors to manage the business 
and affairs of a corporation is restricted. Such a declaration is made by a person 
who is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares of a corporation.237 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement that restricts the supervision or power 
of the directors to manage the business and affairs of a corporation has important 
                                                 
233 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-21 and 6-22. 
234 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 2(1). 
235 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(1). 
236 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(1). 
237 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(2). 
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legal implications for the parties thereto. A party to a unanimous shareholder 
agreement in terms of which the party is given the power to manage or supervise 
the business and/or affairs of a company carries all the rights, powers, duties and 
liabilities as in the case of a director.238 The section makes it clear that the rights, 
powers, duties and liabilities which such a party may attract may found its origins in 
the Act or otherwise.239 The party may rely upon all defences that are available to a 
director of the corporation.240 
(c) Section 146(3) 
Section 146(3) deems the purchaser or transferee of shares to be a party to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement if the shares are subject to such an 
agreement.241 A unanimous shareholder agreement will not be enforceable against 
a transferee of a security unless the transferee had actual knowledge of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement or alternatively reference is made to the 
unanimous shareholder agreement on the security certificate.242 
4.11.7 Issue or exchange of securities243 
 
The court may order an issue or exchange of securities to remedy the conduct 
complained of.244 This form of relief is described as a very intrusive form of relief 
                                                 
238 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(5).  
239 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(5). 
240 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(5). 
241 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 49(8)(c).  
242 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 146(4) read with s 49(8)(c). 
243 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(d). 
244 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(d). See 5.9.6 below for the 
South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
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that is rarely used.245 It suggested that a court should rather order the board of the 
corporation to consider or reconsider resolutions for the issue of shares in the 
corporation as an alternative.246 
4.11.8 Appointment of directors247 
 
As explained above, the power and duty to manage the business and affairs of a 
corporation rest with the directors.248 The shareholders elect the directors.249 The 
directors exercise their powers subject to their legal duties.250 Section 241(3)(e) 
entrusts a court with the power to appoint directors to the corporation in the place 
of existing directors and/or in addition to the existing shareholders.251  
 As can be seen from the reading of this particular subsection, the power of a 
court to order the replacement of directors or the appointment of additional directors 
has far-reaching consequences for a corporation. In principle directors can only be 
removed by those who have appointed them and the removal should take place in 
accordance within the ambit of the provisions of the Act.252 To make this order less 
intrusive consideration should be given to the possibility to order the convening a 
                                                 
245 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-22. 
246 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 6-22. 
247 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(e). 
248 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 102(1). 
249 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 106(3). 
250 See Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 122. This section provides: 
‘122(1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall  
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and 
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances.’ 
251 See 5.9.7.1 below for the South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
252 In terms of section 109(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44) a director 
can be removed at a special meeting by way of an ordinary resolution of shareholders.  
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shareholder meeting for the purpose of appointing directors as alternative to the 
court making direct appointments of directors.253 
4.11.9 Purchase (buy-out) orders254 
4.11.9.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 241(3)(f) a court may order the corporation or any other person 
to purchase the securities held by a security holder.255 The Canada Business 
Corporations Act256 expressly provides that no payment may be made to a 
shareholder by a corporation when reasonable grounds exists for believing that the 
corporation is or would be after such payment be unable to pay its liabilities as they 
become due or that such payment would cause the aggregate of the liabilities of the 
corporation to be more than the realisable value of the corporation’s assets.257  
 It is interesting to note that the prohibition in section 241(6) is only applicable 
to payments to a shareholder. Throughout section 241 reference is made to the 
holders of securities and no distinction is drawn between the holder of a share and 
the holder of a debt instrument. This distinction manifests for the first time in 
subsection (6). The distinction can simply be explained in that it aims to protect the 
creditors of a corporation. A payment in contravention of section 241(6) may benefit 
                                                 
253 See Menlin v Menlin 2018 ABQB 1056; 2018 CarswellAlta 3186 [62] where the court stated that 
the removal of a director in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy is an exceptional form of relief that 
must be used sparingly. 
254 See 5.9.14 below for the South African equivalent of this form of relief. 
255 Such an order may also be made regarding shares or a debt instrument. See the definition of a 
‘security’. 
256 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
257 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(f) read with subsections (6)(a) 
and (b). 
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shareholders to the expense of the creditors of the corporation. A payment directed 
to a holder of a debt instrument will simply decrease the liabilities of a corporation 
and the potential prejudice of creditors do not come into play.  
 A purchase order is usually made when it is found that there is no longer a 
relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant on the one hand and 
the majority shareholders or management of the company on the other.258 This is 
often the case when the complainant had an expectation to participate in the 
management of the corporation and is then excluded from participation in the 
management of the company.259 In the absence of oppressive or unfair prejudicial 
conduct a shareholder has no right to withdraw his or her investment in a company.260  
Section 241(3)(f) provides that a court can make an order directing the 
corporation or any other person to purchase the securities of a security holder when 
such a security holder has succeeded in establishing the jurisdictional requirements 
of section 241(1). The section does not stipulate how the value of the relevant shares 
to be purchased should be determined. Therefore the principles relating to the 
valuation of shares subject to a purchase order must be distilled from case law.261  
 
                                                 
258 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2014 CarswellBC 1906, 2014 244 
ACWS (3d), 2014 CarswellBC 1906 (BCCA) [287]. 
259 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2014 CarswellBC 1906, 2014 244 
ACWS (3d), 2014 CarswellBC 1906 (BCCA) [287]. 
260 Basha v Singh 2016 QCCS 1564, 2016 CarswellQue 2981 (QCCS) [91] and [93]-[95]. See Miklos 
v Thomasfield Holdings Ltd 2001 82 CRR (2d) 126, 2001 105 ACWS (3d) 857, 2001 CarswellOnt 
1303 (ONSC) [110] and [113] where it was held that a shareholder does not have an inherent right 
to force a company to buy or purchase his or her shares. See also Zanardo v Di Battista Gambin 
Developments Limited 2019 ONSC 2115, 2019 Carswell 5222 [43]. 
261 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [84]. 
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4.11.9.2 Valuation of securities 
(a) Introduction 
 
The most important principles relating to the valuation of shares were developed in 
the province of British Columbia.262 Although the statutory form of the oppression 
remedy in British Columbia is not identical to the provision in the Canada Business 
Corporations Act263 the differences are of a minor nature.264 A few important factors 
and principles need to be considered that may directly affect the valuation of the 
shares. 
(b) Fair value 
 
A principle that is clear from case law is that the shares which are subject to a 
purchase order should be valued at a fair value or price.265 The fair value of the 
shares is dependent on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.266 Fair 
value does not necessarily mean that the shares should be valued at the fair market 
                                                 
262 The equivalent of section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act can be found in section 
227(2)-(4) of the Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57. 
263 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
264 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2014 CarswellBC 1906, 2014 244 
ACWS (3d), 2014 CarswellBC 1906 (BCCA) [58]. 
265 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [14]. A fair price is the price that would have emerged from the 
negotiations between a willing seller and a willing purchaser at the relevant point in time. See also 
Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [20]; Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd 2002 BCSC 1236, 
2002 116 ACWS (3d) 194, 2002 CarswellBC 1973 (BCSC) [257]. 
266 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [14]; Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd 2002 
BCSC 1236, 2002 116 ACWS (3d) 194, 2002 CarswellBC 1973 (BCSC) [255]. 
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price of the shares.267 The fair market value of shares at a specific point in time may 
be taken into account as a factor to determine the fair value of the shares. The 
overriding principle remains that the valuation arrived at must be fair to all the parties 
that are affected by the dispute.268  
The valuation of shares is usually done by appropriate experts who must 
base their opinions of their valuations on the correct assumptions and legal 
principles to be relevant and accurate. The shares must also be valued on the basis 
that no oppression has occurred.269 
Considerations such as whether the valuation of the shares should be done 
in isolation or en bloc;270 the specific date on which the valuation of the shares 
should be based;271 whether provision should be made for a minority discount;272 
and whether any adjustments should be made to provide for possible 
compensation273 must be established to provide an accurate basis on which the 
value of such shares should be determined or calculated.274 
                                                 
267 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [14]; Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 
ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [81]-[82], [85]. 
268 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC)) [16]; Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 
2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [11]. 
269 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [11]. 
270 See 4.11.9.2 (c) below. 
271 See 4.11.9.2 (d) below. 
272 See 4.11.9.2 (e) below. 
273 See also 4.11.13 below for a discussion of the award of compensation in terms of the oppression 
or unfair prejudice remedy. 
274 See 4.11.9.2 (g) below. 
 338 
 
(c) The corporation as going concern (en bloc) 
The type of corporation that issued the shares in question may have a bearing on 
the approach to be taken when valuing the shares of a corporation. The type of 
corporation refers to whether or not the shares of the corporation are freely traded. 
Should the shares of the corporation not be freely traded, the best approach is to 
value the shares of the company as a going concern.275 
(d) Date  
As regards the date on which the valuation of shares that is subject to a purchase 
order must be based, the point of departure is the date on which the petition for 
relief was filed.276 An alternative date may be used in circumstances where the use 
of the date on which the petition was filed may be unfair in the circumstances of the 
particular case.277 This will protect the petitioner against a decrease in the value of 
his or her shares while the dispute between him- or herself and the corporation or 
                                                 
275 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [6]-[7] and [89] and [91]. The court [6] in Diligenti valued the share subject 
to a purchase order on the basis of what a prudent investor (‘knowledgeable as to the facts of the 
particular business’), who is under no obligation to buy, will be willing to pay for the acquisition of the 
ownership and control of the business (‘with all its assets, liabilities, records and prospects’). The 
seller is to be regarded to be under an obligation to sell. When a purchase order is made, the 
complainant is entitled to be paid out the fair value of his proportional interest in the corporation as 
a going concern. 
276 Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd 2002 BCSC 1236, 2002 116 ACWS (3d) 194, 
2002 CarswellBC 1973 (BCSC) [228] and [230]; 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences 
Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [23] and 
[28]; Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [12]. 
277 Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd 2002 BCSC 1236, 2002 116 ACWS (3d) 194, 
2002 CarswellBC 1973 (BCSC) [228]. 
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other shareholders is being resolved.278 However, based on the same principle the 
petitioner cannot rely on an increase in the value of the shares after the date on 
which the petition for relief was filed.279 
(e) Minority discount 
The valuation of the shares of a minority shareholder must be done without making 
provision for a minority discount.280 The underlying philosophy of the courts is that 
the majority shareholders (or directors) should not benefit from conduct which has 
made it unbearable for the complainant to remain in the corporation.281  
The application of the minority discount also lacks a rational basis as a 
purchase order is usually enforced against the corporation or the majority 
shareholders of the corporation. A purchase order enables the majority shareholder 
to increase his or her control of the corporation and therefore there is no reason 
why the shares of a minority shareholder should be bought at a discount.282 The 
sale of shares to existing shareholders who are already minority shareholders also 
does not change their position and therefore no basis exists for the application of a 
minority discount.283 The situation differs substantially from the situation where the 
                                                 
278 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [24]. 
279 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [24]. 
280 Mason v Intercity Properties Ltd 1987 CarswellQnt 134 [30]. 
281 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [29]. 
282 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [18]. 
283 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [80]. See Mason v Intercity Properties Ltd 1987 CarswellQnt 134 [17] and 
[28] for the explanation of the disposal of a non-controlling stake in a corporation to an outside party.  
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shares are bought by a third party.284 
(f) Adjustments 
The valuation of shares that is subject to a purchase order may be adjusted to 
provide for any losses that the complainant suffered, provided that there is a causal 
link between the conduct complained of and the decrease in the value of the shares. 
(g) The corporation or other party 
The court has a discretion to determine who will be obliged to buy the shares in 
terms of a purchase order. The Canada Business Corporations Act285 is not 
prescriptive in this regard. When considering who should purchase the shares of 
the complainant the court should be guided by what is equitable in the 
circumstances of each case.286 Usually, an order will be made that the corporation, 
alternatively the majority shareholders, should purchase the shares of the 
complainant.  
Before a court will order that the corporation must purchase the shares of the 
complainant, it will take into consideration the solvency of the corporation and the 
benefit derived by the majority shareholder if such an order is made.287 The court 
will be reluctant to make a purchase order against the corporation in circumstances 
where the order will be rendered unenforceable as a result of the insolvency or 
                                                 
284 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [18] and [29]. 
285 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
286 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [94]. 
287 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [31]. 
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potential insolvency of the corporation.288 It is not a function of the courts to design 
a structure to lessen the consequential effects of a purchase order against a 
party.289 
4.11.10 Payment to security holders  
 
Section 241(3)(g) empowers a court to make an order directing the corporation or 
any other person to repay any part of the monies that a security holder or holders 
paid for securities to the security holders.290 Such payment is also subject to section 
241(6). 
4.11.11 Setting aside of transactions or contracts291 
 
A novel form of relief can be found in section 241(3)(h). This provision enables a 
court to vary or set aside the transaction or contract.292 In the past courts were 
hesitant to interfere with the contractual agreements between parties where such 
contractual agreements had been concluded freely and voluntarily. What is 
interesting to note from the wording of the provision is that it appears that such a 
variation or setting aside of a contract will subsequently be followed by an order 
compensating the corporation or any other party to the contract or transaction.293 
                                                 
288 1043325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2015 BCSC 1160, 2015 46 BLR (5th) 
212, 2015 CarswellBC 1866 (BCSC) [31]. See in this regard section 241(6) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44). 
289 Diligenti v RWMD Operations Kelowa Ltd (No 2) [1977] 2 ACWS 951, 1977 4 BCLR 134, 1977 
CarswellBC 139 (BCSC) [94] where the court responded to an argument that a purchase order 
against certain individual respondents would result in detrimental tax consequences for the 
respondents. 
290 See 5.9.8 below for a similar form of relief under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
291 See, for example, Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 
CarsewellQue 12043 (QCCS). 
292 See 5.9.9 below for a similar form of relief under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
293 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(h). 
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This provision does not expressly include the power of a court to vary a contract 
between the corporation and its shareholders, but the power of the court is not 
necessarily limited by this provision.294 
 Courts are reluctant to issue interim orders that modify a contract. This is due 
to the fact that the purpose of these orders are to protect the rights of parties 
pending litigation.295 The modification of such a contract has an effect that goes 
behind this purpose.296 A court will look more favourably on the suspension of the 
rights of a party on a temporary basis instead of the modification or variation of a 
contract.297 
4.11.12 Access to financial statements 
 
The remedy in section 241 also provides for an order compelling the corporation to 
provide the court or any other interested person with financial statements in the form 
required by the Canada Business Corporations Act298 or any other form as 
instructed by the court.299 
 
                                                 
294 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [39]. See also 4.11.6 above. 
295 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [35]. See also Standal’s Patents Ltd c 160088 Canada inc [1991] RJQ 1996, 1991 Carswell 
1837 (QCCS) [18] where the court held that it does have the power to make such an order on either 
an interim or final basis. See 4.11.3 above. 
296 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [35]. 
297 Adams v Smerchanski 2014 QCCS 5578, 2014 ACWS (3d) 78, 2014 CarsewellQue 12043 
(QCCS) [35]. 
298 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
299 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(i). 
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4.11.13 Compensation300 
 
A court may order the payment of compensation.301 Such compensation may be 
granted to any aggrieved person.302 Such an order will be made if it will rectify the 
oppression suffered by the complainant.303  
 An order for compensation may include an order that the directors and 
officers of the corporation be held personally liable for the payment of 
compensation.304 A court will hold the directors and officers of a corporation 
personally liable in circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the directors 
or officers benefited from their oppressive conduct towards the complainant or 
where the director or directors had total control over the corporation.305 To succeed 
the complainant must disclose a cause of action or make allegations in the relevant 
pleadings that clearly identify the conduct complained of and which will render the 
various individual directors liable.306 
 The termination of an employment relationship does not automatically entitle 
a complainant to relief in terms of section 241, although relief is not necessarily 
                                                 
300 See Black c Alharayeri 2015 CarswellQue 13380 (QCCA) for example. 
301 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(j). See 5.9.11 below for a similar 
form of relief under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
302 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(j). 
303 Budd v Gentra 1998 111 OAC 288, 1991 43 BLR (2d) 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 3069 (ONCA). 
304 In Budd v Gentra 1998 111 OAC 288, 1991 43 BLR (2d) 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 3069 (ONCA) [52] 
the court held that a plaintiff should complete all the necessary facts that justify holding the directors 
and officers of a corporation personally liable and that such an order rectifies the conduct complained 
of. 
305 Budd v Gentra 1998 111 OAC 288, 1991 43 BLR (2d) 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 3069 (ONCA) [52]. 
306 In Budd v Gentra 1998 111 OAC 288, 1991 43 BLR (2d) 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 3069 (ONCA) [48] 
it was held that it is crucial that the oppressive conduct should be linked to the specific individual 
directors whom the plaintiff attempts to hold personally liable for the conduct complained of. 
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excluded in appropriate circumstances.307 The function of awarding damages or 
compensation for the unlawful dismissal of employee falls within the jurisdictions of 
civil courts that will apply the law pertaining to employment contracts.308 
4.11.14 Rectification of registers and records 
 
An order may be made to direct the rectification of registers of the corporation or 
any other records of the corporation under section 243.309 
4.11.15 Liquidation 
 
Although section 241 and more in particular section 241(3) provides for alternative 
remedies, the legislature preserved the relief that a court may grant in the form of 
an order liquidating and dissolving the corporation.310 
 
                                                 
307 See Léger c Garage Technology Ventures Canada Lp (Capital st-Laurent, lp) 2012 QCCA 1901, 
[2012] RJQ 2030, 2012 CarswellQue 15066 (QCCA) [89] and [91] where the court explained that an 
overlap may exist between the remedy for unlawful dismissal and the remedy in terms of section 241 
which may entitle the complainant to relief in both instances provided that the requirements of each 
of the remedies are independently met. See also Heeg v Hightech Piping (HTP) Ltd 2009 QCCS 
4043, 2009 186 ACWS (3d) 393, 2009 CarswellQue 9193 (QCCS) [120] for an example where the 
termination of employment may also be oppressive for purposes of section 241. See further Dubois 
v Lucid Distributors Inc 2018 BCSC 1582, 2018 298 ACWS (3d) 754, 2018 CarswellBC 2456 (BCSC) 
[270] where the court stated that ‘[w]rongful dismissal by itself will not justify a finding of oppression. 
It is only where the interests of the employee are closely intertwined with his interest as a 
shareholder, and where the dismissal is part of a pattern of conduct to exclude the complainant from 
participation in the corporation, that the dismissal can be found to be an act of oppression’. See 
4.6.4.3 above regarding the standing of an employee for purposes of section 241 of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44). 
308 Léger c Garage Technology Ventures Canada Lp (Capital st-Laurent, lp) 2012 QCCA 1901, 
[2012] RJQ 2030, 2012 CarswellQue 15066 (QCCA) [90]. 
309 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(k). See 5.9.12 below for a similar 
form of relief under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
310 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(l). See also 4.9 above. 
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4.11.16 Investigation 
 
A court may also in appropriate circumstances relief in the form of an investigation 
under Part XIX.311 
4.11.17 Trial 
A standard order that a court may make is to direct that any issue relating to the 
application or petition be referred to trial.312 
4.12 The interplay between the statutory unfair prejudice remedy and 
the statutory derivative action313 
4.12.1 The proper plaintiff and the indirect prejudice suffered by 
shareholders 
The proper plaintiff rule found in Foss v Harbottle314 gives effect to the principle of 
separate legal personality.315 Because of the rule in Foss v Harbottle316 and the 
principle of majority rule, courts traditionally were reluctant to interfere with the 
                                                 
311 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(m). 
312 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(n). See 5.9.13 below for a similar 
form of relief under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
313 See 5.9.15 below for a discussion of the position in South Africa.  
314 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
315 The court in Pasnak v Chura 2004 BCCA 221, [2004] 7 WWR 459, 2004 CarswellBC 874 (BCCA) 
[5] and [26] found that the remedial powers of a court under the unfair prejudice remedy do not 
include the power to ignore the separate corporate personality of a corporation. One of the 
consequences of the separate legal personality of a company is that, as a general rule, a shareholder 
cannot institute legal proceedings for a wrong committed against a corporation. This legal position 
was confirmed in Hercules Management Ltd v Ernest & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165, [1997] 8 WWR 
80, 1997 CarswellMan 198 (SCC) [59] where the court further held that the legal position as set out 
in the English Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 
Ch 204 applies equally in Canada. See also 2.10.6 for a discussion of the principles relating to the 
recovery of reflective losses in England. 
316 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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internal affairs of a company or corporation. In terms of this rule, the majority of 
shareholders could ratify wrongs committed against the company.317 Although the 
proper plaintiff rule served an important purpose, the strict application thereof often 
exposed minority shareholders to abuse.318 The shortcomings of the proper plaintiff 
rule are especially apparent in circumstances where a wrong is committed against 
a company or corporation by the directors or majority shareholders of the 
corporation or company.319 This leaves the minority shareholders in an untenable 
position, because minority shareholders or non-controlling shareholders cannot 
institute legal proceedings on behalf of the corporation against wrongdoers. Further, 
shareholders cannot institute legal proceedings in their personal capacity to seek 
relief for harm they have suffered because of a wrong committed against the 
company.320 This is because the harm suffered or loss incurred by the shareholders 
is only a reflection of the prejudice suffered by the corporation. 
 
                                                 
317 In Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) 
[16] the court explained that the common law interpretation of the internal management rule included 
the ratification by majority shareholders of wrongful conduct. In such circumstances, neither an 
individual shareholder nor the corporation could seek redress. It is on this basis that courts were 
reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of a corporation. 
318 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 
4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [47]. See also Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 
OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [18]-[19]. See further DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD 
Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-2. See also 2.3.1.5 above for a discussion of the 
problems associated with the strict application of the principles in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 
461, 67 ER 189. 
319 See also 2.3.1.5 above. 
320 In Pasnak v Chura 2004 BCCA 221, [2004] 7 WWR 459, 2004 CarswellBC 874 (BCCA) [5] the 
court specifically emphasised that ‘a shareholder must show direct and personal harm in order to 
maintain a personal action for oppression, otherwise he must seek leave to bring a derivative action 
in the name of the company’. 
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4.12.2  Statutory reform of the personal action and the derivative remedy 
 
Because of the problems that resulted from the strict application of the proper 
plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle,321 statutory interventions were required to address 
the issues broadly sketched above.322 The statutory interventions took the form of 
a statutory derivative action and the statutory personal remedy (also known as the 
statutory unfair prejudice or oppression remedy). 
On reading the provisions relating to the statutory derivative action and the 
statutory personal remedy, consideration should be given to the purposes of these 
remedies and specifically the purpose of the statutory derivative action.323 The 
purpose of the latter is to create a statutory procedure in terms of which legal 
proceedings can be instituted for relief on behalf of the corporation for a wrong or 
wrongs that was or were committed against the corporation. In short, the relief 
sought in terms of the statutory derivative action is for the benefit of the corporation. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the statutory personal remedy is to provide relief 
for the direct benefit of shareholders who have been harmed or prejudiced due to 
unfairly prejudicial conduct.324 To successfully claim relief in terms of the statutory 
personal remedy, unlawful or wrongful conduct does not have to be proven, while a 
breach of a legal duty towards the corporation is required for the institution of legal 
                                                 
321 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
322 Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [16]-
[17]. See also 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] 
BCWLD 4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [47] where the court viewed the introduction of the 
statutory oppression remedy as a reaction to the inadequate protection provided to shareholders by 
the common law. 
323 See 4.4 above for a discussion of the objective and purpose of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. 
324 See 4.4 above. 
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proceedings on behalf of the corporation.325 
4.12.3 The corporation as beneficiary of the oppression remedy 
 
Case law is clear that the oppression remedy should be interpreted broadly in order 
to give effect to the purpose thereof. However, it is important to determine and 
establish the boundaries of the scope of application of the oppression remedy. A 
broad interpretation or application of the oppression remedy creates an overlap with 
the derivative action in some circumstances.326 This may also raise the question on 
whether the oppression remedy can be utilised to obtain relief for the benefit of the 
corporation or whether the oppression remedy can solely be used to obtain relief for 
shareholders and other stakeholders, in circumstances where a wrong is committed 
against the corporation.327 
The question on whether the rights and interests of a corporation can be 
protected by way of the institution of an oppression remedy or personal action is 
important. The institution of an oppression remedy holds an important advantage in 
that it prevents the institution of multiple actions in circumstances where the conduct 
complained of has prejudiced both the corporation and the interests of individual 
shareholders or other stakeholders.328  
                                                 
325 See 4.7.6 above. See also 4.12.3 below. 
326 In Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [17] 
the court noted that although the oppression remedy (or personal action) and the derivative action 
could potentially overlap, the remedies approach the protection of shareholder rights in two different 
manners or ways. See also M Koehnen Oppression and Related Remedies (2004) 443. 
327 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-19 point out that the 
test for relief in terms of the personal remedy is not whether there had been a breach of duty owed to 
the shareholders of a corporation but rather whether the minority shareholders were treated unfairly. 
328 Sparling c Javelin International Ltd [1986] RJQ 1073, [1986] QJ No 2453, 1986 CarswellQue 406 
(QCSC) [333]. 
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The statutory incorporation of the derivative action and the personal remedy 
should further be viewed against the backdrop of the problems associated with the 
proper plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle.329 From this point of view, the formulation of 
the statutory derivative action and statutory unfair remedy should be with the 
purpose or object to overcome the obstacles created by the strict application of the 
principles in Foss v Harbottle.330  
The fact that a court may make orders in terms of the statutory unfair remedy 
to compensate the corporation or any aggrieved person is considered by some to 
support the argument that the statutory unfair remedy may be used to pursue 
derivative relief.331 
4.12.4 The statutory derivative action 
 
Section 239 contains the statutory derivative action. This section covers the 
defending, discontinuation and the intervention of an action on behalf of the 
corporation or its subsidiaries or against the corporation or its subsidiaries. In terms 
of this provision, a complainant may bring an action for and on behalf of a 
corporation or any of its subsidiaries if the leave of a court is obtained.332  
                                                 
329 (1843) 67 ER 189, 2 Hare 461. 
330 Sparling c Javelin International Ltd [1986] RJQ 1073, [1986] QJ No 2453, 1986 CarswellQue 406 
(QCSC) [333]. 
331 Sparling c Javelin International Ltd [1986] RJQ 1073, [1986] QJ No 2453, 1986 CarswellQue 406 
(QCSC) [333]. See also Ontario (Securities Commission) v McLaughlin [1987] OJ No 1247, 1987 10 
ACWS (3d) 270, 1987 CarswellOnt 2568 (OntHCJ) [22] where the court held that the oppression 
remedy or statutory personal action could include the enforcement of derivative claims. 
332 A party may not pursue a derivative action unless the prerequisites in section 239(2) are met. 
See also Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) 
[18]-[19]. A complainant needs to obtain the leave of a court to pursue a derivative action in order to 
protect the corporation against ‘a multiplicity of frivolous actions instituted by disgruntled 
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 In terms of section 240, a court may make any order it thinks fit, which may 
include an order authorising the complainant to control the action on behalf of the 
corporation or its subsidiaries.333 The court order may further contain instructions in 
accordance with which the action must be conducted.334  
 What is of particular importance is that a court is empowered to order that any 
amount payable by a defendant in action to be paid directly to former or present 
security holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the corporation or its 
subsidiary.335 Relief in this form resemble relief that is usually associated with the 
oppression remedy. Section 240(d) provides for the making of an order by a court 
directing the corporation or its subsidiary to pay the reasonable legal fees incurred by 
complainant in connection with an action authorised in terms of section 239. 
4.12.5 The derivative action in section 239 and the unfair prejudice remedy 
in section 241: The main differences 
 
Section 241 differs from section 239 as the first mentioned remedy is of a personal 
nature.336 Although the derivative actions and the personal remedy are distinct of each 
other, factual circumstances may arise where, both the personal remedy and the 
derivative action can find application.337 Despite the potential overlap that may exist 
between these two remedies or actions, there are fundamental differences. These two 
                                                 
stakeholders pursing private vendettas and frivolous claims’. See DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD 
Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-8. 
333 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 240(a).  
334 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 240(b). 
335 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 240(c) 
336 GTI societe en commandite c Diablo Technologies inc. 2013 QCCS 2987, 2013 238 ACWS (3d) 
92, 2013 CarswellQue 6464 (QCCS) [22]. 
337 Tobin v De Lanauze [2000] RJQ 2596, [2000] QJ No 3137, 2000 CarswellQue 2393 (QCCS) [22]. 
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remedies have different rationales and have separate statutory foundations.338  
 One of the differences between the statutory personal action and the statutory 
derivative action is that a complainant will need to obtain leave from a court to institute 
a derivative action on behalf of the company, while such leave is not required when 
instituting a personal action.339 Secondly, the purpose of a derivative action is to 
provide relief for wrongs committed against the corporation while the personal action 
provides a remedy to a complainant who has suffered harm due to the oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial conduct to or the unfair disregard of the complainant’s interests.340  
 A shareholder cannot rely upon section 241 by merely proving that the 
corporation has suffered damages or harm and therefore he or she as the 
shareholder suffered harm due to the consequential result of the loss suffered by 
                                                 
338 Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [35]. 
339 Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [18]-
[19]. A complainant needs to obtain the leave of a court to pursue a derivative action in order to 
protect the corporation against ‘a multiplicity of frivolous actions instituted by disgruntled 
stakeholders pursing private vendettas and frivolous claims’. See DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD 
Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-8. See also 4.12.4 above. 
340 See Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) 
(ONCA) [18]-[19]. The court [27] stressed the distinction between the oppression remedy and the 
derivative action must be maintained. When a derivative claim is instituted, the individual personal 
interests of the complainant do not come into play [27]. In BCE Inc, Re 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 
560, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (SCC) [42] the court emphasised that rights and obligations are 
enforced by specific legal remedies. Such remedies may be enforced for and on behalf of the 
company in terms of section 239 of the Canada Business Corporations Act while on the other hand 
the oppression remedy deals with expectations of various stakeholders in the company. According 
to the court such expectations form the cornerstone of the oppression remedy. See Ford Motor Co 
of Canada v Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board) [2006] OJ No 990, 2006 208 OAC 
125, 2006 CarswellOnt 1526 (ONCA) [112] (leave to appeal refused) [2006] SCCA No 77 (SCC); 
Hoet v Vogel [1995] BCWLD 987, 1995 54 ACWS (3d) 61, 1995 CarswellBC 2187 (BCSC) [18]-[19] 
for authority that the oppression remedy is a personal claim. 
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the corporation.341 A shareholder is required to establish oppression independent 
from the harm suffered by the corporation.342  
 The application of the statutory personal action and the statutory derivative 
action may overlap in certain circumstances depending on the facts.343 Due to its 
broad discretion, a court has in terms of the unfairly prejudicial remedy and the fact 
that it is not always possible to make a clear distinction of whether the unfair 
prejudicial remedy or the derivative action should apply to a particular set of facts, 
other factors and considerations may apply.344  
                                                 
341 In Robak Industries Ltd v Gardner 2007 BCCA 61, 2007 28 BLR (4th) 1, 2007 CarswellBC 205 
(BCCA) [35] the court held that ‘[t]here is no logic that would allow only one shareholder to claim that 
loss, where the claim relates to wrongs done to the company, and all of the shareholders have 
suffered the loss in value. A single shareholder cannot claim that loss in value of the shares, per se, 
is a personal loss, direct loss’. See also 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 
2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [72]-[73] and [78]. See 
further 4.11.13 above. 
342 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 
4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [72] and [74]; Tobin v De Lanauze [2000] RJQ 2596, [2000] 
QJ No 3137, 2000 CarswellQue 2393 (QCCS) [66]. See Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 
126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [33]-[35] and [41] where the court stressed that 
that the harm suffered by the complainant should be harm that is separate and distinct from harm 
suffered by the corporation. The court [33] explained that a complainant must prove that the harm 
he or she suffers or suffered affected the personal interests of the complainant. See also 10443325 
Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 4927, 2016 
CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [78] and Furry Creek Timber Corp v Laad Ventures Ltd [1992] BCWLD 
2546, 1992 75 BCLR (2d) 246, 1992 CarswellBC 389 (BCSC) [16] where the court held that a 
shareholder must prove that he or she has been offended in a manner that is in ‘addition to the 
indirect effect on the value of all shareholders’ shares generally’. See further Hercules Management 
Ltd v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165, [1997] 8 WWR 80, 1997 CarswellMan 198 (SCC) [62]. 
343 See 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, [2016] BCWLD 
4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [71] in the context of the payment of excessive management 
fees. 
344 In Malata Group (HK) Ltd v Jung 2008 ONCA 111, 2008 290 DLR (4th) 343, 2008 CarswellOnt 
699 (ONCA) [39]-[40] the court emphasised that the use of the oppression remedy may be justified 
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4.12.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Case law that deals with the potential overlap between the statutory oppression 
remedy and the statutory derivative action are divided. It may be argued by some 
that, in circumstances where the derivative action applies, the application of the 
personal remedy or oppression remedy is excluded. However, the oppression 
remedy may find application should the complainant be able to prove that the 
prejudice suffered by the complainant is distinct from the collective prejudice 
suffered by all the shareholders of the corporation.345 Others may argue, that the 
                                                 
to provide relief to a complainant in circumstances where the derivative action could just as easily 
be applied. This is especially the case when such relief is sought in the context of a closely held 
corporation with relatively a few shareholders. The danger of exposing the corporation to a range of 
frivolous lawsuits is much less and therefore such an action does not have to be brought in terms of 
the derivative action. In Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 
7602 (ONCA) [31] the court qualified the approach taken in Malata by emphasising that the 
misappropriation of funds not only infringed on the interests of the corporation but that the interests 
of a minority shareholder have also been affected as the relevant shareholder was a creditor of the 
company. The court further explained that conflating the two remedies will be ignoring the separate 
statutory basis and rationale of the remedies. The court in Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 
126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) [49] further remarked that ‘[w]here the facts may 
give rise to both a “corporate claim” and a “personal” oppression remedy claim – as Malata and the 
other cases referred to above illustrate – the question of whether an oppression remedy proceeding 
is available will have to be sorted out on a case by case basis’. 
345 See Rea v Wildeboer 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 126 OR (3d) 178, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602 (ONCA) 
[33]-[35] and [41] where the court stressed that the harm suffered by the complainant should be harm 
that is separate and distinct from harm suffered by stakeholders as a whole. The court [33] explained 
that a complainant should prove that harm he or she suffers or suffered affected the personal 
interests of the complainant and must only affect the interests of ‘the collectivity of shareholders as 
a whole’. See also 10443325 Ontario Ltd v CSA Building Sciences Western Ltd 2016 BCCA 258, 
[2016] BCWLD 4927, 2016 CarswellBC 1607 (BCCA) [78]; Robak Industries Ltd v Gardner 2007 
BCCA 61, 2007 28 BLR (4th) 1, 2007 CarswellBC 205 (BCCA) [38]. See further Furry Creek Timber 
Corp v Laad Ventures Ltd [1992] BCWLD 2546, 1992 75 BCLR (2d) 246, 1992 CarswellBC 389 
(BCSC). According to DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-
20 this approach does provide a rational basis for the oppression or personal remedy only being 
available when the shareholders of a corporation are treated unfairly. 
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provisions of the statutory derivative action and the statutory personal remedy is 
complementary and not mutually exclusive.346 
As a general rule is the statutory derivative action apply when a director or 
directors have breached their duties owed to the corporation. The possibility to 
utilise the oppression remedy to seek relief on behalf of the corporation was 
considered above.347 The main criticism against such an approach is that the 
oppression remedy can then be used to circumvent the requirement in the statutory 
derivative action to obtain the leave of the court, prior to the institution of legal 
proceedings on behalf of the court. Case law dealing with the overlap between the 
statutory derivative action and the oppression remedy can be divided into two 
approaches. Firstly, the application of the appropriate remedy or action can be 
determined with reference to the nature of the legal duty breached.348 Secondly, the 
application of the appropriate remedy can be determined with reference to nature 
of the harm caused.349 Both these approaches still fail to provide theoretically sound 
guidelines on how to distinguish between the application of the statutory derivative 
                                                 
346 Ontario (Securities Commission) v McLaughlin [1987] OJ No 1247, 1987 10 ACWS (3d) 270, 
1987 CarswellOnt 2568 (OntHCJ) [22]. See also Tobin v De Lanauze [2000] RJQ 2596, [2000] QJ 
No 3137, 2000 CarswellQue 2393 (QCCS) and Ford Motor Co of Canada Ltd v Ontario (Municipal 
Employees Retirement Board) [2004] OJ No 191, 2004 41 BLR (3d) 74, 2004 CarswellOnt 208 
(ONSC) [241] where the court stated that ‘[c]onduct which may result in harm to a company and may 
therefore be the subject of a derivative claim may also result in oppression to minority shareholders. 
The presence of a derivative action remedy does not preclude minority shareholders from pursuing 
their personal remedy under s 241’. In Deluce Holdings Inc v Air Canada [1992] OJ No 2382, 1992 
12 OR (3d) 131, 1992 CarswellOnt 154 (ONCJ.GD) [92] the court held that the fact that a wrong is 
committed against a company does not bar the application of the personal remedy. 
347 See 4.12.3 above. 
348 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-19. 
349 DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 7-19. 
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action and the statutory oppression or personal remedy in some circumstances. 
4.13 The interrelationship between the right to dissent and the unfair 
prejudice remedy 
Section 190 provides for a shareholder’s right to dissent.350 When a shareholder 
exercises his or her right of dissent, it has the right to be paid by the corporation a 
fair value for those shares in terms of which the right of dissent has been 
exercised.351 To a substantial degree the consequences of the exercise of the right 
to dissent resembles relief in the form of a buy-out or purchase order352 that can be 
granted in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy where the shares of a complainant 
is bought at a fair value by the corporation or other shareholders.353  
The facts and circumstances of each case should be carefully considered to 
determine whether the unfair prejudice remedy or the right of dissent provisions 
apply to a particular case. It has to be established whether the unfair prejudice 
remedy can be applied to situations where the right to dissent applies.  
One of the important aspects that a shareholder should consider when 
exercising his or her right to dissent is that the end result will be the exit of the 
shareholder from the corporate structure.354 This is not necessarily the result when 
                                                 
350 See 5.10 below for a discussion of the overlap between the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy 
and the appraisal remedy in section 164 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
351 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 190(3). 
352 See 4.11.9 above. 
353 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(f). 
354 Brant Investments v KeepRite Inc 1987 42 DLR (4th) 15, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [46]. 
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reliance is placed on the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.355 In terms of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy a court has a wide variety of relief that can be 
granted in addition to or in place of an order that the complainant should be bought 
out at fair value.356 This creates the possibility that a court may grant relief to remedy 
the unfair prejudicial results or conduct complained of in a form that allows the 
complainant to remain a shareholder of the corporation. 
In appropriate circumstances the exercise of the right of dissent does not 
prohibit a shareholder from relying on the provisions of the unfair prejudice for 
relief.357 Some argue that the failure of a complainant to have exercised his or her 
right of dissent can be viewed as to legitimise the conduct or actions of the majority. 
This approach has been subjected to criticism by some courts.358 Others argue that 
both these remedies are available to a shareholder provided that the requirements 
for each of the remedies can be proven.359 
It is argued that the right to dissent and the unfair prejudice remedy co-exist 
                                                 
355 Brant Investments v KeepRite Inc 1987 42 DLR (4th) 15, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [46]. 
356 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(3)(f). 
357 Brant Investments v KeepRite Inc 1987 42 DLR (4th) 15, 1987 60 OR (2d) 737, 1987 CarswellOnt 
135 (OntHCJ) [46]-[47]; DS Morrit, SL Bjorkquist and AD Coleman The Oppression Remedy (2004) 
7-30 and 7-31.  
358 Wind Ridge Farms Ltd v Quadra Group Investments Ltd [1999] 12 WWR 203, 1999 178 DLR (4th) 
603, 1999 CarswellSask 592 (SKCA) [22]. 
359 In Wind Ridge Farms Ltd v Quadra Group Investments Ltd [1999] 12 WWR 203, 1999 178 DLR 
(4th) 603, 1999 CarswellSask 592 (SKCA) [22] the court noted that the oppression or unfair prejudice 
remedy in section 234 of the Saskatchewan Business Corporations Act is wider than the right of 
dissent in section 184. Section 184 only provides a remedy to shareholders where section 234 
provides a remedy to a complainant, which among others includes a shareholder. These remedies 
are not mutually exclusive and will find application when the requirements of each of the provisions 
is proven. According to the court [25] ‘[t]here is no reason to require a shareholder to dissent before 
it can bring an application for an oppression remedy pursuant to s 234’. 
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in the appropriate circumstances.360 This implies that a shareholder can still rely on 
the unfair prejudice remedy even after the complainant has exercised his or her right 
of dissent.361 
4.14 Alternative dispute resolution and offers of settlement 
4.14.1 Introduction 
 
Similar to the position in other jurisdictions, courts are often involved in protracted 
litigation in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy involving extensive and 
complex factual disputes. These disputes usually play out in commercial or 
business contexts, which require them to be resolved expeditiously and in a cost 
effective manner. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by making use 
of arbitration proceedings. This necessitates the consideration of the application of 
section 241 in the context of arbitration proceedings.  
Another method that can be utilised in an attempt to avoid protracted litigation 
is negotiating offers of settlements. Parties are encouraged to settle their dispute(s) 
                                                 
360 In Arthur v Signum Communications Ltd [1991] OJ No 86, 1991 25 ACWS (3d) 58, 1991 
CarswellOnt 3126 (ONCJ.GD) [128] the court held that the provisions containing the right to dissent 
expressly acknowledged that the right to dissent is additional to any other rights of the shareholder. 
See also Alberta Treasuary Branches v SevenWay Capital Corp 2000 ABCA 194, [2000] 10 WWR 
453, 2000 CarswellAlta 705 (ABCA) [40] where the court held that unfair prejudice or oppression 
remedy is available to a complainant despite the right to dissent and the language of the provisions 
of section 184 containing the right to dissent. 
361 See, for example, Ford Motor Co of Canada v Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board 
[2004] OJ No 191, 2004 41 BLR (3d) 74, 2004 CarswellOnt 208 (ONSC) [468]-[474] where the court 
awarded additional value (compensation) to minority shareholders who exercised their right to 
dissent. This additional value was based on the oppression remedy to rectify prejudice suffered as 
a result of oppressive conduct that took place prior to the event that triggered the shareholders’ right 
to dissent. 
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prior to the commencement of any court process. This will require parties to make 
acceptable offers in an attempt to settle the dispute. Aspects of offers of settlement 
and arbitration proceedings are now be considered in the context of disputes in 
terms of section 241. 
4.14.2 Arbitration 
4.14.2.1 Introduction 
The position regarding the arbitrability of disputes in terms of section 241 is 
uncertain.362 Case law dealing with the issue does not provide clarity on this 
question. According to some authorities only the court has the power to grant relief 
in terms of section 241 based on the wording of the Canada Business Corporations 
Act363 and on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be ousted by an 
arbitration agreement.  
 The arbitration of certain disputes which by their nature affect values that are 
fundamental to the Canadian legal system will usually not be susceptible to 
arbitration. Such disputes usually impact on the legal status of a person. Further it 
was held that because issues of fraud and bad faith are raised in reliance on the 
oppression remedy, the remedy was once regarded as one which deals with matters 
of public order that cannot be subjected to arbitration.364 However, when reliance is 
                                                 
362 See 5.11.2 below for the South African position on the reliance on the oppression remedy in 
arbitration proceedings. 
363 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
364 Tremblay c Acier Leroux inc [2004] RJQ 839, 2004 133 ACWS (3d) 589, 2004 CarswellQue 449 
(QCCA) [30]. See also [35]-[36] where the court explains that content should be given to public order 
that would not unjustifiably restrict the disputes to be submitted to arbitration which has the potential 
of being an effective dispute resolution mechanism. See also Desputeaux v Editions Chouette Inc 
2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 SCR 178, 2003 CarswellQue 342 (SCC) [52]. See further in this regard 
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placed on the oppression remedy based on allegations of fraud and bad faith the 
fundamental values of the legal system are not necessarily affected.365 
4.14.2.2 The powers of a court and an arbitrator 
Section 241 specifically provides that a complainant may approach a court for relief. 
Because specific reference is made to ‘a court’, the question can be raised whether 
relief in terms of section 241 may be granted by an arbitrator in arbitration 
proceedings. However, some courts are of the view that through case law, the law 
has developed enough to allow parties to an arbitration agreement to cover disputes 
in terms of the oppression remedy.366 No party will be prejudiced by having the 
dispute adjudicated by an arbitrator as the latter would be able to provide the same 
relief as a court.367 This argument is further supported by the notion that parties 
usually voluntarily and freely agree to subject the disputes to arbitration proceedings 
and that such an undertaking should be enforced.368 Arbitration must no longer be 
                                                 
Woolcock v Bushert 2004 192 OAC 16, 2004 246 DLR (4th) 139, 2004 CarswellOnt 4517 (Ont CA) 
[33] where the court held that the fact that a dispute between the parties relates to oppressive 
conduct does not disqualify it from being subjected to arbitration proceedings. See further Kints v 
Kints [1998] OJ No 3244, 1998 73 OTC 42, 1998 CarswellOnt 3188 (ONCJ.GD) [26]. 
365 Tremblay c Acier Leroux inc [2004] RJQ 839, 2004 133 ACWS (3d) 589, 2004 CarswellQue 449 
(QCCA) [35]. 
366 Tremblay c Acier Leroux inc [2004] RJQ 839, 2004 133 ACWS (3d) 589, 2004 CarswellQue 449 
(QCCA) [30]. See also ABOP LLC v Qtrade Canada Inc 2007 BCCA 290, (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 171, 
2007 CarswellBC 1082 (BCCA) [28] where the court held that reliance on oppressive conduct does 
not oust the jurisdiction of an arbitrator. 
367 Kints v Kints [1998] OJ No 3244, 1998 73 OTC 42, 1998 CarswellOnt 3188 (ONCJ.GD) [26]. 
368 See Kints v Kints [1998] OJ No 3244, 1998 73 OTC 42, 1998 CarswellOnt 3188 (ONCJ.GD) [26] 
for a judgment handed down in terms of section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1991. Section 7(1) provided 
that a court will enforce an arbitration agreement between the parties when such an agreement 
covers the dispute. Section 7(2) described the circumstances under which a court will not enforce 
an arbitration agreement. Such circumstances or grounds include the legal incapacity of one of the 
parties at the time of the execution of the arbitration agreement; the invalidity of the arbitration 
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seen as an exceptional mechanism for parties to use in order to have their disputes 
resolved.369 
4.14.2.3 The enforcement of agreements 
Unless, the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, a court will refer parties to arbitration.370 This is the position provided 
that the wording of such arbitration clause and agreement covers the nature of the 
dispute.371 The enforcement of arbitration agreements between parties recognises 
the autonomy and freedom of parties to elect to have their disputes subjected to 
arbitration.372 This further enforces the principle that a party who has voluntary 
agreed to arbitration proceedings should be kept to such an agreement.373 
 
                                                 
agreement; when the nature of the dispute is such that it cannot be arbitrated in terms Ontario law; 
the motion was moved after an undue delay; and/or the matter is susceptible to default or summary 
judgment. 
369 Bridgepoint International Canada Inc v Ericsson Canada Inc [2001] QJ No 2470, 2001 
CarswellQue 1519 (QCCS). In Anor Management Ltd c Brooklo Industries Ltd [1978] CS 731, 1978 
CarswellQue 984 (QCCS) [19] the court recognised the expeditious resolution of disputes as one of 
the objectives of section 241. 
370 Article 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act RSC 1985, c 17 (2nd Supp). 
371 Maher v Morelli Chertkow 2003 BCSC 48, 2003 120 ACWS (3d) 358, 2003 CarswellBC 35 
(BCSC) [14]; ABOP LLC v Qtrade Canada Inc 2007 BCCA 290, (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 171, 2007 
CarswellBC 1082 (BCCA) [20]. 
372 Desputeaux v Editions Chouette Inc 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 SCR 178, 2003 CarswellQue 342 
(SCC) [22] and [52]. See also Bridgepoint International (Canada) Inc v Ericsson Canada Inc [2001] 
QJ No 2470, 2001 CarswellQue 1519 (QCCS) [8]-[10] where the court held that arbitration 
agreements must be interpreted in a liberal way to give effect to the autonomy of the parties to the 
agreement. 
373 See Kints v Kints [1998] OJ No 3244, 1998 73 OTC 42, 1998 CarswellOnt 3188 (ONCJ.GD) [26]. 
See also Maher v Morelli Chertkow 2003 BCSC 48, 2003 120 ACWS (3d) 358, 2003 CarswellBC 35 
(BCSC) [14] where the court held that it will keep parties to an agreement to have their disputes 
resolved by way arbitration unless proper reasons exists not to give effect to such agreement. 
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4.14.2.4 The hybrid model 
 
Some courts endorse a hybrid model when adjudicating oppression disputes to 
which arbitration clauses apply.374 This may especially be the case where the relief 
sought is of the type that can only be granted by a court, such as an order for the 
appointment of a receiver or the liquidation of the corporation.375 This entails that 
the arbitrator will consider the merits of the facts regarding oppression of a 
shareholder. Once the arbitrator has found that oppression is present in a particular 
matter, the rest of the dispute is then referred to the court who will formulate and 
grant the appropriate relief to remedy the conduct complained of.376 
4.14.3 Offers of settlement 
 
The English case of O’Neill v Phillips377 is an influential case relating to the resolving 
of disputes in terms of the oppression remedy.378 The effect of the obiter remarks 
made by the court is that a claim based on oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct 
may be dismissed if the petitioner or plaintiff rejected a reasonable offer for the 
purchase of his or her shares at a fair value.379 
 The effect of the rejection of an offer to purchase the shares of the 
complainant at a fair value is yet to be thoroughly considered by the Canadian 
                                                 
374 ABOP LLC v Qtrade Canada Inc 2007 BCCA 290, (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 171, 2007 CarswellBC 
1082 (BCCA). 
375 ABOP LLC v Qtrade Canada Inc 2007 BCCA 290, (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 171, 2007 CarswellBC 
1082 (BCCA) [26]. 
376 ABOP LLC v Qtrade Canada Inc 2007 BCCA 290, (2007) 284 DLR (4th) 171, 2007 CarswellBC 
1082 (BCCA) [23] and [24]. 
377 [1999] WLR 1092. 
378 See 2.11.2 above for a discussion of this case and the position in England. 
379 See 2.11.2 above. See 5.11.1 below for the position in South African relating to reasonable offers. 
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courts. It is doubtful whether the judgment in O’Neill380 be will be applied in Canada 
as some of the guidelines in O’Neill381 are not clear. Therefore, the obiter remarks 
of the court should be approached with caution.382 
It is argued by some that the court in O’Neill383 approached the oppression 
remedy as a remedy in terms of which a shareholder (minority) may leave the 
company structure when the circumstances justifying such relief are present.384 The 
problem with this approach is that it fails to recognise that the buy-out or purchase 
order is not the only relief that a court can grant in terms of the remedy.385 The 
oppression remedy provides for a wide range of other possible orders a court can 
make.386 
It would be difficult to determine what a reasonable offer would constitute if 
the relief sought by a complainant is in a form other than a buy-out of the 
complainant’s shares.387 However, there are many practical justifications for 
providing a complainant with an offer in terms of which a complainant is offered cash 
as an alternative to any other remedies.388  
                                                 
380 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
381 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
382 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. 
383 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
384 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447.  
385 See 4.11 above for a discussion of the various forms of relief a court may grant. 
386 See 4.11 above. 
387 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447.  
388 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447.  
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From a theoretical perspective, the approach in O’Neill v Phillips389 may be 
problematic, especially in those situations where the complainant wants to remain 
part of the company and seek relief other than a buy-out order. Some authors are 
of the view that a reasonable buy-out offer can only neutralise a claim in terms of 
the oppression remedy when the relief sought by a complainant is a buy-out of the 
complainant’s shares.390 
The characteristics of a reasonable offer as described in O’Neill v Phillips391 
are also problematic.392 The valuation of the shares of a complainant will depend 
on the context of the dispute before the court. As a general rule the shares will be 
valued on a pro rata basis, but there may be exceptions.393 The court’s statement 
in O’Neill394 that the value of the shares should be fixed by an expert and that full 
arbitration proceedings do have not to be available for determining the value of the 
shares is questionable. The court acknowledged that a risk existed that the 
                                                 
389 [1999] WLR 1092. 
390 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. See also in this regard Valrut Investments 
Ltd v Norstar Commercial Developments 2008 171 ACWS (3d) 455, 2008 CarswellOnt 1910 (ONSC) 
[11] where the court dealt with interests in a partnership and distinguished the case from O’Neill v 
Phillips [1999] WLR 1092 on the basis that in the application relief was not sought in the form of a 
buy-out order. 
391 [1999] WLR 1092. 
392 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. 
393 See 4.11.9.2 below for a discussion of the valuation of shares for purposes of a purchase or buy-
out order. See also 2.11.2 above for a discussion of the obiter remarks in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 
WLR 1092. A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill 
v Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447 provide examples of such exceptions, for 
example, where the complainant never had a legitimate expectation to share in the net assets of a 
company.  
394 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] WLR 1092. 
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valuation of the shares subject to the dispute may not always be accurate, but that 
the approach is justified on the basis that all the parties to the dispute are exposed 
to this possibility. This is considered by some as unjust as there is no reason why 
the complainant should carry any risk when the wrongdoer acted in contravention 
of section 241.395 The judgment fails to provide guidance on the scale on which legal 
costs must be offered in the event of a party being under an obligation to offer the 
payment of legal costs at all.396 It is further not clear when a complainant becomes 
entitled to be offered the payment of legal costs relating to the dispute.397 
4.15 Conclusion and recommendations 
4.15.1 The development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
 
At first the introduction of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in Canada was 
resisted on the grounds that it allowed unnecessary court intervention in the internal 
affairs of corporations.398 Later, forms of the oppression remedy were introduced in 
some of the Canadian provinces. Some of these early versions of the statutory 
oppression remedy were modelled on section 210 of the English Companies Act 
1948.399 This approach of the legislature could also be observed in other 
                                                 
395 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. 
396 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. 
397 A Duggan, JS Ziegel and J Girgis ‘Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper? O’Neill v 
Phillips’ (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 447. 
398 See 4.2 above. 
399 See 4.2 above. 
 365 
 
jurisdictions considered in this thesis.400 Although the legislature moved away from 
the English form of the oppression remedy, the influence of English law is still 
evident in certain respects of the Canadian remedy.401  
4.15.2 The statutory formulation of the remedy 
 
The formulation of the Canadian statutory unfair prejudice remedy is important to 
the evaluation of the South African equivalent of the remedy as it almost follows the 
exact wording of section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.402 The 
Canadian statutory unfair prejudice remedy is characterised by its extensively wider 
and broader formulation of the remedy in some aspects, when compared with the 
formulation of the remedy in other jurisdictions investigated in this thesis.403 This 
approach of the legislature has significantly advanced the application of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy.  
4.15.3 Standing 
The Canadian statutory unfair prejudice remedy is not limited to shareholders. 
Section 238 makes it clear that this remedy is available the holders of securities. 
The remedy is not only available to registered holders but also to beneficial owners, 
                                                 
400 See 3.3, and more specifically 3.3.2, above regarding the development of the Australian unfair 
prejudice remedy. See Chapter 5 below for a discussion of the influence of English law on the 
development of South African company law. 
401 See, for example, the retention of the term oppressive in the Canadian remedy and the application 
of the no reflective loss principle. 
402 RSC, 1985, c C-44. See the wording of the South African remedy in section 163 of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 as set out in 5.3 below. 
403 Especially in relation to the various stakeholders to whom the remedy is available and the various 
capacities in which a complainant may suffer unfair prejudice. See 4.6 above. For the position in 
England see 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 above. For the position in Australia and South Africa see 3.7 above and 
5.7.1 below respectively. 
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former registered holders and beneficial owners.404 A current and former director or 
officer may also apply for relief in terms of the remedy.405 Section 238 also provides 
the court with a wide discretion to grant leave to any person that is proper to make 
an application in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.406 This provision is 
aligned with the interpretational approach that the remedy should not be interpreted 
in an unjustifiable restrictive manner in light of the fact that the unfair prejudice 
remedy should be flexible enough to provide for circumstances not foreseen by the 
legislature. 
4.15.4 Capacity  
 
Section 241 differentiates between the person who may rely on the provisions of 
the statutory unfair prejudice and the capacity in which a person may suffer 
prejudice. The provision expressly recognises that the interests of a security holder, 
creditor, director or officer may be unfairly prejudiced. 407This approach is 
commendable in light of the fact that similar provisions in other jurisdictions are 
criticised for restricting the unfair prejudice remedy to shareholders in their capacity 
as shareholders.408 
4.15.5 Grounds and the concepts of oppression, unfair prejudice and 
unfair disregard of interests 
The grounds on which a complainant can rely for purposes of the statutory unfair 
prejudice remedy are set out in section 241(2)(a)-(c). Canadian courts interpret the 
                                                 
404 See 4.6.1 above. 
405 See 4.6.2 above. 
406 See 4.6.4, and more specifically 4.6.4.1, above. 
407 Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44), s 241(2). 
408 See 5.7.1.4 below for criticism in the South African context on requiring that a shareholder should 
be unfairly prejudiced in his or her capacity as shareholder.  
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grounds in section 241(2)(a)-(c) as a whole and do not interpret each of the grounds 
separately.409 What is emphasised by the courts is that a complainant can rely on 
the effect or result of conduct or may complain of the manner in which powers are 
exercised or the business or affairs of the corporation are conducted.410 
Once it is established that the conduct complained of falls within the grounds 
stated in section 241(2)(a)-(c), it must further be determined whether the conduct 
can be described as oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding the 
interests of the complainant. According to Canadian courts the legislature 
deliberately drafted the provisions of the remedy in such a manner that it is not only 
triggered by oppressive conduct but also by conduct that can be described as 
unfairly prejudicial or can be regarded as an unfair disregard of the interests of the 
complainant. The use of the terms unfair prejudice and unfair disregard of interests 
is that there is a movement away from the restrictive connotation to the term 
oppressive which originates from the English law.411 An objective test is used to 
determine whether conduct is unfairly prejudicial. For this purpose, the subjective 
intention of the party that committed the conduct complained of does not play a role 
in the evaluation of the conduct complained of.412 Despite the fact that conduct that 
is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or is an unfair disregard of interests entitles the 
complainant to the same forms of relief, the courts do create the impression that 
there are some semantical differences between the terms. While oppressive 
conduct is regarded as the most serious form of conduct on which a complainant 
                                                 
409 See 4.7.1–4.7.4 read with 4.7.5 above. 
410 See 4.7.5 above. 
411 See 4.7.6.4 above. 
412 See 4.7.6.3 above. 
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may rely,413 conduct that is of an unfair prejudicial nature or is an unfair disregard 
of interests, is of a lesser serious nature when the conduct complained of is 
evaluated against the criteria of fairness in a commercial context.414 It is not required 
that the conduct on which a complainant relies must be unlawful.415 Further the 
lawfulness of conduct is not necessarily a defence against an application based on 
the unfair prejudice remedy. 
The breach of a reasonable expectation can be regarded as unfair prejudicial 
conduct for purposes the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.416 Some argue that the 
protection of reasonable expectations provides the justification for the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy.417 
4.15.6 Corporations within a group 
 
Section 241 does not leave the application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
in the hands of the court. The legislature expressly provided that the remedy can be 
applied within a group of companies. The remedy applies to the ‘affiliates’ of a 
corporation.418 
4.15.7 Relief 
 
The wording of section 241 provides clearly that the purpose of the relief is to rectify 
the conduct complained of.419 When the statutory grounds for relief are established, 
                                                 
413 See 4.7.6.2 above. 
414 See 4.7.6.3 and 4.7.6.4 above 
415 See 4.7.6.5 above. 
416 See 4.8.2 above. 
417 See 4.8.2 above. 
418 See 4.10 above. 
419 See 4.11.2 above. 
 369 
 
a court can order a variety forms of relief. It is interesting to note that although a 
court may make an order for liquidation and dissolution in terms of section 241, 
section 214 provides for the same relief on the same grounds.420 However, what is 
important to note is that section 214 makes a direct cross reference to section 241 
allowing a court to make an alternative order in an application for the liquidation and 
dissolution of a corporation.421 
Relief may be granted in the form of the delivery of financial statements to a 
court or interested person.422 The registers or other records of a corporation can 
also be rectified in terms of the remedy.423 
Section 241(3) expressly provides for the purchase or buy-out of securities. 
As with the case in other jurisdictions the Canada Business Corporations Act424 
does not regulate the valuation of securities subject to a purchase order.425 The 
overall principle is that the valuation must be fair in light of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.426 The actual market value of the relevant securities is 
only one of the factors that is taken into account to determine their value.427 The 
valuation of securities is usually based on the opinions of various experts whose 
opinions must be based on certain legal principles that may have bearing on the 
value of the relevant securities. Important factors that must be taken into account in 
                                                 
420 See 4.9 and 4.11.15 above. 
421 See 4.9 above. 
422 See 4.11.12 above. 
423 See 4.11.14 above. 
424 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
425 For the position in England see 2.10.5 above. For the position in Australia see 3.10.4 above. For 
the South African position see 5.9.14 below. 
426 See 4.11.9.2 (b) above. 
427 See 4.11.9.2 (b) above. 
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the valuation of shares include whether the securities are freely traded,428 the date 
on which the valuation must be based,429 whether a minority discount must be 
applied430 and whether any adjustments must be made to neutralise any prejudice 
suffered as a result of the conduct complained of.431 
4.15.8 The relationship between the statutory unfair prejudice remedy and 
the statutory derivative claim 
 
The Canadian unfair prejudice remedy does not provide for the authorisation of a 
complainant to commence or intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of a 
corporation. This means that a complainant who wishes to commence or intervene 
in legal proceedings on behalf of a corporation must rely on the statutory derivative 
claim. The importance of this observation is that lawmakers in Canada chose to 
maintain a strict division between the statutory unfair prejudice remedy and the 
statutory derivative claim. This is in contrast with the approach in some other 
jurisdictions researched in this thesis.432 The implication of such an approach is that 
a litigant must be able to clearly identify the various rights and interests to be 
protected or enforced in order to rely on the correct application remedy. This is often 
a very complex task as demonstrated in the preceding chapters. This has the 
potential to create uncertainty and in some instance may even be unfair. 
4.15.9 The right of dissent and the unfair prejudice remedy 
 
A feature which distinguishes the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy is its 
                                                 
428 See 4.11.9.2 (c) above. 
429 See 4.11.9.2 (d) above. 
430 See 4.11.9.2 (e) read with 4.11.9.2 (g) above. 
431 See 4.11.9.2 (f) above. 
432 Compare with the position in England as discussed in 2.10.3 above and the position in Australia 
as discussed in 3.9.6 above. 
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relationship with the right to dissent. The two remedies are not exclusive. A holder 
of securities may rely on either of the remedies provided that he or she is able to 
satisfy the requirements of the particular remedy.433 
4.15.10 Arbitration 
 
Case law does allow for the arbitration of disputes based on the unfair prejudice 
remedy.434 An arbitrator may award the relief provided for in the remedy save for 
ordering the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation.435 
4.15.11 Reasonable offers 
 
The obiter remarks in O’Neill are acknowledged by Canadian courts.436 However, 
the Canadian courts are of the view that the scope of application of the remarks of 
the court in O’Neill is very limited and particular to the facts and circumstance of that 
particular case.437 
4.15.12 The function of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice remedy recognised that internal disputes cannot be 
resolved on an equitable manner by the enforcement of rights or democratic 
company structures.438 The statutory unfair prejudice remedy does not cloak a 
stakeholder with rights he or she did not already enjoy in terms of the corporations 
law but provides a mechanism through which such rights or interests are protected.  
                                                 
433 See 4.13 above. 
434 See 4.14 above. 
435 See 4.14 read with 4.14.2.4 above. 
436 See 4.14.3 above. 
437 See 4.14.3 above. 
438 See 4.4 and 4.4.2 above. 
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5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Shareholder protection as purpose of the Act 
 
Adequate shareholder protection is an important aspect of company law. One of the 
purposes of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) is to promote investment and 
innovation in South African markets.1 Investors are reluctant to invest in companies 
where good corporate governance is absent and if the jurisdiction in which the 
company operates does not possess an appropriate legislative framework in which 
investors are protected.  
Shareholder protection is important for all types of companies irrespective of 
whether the shares in a company are held by institutional shareholders or by 
individuals holding relative small stakes in the company. The rise of shareholder 
activism further underscores shareholder protection and the need for companies to 
adopt good corporate governance practices to ensure that investors’ rights and 
interests are protected and that the ultimate beneficiaries of the investments can 
enjoy the benefits of the value created by these companies. 
5.1.2 Shareholder protection in context of the established company 
principles 
 
The protection of shareholders should be viewed against the background that 
companies are separate juristic persons and that decision-making within a company 
is based on the principle of majority rule.2 These principles were also strictly 
                                                 
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(c). 
2 See 5.2.1 and 5.2.3 below. See also 5.4.3 below for a discussion of the role fundamental corporate 
law principles play in determining oppression of unfair prejudice. 
 385 
 
enforced at common law.3 The effect of the strict enforcement of traditional and 
established company law principles revealed that the common law position 
regarding the protection of shareholders, and more specifically minority 
shareholders, was inadequate.4 Prior to the Companies Act 46 of 1926 the 
protection of shareholders was dependent on the interpretation and application of 
the proper plaintiff rule as found in Foss v Harbottle.5 In recognition of the fact that 
the protection afforded by the proper plaintiff rule is inadequate, the legislature 
intervened and incorporated various statutory remedies aimed at strengthening the 
protection of shareholders.6 
5.1.3 A critical evaluation of section 163 of the Act 
 
In this chapter a critical analysis is provided of the statutory oppression or unfair 
prejudice remedy and related aspects as found in section 163 of the Act.7 This is 
done after a brief overview of the development of the statutory personal action in 
South Africa.8 The overview forms part of the background against which the 
provisions of section 163 of the Act should be considered. In some respects, the 
protection of shareholders, and more specifically minority shareholders, creates 
tension between established legal principles such as the principal of majority rule.9 
                                                 
3 See 5.2.2 below. 
4 See 5.2.2 below. 
5 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
6 See 5.2.2 below. 
7 See 5.7–5.11 below. 
8 See 5.2 below. 
9 This will specifically be the case when the directors of a company or the majority of shareholders 
implement a resolution which prejudices a minority shareholder, but the minority shareholder is 
bound to the decision based on the provisions in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
and the principle of majority decision-making. 
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A proper understanding of the fundamental principles of company law is therefore 
imperative to conduct a critical analysis of section 163 of the Act.10  
To establish whether the provisions of section 163 of the Act is an 
advancement in the statutory protection of shareholders, the principles developed 
in terms of its predecessor, section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, must be 
considered together with developments in other comparable jurisdictions.11 While 
the provisions of section 163 are measured against the provisions in comparable 
jurisdictions it is essential that the formulation of section 163 be evaluated against 
the criticisms of various authors raised against section 252 of the previous Act.12 
This is important to establish how the legislature approached the drafting of section 
163 to ensure problems in relations to section 252 of the previous Act are not 
repeated in the current statutory form of the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy. 
A consideration of the predecessors of the current remedy also provides valuable 
insight into the interpretation and application of the remedy, as the development of 
the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy consists of certain unique features. One 
such unique feature is that South African company law has been substantially 
influenced by the English law. One would have anticipated that the South African 
legislature would follow the developments in English law with the necessary 
adjustments to refine the formulation of the South African oppression or unfair 
                                                 
10 See 5.4.3 below for the consideration of fundamental corporate law principles in determining 
whether conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. 
11 The findings in E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) in respect of section 
252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 are also considered in the context of section 163 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
12 See 5.2.4.3 below for the main criticisms raised against the formulation of section 252 of the 
previous Act. 
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prejudice remedy. It is indicated later in this chapter that it seems that in the 
formulation of the oppression remedy in the Act, the legislature preferred to follow 
the wording of the Canadian equivalent of the statutory oppression or unfair 
prejudice remedy.13  
A critical analysis of the provisions of section 163 of the Act later in this 
chapter reveals that the approach followed by the legislature in the formulation of 
the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy is problematic for a number of reasons: 
firstly, it casts doubt on the weight that can be attributed the body of case law that 
developed under section 252 of the previous Act to interpret the provisions of the 
current remedy;14 secondly, it creates uncertainty in respect of established 
corporate law principles such as the nature of the relationship between the 
company, the directors, the shareholders and the shareholders inter se;15 thirdly, 
terminology that is foreign to South African law is introduced;16 fourthly, the South 
African legislature failed to incorporate certain essential provisions of the Canadian 
oppression and unfair prejudice remedy causing amongst others a disconnect 
between the remedies available in terms of the remedy and the person who enjoys 
standing for purposes of section 163;17 fifthly, the approach of the legislature 
ignored the valuable and constructive criticisms raised against the provisions of 
                                                 
13 See 5.4.4 below. For a discussion of the Canadian remedy see Chapter 4 above. 
14 See 5.2.4.2 below for a discussion of the relevance of judgments handed down in terms of section 
252 of the previous Act for purposes of obtaining guidance on the interpretation and application of 
section 163 of the Act. 
15 See 5.5.1 and 5.5.3 below with regard to the contractual nature of the relationship between the 
company, directors and shareholders.  
16 See, for example, the use of the term ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’; in section 163(2)(d) as 
discussed in 5.9.5.3 (a) below. 
17 See 5.7.1 below for the provisions relating to standing for purposes of section 163 of the Act read 
with 5.9 below. See, for example, specifically 5.9.12 below. 
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section 252 of the previous Act.18 The effect of the approach of the South African 
legislature is that in stead of utilising the available research to eradicate or avoid the 
problems associated with the oppression remedy in terms of section 252, it failed 
properly to address these problems and introduced new problematic aspects. The 
final point of criticism is that the legislature omitted important provisions from the 
current oppression remedy that were present in the predecessors of section 163 of 
the Act.19 
5.1.4 The interrelationship between section 163 and other provisions in 
the Act 
 
The unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 of the Act must also be considered in 
the context of a number of new innovative concepts and provisions. The remedy 
therefore has to be considered in light of the fact that some of the duties of directors 
are now partially codified and that the conduct of directors will be evaluated against 
the statutory business judgement rule contained in section 76(4) of the Act.20 The 
Act now also contains provisions directed at delinquent directors.21 Section 164 of 
the Act contains a statutory form of the appraisal remedy which is also a novelty to 
                                                 
18 See 5.2.4.3 below for the most important criticisms raised against section 252 of the previous Act. 
19 See 5.9.14 below where relief in the form of a buy-out order is discussed and where it is noted 
that section 163 of the Act does not expressly provide for this form of remedy. 
20 On the partial codification of the duties of directors see L Coetzee and JL van Tonder ‘Advantages 
and disadvantages of partial codification of directors’ duties in the South African Companies Act 71 
of 2008’ (2016) 41:2 JJS 1; FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 507; 
Michael M Katz ‘Governance under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Flexibility is the keyword’ 2010 
Acta Juridica 248. See also the commentary on section 76 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018).  
21 See 5.9.7.2 below. 
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South African corporate law.22 The Act further makes specific provision for the 
protection of the holders of securities by providing for a remedy in terms of section 
161. The unfair prejudice remedy, also known as the statutory personal action, is 
contained in section 163 of the Act, while section 165 contains the statutory 
derivative action. These remedies differ from their predecessors in some material 
respects. The relationship between section 163 and section 165 of the Act is also 
considered.23 To do a proper analysis of the provisions of the Act aimed at the 
protection of shareholders, one needs a broad understanding of the general 
philosophy pertaining to the protection of shareholders as contained in the Act.24 
5.1.5 Section 163 and the Constitution25  
 
All law is subject to the Constitution.26 Company law is no exception. Therefore, the 
relevance of recent constitutional developments to section 163 of the Act are 
considered. In this regard constitutional developments in relation to the law of 
contract are of particular importance. The Memorandum of Incorporation is of a 
contractual nature and binds the company, directors, shareholders and 
shareholders inter se.27 In this regard the approach of the courts to the role fairness, 
reasonableness and bona fides play in contractual relations is considered.28 This 
                                                 
22 See 5.10 below for a discussion of the similarities and differences between a buy-out order in 
terms of section 163(2) and the appraisal remedy in section 164. 
23 See 5.9.15 below. 
24 See I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1 for a discussion of the shareholder protection philosophy adopted 
by the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
26 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 2 read with s 172 (1)(a). 
27 See 5.5.1 and 5.5.3 below for a discussion of the nature of the relationship between the company, 
directors and shareholders. 
28 See 5.6 below. 
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may be directly relevant to the company law contract in light of the fact that the 
enforcement of rights in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
or, in some instances, the Act is dependent on the fairness (or unfairness) of the 
conduct complained of in terms of section 163 of the Act. 
5.1.6 The balancing of interests 
 
The conundrum presented to the legislature is to strike a fine balance between the 
rights of shareholders and the rights of directors in the context of the principles of 
majority rule and the separate juristic personality of a company.29 In this balancing 
act a situation must be avoided in terms of which the rights and interests of the 
majority shareholders are undermined by the rights of minority shareholders. 
5.2 The development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South 
Africa 
5.2.1 Introduction  
 
Understanding the development of the oppression remedy in South Africa makes it 
possible critically to evaluate the current form of the remedy.30 Prior to the 
introduction of the statutory forms of the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy, 
shareholders had to rely on the common law for protection. In this regard, the 
principles found in Foss v Harbottle31 were directional. The implications of the 
                                                 
29 See section 7(i) which provides that one of the purposes of the Act is to balance the rights and 
obligations of shareholders and directors respectively. See also I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder 
Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1. 
30 For an evaluation of section 163 of the Act see 5.4 and 5.7 below and onwards. 
31 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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principles contained in Foss v Harbottle32 are considered and evaluated below.33 In 
recognising the limitations associated with the strict application of the principles in 
Foss v Harbottle34 the legislature responded by introducing the first form of the 
statutory oppression remedy in the form of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 
of 1926.35 This Act was later replaced with the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The 
reforms in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 were mainly based on the 
recommendations of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission which specifically 
considered section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926.36 Section 252 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 contained the equivalent of section 111bis of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926. More recently the Companies Act 71 of 2008 replaced 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The statutory oppression or unfair prejudice remedy 
is now contained in section 163 of the Act.37 
5.2.2 The proper plaintiff rule and the need for statutory reform 
5.2.2.1 The proper plaintiff rule 
The judgment in Foss v Harbottle38 contains what is known as the ‘proper plaintiff 
rule’ and the ‘internal management rule’.39 These rules and exceptions thereto 
                                                 
32 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
33 See 5.2.2 below.  
34 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
35 An overview of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 is provided in 5.2.3 below. 
36 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970). See also 5.2.3 
below. 
37 A critical analysis of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is provided in 5.4, 5.7–5.11 
below. 
38 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
39 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 48. See also BA van der Merwe ‘Die 
Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle 
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formed part of the South African company law.40 In terms of the proper plaintiff rule 
it is the company, and not a shareholder of the company, that must act to seek 
redress for a wrong committed against a company and/or a loss suffered by a 
company.41 This was the legal position even when the wrong committed against the 
company caused a shareholder or shareholders to suffer a loss in the form of the 
diminution of the value of their shareholding or a loss in dividend.42  
5.2.2.2 The proper plaintiff rule as enforcement of separate juristic 
personality 
In Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd43 the court explained that the proper plaintiff rule 
enforces the concept of separate juristic personality.44 The court further held that 
the purpose of the rule is not to protect the wrongdoer against the likelihood of a 
possible double recovery.45 The principle is rather that if a wrong is committed 
                                                 
Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216. See further 2.3.1 above for a discussion of the proper plaintiff 
rule in England. 
40 BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die 
Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 226. Therefore, this discussion of the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 must be read and understood with the 
discussion in 2.3.1 above of the proper plaintiff rule in England. 
41 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [108] and [109]. 
See the discussion of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 
and Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2001] 1 All ER 481; [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) in the context of 
the no reflective loss principle in Chapter 2 above. 
42 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [109]. See also 
5.9.11 below for a discussion of the principles relating to the recovering of loss suffered by 
shareholders based on the diminution of the value of their shares. 
43 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [10]. 
44 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [107]. See also 
E Hurter Aspekte van statutêre minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 51. 
45 In Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [16] the court specifically rejected the 
approach and reasoning adopted in McCrae v Absa Bank Ltd 2009 JDR 0782 (GSJ), McLelland v 
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against the company it is the company that suffers from the wrong and not the 
shareholders of the company.46 The diminution in value of the shares of 
shareholders is only an indirect consequence of the wrong committed against the 
company.47  
5.2.2.3 The enforcement of the proper plaintiff rule when the wrongdoers 
are in control of the company 
The problem with the ‘proper plaintiff rule’ as embodied in Foss v Harbottle48 was 
that when a wrongdoer or wrongdoers were in control of a company against which 
they have committed a wrong, they could use their power in or control over the 
company to prevent the company from seeking redress against them.49 In such 
circumstances the strict enforcement of the proper plaintiff rule may lead to 
inequitable consequences. This had the potential for the interests of minority 
shareholders to be prejudiced as a result of an abuse of power or control by the 
majority shareholders. The court in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and 
                                                 
Hullet 1992 (1) SA 456 (D), and Kalinko v Nisbet 2002 (5) SA 766 (W). The court specifically held 
that the proper plaintiff rule does not apply in cases where the shareholder institutes legal 
proceedings in his personal capacity. See specifically BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van 
Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 
5 SA Merc LJ 216, 227-28 for criticism of McLelland v Hullet 1992 (1) SA 456 (D). 
46 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [107]. 
47 See also 5.9.11 below for discussion of the principles relating to the recovering of losses suffered 
by shareholders based on the diminution of the value of shares. 
48 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
49 This is because the rule in Foss v Harbottle Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 
confirmed the principle of majority rule, making it possible to ratify wrongs committed against a 
company, unless such wrongs are unratifiable. Once of the problems that plagued the application of 
the proper plaintiff rule was that it was in some circumstances very difficult to distinguish between 
ratifiable and unratifiable wrongs. See BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van 
Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 
5 SA Merc LJ 216, 218. 
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Others50 acknowledged that the strict enforcement of the proper plaintiff rule could 
lead to the ‘oppression’ of the shareholder and therefore in certain circumstances 
the shareholder should be allowed to recover the loss suffered by a company by 
way of a derivative action and in certain circumstances the shareholder should be 
permitted to recover his or her own loss.51  
5.2.2.4 The exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule 
To overcome the strict enforcement of the ‘proper plaintiff rule’ courts had over the 
years developed exceptions to the rule.52 When an exception applies, a shareholder 
will be allowed to proceed to recover the loss suffered by a company by way of a 
derivative action.53 There is not consensus on the exceptions to the proper plaintiff 
rule regarding what constitutes unratifiable wrongs, but traditionally examples are 
ultra vires conduct or conduct in contravention of the law;54 the absence or invalidity 
of a special resolution decision;55 the breach of the individual rights of a 
                                                 
50 [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [107]. 
51 See 5.2.2.4 below for the recognised exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule. 
52 See BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld 
van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 216 who explains that the 
‘exceptions’ must rather be seen as instances where the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 
67 ER 189 does not apply at all. 
53 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [107]. 
54 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [108]. These 
forms of breach cannot be ratified. See also Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No 2) [1982] Ch 204. 
55 The proper plaintiff rule further did not apply to circumstances where a transaction or conduct 
complained of could only be executed in accordance with a special resolution. Special resolutions 
serve to protect minority shareholders and therefore a simple majority cannot ratify or sanction 
transactions or conduct that required a special resolution. See Gihwala and Others v Grancy 
Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [108]. See also Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204. See also BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van 
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shareholder56 and instances of fraud on the minority.57 In McLelland v Hulett58 the 
court held that the proper plaintiff rule can be ignored when it is in the interests of 
justice to do so. This exception received some criticism.59 
5.2.2.5 The problem with the exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule and the 
need for statutory reform 
Although the exceptions60 are helpful and essential in promoting justice, courts often 
find it difficult to determine whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case 
fall within the ambit of one the exceptions to ‘the proper plaintiff rule’.61 Hurter62 
found that one of the main problems with the proper plaintiff rule is that the 
application of the personal action and the derivative action may in certain 
circumstances overlap but that the courts are reluctant to acknowledge such an 
                                                 
Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 
5 SA Merc LJ 216, 218. 
56 BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die 
Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 218. 
57 BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die 
Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 218. 
58 1992 (1) SA 456 (D). 
59 See BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld 
van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 226-27 who argues that 
although it may be required that some exceptions to the proper plaintiff be allowed, it is incorrect to 
argue that ‘claims of justice’ in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 must be regarded as 
a separate and independent exception to the proper plaintiff rule. 
60 See 5.2.2.4 above. See also 2.3.1.4 above for a discussion of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 as developed under the English law. 
61 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 53. See also BA van der Merwe ‘Die 
Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle 
Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216. For a similar criticism in the context of the approach of English 
courts to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 see 2.3.1.5 above. 
62 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa). 
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overlap.63 This creates conceptual problems as to which remedy applies to what 
circumstances and the determination of standing.64  
5.2.3 Section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 
 
The provisions of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 are quoted below 
to provide a complete view of the development of the statutory development of the 
statutory unfair prejudice (or oppression remedy) in South Africa.65 This will assist 
in making comparisons between the various versions of the remedy that have been 
introduced in South Africa thus far. It would further make it possible to identify 
similarities and differences with the statutory development of the unfair prejudice 
remedy in other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis. 
Section 111bis provided: 
‘Alternative remedy to winding-up in cases of oppression 
(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the 
company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part 
of the members (including himself), may make an application to the 
Court by petition for an order under this section; and in a case falling 
within sub-section (2) of section ninety-five the Minister may make 
the like application. 
(2) If on any such petition the Court is of opinion  
(a) that the company’s affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; 
and 
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice that part 
of the members, but otherwise the facts would justify the 
                                                 
63 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 53-58. See also 5.9.15 below for a 
discussion of the relationship between section 163 and section 165. 
64 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 53-58. 
65 This provision was replaced by section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which is discussed 
in 5.2.4 below. See also E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 324-329 for 
a brief discussion of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
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making of a winding-up order on the ground that it is just and 
equitable that the company should be wound up, 
  the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters 
complained of, make such order as it thinks fit, whether for 
regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in future, or for 
the purchase of shares of any members of the company by 
other members of the company or by the company and, in the 
case of a purchase by the company, for the reduction 
accordingly of the company’s capital, or otherwise. 
(3) Where an order under this section make any alteration or addition 
to any company’s memorandum or articles, then notwithstanding 
anything in this Act but subject to the provisions of the order, the 
company concerned shall not have the power without the leave of 
the Court to make any further alteration in or addition to the 
memorandum or articles inconsistent with the provisions of the 
order; but, subject to the foregoing pro-visions of this sub-section, 
the alterations or additions made by the order shall be of the same 
effect as if duly made by resolution of the company, and this Act 
shall apply to the memorandum or articles as so altered or added 
accordingly. 
(4) A copy of any order under this section altering or adding to, or giving 
leave to alter or add to, a company’s memorandum or articles shall, 
within thirty days after the making thereof, be delivered by the 
company to the Registrar for registration; and if a company makes 
default in complying with this sub-section, the company shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine of two pounds 
for every day that the default continues.’  
 
What is important to note from the formulation of section 111bis is the use of the term 
‘oppressive’ to describe the conduct on which a member could rely for purposes of 
relief.66 Further, the provisions of section 111bis made it clear that it aimed to 
introduce alternative forms of relief to the wining-up of companies in circumstances 
where such an order for the winding-up of a company would be unfairly prejudicial to 
other members of the company.67 From a reading of section 111bis other interesting 
observations can be made and their relevance are explored in more detail in relation 
                                                 
66 Companies Act 46 of 1926, s 111bis(1). In the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Companies Act (RP 45/1970) 247 it was recommended that the conduct of which a member may 
complain should rather be described as ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’ instead of 
‘oppressive’. 
67 See 5.8 below. 
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to the discussion the provisions of section 163 of the Act. In this regard section 111bis 
expressly provided for the buy-out of the shares of a member by other members or 
the company.68 Further, the formulation of the provision maintains a direct relationship 
between the oppressive conduct in relation to the affairs of a company and the 
winding-up of a company.69 Section 111bis(2) also made it clear that the purpose of 
the order should be to bring an end to the conduct complained of. 
5.2.4 Section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
5.2.4.1 Introduction 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 replaced the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Section 
252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was the equivalent of section 111bis of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926. Section 252 contained some reforms based on the 
recommendations of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission in relation to section 111bis 
of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
Section 252 provided: 
‘Member’s remedy in case of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. –  
(1)  Any member of a company who complains that any particular act 
or omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted 
in a manner unfair prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to some 
part of the members of the company, may, subject to the provisions 
of subsection (2), make an application to the Court for an order 
under this section. 
(2) Where the act complained of relates to – 
(a) any alteration of the memorandum of the company under 
section 55 or 56; 
                                                 
68 Companies Act 46 of 1926, s 111bis (2). For the position in terms of section 163 of the Act see 
5.9.14 below. 
69 Companies Act 46 of 1926, s 111bis (2). See also 5.8 below. 
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(b) any reduction of the capital of the company under section 83; 
(c) any variation of rights in respect of shares of a company under 
section 102; or  
(d) a conversion of a private company into a public company into 
a private company under section 22, 
an application of the Court under subsection (1) shall be made within six 
weeks after the date of the passing of the relevant special resolution 
required in connection with the particular act concerned. 
(3) If on any such application it appears to the Court that the particular 
act or omission is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that 
the company’s affairs are being conducted as aforesaid and if the 
Court considers it just and equitable, the Court may, with a view to 
bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it 
thinks fit, whether for regulating the future conduct of the company’s 
affairs or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members thereof or by the company and, in the 
case of a purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of 
the company’s capital, or otherwise. 
(4)  
(5).’ 
 
A number of aspects of section 252 deserve detailed attention as they are relevant 
to the interpretation of section 163 of the Act.70 Firstly, the use of the concept 
‘oppressive’ in section 252.71 The concept ‘oppressive’ was only used in the heading 
of section 252 and did not appear in the provisions of section 252. The word 
‘oppressive’ in the body of the statutory oppression remedy was replaced by the 
concept of ‘unfairly prejudicial’ conduct with the purpose of breaking away from the 
restrictive interpretation associated with the concept of ‘oppressive’ conduct.72 
                                                 
70 See 5.2.4.2 below. 
71 See 5.7.3.2 and 5.7.8 below for a discussion of the use of the oppressive concept in section 163 
of the Act. 
72 See the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970) 246-47 
and 250 where it was recommended that the term ‘oppressive’ should be replaced by the phrase 
‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’ as the term ‘unfairly prejudicial’ can be provided with 
content by judicial interpretation and the introduction of the phrase ‘unjust or equitable’ will assist in 
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Secondly, the remedy in section 252 was also limited to members of a company.73 
Section 252 clearly stated that the purpose of the relief that may be granted in terms 
it was to end the matters complained of.74 It must further be noted that section 
252(3) expressly provided for the buy-out of a shareholder’s shares in a company.75 
5.2.4.2 The relevance of the principles developed in terms of section of 252 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
 
Knowledge and understanding of the principles developed under section 252 of the 
previous Act are still relevant to the interpretation and application of section 163 of 
the Act.76 Because there is a substantial overlap between the provisions of section 
163 of the Act and section 252 of the previous Act the courts may consult case law 
decided under section 252 for guidance on interpreting section 163.77 Even though 
section 163 of the Act replaced section 252 of the previous Act, South African courts 
in a number of judgments dealing with section 163 of the Act have referred to the 
                                                 
this process as the terms or concepts in the phrase already carried some form of meaning or content 
gained from judicial interpretation. 
73 See also the criticism of this requirement in 5.2.4.3 (a) below. See also 5.7.1.1 – 5.7.1.2 and 
5.7.1.4 below regarding the standing of a shareholder for purposes of section 163 of the Act. 
74 See 5.9.1 below for a discussion of the purpose of the relief granted in terms of section 163(2) of 
the Act. 
75 Compare the formulation of section 252 of the previous Act with the position under section 163 of 
the Act. See 5.9.14 below for a discussion of buy-out orders in terms of section 163 of the Act. 
76 This especially the case in light of the fact that the provisions of section 252 of the previous Act 
made use of the term ‘unfairly prejudicial’ instead of the oppressive concept that had only occurred 
in the heading to section 252. See 5.2.4.1 above. 
77 Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC). See 
also Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP); Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [22]; Peel 
and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [43]-[45]; Knipe 
and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [31]; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v 
Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [53]. See further A Sibanda ‘The 
Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company’ (2013) 38:2 JJS 58, 73. 
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wording of section 252 of the previous Act in seeking guidance on the interpretation 
and application of section 163 of the Act.78  
This approach by South African courts makes the case law dealing with 
section 252 of the previous Act directly relevant to the interpretation and application 
of section 163 of the Act. However, the application of judgments delivered in terms 
of section 252 to disputes in terms of section 163 has to be done with caution. The 
court in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others79 took the 
view that section 163 of the Act may find wider application than its predecessor, 
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.80 When compared there are important 
differences between the wording of section 252 of the previous Act and the 
formulation of section 163 of the Act.  
5.2.4.3 The use of the criticism against section 252 of the previous Act to 
provide a critical evaluation of section 163 of the Act 
 
The statutory remedy in section 252 was regarded as an improvement on section 
111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Despite the reform brought about by 
section 252 of the previous Act, Hurter81 identified a number of deficiencies in the 
                                                 
78 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [43] and 
[46]; Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP); Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA); Visser 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). See also the 
commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service 
issue 17, 2018) who argues that section 252 of the previous Act also made use of the terms unfairly 
prejudicial and therefore may provide courts with guidance on the interpretation of the concept or 
terms unfairly prejudicial for purposes of section 163 of the Act. 
79 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
80 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [53]. 
81 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa). 
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statutory oppression remedy.82 The criticism and recommendations of Hurter83 in 
relation to the section 252 of the previous Act are used as one of the criteria critically 
to evaluate the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy contained in section 163 of 
the Act. 
(a) The restrictive approach to the interpretation of section 252 
Hurter argued that courts were too conservative in their approach in intervening in 
the affairs of companies when applying the provisions of section 252 of the previous 
Act.84 The wording of section 252 justifies a liberal interpretation of the section. 
However, the liberal interpretation of section 252 is counteracted by the restrictive 
requirement by the courts that a member must prove that he or she suffered 
prejudice in his or her capacity as member of the company.85 Such an interpretation 
of section 252 creates an artificial exclusion of the application of the provision in 
circumstances where the member has been prejudiced in a capacity other than that 
of a member of the company.86 Conduct which may trigger relief under section 252 
                                                 
82 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 389-96. 
83 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa). 
84 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 390. 
85 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 389-90. See 5.7.1.4 below for the 
approach of the court in terms of section 163 of the Act. 
86 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 113. 
See also E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 325 where the position 
under section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 is discussed. See 5.7.1.4 below for a 
discussion of the capacity in which a shareholder or director must have suffered prejudice for 
purposes of section 163 of the Act. 
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may be prejudicial to a member in other capacities such as an employee, creditor, 
office, director or holder of a debenture.87  
(b) The strict enforcement of the principle of majority rule 
According to Hurter88 courts further placed far too much emphasis on the principle 
of majority rule.89 The fact that a resolution has been lawfully adopted by the 
shareholders does not necessarily mean that other shareholders have not been 
prejudiced.90 In the discussion of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926, 
Hurter points out that the statutory oppression remedy should not be seen as an 
interference in the principle of majority rule, but should rather be evaluated in light 
of the results of the consequences of the conduct.91 
(c) The protection of rights in stead of interests 
Section 252 of the previous Act provided relief to a member whose member’s rights 
                                                 
87 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 389-90. See also MJ Oosthuizen 
‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 113. 
88 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 390. 
89 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 390. 
90 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 390. See 5.7.3.5 below where it is 
demonstrated that reliance may be placed on the provisions of section 163 when commercial 
unfairness is proven and that unlawfulness is not a requirement for purposes of section 163. 
91 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 327. See also the Main Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970) 250-51 where it was favoured that the 
statutory personal action or remedy should be aimed at addressing the nature of the results flowing 
from the conduct of directors or majority shareholders. 
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had been infringed.92 The focus on the rights of a member, rather than on the 
interests of a member, is an unnecessarily restriction on the remedy contained in 
section 252.93 The specific acknowledgement of the interests of members in section 
252 would have been an express recognition that relief would also have been 
available in circumstances where the conduct of the majority was lawful.94 Although 
all members may have the same rights they do not necessarily hold the same 
interests in the company.95 The use of ‘unfairly’ indicates that although the rights of 
the members of a company may be equal the court may give effect to the fact that 
the interests of the various members may not be necessarily be equal.96 
(d) Protection against threatening unfair prejudicial conduct 
A further criticism of section 252 of the previous Act, is that the remedy failed to 
protect a member or applicant against threatening unfair prejudicial conduct.97 In 
this respect the remedy was regarded as reactive.98 The remedy was only available 
                                                 
92 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 391. 
93 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 391. Compare with the approach taken 
by the legislature in 5.7.4 below regarding section 163 of the Act. 
94 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 391. 
95 In E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. 
96 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. 
97 See 5.9.2.3 below for a discussion of relief against future or threatening conduct in terms of section 
163(2). 
98 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. For the position in this regard in 
terms of section 163 see 5.9.2.3 below. 
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when actual prejudice was suffered.99 
(e) The ‘just and equitable’ requirement for relief 
The requirement in section 252(3) that relief will only be granted when it is ‘just and 
equitable’ was also subjected to criticism.100 This criticism was based on the fact 
that because a court enjoyed a broad discretion when considering the relief, it was 
unnecessary to require that a member must convince the court that such relief 
should be ‘just and equitable’.101 
(f) The list and description of possible forms of relief in terms of 
section 252 
Hurter102 further recommended that the legislature should have given a more 
comprehensive list of orders that a court can make in terms of section 252(3) of the 
previous Act.103 A more comprehensive list would give a better indication as to the 
nature of the list of orders that a court can make.104 
                                                 
99 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. 
100 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392-93. 
101 See the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970) where 
it was recommended that shareholder protection would be enhanced if the requirement that it has to 
be proven, in addition to prove conduct that is ‘oppressive’, that it would be just and equitable to 
wind-up a company be dispensed with. See also E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre 
Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; 
University of South Africa) 392-93. 
102 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa). 
103 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 393-94. 
104 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 393-94. 
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5.3 The provisions of section 163 of the Act 
 
Section 163 of the Act provides as follows: 
‘Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of 
separate juristic personality of a company –  
(1)  A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to a court for 
relief if – 
(a) any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has 
had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant; 
(b) the business of the company, or a related person, is being or 
has been carried on or conducted in a manner that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards 
the interests of, the applicant; or 
(c) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, 
or a person related to the company, are being or have been 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant. 
(2)  Upon considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court 
may make any interim or final order it considers fit, including – 
(a)  an order restraining the conduct complained of; 
(b)  an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be 
insolvent; 
(c)  an order placing the company under supervision and 
commencing business rescue proceedings in terms of 
Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that the circumstances set 
out in section 131(4)(a) apply; 
(d)  an order to regulate the company’s affairs by directing the 
company to amend its Memorandum of Incorporation or to 
create or amend a unanimous shareholder agreement; 
(e)  an order directing an issue or exchange of shares; 
(f)  an order – 
(i) appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any 
of the directors then in office; 
(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as 
contemplated in section 162; 
(g)  an order directing the company or any other person to restore 
to a shareholder any part of the consideration that the 
shareholders paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with 
or without conditions; 
(h)  an order varying or setting aside a transaction or an 
agreement to which the company is a party and compensating 
the company or any other party to the transaction or 
agreement; 
(i)  an order requiring the company, was in a time specified by the 
court, to produce to the court or an interested person financial 
statements in a form required by this Act, or an accounting in 
any other form the court may determine; 
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(j)  an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject 
to any other law entitling that person to compensation; 
(k)  an order directing rectification of the registers or other records 
of a company; or 
(l)  an order for the trial of any issue as determined by the court. 
(3)  If an order made under this section directs the amendment of the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation – 
(a)  the directors must promptly file a notice of amendment to give 
effect to that order, in accordance with section 16(4); and 
(b)  no further amendment altering, limiting or negating the effect 
of the court order may be made to the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, until a court orders otherwise. 
(4)  …… 
 
[Sub-s (4) deleted by s 102 of the Act No 2 of 2011.]’ 
5.4 The interpretation of section 163 – specific principles and 
considerations 
 
5.4.1 The relationship between section 158 and the interpretation of 
section 163 of the Act 
 
Chapter 7 of the Act deals specifically with the enforcement of and the remedies in 
terms of the Act. Section 163 can be found in Part B of Chapter 7 of the Act. In 
interpreting section 163 of the Act, one must take the provisions of section 158 into 
consideration. Section 158 speaks directly to the remedies contained in the Act. In 
terms of its provisions, a court must promote the spirit, purpose and objects of the 
Act when interpreting and applying its provisions.105  
Further, when on reasonable construction or interpretation, a provision of the 
Act or any other document in terms of the Act, has more than one possible meaning 
                                                 
105 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 158(b)(i). 
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or interpretation, preference must be given to an interpretation that promotes the 
spirit and purpose(s) of the Act and advances the realisation and enjoyment of the 
rights in terms of the Act.106  
5.4.2 The development of the common law in terms of section 158 of the 
Act 
When a court considers a matter in terms of the Act, it has a duty to develop the 
common law to achieve the realisation and enjoyment of the rights established in 
the Act.107 This duty to develop the common law must be read with the 
Constitution.108 The Constitution109 contains the express duty to develop the 
common law and interpret legislation in the context of the Constitution to promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.110 This duty of a court has also 
now been expressly confirmed in section 7(a) of the Act which provides that a court 
must promote the compliance with the Bill of Rights when applying company law.111 
5.4.3 Fundamental corporate law principles: The principle of separate 
juristic personality, majority decision-making and the board of 
directors 
5.4.3.1 Introduction 
The consideration of fundamental corporate principles is imperative in the 
application of section 163 and therefore a proper grasp of these principles is 
                                                 
106 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 158(b)(ii). 
107 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 158(a). 
108 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
109 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
110 See 5.5.2.2 below. 
111 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(2). See also 5.5.2.4 below. 
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essential.112 A brief overview of the most relevant principles is provided and, where 
applicable, how these principles differ or may differ from the principles that applied 
under the previous Act. 
5.4.3.2 The management and decision-making within companies 
Decision-making within companies is conducted in accordance with the principle of 
majority rule. This principle entails that minority shareholders are bound by the 
lawfully adopted resolutions of the majority.113 These principles were strictly 
enforced by the interpretation and application of the principles in Foss v Harbottle.114 
It later became evident that circumstances may arise in which the principle of 
majority rule may adversely and unfairly affect the rights and interests of some of 
the shareholders.115  
Companies enjoy separate juristic personality.116 As a fictitious person a 
company cannot conduct its own affairs. This brings the important provision of 
section 66(1) of the Act into play. The section clearly stipulates that the board of 
directors are responsible for the management of the business and affairs of a 
company.117 The management must be carried out in accordance with the fiduciary 
duties of a director, namely, to act bona fide and in the best interests of the 
                                                 
112 See Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC). See also Grancy Property 
Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [32]. 
113 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [64]; 
Knipe and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [31]; Sammel v President 
Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 678. For the position in England see 2.2 above. 
114 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See 5.2.4.3 (b) above for criticism against the strict enforcement 
of the principle of majority decision-making. 
115 See 5.2.2 above. 
116 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 19. 
117 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 66(1). See 3.5 above for the position in Australia. 
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company.118 Directors must also act with reasonable care, skill and diligence in the 
management of the business and affairs of the company.119 
The relationship between the company and its directors is regulated by the 
common law, the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Memorandum of Incorporation and 
any other contracts between the company and the directors. An important aspect to 
note is that a director is a party to the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company.120  
5.4.3.3 The power to manage the business and affairs of a company as an 
original power 
The power and duty to manage the business and affairs of a company is now an 
original power derived from the provisions of the Act.121 This shift of power also has 
important implications for the reading of the Act. Because the board of directors are 
the main holders of the authority and powers of the company, shareholders cannot 
ratify any actions or conduct of directors in breach of their authority or duties in terms 
of the Act.122 The shareholders will only be able to ratify such conduct or breach 
                                                 
118 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 76(3)(a) and (b). 
119 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 76(3). 
120 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 15(6). In terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 directors were not 
bound to the constitutive documents of a company. 
121 Navigator Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2014] 3 All SA 591 (WCC) [31]; Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) 
[12]. This is in contrast with the Companies Act 61 of 1973 where the power to manage the company 
was delegated by the shareholders to the board. See I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection 
Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 4-5 and 8-9 and FHI 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 403. 
122 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 9-10. 
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when the act or the Memorandum of Incorporation provides for such ratification.123  
Some authors argue that because the board of directors is the ultimate organ 
that holds the power of the company, the references in the act to ‘the company’ 
should be read as to referring to the board and not the shareholders of the 
company.124 Esser and Delport further argue that section 66(1) may create an 
obstacle to the protection of shareholders in companies where the shareholding is 
dispersed.125  
5.4.3.4 In whose interests should a company be managed? 
(a) Partial codification of directors’ duties 
  
The duties of directors have now been partially codified in the Act.126 The duties are 
also supplemented by the common law duties of directors as developed and 
interpreted by case law, unless the Act provides otherwise. Amongst others a 
director has the duty to act at all times bona fide and in the best interests of the 
company.127 The conduct of directors is also indirectly regulated to some extent by 
                                                 
123 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 10. 
124 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 10. 
125 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 10. 
126 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ 2016 (79) THRHR 1, 1-2. 
127 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 76(3)(a) and (b). An overview is only furnished to provide a context 
to establish how the criteria for a breach of directors’ duties and the grounds for relief in terms of 
section 163(1) may in some instances overlap and in other instances differ from each other. For a 
detailed study of the recognition of stakeholder interests see Irene-Marie Esser Recognition of 
Various Stakeholder Interests in Company Management (2008) (unpublished LLD thesis; University 
of South Africa). 
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voluntary codes such as the King reports on governance.128 Although these codes 
are not law, courts have recently taken these codes and reports into consideration 
when determining whether or not a director or directors have breached their duties 
as such.129  
(b) The interests of shareholders versus the interests of other 
stakeholders 
The main challenge of any corporate law system in the allocation of powers is to 
strike an appropriate balance between the directors and shareholders.130 In the 
allocation of powers between the directors and shareholders one should also take 
the interests of stakeholders in consideration.131 However, such an approach may 
place the interests of stakeholders in competition with the interests of shareholders. 
This may erode the rights and interests of shareholders.132 For this specific reason 
it is important to determine what is meant by the duty of directors to manage and to 
act in the best interests of the company. It has to be determined whether the Act 
subscribes to the enlightened shareholder-value approach133 or whether it promotes 
or advocates the pluralist approach or theory.134  
                                                 
128 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 2. 
129 See, for example, Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 (5) 
SA 333 (W); South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu [2009] 4 All SA 169 (GSJ). 
130 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(i). See also I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection 
Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1. 
131 See Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(b)(iii) and s 7(d). See also I Esser and PA Delport 
‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 
1, 5. 
132 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 5. 
133 See 5.4.3.4 (c) below. 
134 See 5.4.3.4 (d) below 
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(c) The enlightened shareholder-value theory 
In terms of the enlightened shareholder-value theory a company should be 
managed to the benefit of the shareholders.135 According to this theory the purpose 
of a company is to generate maximum value for the shareholders of a company.136  
(d) The plurism approach 
According to the plurism approach, shareholders are seen as one of the 
stakeholders of the company. In contrast with the enlightened shareholder-value 
theory, the interests of shareholders do not enjoy preference by default.137 The 
success of the company is not seen and measured against the value created for 
shareholders and the advancement of their interests.138 The success of the 
company is seen as dependent on and intertwined with the interests with all the 
potential stakeholders of the company.139 
(e) The inclusive stakeholder value approach 
Esser and Delport140 argue that the King III141 report subscribes to the inclusive 
                                                 
135 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15; FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 518. 
136 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15; FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 518. 
137 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder protection philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ 2016 (79) THRHR 1, 15; FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 518. 
138 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15. 
139 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15. 
140 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15. 
141 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (The Institute of Directors in Southern 
Africa) September 2009. 
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stakeholder value approach.142 According to this approach the board should not 
only consider the interests of shareholders, but should also seriously consider the 
interests of all legitimate stakeholders.143 The facts and circumstances of each case 
will determine how the interests of each legitimate stakeholder will be balanced 
against the interests of other competing stakeholders to determine the best interests 
of the company.144 In applying this approach to the management of a company a 
long-term view is taken of what will be in the best interests of the shareholders as 
long as there is a link between the decision of the board and what is regarded as in 
the best interests of the company.145 Esser and Delport146 argue that when 
interpreting the duty to act in the best interests of a company, a stakeholder inclusive 
approach should be followed. Such an approach entails that the board should act 
in the best interest of the company even though it may be detrimental or prejudicial 
to the interests of shareholders.  
Esser and Delport147 emphasise that irrespective of whether a stakeholder 
inclusive approach is applied or the enlightened shareholder value approach is 
adopted the interests of stakeholders should be taken into account when managing 
                                                 
142 The King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016, Institute of Directors 
Southern Africa and the IoDSA is available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=AboutKingIV. 
143 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15-6. 
144 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 15-16. 
145 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 16. 
146 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 17. 
147 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 17. 
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the company. Because section 7(d) of the Act states as an objective that a company 
should be managed to promote economic and social benefits, it can be argued that it 
recognises that the board may take into consideration the interests of stakeholders.148 
The authors do note that this does not create direct rights for stakeholders.149  
5.4.4 The consideration of foreign law in terms of section 5(2) of the Act  
The consideration of foreign law, especially English law, is of particular 
importance.150 The body of case law that developed under section 252 in many 
instances drew heavily upon English decisions. There are many instances where 
South African courts still refer directly to English legislation and case law in 
determining the correct interpretation and application of certain South African 
legislative provisions.151 However, in this regard it should be noted that the 
legislature followed the exact words of the Canadian equivalent of section 163 in 
the drafting of the South African statutory unfair prejudice remedy.152 This may 
indicate that the legislature intended to break away from the approach used in 
English case law and legislation, and it is imperative that the Canadian position be 
considered in the context of the wording of section 163.153 
                                                 
148 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 18. 
149 I Esser and PA Delport ‘Shareholder Protection Philosophy in Terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008’ (2016) 79 THRHR 1, 18. 
150 Section 5(2) of the Act provides that when interpreting the provisions of the Act a court may 
consider foreign law. See 2.1 read with 5.2.4.2 above for a discussion of the value of English 
precedents in guiding South African courts in interpreting similar legislative provisions. 
151 See, for example, Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) and De Sousa 
and another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and others [2016] JOL 36298 (GJ). 
152 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.9]. For 
a discussion of the Canadian oppression or unfair prejudice remedy see Chapter 4 above. 
153 See Chapter 4 below for an analysis of the position in Canada. 
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5.5 The Constitution154  
5.5.1 The Constitution and the interpretation of legislative provisions 
 
The Constitution155 reigns supreme and any law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid.156 Further the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2.157 The 
Constitution158 read with the Act makes it imperative that when reading, interpreting 
and applying a legislative provision such as section 163 of the Act, preference must 
be given to an interpretation and meaning that falls within the ambit of the 
parameters of the Constitution.159  
The various branches of the law do not function in a vacuum and are subject 
to the Constitution.160 The relationship between shareholders inter se, the 
shareholders and the company, and the company and its directors is regulated by 
the Memorandum of Incorporation and the Act.161 In some instances the relationship 
between the various parties is regulated by one or more shareholder agreements. 
The legal relationship between these parties is then of a contractual nature which 
                                                 
154 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
155 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
156 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 2 read with s 172 (1)(a).  
157 See 5.2.2 below for a discussion of the relevant provisions contained in the Bill of Rights forming 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
158 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
159 Section 2 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 read with sections 5(1) and 7(a) of the Act. 
160 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
161 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 15(6). It is submitted that, as was the case under the previous Act, 
the relationship between the parties to a Memorandum of Incorporation is of a contractual nature. 
See the obiter remark in De Lange v Presiding Bishop for the time being of the Methodist Church of 
Southern Africa and another [2015] 1 All SA 121 (SCA) [52] and the discussion of section 15(6) by 
PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). For a 
discussion of the most important developments in the law of contract that may be influential on the 
interpretation and enforcement of company contracts see 5.6 below. 
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makes the developments in the law of contract directly relevant to company law.162 
In this regard the development of the law of contract in the context of the 
Constitution163 is of particular importance.  
5.5.2 The Bill of Rights, the interpretation of legislation and the 
development of the common law 
5.5.2.1 The Bill of Rights 
The Constitution reigns supreme, and any conduct, law or legislation in 
contravention thereof is invalid.164 The Bill of Rights forms the cornerstone of the 
South African democracy.165 It applies to all law and binds juristic persons such as 
companies.166 The Bill of Rights also states very clearly that a juristic person may 
be the bearer of rights and obligations under the Constitution.167 One of the 
purposes of the Act is the promotion of the compliance with the Bill of Rights in the 
application of company law.168 The Bill of Rights is important as it significantly 
impacted and impacts of the development of the common law relating to company 
law and the law of contract.169 The Bill of Rights further contains provisions 
pertaining to the interpretation of legislation.170 
                                                 
162 Authors and case law regard the relationship in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
created by section 15(6) of the Act as contractual. See also 5.5.3 below. 
163 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 5.5.2.2 below for the duty of courts to 
develop the common law in light of the Bill of Rights. For a discussion of the interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights and other legislation see 5.5.2.1–5.5.2.3 and 5.5.2.4 below, respectively.  
164 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 2 read with s 172 (1)(a).  
165 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 7(1). 
166 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 8(1) and (2). 
167 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 8(4). 
168 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(a). 
169 See 5.5.2.2 below. 
170 For a brief overview of the provisions relating to the interpretation of legislation see 5.5.2.4 below. 
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5.5.2.2 The duty to develop the common law 
The Constitution171 is prescriptive regarding the application of the Bill of Rights. High 
courts are specifically entrusted with the inherent power to develop the common law 
in the interests of justice.172 When applying a right entrenched in the Bill of Rights, 
a court has to develop the common law to give effect to such a right in so far as 
specific legislation does not give effect to the relevant right in question.173  
5.5.2.3 The interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
Section 39 of the Bill of Rights is applicable to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
itself. When the Bill of Rights is interpreted the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom must be promoted.174 When interpreting the Bill of Rights courts must 
consider international law and may consider foreign law.175 This also requires that 
the provisions of the Act be interpreted to promote the values entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights.176 Further, it allows for the consideration of foreign law in seeking 
                                                 
171 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
172 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 173. See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). See further Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) [34] where it was held that ‘[a] court should always be alive to the 
possibility of the development of the common law in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights’. 
173 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 8(3)(a). See also Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) [39] where the court held that ‘the obligation 
of courts to develop the common law, in the context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely 
discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) read with section 173 that where the 
common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under 
a general obligation to develop it appropriately’.  
174 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(1)(a).  
175 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(1)(b) and (c). Compare with section 5(2) 
of the Act. 
176 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 7(a). 
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guidance in the interpretation of the provisions of the Act.177 
5.5.2.4 The interpretation of legislation 
When interpreting legislation every court is also under the duty to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.178 The Bill of Rights does not deny any 
freedoms and rights that are enjoyed in terms of the common law as long as these 
rights and freedoms are aligned with the Constitution.179 Courts are under a duty to 
deviate from the common law in cases where the common law is inconsistent with 
the Constitution.180 
5.5.2.5 The judicial approach to the interpretation of documents and 
legislation 
Although the Constitution and the Act contain provisions that direct the interpretation 
of legislation, the judicial interpretation of legislation has become a complex matter 
and has become a topic of considerable academic debate.181 It is not the purpose 
here to provide a comprehensive and critical analysis of the judicial approaches to 
the interpretation of legislation and other legal documents, but rather to describe the 
legislative framework that guides judicial interpretation. The framework consists of 
                                                 
177 See also Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 5(2). 
178 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(2). See also Botha and Another v Rich 
NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [28]. 
179 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(3). See 5.6 below where courts 
reconsidered common law principles of the law of contract in light of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996. 
180 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). See 5.5.2.2 above. 
181 See Franziska Myburgh ‘Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Paradigm Shifts, and 
Crises: Analysing Recent Changes in the Approach to Contractual Interpretation in South African 
Law’ (2017) 134 SALJ 514 for a thorough analysis of the judicial approaches of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to judicial interpretation.  
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the provisions relating to interpretation contained in the Constitution and the specific 
provisions contained the Act.182 One important aspect of judicial interpretation to 
note is that the same principles of judicial interpretation that apply to legislative 
provisions also apply to other documents such as contracts.183 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality184 held 
that it is insufficient only to consider the grammatical meaning of the words to 
enforce the provisions of a statute or contract.185 In a later judgment the Supreme 
Court of Appeal186 held that the judgment in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v 
Endumeni Municipality187 should not be understood to allow the leading of evidence 
about the intention of the parties and on how an agreement between parties should 
be interpreted, because it is the primary function and the role of the court to interpret 
the wording of agreements.188 However, parties are allowed to lead evidence 
relating to the context of the agreement as a court may take the context of the 
agreement into consideration when interpreting an agreement.189 Other 
considerations such as the context in which the provision or contract has been 
formulated and its purpose, amongst others, form part of the process to establish 
                                                 
182 See 5.4, and more specifically 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 above, for a discussion of the various statutory 
provisions dealing with interpretation. 
183 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [18]-[19]. 
184 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
185 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [18] and 
[25]. 
186 City of Tshwane Metropolitan v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association [2019] 1 All SA 291 (SCA). 
187 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
188 City of Tshwane Metropolitan v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association [2019] 1 All SA 291 (SCA) 
[62]-[64], [66] and [69]. 
189 City of Tshwane Metropolitan v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association [2019] 1 All SA 291 (SCA) 
[61]. 
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the correct interpretation of a statutory provision or contract.190 Later, it is 
demonstrated that section 163 of the Act significantly influences the interpretation 
and enforcement of rights in terms of the Act, the Memorandum of Incorporation 
and shareholder agreements in a specific commercial context.191 
5.5.3 The constitutional notion of fairness and its application to 
shareholder agreements and the Memorandum of Incorporation of 
a company  
Subscribers to the shares of a company are contractually bound to the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of a company.192 The statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy contained in section 163 of the Act subjects the exercise and enforcement 
of rights in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation and the Act to fairness.193 
The role that notions and concepts such as fairness, reasonableness and bona fides 
play in the formation, interpretation and enforcement of contracts needs to be 
considered in light of the Constitution.194 Section 163 of the Act makes the remedy 
also directly applicable to shareholders’ agreements.195 
Although, the company contract in the form of a Memorandum of 
                                                 
190 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [18]. 
191 See 5.5.3 below for a discussion of the influence of fairness on shareholder agreements and the 
Memorandum of Incorporation. See 5.7.3.5 below for a discussion of the concept of commercial 
(un)fairness. See further 5.7.4 below for a discussion of the protection of interests, 5.7.6 below 
regarding the protection and enforcement of legitimate expectations and 5.9.5 below for an example 
of how relief in terms of section 163(2) of the Act may impact on the contractual relations between 
parties related to a company. 
192 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 15(6). See also 5.4.1 above. 
193 See 5.7.3.5 below for a discussion of the concept of commercial (un)fairness for purposes of 
section 163 of the Act. 
194 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
195 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(d). For a discussion of section 163(2)(d) of the Act see 
5.9.5.3 below. 
 422 
 
Incorporation does differ from the ordinary common law contract in some respects, 
it may potentially contain provisions that may bring it in direct conflict with some of 
the provisions in the Constitution or the legal convictions of the community as 
contained in the Constitution. In the company law context, it is not only the fairness 
of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company that 
must be evaluated in light of the Constitution and the Act, but also the effect of the 
conduct of the various parties.196 The Act introduced a new dimension to contracts, 
namely, that contracts must be measured against ‘oppressive and unfairly 
prejudicial conduct’.197 The impact of the Constitution198 on the common law of 
contract is now analysed.199 Specific focus is placed on the application of values 
such as fairness and the principle of bona fides to the law of contract.200 The 
Constitution201 may also provide insight into how fairness as a normative 
consideration should be determined.202 
 
                                                 
196 See 5.7.3.6 below where it is pointed out that the effect of the conduct complained of has to be 
evaluated in light of commercial fairness.  
197 PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). See 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61] where the court accepted that contracts should be measured against 
the oppressive and/or unfair prejudicial conduct. See also Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [49]; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54]. 
198 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
199 See 5.6 below. 
200 See 5.6 and particularly 5.6.2 below. 
201 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
202 It has to be noted that ‘fairness’ is not explicitly mentioned as a value of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 or the Bill of Rights. However, it will be pointed out in 5.6 below that 
fairness does form an element of the legal convictions of the community or public policy as found in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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5.6 The role of fairness, reasonableness and the principle of bona fides 
in the constitutional development of the law of contract 
5.6.1 Introduction 
 
Recently, the highest courts in the country had to consider the common law 
principles underlying the enforcement of contractual clauses in light of the 
Constitution.203 Amongst others, consideration had been given to the role bona 
fides, reasonableness and fairness play in the formation, interpretation and 
enforcement of contracts.204  
5.6.1.1 Legality as a requirement for a valid contract 
One of the fundamental requirements for a valid and enforceable contract is 
legality.205 Legality comprises of public policy. In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom206 
the court held that public policy or alternatively the legal convictions of the 
community is determined with reference to the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom in the Constitution.207 The broader question to be answered is: to what 
extent do fairness, reasonableness and bona fides influence the legal convictions 
of the community and how do they impact on the formation and enforcement of 
contracts?208 
 
                                                 
203 See 5.6 below where these cases are discussed. 
204 See 5.6 and in particularly 5.6.2 below. 
205 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [29]; Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [39]. See also S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB 
Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles (5th ed, 2016) 187-88. 
206 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
207 See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [28]; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 
(6) SA 21 (SCA) [18]; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [91]. 
208 See 5.6 and in particularly 5.6.2 below. 
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5.6.1.2 The importance of understanding the role of fairness, 
reasonableness and bona fides in the context of companies 
  
An evaluation of fairness, reasonableness and bona fides in the context of the South 
African company law is essential for three reasons. Firstly, it can argued that bona 
fides, reasonableness and fairness are introduced to the law of contract by the 
Constitution.209 Secondly, because English company law substantially influenced 
South African company law, and English company law derived from the law of 
partnership that was based on bona fides.210 Thirdly, an understanding of the 
enforcement of contracts in light of fairness may provide insight into the operation 
of company contracts that must be measured against ‘oppressive and unfairly 
prejudicial conduct’ or in other words commercial fairness.211 ‘Commercial fairness’ 
is considered later as a specific form of fairness.212  
 
                                                 
209 See 5.6.3 read with 5.6.4 below. See Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving practical effect to good faith in 
the law of contract’ (2018) 3 Stell LR 379, 404 argues that ‘[t]hus, while South African law may not 
have a good faith clause like German Law, it is through the public policy requirement that effect could 
be given to good faith as a value’. The author is further of the view (417) that the South Africa legal 
system ‘accepts that good faith as constitutional value could be taken into account when determining 
whether public policy should invalidate a term good faith may indirectly assist in deciding whether 
contractual terms should be “corrected”’. 
210 See 1.5.1 and 2.1 above for a brief discussion of the influence of English law on South African 
company law.  
211 PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). See 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61] where the court accepted that contracts should be measured against 
the oppressive and/or unfair prejudicial conduct. See also Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [49]; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54]. 
212 See 5.7.3.5 below. 
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5.6.1.3 Pacta sunt servanda 
The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda entails that courts must enforce contractual 
obligations that are created within the boundaries of the freedom of contract and 
are based on consensus.213 It is trite that public policy supports freedom of contract 
and therefore a court will use its discretion not to enforce a contractual clause 
sparingly.214  
Later it will be demonstrated that the lawful exercise of legal rights may be 
interdicted or restrained based on the provisions of section 163 of the Act.215 This 
has important implications for the application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
when the Memorandum of Incorporation and shareholders’ agreement are viewed 
as contracts to which the parties voluntarily and freely agreed.  
5.6.2 Fairness, reasonableness and the principle of bona fides as legal 
convictions of the community 
 
5.6.2.1 The principle of pacta sunt servanda at common law 
 
In contractual disputes a court will traditionally use the rules of interpretation to 
establish the intention of the parties. Once their intention is established from the 
wording of the contract or agreement, a court in principle does not have the power 
to deviate from the enforcement of the parties’ intention as contained in the 
                                                 
213 See S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 11. 
214 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [70]; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B-
E. See also GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 12-13. See 
further Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [12] where the court held that it has no discretion on 
whether or not to enforce a valid contractual term.  
215 See 5.7.6 below regarding the protection of legitimate expectations. 
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contract.216 Agreements that are freely and voluntarily concluded by parties will be 
strictly enforced on the basis of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.217 The doctrine 
of pacta sunt servanda entails that courts must enforce contractual obligations that 
are created within the boundaries of the freedom of contract and are based on 
consensus.218 It is trite that public policy supports freedom of contract and therefore 
a court will sparingly use its discretion not to enforce a contractual clause based on 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.219 The enforcement of the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda is not absolute.220 A court will not enforce contractual rights and 
obligations on the basis of the principle of pacta sunt servanda where such 
contractual rights and obligations offend public policy.221 In Barkhuizen v Napier222 
the court held that courts must be careful to intervene in the contractual 
arrangements of parties when such arrangements were freely and voluntarily 
arrived at by the parties.223 
5.6.2.2 Balancing the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda against other rights 
contained in the Constitution 
The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the notion of fairness, the freedom to contract, 
                                                 
216 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) [30]. 
217 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [23] and [24]; SA Sentrale Ko-
op Graanmaatskappy Beperk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 740 (A) 767. See also S van der 
Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 5th (2016) (Juta: 
Cape Town) 11. 
218 See S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 10-11. 
219 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [70]; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B-
E. See also GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 12-13. 
220 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [37]. 
221 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [87]. 
222 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
223 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [70]-[71]. 
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and the right to dignity may potentially come into conflict with each other and the 
rights contained in the Constitution and must then be weighed and balanced in light 
of public policy as envisaged in the Constitution.224 In an attempt to avoid the 
enforcement of a contractual clause, it is not enough to demonstrate that the 
contract or a particular clause offends one’s individual’s sense of fairness nor can 
contractual clauses be avoided on the basis of good faith.225 Recently, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal reiterated that ‘although fairness and reasonableness inform policy 
they are not selfstanding principles’.226 
(a) Decisions based on equity and fairness as judicial functions of 
courts 
To accept that courts will have a discretion to avoid contractual principles in 
circumstances where such principles are unfair or do not comply with the principle 
of bona fides, will give courts the power to apply their own views of fairness.227 Such 
power will stretch beyond the judicial function of courts.228 This is because courts 
do not reach decisions based on equity and fairness, but on the application of the 
law.229 The judicial function of the court is to apply the law to the facts and 
                                                 
224 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
225 See also South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) [31]; Brisley 
v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [31]; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7-8. See also 
Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving practical effect to good faith in the law of contract’ (2018) 3 Stell LR 379, 
404. However, Du Plessis does point out (416) that South African courts ‘have at times at least 
indicated that pacta sunt servanda cannot be a trump card that defeats any attempt to deal with 
changed circumstances’. 
226 Trustees for the Time Being of the Oregon Trust v BEADICA 231 CC and Others (74/2018) [2019] 
ZASCA 23 (28 March 2019) [35]. 
227 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
228 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
229 Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) [34]; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
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circumstances of each case.230  
(b) Legal uncertainty and the principle of bona fides and fairness  
Adjudicating cases based on the principle of bona fides and fairness will also cause 
legal uncertainty between parties to a contract.231 A dispute between the parties 
would then not only be resolved based on the terms and conditions of their contract, 
but also in accordance with the sense of reasonableness and fairness of the 
individual judge that presides over the particular dispute.232  
The adjudication of disputes on the basis of fairness and reasonableness will 
contribute to legal uncertainty.233 The content of what is fair or reasonable will differ 
from person to person and from court to court.234 In South African Forestry Co Ltd 
v York Timbers Ltd235 the court cautioned against finding that agreements are 
unenforceable because they are unfair and inequitable.236  
In Brisley v Drotsky237 it was held that the principle of bona fides is not an 
independent separate legal rule, but is underlying to the law of contract like the 
value that parties who voluntarily commit themselves to contracts should honour 
                                                 
230 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
231 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
232 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
233 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22] and [93]; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) 
SA 21 (SCA) [32]; Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 
(SCA) [53]; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 19 (SCA) [23] and [25]; 
Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) [34]. 
234 Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) [34]. 
235 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA). 
236 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) [27]. See also the 
discussion of the approach in Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) in 
5.6.4 below. 
237 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
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their undertakings.238 The duty rests with the party who wishes to avoid the 
enforcement of the contractual clause, to set out the circumstances in which the 
enforcement of the contractual clause will offend public policy.239 In Brisley v 
Drotsky240 the court emphasised that it will only find a clause in a contract to be 
contrary to public policy when the inequity of the clause is clear and exceptional.241  
5.6.3 The need for substantive justice between parties to a contract 
 
Van der Merwe highlights the notion that though fairness and reasonableness form 
part of the principles of the law of contract, they do not necessarily ensure the fair 
operation of a contract.242 To achieve the fair operation of a particular contract one 
must consider ‘the general concepts that underlie the doctrines, rules and remedies 
intended to effect the fair operation of contracts, such as the concept of reasonable 
balance between performance and counter-performance or the concept of 
“conscionability”’.243  
                                                 
238 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22]-[23]. See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [32]. 
239 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [84]-[85]. 
240 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
241 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [31]-[32]. 
242 See S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 310 who note that ‘[i]n principle, agreements that comply with the requirements for the 
creation of contracts will be executed and enforced strictly in terms of the consensus, or reasonable 
reliance on consensus, between the parties. This should generally be fair and just towards the 
contractants: some measure of fairness and reasonableness is already incorporated in the principles 
on which contractual liability is based, in the principle that agreement must be obtained properly, in 
the agreement of legality and in the process of interpreting contracts. Nevertheless, these factors 
alone cannot ensure justice in every instance where a contract is put into operation, and the question 
remains how the law can further provide for the fair operation of a particular contract’ (footnotes 
omitted). 
243 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 310. As regards the concept of ‘conscionability’ the authors (310 n 483) remark that 
the concept ‘is usually encountered in its negative counterpart “unconscionability”, a “hold-all” which 
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According to Van der Merwe the problem can also be approached by 
focussing on the specific remedies that embody the changing convictions of what is 
just and fair.244 One such a remedy is the exceptio doli generalis.245 The exceptio 
doli generalis is a contractual defence that a party could raise against a contractual 
claim in unfair circumstances that developed after the conclusion of the contract.246 
The effect of the defence was that a court could refuse a claim even if such claim 
falls squarely within the parameters of the contract, but enforcement of the contact 
would be regarded as unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive.247  
The roots of this remedy are found in the Roman law.248 Van der Merwe 
points out that South African courts were prepared to accept the remedy as part of 
South African law to be an instrument of equity.249 However, the court in Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas250 held that the remedy does not form 
                                                 
may encompass unacceptable conduct in contrahendo, unfair terms, unfairness in attempting to 
enforce a contract and the like’. 
244 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 275. 
245 See Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W). See also S van der Merwe, LF van 
Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles (5th ed, 2016) 310-11; GB 
Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 16-17. 
246 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 16. See also S van der 
Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles (5th ed, 2016) 
310. 
247 See also Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving Practical Effect to Good Faith in the Law of Contract’ (2018) 
3 Stell LR 379, 397 who explains that the exceptio doli prevents a party from exercising a right in a 
manner that is contrary to good faith. 
248 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 310. 
249 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 311. 
250 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
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part of South African law.251 Van der Merwe et al emphasise the fact that the courts 
did not point or allude to any other remedies that will perform the same function as 
the exceptio doli.252  
The fact that South African law does not have a remedy which ensures 
substantive justice between contract parties does not mean that there is not a need 
for such remedy.253 The need to do simple justice between parties to a contract is 
recognised by the Constitutional Court.254 In Barkhuizen v Napier255 the 
Constitutional Court held that reasonableness, justice and fairness are elements of 
public policy.256 The test to avoid the enforcement of a contract or contractual clause 
is neither the principle of bona fides nor fairness, but rather the interests or legal 
convictions of the legal community based on the values of equality, freedom and 
human dignity.257 It is the role of the court to balance these competing principles.258 
Abstract considerations such as equity, reasonableness and justice are not legal 
rules but form part of the considerations that form the basis of the law of contract 
                                                 
251 See also Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) 
[32]. 
252 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 311. 
253 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 311. 
254 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [73]. 
255 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
256 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [73]. See also Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving Practical Effect to Good Faith in 
the Law of Contract’ (2018) 3 Stell LR 379, 388-89. 
257 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 39(2). See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 
(5) SA 323 (CC) [28]; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [92]-[93].  
258 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [24]. 
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and public policy.259  
5.6.4 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others260 
 
5.6.4.1  Introduction 
 
The court in Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others261 acknowledged that the law 
of contract, based on the principle of good faith, has the necessary flexibility to 
ensure fairness.262 The principle of reciprocity originated from notions such as 
justice, reasonableness and fairness.263 These notions and concepts constitute 
good faith in a contract.264 
5.6.4.2  The position prior to Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others265 
 
It was argued and accepted by the courts that the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
brings legal certainty and is aligned with the values of freedom and human dignity 
as entrenched in the Constitution.266 Although this view is held by various courts 
and particularly the Supreme Court of Appeal267 it cannot be denied that the strict 
                                                 
259 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [73] and [82]. See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 
1 (SCA) [22] on bona fides and the law of contract. According to R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of 
a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ 
(2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 181-82 the same argument applies to the notion that contractual parties 
owe a duty of bona fides to each other. 
260 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
261 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
262 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [45]. 
263 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [45]. 
264 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [45]. 
265 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
266 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). See also Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) 
[34] where the court cautioned against deciding cases on the basis of fairness.  
267 See, for example, Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) and Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
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application of the principle may be unreasonable or unfair in certain 
circumstances.268  
The recognition that fairness and reasonableness are underlying values of 
the law of contract can be found in the common law.269 Examples can be found in 
the principles relating to misrepresentation, duress, the rules of interpretation and 
that a contract may not offend the public policy.270 In the application of the said 
principles courts developed these concepts to meet the changing needs of society 
who are the ultimate users of these principles.271  
5.6.4.3  The importance of the judgment in Botha and Another v Rich NO 
and Others272 
In Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others273 the court refused to enforce a 
contractual clause, because the result of the implementation of a clause of the 
relevant contract would offend public policy on the basis that it was unfair and 
unreasonable on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.274 Although the 
judgment is welcomed, the reasoning in the written judgment failed to provide the 
                                                 
268 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 
SA 323 (CC) [73]. 
269 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [32]. 
270 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 14-15. 
271 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 14-15. 
272 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
273 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
274 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) [49]-[50]; See also R Sharrock 
‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right direction? Botha v Rich and Combined 
Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 183. 
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guidance required in respect of this matter.275  
5.6.5  The criticism against Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others276 
 
Sharrock277 questions the reasoning in the written judgment as it failed to provide 
the required guidance. The approach in the judgment is also criticised by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Trustees for the Time Being of the Oregon Trust v 
BEADICA 231 CC and Others.278 
5.6.5.1 The failure to follow a principled approach to promote legal 
certainty in the application of the relevant principles and doctrines 
 
The court did not expressly explain the principles that justify the non-enforcement 
of a contract or contractual clause based on unfairness.279 The failure by the court 
to clearly define the principles upon which the court has exercised its discretion is 
problematic as this may now lead courts to enforce contracts in accordance with 
their own views or ideas of fairness.280 This position is highly undesirable and 
threatens the object of legal certainty. Although it may be argued that the concepts 
                                                 
275 See the analysis of R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? 
Botha v Rich and Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174. See also 5.6.5 
below. 
276 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
277 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174. 
278 (74/2018) [2019] ZASCA 23 (28 March 2019). In this judgment the court rejected [38] the notion 
in Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) that a contract may be 
unenforceable because the consequences that follows the breach of a contract or the failure to 
adhere to the terms of a contract are disproportionate. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
[38] the correct test is rather whether or not the terms of the contract offend public policy. 
279 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 180. 
280 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 180. 
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of fairness and reasonableness, or in their negative forms unfairness and 
unreasonableness, are abstract values and concepts it must be noted that the 
content of these concepts are determinable by using a principled approach to 
determine whether or not public policy is offended.281  
5.6.5.2 The status of relevant judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
The court further failed to consider the legal position regarding the unfair enforcement 
of contracts without referring to the most important judgments of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal dealing with the issue.282 The effect of this is that the legal status of the 
body of case law developed by the Supreme Court of Appeal is uncertain.283  
5.6.6 The application of fairness within companies: Lessons learned from 
the law of contract  
5.6.6.1 Fairness and reasonableness as elements of the legal convictions 
of the community 
Recently, the constitutional court held that the enforcement of contracts is also 
subject to the legal convictions of the community based amongst others on fairness 
and reasonableness.284 The validity of contracts is also subject to public policy or 
                                                 
281 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 184-85. See also Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [51] where the court held that fairness and reasonableness form 
elements of public policy. 
282 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 181. See also Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South African Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) regarding the notion that the enforcement 
of a contract can be barred upon the ground of unfairness. 
283 R Sharrock ‘Unfair Enforcement of a Contract: A Step in the Right Direction? Botha v Rich and 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 174, 181. 
284 See 5.6.4 above. See also Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving practical effect to good faith in the law of 
contract’ (2018) 3 Stell LR 379, 388-89. 
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the legal convictions of the community.285 Bona fides, reasonableness and fairness 
form elements of the legal convictions of the community.286 These elements require 
the enforcement of contracts to be fair and reasonable taking into consideration the 
facts and circumstances of a case.  
5.6.6.2 The strict application of pacta sunt servanda  
Traditional principles and doctrines of the law of contract acknowledge that the 
enforcement of contracts may in some instances be unconscionable, oppressive or 
alternatively that the enforcement of a contract may be unfair or unreasonable in 
circumstances that were unforeseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.287 
Thus, the free and voluntary acceptance of contractual obligations is not the only 
consideration to be taken into account in the enforcement of contractual obligations.288 
This is now evident from the judgment in Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others.289 
5.6.6.3 Section 163 of the Act as a criterion for the enforcement of rights 
and obligations between the company, directors and shareholders 
 
Delport is of the view that the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 
of the Act introduces a new dimension against which company contracts and 
shareholder agreements will be measured.290 These contracts or agreements will 
                                                 
285 See 5.6.1 above. 
286 See 5.6.3 above. 
287 See 5.6.3 above. 
288 See 5.6.4 above. 
289 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). See also 5.6.4 above. 
290 PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). See 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61] where the court accepted that contracts should be measured against 
the oppressive and/or unfair prejudicial conduct. See also Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
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be measured against results flowing from oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct 
or an unfair disregard of interests. In short the remedy is triggered by commercial 
unfairness.291 This is aligned with the notion that the principles underlying the law 
of contract aim to achieve fairness.  
5.6.6.4 The need for fairness within the company structure 
Due to the nature of companies and the relationships it embodies, the need to 
ensure fairness between parties presents itself to a certain degree more acutely 
than for instance in the law of contract. Firstly, it is because the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company (and applicable shareholder agreements) applies to and 
regulates multidimensional relationships. Secondly, it is because of the often 
dynamic nature of the relationships of the company, directors and shareholders as 
parties to a Memorandum of Incorporation (and shareholder agreement where 
applicable). Thirdly, unlike with an ordinary common law contract, the Memorandum 
of Incorporation may be amended by a special resolution.292 It is also a common 
feature that the constitutive documents of a company do not exhaustively regulate 
the relationship between the parties thereto and arrangements and understandings 
may exist that are not necessarily contained in the Memorandum of Incorporation 
or an applicable shareholder agreement.293 
 
 
                                                 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [49]; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54]. 
291 See 5.7.3 and more specifically 5.7.3.5 below. 
292 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 16. 
293 See 5.7.6 below. 
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5.6.6.5 Section 163 as a specific embodiment of the legal convictions of the 
community  
Section 163 of the Act makes it possible for company law to avoid some of the 
problems with which the law of contract grapples. The status of the remedy is certain 
and makes fairness directly applicable to conduct in terms of the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, shareholder agreements or other documents of the company and is 
available to temper the unfair results that may result from company-related conduct. 
To follow a principled approach in the context of the application of fairness for 
purposes of section 163 is to a degree easier than in the context of the law of 
contract. The reason for this is that in terms of section 163 one deals with a particular 
form of fairness, namely, commercial fairness. The commercial fairness of the effect 
of conduct complained of always has to be determined in a particular context, 
namely, the statutory framework and fundamental principles of company law in 
which companies function. Although the articles or provisions of the Memorandum 
of Incorporation of a company or a shareholders’ agreement are also subject to the 
legal convictions of the community as found in the Constitution, very specific 
considerations apply in the company law context to determine whether conduct is 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or an unfair disregard of interests.294 It is therefore 
submitted that section 163 of the Act refines aspects of the legal convictions of the 
community in the context of relationships within the company structure.295 
 
                                                 
294 See 5.7.3 below for a discussion of the concepts oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and unfair 
disregard of interest. 
295 See 5.4 above for a discussion of the specific principles and considerations that apply to 
companies. 
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5.7 Relief for oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct under the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
5.7.1 Standing296 
 
Section 163 of the Act provides that a director or a shareholder may approach the 
court for relief.297 The standing of a shareholder and a director as applicants or 
plaintiffs in terms of section 163 of the Act is now be considered.298 The wording of 
section 163(1) does not furnish a court with a discretion to extend standing to 
persons who have not been specifically mentioned.299 The remedy in section 163 is 
only available to a shareholder or director of a company.300 
 
 
                                                 
296 See also 5.9.15 below for the interrelationship between the standing requirements for purposes 
of section 163 and section 165. 
297 It should be noted that section 163(2)(l) of the Act does provide for the referral to trial of any issue 
that is not appropriate to be determined by way of motion proceedings.  
298 See 5.7.1.1 below for a discussion of a shareholder as an applicant or plaintiff in terms of section 
163 of the Act and 5.7.1.3 below for a discussion of a director as an applicant or plaintiff for purposes 
of section 163. 
299 See HGJ Beukes and WJC Swart ‘Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd: Ignoring the Result-
Requirement of Section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act and Extending the Oppression Remedy 
Beyond its Statutorily Intended Reach’ (2004) 14:4 PER/PELJ 1691, 1699-700. See also Smyth and 
Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [30] where the court in the 
consideration of the definition of ‘member’ for purposes of section 252 of the previous Act held that 
‘to include a beneficial owner of shares registered in the of a nominee, it would in my view amount 
to judicial legislation, and not interpretation’ and [48] where the court stated that ‘in adopting a 
purposive approach, the court engages in the process of interpretation relating to the remedy, and 
does not assume a legislative role by expanding the term “member” to include persons who are not 
referred to in the definition of “member” in s 103, and for whom the legislature did not see fit to create 
a statutory exception’. 
300 See Du Plooy v De Hollandsche Molen Share Block Ltd [2016] 1 All SA 748 (WCC) [56]. 
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5.7.1.1 The shareholder as applicant (or plaintiff) 
(a)  Introduction 
Although the remedy in section 163 is not restricted to minority shareholders it would 
usually be utilised by a minority shareholder because of his or her position in the 
company.301 In Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese 
Company (Pty) Ltd and Others302 the court noted that section 252 of the previous 
Act, the predecessor of section 163, was not only available to minority shareholders 
but could be applied in instances where all shareholders have equal voting 
control.303 The remedy therefore comes to the assistance of a shareholder or 
director who is prejudiced by unfair or oppressive conduct, and the shareholder or 
director is unable to protect him- or herself from such conduct due to his or her lack 
of control in the company.304 
When reading provisions of the Act one must be conscious of the fact that 
the term ‘shareholder’ does not carry the same meaning or definition throughout the 
Act.305 The definition or meaning of a shareholder is dependent on where in the Act 
the term is used. The definition of a shareholder for purposes of the Act and in 
                                                 
301 See 5.7.1.1 (e) below. 
302 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
303 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [51] and [77]. The court in Grancy Property Limited v Manala and 
Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [32] cautioned that the provisions of section 163 must not be used 
to oppress the majority. 
304 See 5.7.1.1 (e) below for a discussion of the position of majority or controlling shareholders. 
305 Compare the definition of ‘shareholder’ in section 1 of the Act with the definition of a ‘shareholder’ 
in section 57 of the Act for purposes of Part F of Chapter 2 of the Act dealing with the formation, 
administration and dissolution of companies. 
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particular in terms of section 163 of the Act is now considered.306 
(b) The definition of shareholder  
Section 1 of the Act defines a ‘shareholder’ as a holder of a share issued by the 
company and whose name has been entered as such in the securities register of 
the company, irrespective of whether the securities are certificated or uncertificated. 
This definition of a shareholder corresponds with the definition given to a ‘member’ 
in section 103 of the previous Act. The legislator does not use the term ‘member’, 
as the case was in terms of the previous Act. The definition of a shareholder in 
section 1 of the Act will apply unless the Act provides otherwise for purposes of 
other chapters, parts or provisions of the Act.307 
(c) The extended definition of a shareholder 
Part F of Chapter 2 of the Act deals with the governance of companies. For 
purposes of Part F of the Act, the definition of ‘shareholder’ in section 1 has an 
extended meaning.308 The definition of a shareholder in section 1 of the Act is 
extended by section 57 (1) to ‘a person who is entitled to exercise any voting rights 
in relation to a company, irrespective of the form, title or nature of the securities to 
which those voting rights are attached’.309 This definition of a shareholder only 
applies to Part F of Chapter of the Act. 
 
                                                 
306 See 5.7.1.1 (c) below for a discussion of the definition of a ‘shareholder’ in section 57 of the Act 
for purposes of Part F of Chapter 2 of the Act. 
307 See, for example, section 57 of the Act for purposes of Part F of Chapter 2 of the Act. 
308 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 57(1). 
309 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 356. 
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(d) The definition of a shareholder for purposes of section 163 of the 
Act 
Chapter 7 of the Act consists of Parts A to F. Section 163 is contained in Part B that 
regulates the right to seek specific remedies. In contrast with Part F of Chapter 2, 
Part B of Chapter 7 does not contain a specific provision defining a shareholder for 
purposes of this specific part in the Act. Therefore, unless the Act specifically 
provides otherwise, the default definition of a ‘shareholder’ in section 1 applies to 
Part B of Chapter 7 of the Act.310 This has the result that for purposes of section 163 
the legislature chose to give term shareholder a narrow meaning for purposes of 
Part B of Chapter 7 compared with the definition of the same term in Part F of 
Chapter 2 of the Act.311 The implication of this is that a shareholder whose name 
does not appear on the securities register will be unable to make use or rely on 
section 163 for relief. This is because the entering of the name of the shareholder 
                                                 
310 Under the previous Act a person must have been a ‘member’ to have standing for purposes of 
section 252. Who constituted a ‘member’ was determined with reference to section 103 of the 
previous Act. This occasionally invited the argument that the description of a member in section 103 
should not be regarded as a definition of the term ‘member’ as it does not fall within the section 1 of 
the Act containing the definitions of the Act. This argument was rejected by the court in Smyth and 
Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [23]-[26] and Smyth and Others v 
Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA) [42]. 
311 Such a narrow approach to who is entitled to approach a court for relief in terms of section 163 is 
not new in South African company law. See the approach taken by the court in Smyth and Others v 
Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) where the court considered who is a ‘member’ 
for purposes of section 252 of the previous Act. The definition of a ‘member’ in section 103 of the 
previous Act is substantially similar to the definition of a shareholder in section 1 of the Act. Section 
103 of the previous Act defined a member as follows: - 
‘103 Who are members of a company 
(1) The subscribers of the memorandum of a company shall be deemed to have 
agreed to become members of a company upon its incorporation, and shall 
forthwith be entered as members in its register of members. 
(2) Every other person who agrees to become a member of a company and whose 
name is entered in its register of members, shall be a member of the company.’ 
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in a company’s register of securities is a prerequisite for purposes of the definition 
of a shareholder in section 1 and subsequently for having standing for purposes of 
section 163 of the Act.312 
(e) Majority shareholders 
The remedy is section 163 is not limited or restricted to minority shareholders 
although it would usually be utilised by a minority shareholder because of his or her 
position in the company.313 In Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape 
Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others314 the court noted that the application of 
the predecessor of section 163, namely, section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973, was not only available to minority shareholders but could be applied in 
instances where all shareholders have equal voting control.315 However, the court 
in Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others316 cautioned that the 
provisions of section 163 should not be used to oppress the majority.317 
 
 
                                                 
312 For a similar remark in the context of section 103 of the previous Act see Smyth and Others v 
Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [17]-[19]. 
313 See 5.5.3 above. See also SJ Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur met 
Besondere Verwysing na die Interne Maatskappyverband (1969) (unpublished LLD thesis; 
University of South Africa) 399-411 for a discussion of forms of control that shareholders can 
exercise within the company structure. 
314 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
315 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [51] and [77]. 
316 [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA). 
317 [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [32]. See also Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [64] where the court noted that in evaluating the fairness of 
conduct ‘the principle of majority rule and the binding nature of the company’s constitution as its 
starting point’. See further Knipe and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 
(FB) [31]. In Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) 
the court also made reference to the separate juristic personality of a company. 
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5.7.1.2 Persons excluded from the definition of a shareholder for purposes 
of section 163 of the Act 
(a)  Introduction 
This definition excludes beneficial shareholders (or owners)318 or persons such as 
curators or executors from acting as applicants in terms of section 163.319 This 
would leave beneficial shareowners without a remedy or a person who has as a 
result of unfair prejudicial conduct parted with his or her shares.320 To interpret the 
definition of a shareholder in section 1 to include a beneficial shareholder (or owner) 
could be regarded as judicial legislation which falls beyond the power of a court.321 
A court is entrusted with the duty imposed by the Constitution to interpret legislation 
and not to create legislation.322  
(b)  The criticism against limiting section 252 of the previous Act to 
registered members 
Oosthuizen criticised the provisions relating to standing under section 252 of the 
                                                 
318 See Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA) [54]-[55] where 
the court considered the definition of a member in section 103 and the provisions of section 252 of 
the previous Act to find that a beneficial shareowner does have standing to rely on the oppression 
remedy. 
319 See MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
109 who also argued that the definition of a member for purposes of section 252 of the previous Act 
was too restrictive as it excluded curators and executors. 
320 See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 
105, 110 who demonstrates and criticises the position under section 252 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 where the purchaser of shares cannot rely upon the remedy in circumstances where the 
name of the purchaser is not entered into the register of members. 
321 However, see 5.7.1.2 (b) below. 
322 See Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [30] and [48]; LD 
v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others; SD v LD (40036/16; 35926/16) [2018] 
ZAGPJHC 69 (23 February 2018) [51]; Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) [182]. Note that all 
these cases have been decided in terms of section 252 of the previous Act. 
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previous Act.323 He argued that limiting or restricting standing only to members 
whose names appear on the register of members of the company is too formalistic 
a requirement that ignores the reality that the executors or curators of estates should 
be able to rely on the provision.324 
In Lourence and Others v Ferela (Pty) Ltd and Others (No 1)325 the court held 
that a person who is not registered as a member of a company does not have 
standing for purposes of section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.326 The 
applicants in Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another327 failed to 
persuade the court that the definition of a member for purposes of section 252 
included a beneficial shareholder.328 However, in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others329 the court held that although the second 
applicant who sold all his shares in terms of a sale and transfer agreement was not 
a registered shareholder at the time of the application in terms of section 163, the 
second applicant ‘may have an interest in the repayment of the purchase price in 
                                                 
323 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
109-10. 
324 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
109-10. 
325 1998 (3) SA 281 (T). 
326 The case dealt with the situation where the applicants inherited shares. 
327 Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP). 
328 See Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [27] read with [67] 
where this argument was rejected by the court. The court [71] read with [76] further held that the 
economic interest that a shareholder has in shares did not entitle him to rely on section 252 of the 
previous Act when those shares are registered in the name of a nominee. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal upheld the last mentioned judgment in Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 
2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA). The court further held [44] that no ‘utterly glaring’ absurdities arise when the 
definition of a ‘member’ is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning that excludes beneficial 
shareholders from the definition. 
329 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
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terms of a wider interpretation of section 163 of the new Companies Act’.330 It is 
submitted that the court incorrectly extended standing to the second applicant as 
he was not a shareholder of the company anymore and the definition of a 
shareholder for purposes of section 163 did not allow for the inclusion of a former 
shareholder.331 
(c) Conclusion 
An analysis of the meaning of shareholder revealed that creditors, employees, the 
holders of debentures, curators or executors of estates and shareholders whose 
names are not registered in the securities register of the company do not have 
standing to apply for relief in terms of section 163. It has been settled under section 
252 of the previous Act that a court does not have a discretion to extend standing 
for purposes of the last mentioned provision to persons not identified by the section. 
In this regard legislative intervention is required as this matter has not been settled 
in section 163 of the Act. Legislative intervention is required to provide certainty on 
who enjoys standing for purposes of section 163 and to address the criticism raised 
to standing in terms of section 252 of the previous Act which still applies to the 
requirements for standing in terms of section 163 of the Act.332 
 
 
 
                                                 
330 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [26]. 
331 See 5.7.1.1 above. 
332 See 6.3.3.6 below for recommendations in this regard. 
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5.7.1.3 The director as an applicant 
 
(a)  Introduction 
 
One of the important differences between the formulation of section 163 of the Act 
and section 252 of the previous Act is that the current remedy is extended to a 
director.333 Hurter argued that the requirement under section 252 of the previous 
Act that the member should have been prejudiced in his or her capacity as member 
was too restrictive and failed take cognisance of the business realities of a 
company.334 It is submitted that the extension of the remedy to directors must be 
viewed as an acknowledgement by the legislature that, in some instances, 
oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct or alternatively an unfair disregard of the 
interests of a shareholder may in certain specific circumstances be prejudicial to 
someone in a capacity other than that of a shareholder.335 Although it is not required 
by section 163, early indications are that courts will require applicants in terms of 
section 163 to prove that the conduct prejudiced the applicant (or plaintiff) in his or 
                                                 
333 Section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 made the statutory personal action only available 
to members of the company. See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van 
Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse regspraak’ 
(1988) 2 TSAR 268, 273 where he suggested that standing for purposes of section 252 of the 
previous Act be extended to persons other than members. The author (273) cited directors, 
debenture holders, creditors and officers of a company as persons to whom standing can be 
extended in recognition of the fact that a shareholder may suffer prejudice in a capacity other than 
than that of a shareholder. See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die 
Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 118 proposes that it may be helpful if the personal remedy is 
extended to a member in his or her capacity as director or officer of the company. 
334 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 389. 
335 See also the interpretation of A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South 
African Company’ (2013) 38:2 JJS 58, 71 who argues that a director should demonstrate that he or 
she has been prejudiced in his or her capacity as director of the company. See FHI Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 760-63. 
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her capacity as shareholder or director.336  
(b) The removal of a director 
(i) The legitimate expectation to participate in the management of a 
company 
The prejudice suffered by the director is not necessarily prejudice suffered by a 
director in his or her capacity as such, but is prejudicial to him or her in the capacity 
as a member or is unfairly prejudicial to other members.337 The removal of a director 
may be prejudicial to a shareholder This will usually be the case where a director is 
excluded from the management or board of a company in the face of an agreement 
or legitimate expectation338 that he or she will have the right to participate in the 
management of the business and affairs of the company in which he or she holds 
shares. It is submitted that extending standing for purposes of section 163 of the 
Act to directors has neutralised the argument that the removal of a director is 
prejudice suffered in the capacity as shareholder.339 This argument had the potential 
                                                 
336 See also the interpretation of A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South 
African Company’ (2013) 38:2 JJS 58, 71. See FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd 
ed, 2012) 760-63. For a discussion of the capacity in which shareholders should be prejudiced see 
5.7.1.4 (c) below. 
337 See Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (K) 531 where the court held that 
the removal of a director may be prejudicial to the interests of shareholders.  
338 See 5.7.6 below for a discussion of the protection of legitimate expectations. 
339 This is because courts require that a shareholder must have suffered prejudice in his or her 
capacity as shareholder. If a similar approach is adopted in relation to a director as an applicant or 
plaintiff, the consequence for purposes of section 163 of the Act will be that a shareholder will only 
be able to rely on prejudice suffered in his or her capacity as a shareholder and a director will only 
be able to rely on section 163 if he or she suffered prejudice in his or her capacity as director. It is 
demonstrated below that the emphasis should rather have been that a shareholder could experience 
prejudice in other capacities as a shareholder. See 5.7.1.3 (c) for a discussion of the requirement 
that a shareholder or director has to suffere prejudice in a particular capacity. It will also be 
demonstrated that this approach by the courts neutralised the efforts of the legislature to 
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of leaving both the shareholder and director without the benefit of the unfair 
prejudice remedy. 
(ii) The protection of a director’s employment interests 
Some directors may be executive directors while others are appointed as non-
executive directors. One should be mindful of the fact that section 163 provides 
protection to a director as an officer of a company and not necessarily to an 
employee. It is further doubtful whether it was the intention of the legislature to 
provide the remedy to a director only because of his or her removal from the board 
or to protect an executive director against unfair labour practices or unfair dismissals 
that are regulated by the Labour Relations Act.340 A director will not be able to rely 
on section 163 to protect or enforce his or her rights under an employment contract. 
It could not have been the intention of the legislature to provide additional protection 
to an executive director’s employment rights which are specifically provided for in 
specific legislation such as the Labour Relations Act.341 The purpose of section 163 
could not have been to protect the employment interests of a director. 
(iii) The duty to manage 
The directors of a board have a duty to act collectively in the management of the 
business and affairs of the company.342 To be able to participate meaningfully in the 
                                                 
acknowledge that shareholders may be prejudiced in other capacities related to his or her 
shareholding. 
340 66 of 1995. See also PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 
17, 2018) for commentary in this regard on section 163. 
341 66 of 1995. See specifically section 5(4)(b)(i)(bb) which clearly states that when the provisions of 
the Act and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 cannot be applied concurrently, the provisions of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 will prevail. 
342 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 66(1). 
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management and affairs of a company, directors should have access to all relevant 
information pertaining to the company. Frustrating or denying a director such 
information may constitute unfair prejudicial conduct for purposes of section 163.343 
This would enable a director to argue that he or she is prejudiced in the 
capacity of a director when the conduct of the affairs of the company is in breach of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of the 
company.344 It can be specifically argued that a director may rely on the provisions 
of section 163 in the event of interference with his or her right to manage the 
business and affairs of the company345 or in circumstances where the company is 
in financial distress346 and the company fails to take the necessary steps in terms 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.347 
(c) Concluding remarks on the standing of a director for purposes of 
section 163 
 
The extension of standing for purposes of section 163 to persons other than 
shareholders is in line with developments in other jurisdictions evaluated in this 
thesis. However, the provision of standing to directors has little value for two 
reasons. Firstly, it seems that courts will require a director to prove that he or she 
                                                 
343 See also 5.9.10 below. 
344 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
[17.5]. 
345 See Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) where the applicant argued that 
the respondents frustrated or denied him to fulfil his fiduciary duties to the company. However, the 
court found ([33]-[34]) that the applicant failed to present the factual evidence to prove such 
allegation. 
346 See specifically 5.9.4 below. 
347 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
[17.5]. 
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has suffered prejudice in his or her capacity as director. Such an approach will 
restrict the application of the remedy. In this respect the legislature should rather 
have acknowledged expressly that a shareholder could experience prejudice in 
other capacities related to his or her shareholding. The prejudicial conduct towards 
a director may in fact prejudicially affect the interests of shareholders. Secondly, 
directors often experience prejudice in the form of the exclusion from the 
management of a company. If such exclusion entails the removal of the director 
from the board, he or she will not have standing for purposes of section 163 of the 
Act as such a person will not be a director anymore.348 This will especially be the 
case when such a removal has been effected in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act, but was in breach of a legitimate expectation. The provisions would 
therefore be of little value to a director who does not also hold shares in the relevant 
company or is not representing a specific shareholder on the board. 
5.7.1.4  Prejudice and the capacity in which a person has suffered unfair 
prejudice 
(a)  Introduction  
A distinction must be drawn between prejudice to the interests of an applicant as a 
result or consequence of the application of normal corporate law principles, to which 
an applicant agreed to prior to joining the particular corporate structure, and conduct 
or consequences which can be regarded as being unfairly prejudicial.349 A 
                                                 
348 See 6.3.3.6 below for recommendations in respect of former directors of a company. 
349 See 5.5 and more specifically 5.5.3 above read with 5.7.3 below. For example, a shareholder 
cannot claim that the he or she is unfairly prejudiced by being constantly be outvoted by the majority. 
In Pakade NO and Others v Lukhanji Leisure (Pty) Ltd 2017 JDR 0449 (ECG) [31] the court stated, 
footnotes omitted, that ‘[f]urthermore, a Court faced with an application of this nature must also not 
easily enter into the commercial space and must respect the majority rule. This is so because by 
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shareholder must not only prove that the conduct or the result complained of is 
prejudicial but must prove that it is unfairly prejudicial.350 The nature of prejudice 
that a shareholder has to prove for purposes of section 163 of the Act is considered 
next.351 The controversial requirement that a shareholder (and now director) must 
suffer prejudice in his or her capacity as such is also evaluated.352 
(b) Prejudice  
(i) The nature of prejudice  
For purposes of section 163 a wide interpretation is to be given to prejudice.353 The 
prejudice suffered by a shareholder is usually of a financial nature. The financial 
prejudice suffered can take the form of a loss in the value of shareholding, but may 
include a loss of income, dividends, profits and remuneration.354 Prejudice or 
                                                 
becoming a shareholder in a company, person undertakes by his contract to be bound by the 
decisions of the prescribed majority, if those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at 
in accordance with the law, even where they adversely affect his own rights’. See also Knipe and 
Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [31]. See further Count Gotthard 
SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [16.3] where the court held 
that ‘[c]orporate fairness is not requiring lawfulness to override unfairness of consequences, but is 
recognition of corporate context and its basic democratic principle of majority rule as a particle 
concept of fairness’. See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die 
Maatskappyreg (slot)’ (1981) TSAR 223, 226-27.  
350 See Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [29] and [31]; Count Gotthard 
SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [90.5]; De Sousa and Another 
v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 36298 (GJ) [30] and [46]; 
Oosthuizen v Oosthuizen and Others [2017] JOL 39213 (WCC) [50]. 
351 See 5.7.1.4 (b) below. 
352 See 5.7.1.4 (c) below. 
353 See Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [63] where the 
court stated that the concept or term ‘prejudice’ should be given a wide interpretation. See also 
Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA) where the judgment of 
the court a quo was upheld. 
354 Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [26]. 
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damage may also be suffered by a shareholder when the conduct complained of 
unfairly prejudices a debt owed by a company to the relevant shareholder.355 It will 
be difficult to prove prejudice if a shareholder cannot prove financial damage. This 
will be the case where the interests of a shareholder are unfairly disregarded.356 
(ii) Conduct affecting all shareholders 
It is uncertain whether reliance may be placed on the remedy in section 163 of the 
Act where all the shareholders of a company have been affected by the same unfair 
prejudicial conduct. There is authority available in support of the possible reliance 
on the unfair prejudice remedy in circumstances where the conduct complained of 
prejudiced all the shareholders of a company.357 This is because all the 
                                                 
355 Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [26]. 
356 Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [26]. See also 5.7.3.3 below for 
a more detailed discussion of the concept unfair disregard of interests. 
357 See the comments made by the court regarding section 252 of the previous Act in De Sousa and 
Another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 36298 (GJ) in 
considering an exception to the particulars of claim to the plaintiff. The court remarked [28] that ‘there 
is no warrant for the proposition that section 252 does not apply where prejudice is suffered by all 
members’ and further stated that ‘[i]t is artificial to reason that there is no unfair prejudice to a member 
or several members if all members are prejudiced’. See also L van Rooyen ‘Versuim om Dividend te 
Verklaar: Onredelik Benadelende Optrede of Likwidasiegrond’ (1989) TSAR 706, 711 who criticised 
the approach by English courts that the oppression or unfair prejudice remedy did not find application 
when the conduct complained of affects all shareholders. According to Van Rooyen (711) such an 
approach is contrary to the opinion of most authors who ventured an opinion on the interpretation 
and application of the unfair prejudice remedy. According to the author (711) such an interpretation 
may lead to ‘absurde en onaanvaarbare resultate’ and ignores the fact that ‘die gevaarlikste 
onderdrukkers juis diegene is wat kan bekostig om hulself terselfdertyd te benadeel’. See further MJ 
Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyreg (slot)’ (1981) TSAR 223, 225 
who argued that oppression or unfair prejudice does not have to contain an element of discrimination 
by stating ‘[n]ietemin is dit duidelik dat diskriminasie nie ŉ sine qua non vir onderdrukking is nie. 
Onderdrukking kan derhalwe bestaan selfs al word alle aandeelhouers gelykelik benadeel’ 
(footnotes omitted). Oosthuizen (226) further argued that oppression may be present even if the 
oppressors do not gain or strive to gain a personal or financial benefit. 
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shareholders’ rights may be affected by the same conduct, but because 
shareholders have the same rights the various interests of shareholders may have 
the effect that the nature and manner of prejudice experienced by some 
shareholders may differ.358 However, in the context of section 163 of the Act, it may 
also be argued based on the strict wording of section 163 that the remedy may not 
be available to a shareholder in instances where all the shareholders of a company 
suffered prejudice from the same conduct.359 
(c) The capacity in which the prejudice is suffered 
When a shareholder wishes to rely on section 163, the shareholder will have to 
prove that he or she has been prejudiced in his or her capacity as such.360 If this 
approach of the courts is applied consistently it would also include that a director 
                                                 
358 See De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] 
JOL 36298 (GJ) [21] read with [28] and [36] where the court in considering the merits of an exception 
to a plaintiff’s claim refused to accept an argument that a shareholder cannot argue that he or she 
suffered prejudice for purposes of section 252 of the previous Act, as all the shareholders were 
affected by the same conduct. The fact that the prejudice is committed against a company did not 
preclude a shareholder from relying on section 252 of the previous Act [28]. This approach is similar 
to the approach in England - see 2.6 above. 
359 See PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) for 
comments on section 163 of the Act. He is of the view that despite the fact that the phrase ‘to some 
part of the members of the company, may’ has previously been interpreted to include situations 
where all the shareholders has been prejudiced equally, section 163(1) of the Act specifically refers 
‘a shareholder’ as an applicant. He further argues that such an interpretation may be regarded too 
restrictive when viewed in light of the objective to balance the rights of shareholders and directors in 
section 7(i) of the Act  
360 See Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP) [17.5]-[17.6] and [17.12]. In [17.12] where the court held ‘[a]s the applicant is relying 
specifically thereon I do not find it necessary to decide whether all the phrases must be read as a 
composite whole, but I do find that interests unfairly prejudiced must result in commercial unfairness 
affecting the applicant in such capacity’. See also the commentary in JL Yeats et al Commentary on 
the Companies Act of 2008 (1st ed Juta 2018) on section 163 of the Act. 
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should prove that he or she has been prejudiced in his or her capacity as director.  
 The strict application of the requirement that a shareholder must be 
prejudiced in his or capacity as shareholder is open to criticism.361 The effect of such 
an approach can also be illustrated with reference to recent case law. Visser Sitrus 
(Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others362 serves as an example where 
the seller of the shares brought an application in terms of section 163 to compel the 
board of the company to record the purchaser’s name in the securities register of 
the company. On the wording of section 163(1), the purchaser in Visser Sitrus (Pty) 
Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 363 did not have standing to rely on 
section 163.364 It is important to consider the argument of Oosthuizen who argued 
that the seller of the shares would not be successful in relying on the provisions of 
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 as the seller of the shares would be 
unable to demonstrate that he or she suffered prejudice in his capacity as a member 
                                                 
361 See Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in Die Maatskappyreg 
– Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 272. Van Rooyen (273) 
explains, for example, that it is often very difficult to make a clear distinction between the capacity of 
a member (shareholder) as shareholder or as director. This is especially the case when a 
shareholder is removed as a director from the board (273). Such a removal causes the shareholder 
to lose his ability to participate in the management of the company and may also deprive a 
shareholder from his or her income from the company (273). The shareholder often has no choice 
but to either dispose of his share on unfavourable terms or resort to liquidation, both of which options 
are often undesirable (273). Van Rooyen (274) suggested that one approach of alleviating this 
problem is to allow a member (shareholder) to approach the court irrespective of the capacity in 
which the member (shareholder) has been prejudiced. The author (274 read with 276 and 277) 
further supports a judicial approach where a wide interpretation is given to the interests of a member 
which will have the effect that a shareholder will have the right to obtain relief when interests related 
to his or her capacity as shareholder are prejudiced. 
362 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
363 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
364 See 5.7.1, and more especially 5.7.1.1 above. 
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of the company as it would the purchaser of the shares that suffers the prejudice.365 
However, it may now be argued that based on the decisions in Smyth and Others v 
Investec Bank Ltd and Another366 the interests of the nominee (for example, the 
seller) that may be subject to prejudice may include the contractual and economic 
interests of the beneficial owner.367 The argument of Oosthuizen368 on the 
requirement that a shareholder must be prejudiced in his capacity as such remains 
relevant in other contexts and in light of the judgment in Count Gotthard SA Pilati v 
Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others369 which required that a shareholder 
should prove that he suffered prejudice in his capacity as shareholder.370  
A further dimension of the judicial requirement that a shareholder must be 
prejudiced in his or her capacity as such, is the question whether it excludes a 
shareholder’s reliance on the unfair prejudice remedy when a wrong is committed 
                                                 
365 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
110.  
366 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) and 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA). 
367 For a discussion of the position of beneficial owners regarding their standing for purposes of 
section 163 of the Act see 5.7.1.2 above. See also FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
(2nd ed, 2012) 759 who submit that a person may be able to rely to on section 163 if the conduct of 
the affairs of the company is conducted in a manner which prevents an applicant to obtain registration 
and such prevention is regarded as oppressive or unfairly prejudicial towards the applicant. For a 
more detailed discussion of the application of the unfair prejudice remedy in the context of the 
registration of shares see 5.9.12 below where a misalignment between the requirements for standing 
for purposes of section 163 of the Act and the available relief is illustrated. 
368 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
110. 
369 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP). 
370 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
[17.5]. See also the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) who points out that section 163 of the Act does not require that 
the interests of an applicant must be affected or unfairly prejudiced in a particular capacity. 
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against the company and the shareholder is indirectly prejudiced.371 The position 
must be considered in light of the fact that a company has separate legal personality 
and the availability of the statutory derivative action.372 Allowing a shareholder relief 
based on wrongs committed against the company may have some undesirable 
consequences.373 However, on the other hand the utilisation of the derivative action 
may not always address the underlying unfair prejudice suffered by the 
shareholders of a company.374 In light of the fact that the courts enjoy a wide 
discretion under section 163(2) of the Act and that the derivative action may in some 
instances be unable to provide the required redress, it appears justified that relief 
may be granted to shareholders based on wrongs committed against the 
company.375 
                                                 
371 Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – 
Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 278. 
372 See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die 
Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 277-78. 
For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative 
actions in the Act see 5.9.15 below. 
373 Leon van Rooyen Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – 
Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 279 footnote 45 points out 
that companies may be entangled in multiple legal proceedings which could have been more 
effectively disposed of in terms of derivative proceedings. Such an approach further exposes the 
wrongdoers to liability to the company and the aggrieved shareholders. Some forms of relief may 
affect the interests of creditors and impact of the principle of the legal personality of a company. It 
may also lead to the redundancy of the derivative action. 
374 Leon van Rooyen Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – 
Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 281. 
375 Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – 
Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 280 explains that a court 
would for purposes of section 252 of the Act take into to consideration the status and nature of the 
relationship between the members (shareholders), the prospect of the parties working together in 
future; the reasonableness for requiring a shareholder to remain a member (shareholder) of the 
company; and the fact that the investment of the member (shareholder) are for all practical purposes 
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5.7.2 The jurisdictional grounds in section 163(1) 
5.7.2.1 The formulation and interpretation of section 163 of the Act 
After an applicant (or plaintiff) has satisfied the standing requirements for purposes 
of section 163, a shareholder or director must prove the jurisdictional requirements 
of section 163(1). These jurisdictional requirements require that a shareholder or 
director must prove a result or conduct that is oppressive, or/and is unfairly 
prejudicial to or unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.376 To be entitled to 
relief in terms of section 163 an applicant should place ‘clear evidence’377 before a 
court of oppressive, unfairly prejudicial conduct or conduct that unfairly disregards 
the interests of a shareholder or director.378 When a shareholder or director is able 
to prove the jurisdictional requirements he or she would be entitled to the relief 
deemed fit by the court.379  
 
                                                 
locked in the company as factors in the exercise of its discretion to grant relief of a personal nature. 
Van Rooyen (282) argues that although there are instances where the provision of personal relief is 
justified when wrongs are committed against a company, it is undesirable that the provisions of the 
statutory personal remedy be invoked in every instance where a wrong is committed against a 
company. See Civils 2000 Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Black Empowerment Partner Civils 2000 (Pty) Ltd 
and others [2011] 3 All SA 215 (WCC) [21] where the court held, in dismissing an exception to the 
particulars of claim of the plaintiff, that ‘the breach of their fiduciary duty on the part of the directors 
who represent the first defendant on the board of the company is conduct of the company as 
contemplated under section 252 of the Act, is legally sound. In my view, there is therefore no merit 
in the first ground of exception raised by first and third respondents’. The last mentioned defendant 
argued [12] that the plaintiff could not successfully rely on section 252 of the previous Act, as the 
conduct complained of, a breach of the fiduciary duties of directors, does not constitute conduct by 
the company. 
376 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(1)(a)-(c). 
377 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [83]. 
378 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [55]. 
379 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2). 
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In drafting the provisions of section 163 the legislature made use of wide and 
open concepts. Section 163 requires a liberal interpretation to advance the 
remedy.380 The use of wording of this nature in this section does create some 
degree legal uncertainty. One will not always be able to establish exactly what types 
of conduct or results will be met with the application of section 163 by only 
considering the wording of the provision. Weighing against the degree of uncertainty 
created by the wording of section 163, the provision dresses courts with the freedom 
to consider the facts and circumstances of each case and to tailor the relief to fit the 
unique aspects of a particular case.381 An analysis of judgments delivered in terms 
of section 163 reveals that an interpretation that advances the remedy is preferred 
to an interpretation which restricts the application of the remedy.382 
In summary, a shareholder or director may rely on this section if the conduct 
of the company or a related person383 has had a result that is oppressive or is 
unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.384 The 
grounds on which a shareholder or a director may rely are stipulated in section 
                                                 
380 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [52]-[53]; 
Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [53] where 
it was held that the provisions in section 163 are wider than that of section 252 of the Companies Act 
61 of 1973. Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [60]; Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 
3 All SA 111 (SCA) [26]; De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) [62]. 
381 See Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg 
– Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 285 for a similar 
argument in the context of section 252 of the previous Act. 
382 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [52]; 
and [53]; Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [60] and [61]. 
383 See definition of related person in section 2 of the Act. 
384 See specifically section 163(1)(a) of the Act. 
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163(1)(a)-(c). These provisions are evaluated below.385 
5.7.2.2 The jurisdictional requirements of section 163(1) of the Act 
(a) Section 163(1)(a) 
(i) The tense in which section 163(1)(a) is formulated 
It is important to notice the tenses used in the formulation of section 163(1). In 
particular section 163(1)(a) requires conduct that ‘has had a result’ that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of an 
applicant. It is clear from the wording of section 163(1)(a) that the conduct 
complained of must have produced a result at the time of the legal proceedings.386 
This formulation of the provision has the further important implication of excluding 
the application of section 163(1)(a) to threatening conduct.387 This implies that 
                                                 
385 See 5.7.2.2 below. 
386 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [52]-[53]. The court in Kudumane [53] specifically stated that there are ‘no 
reason why there cannot be a continuing state of affairs which constitutes the complaint – after all 
an act may be repeated; an omission may be enduring; the current state of affairs will certainly have 
commenced in the past and may continue indefinitely’. See also Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein 
Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.6]. See also 5.6.2.2 (a)(ii) for a 
further discussion of the result-requirement. 
387 See Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [52]. A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in 
South African Company’ (2013) 38:2 JJS 58, 68-69 argues that the provisions of section 252 spoke 
to the conduct complained of. The author (68) further argues that one of the weakness created by 
the approach is that an applicant first has to wait for the effects of the conduct complained of to 
materialise before such an applicant can approach a court to seek relief in terms of section 252 of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. See also 5.2.4.3 (d) above and 5.9.2.3 below for a similar criticism 
against the provisions of section 252 of the previous Act. See further 5.9.2.3 and 5.9.2.4 below for a 
discussion of the application of section 163 for protection against future and/ threatening conduct. 
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threatening conduct is not covered by the provision.388 However, conduct which has 
materialised a result and is continuing into the future is not excluded from relief 
under section 163.389  
(ii) The result requirement 
A reading of section 163 also raises some other interesting questions. In the context 
of section 163(1)(a) it is specifically provided that the conduct of the company or 
related person should have had a result as a consequence that is oppressive or is 
unfairly prejudicial to the applicant.390 In Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd and Others391 the court held that the exposure of the applicant to an 
unreasonable business risk is a result for purposes of section 163.392 The court in 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd 
and Others393 held that the uncertainty regarding the identity and the validity of the 
                                                 
388 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [52]. See the criticism of E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre 
Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; 
University of South Africa) 350 on the failure of section 252 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to 
provide for relief against threatening conduct. 
389 Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [53] and [55]. 
390 See Pakade NO and Others v Lukhanji Leisure (Pty) Ltd 2017 JDR 0449 (ECG) [28]; Peel and 
Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [46] read with [53]; 
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [57]; Knipe and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 
52 (FB) [31]. See in this regard also Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.6] and [19] where the court held that it is the effect of the 
conduct that is crucial to determine whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 163(1) are met.  
391 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
392 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [46] read with [53]. 
393 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
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appointment of the directors of a company can be regarded as a result for purposes 
of section 163.394  
The result requirement in the first part of section 163(1)(a) appears not to be 
a requirement if a shareholder or director argues that the conduct complained of 
unfairly disregards the interests of the shareholder or director which further creates 
uncertainty as what will be regarded as a result of purposes of section 163(1)(a).395 
According to Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others396 
the grounds in section 163(1) must be read as a whole.397 If such an approach is 
followed it is implied that section 163(1)(b) and (c) would require a result although 
these sections do not expressly make reference to a result.398 If such an approach 
is not followed the impression may be created that relief may be provided based 
only on the nature of the act or omission committed without taking into consideration 
the nature of the consequences flowing from such conduct.399  
Until the legislature intervenes or until the Supreme Court of Appeal or 
Constitutional Court delivers a judgment dealing specifically with this aspect, the 
position remains uncertain. It will be recommended below that some legislative 
amendments be introduced to clarify the position and to provide guidance on the 
                                                 
394 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [57]. 
395 Section 163(1)(b) and (c) refers to the manner in which the conduct complained of took place. 
See also 5.7.2.2 (b) and (c) below. 
396 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
397 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54]. 
398 Christiaan Swart and Marianne Lombard ‘Vonnisbespreking: Statutêre Aandeelhouers-
beskerming: Die Geregtelike Beoordeling van Onderdrukkende en Onredelik Benadelende 
Direksiebesluite Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 
(WCC)’ (2015) 12:1 Litnet Akademies 387, 393-94. 
399 The relationship between the nature of the act or omission (conduct) and the nature of the results 
or consequences flowing therefrom is considered in 5.7.3.6 below. 
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application of this provision in accordance with a principled approach.400 It is 
submitted that the result requirement rather refers to the fact that a court must apply 
an objective test to determine whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 163 
had been proven by a shareholder or director.401 Such a test will make the subjective 
intentions of the parties involved irrelevant, but may have an effect on the nature of 
relief that may be granted.402 
(b) Section 163(1)(b) 
The wording of section 163(1)(b) follows substantially the same wording as section 
163(1)(a). However, section 163(1)(b) does differ from section 163(1)(a) in two 
respects, namely the tense in which section 163(1)(b) is formulated and the 
reference in this section to the manner with which conduct is committed.  
(i) Tense in which section 163(1)(b) is formulated 
 
Section 163(1)(b) applies to when the business of a company ‘is being or has been 
carried on or conducted’ in a particular way. The tense in which this provision is 
formulated differs from the tense in which section 163(1)(a) is formulated. It is 
                                                 
400 See 6.3.4 below. 
401 See also Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [31] read with [78]; De 
Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 36298 
(GJ) [30]. 
402 See De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) [70] where the court made 
specific reference to the mala fide conduct of the respondents. It should be noted that the applicant 
in this case disputed the lawfulness of her retrenchment and the implementation of the deemed 
offers in terms of the shareholders’ agreement. The applicant sought an interdict to preserve her 
rights in restraining the implementation of a shareholders’ agreement pending the outcome of the 
proceedings instituted by the applicant. The court held that the applicant had a right not to be 
unlawfully excluded from favourable transactions. This judgment therefore does not serve as 
authority that the subjective intention of the respondent should be taken into consideration when 
determining whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 163 have been met. 
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difficult to explain the inconsistent use of tenses in the formulation of the grounds 
stipulated in section 163(1)(a)-(c). 
(ii) The manner with which the business of a company is conducted  
While section 163(1)(a) required a result, section 163(1)(b) only refers to the manner 
in which the business of a company is conducted. A shareholder or director may be 
entitled to relief when the manner in which the business a company is conducted 
can be described as oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to or in unfair disregard of 
the interests of an applicant. Such an approach will result that conduct may be found 
to be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial without considering the effects or 
consequences flowing from the conduct complained of. This approach will also be 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the court in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede 
Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others403 requiring that the grounds in section 163(1) 
must be read as a whole.404 
(iii) The rationale of section 163(1)(b) and the reference to the business 
of a company 
The rationale for the introduction of this ground in section 163 may be viewed 
against the judgment in Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd405 
in terms of section 252 of the previous Act. In this case the court held that it did not 
have the jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs or ordinary running of a 
company.406 This approach of the court is problematic as it establishes the principle 
                                                 
403 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). 
404 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) above. 
405 1979 (3) SA 170 (W). 
406 Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 170 (W) 177. In this case a 
group of minority shareholders attempted to obtain an interdict against the holding of a meeting for 
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that a court would never interdict certain conduct of a company as it would regarded 
as as an interference with the internal affairs of a company over which the court has 
no jurisdiction.407 Viewed against the purpose of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy and the modern approaches to the interpretation of statutory unfair 
prejudice remedies, the judgment in Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South 
Africa) Ltd408 can be seen as unjustifiably restrictive. It is submitted in light of the 
judgment in this case, that the purpose of section 163(1)(b) may be seen as 
disposing of any uncertainty regarding the power of a court to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a company by confirming in the section that a court now has the 
jurisdiction to do so in terms of section 163. However, this will only be done while 
taking established corporate law principles into consideration.  
It is further interesting to note that section 163(1)(b) refers to the business 
and not the ‘affairs’ of a company. It is unfortunate that the word ‘affairs’ or ‘business 
and affairs’ are not used in the section. The current use of ‘business’ in section 
163(1)(b) creates the impression that one has to differentiate between the ‘business’ 
of a company on the one hand and its ‘affairs’ on the other. Although there usually 
is an overlap between the affairs and the business of a company, the ‘affairs’ of a 
company are usually regarded as a wider concept as the ‘business’ of a company. 
(c) Section 163(1)(c) 
Section 163(1)(c) deals with the exercise of powers by a director or a prescribed 
officer of the company or a person related to the company. From this section it is 
                                                 
the purpose of obtaining approval in terms of section 228 of the previous Act to sell the company’s 
assets, pending an investigation by the Minister of Economic Affairs. 
407 See 5.9.2 below where such a reactive approach to prejudice is criticised.  
408 1979 (3) SA 170 (W). 
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clear that a complaint can be brought against a director or prescribed officer if the 
the powers entrusted to the particular director or prescribed officer are exercised in 
a manner that it is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the 
interests of the applicant. There is doubt whether this ground adds something more 
that is not already covered by the grounds in section 163(1)(a) and (b).409 In this 
regard it is argued that a corporate power will usually be exercised by a director or 
prescribed officer and such exercise of power is conduct by the company.410 
5.7.3 The concepts oppressive, unfair prejudicial or an unfair disregard 
of interests (commercial unfairness) 
5.7.3.1 Introduction  
The Act does not define the terms or concepts ‘oppressive’ or ‘unfairly prejudicial’ 
nor does it describe what constitutes an unfair disregard of the interests of a 
shareholder or director.411 Content should be given to the concepts in section 163 
of the Act through judicial interpretation. The meaning of these concepts or terms 
may be determined with reference to section 252 of the previous Act.412 However, 
the use of the terms or concepts ‘oppressive’ or ‘unfairly prejudicial’ or an ‘unfairly 
disregard of the interests’ of a shareholder or director in section 163 of the Act, 
                                                 
409 See Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) 
[53]. 
410 See, for example, Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 
179 (WCC) [53]. 
411 See also M Lehloenya and T Kgarabjang ‘Defining the Limits of the “Oppression Remedy” in the 
Wake of the Section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Grancy Properties Limited v Manala 
[2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA)’ (2015) 2 Obiter 511, 514 who argue that the definition of these terms is 
uncertain. 
412 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [60]. 
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differs from the terms and concepts used in section 252 of the previous Act to 
describe the conduct against which relief may be sought in terms of the last 
mentioned remedy. Section 252 of the previous Act referred to conduct that was 
‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’.413  
When interpreting legislative provisions, the rules of interpretation must be 
observed.414 One of the rules of statutory interpretation requires that each and every 
word of the relevant legislative provision must be given a meaning.415 When this 
rule is to be applied to section 163, a court should assign an individual meaning to 
the terms ‘oppressive’ and ‘unfairly prejudicial’ and ‘unfairly disregards of the 
interests’.416 Drawing from judgments in terms of section 252 of the previous Act the 
court in Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company 
(Pty) Ltd and Others417 described conduct that is covered by the provisions of the 
Act as conduct that can be described as ‘burdensome’, or deprives a minority 
shareholder from ‘a fair participation in the affairs of the company’, or conduct which 
is ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’ or conduct that is ‘doing them an injury 
in their business’. When one interprets the provisions and concepts of section 
163(1) one needs to pay specific attention to the use of term ‘oppressive’ in 
                                                 
413 It is important to note that the previous Act only used the term ‘oppressive’ in its heading and not 
within the body of the provision. It is argued below that the reintroduction of the term oppressive is 
unfortunate in light of the development of the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa and other 
jurisdictions. See 5.7.3.1 below. 
414 See in this regard 5.4 and 5.5 above. 
415 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [18]. See 
also NST Ferrochrome (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 2000 (3) SA 1040 (SCA) where 
the court held that when interpreting legislation effect should as far as possible be given to each 
word or phrase in order to avoid tautology. 
416 All these concepts are found in section 163(1)(a)-(c) of the Act. 
417 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [60]. 
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conjunction with concepts such unfairly prejudicial or an unfair disregard of the 
interests of an applicant. The use of the concepts ‘oppressive’, ‘unfairly prejudicial’ 
and an ‘unfair disregard’ is analysed below.  
5.7.3.2 Oppressive 
The previous Act only made reference to the term ‘oppressive’ in the heading of 
section 252. 418In contrast with section 252 of the previous Act, section 163 uses 
the term ‘oppressive’ in both the heading and text of the provision.419 The 
reintroduction and use of the term ‘oppressive’ is against the trend in other 
jurisdictions of moving away from using the term and replacing it with the term or 
concept of ‘unfairly prejudicial’ conduct.420 The use of the term ‘oppressive’ is also 
                                                 
418 See the commentary in JL Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (1st ed Juta 
2018) on section 163 of the Act. 
419 It is interesting to note that in section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 the term 
‘oppressive’ was the only term used to describe the conduct that an applicant could complain of. 
Section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 was the predecessor of section 252 of the previous 
Act. 
420 See Chapter 2 above for the position in England. However, see Chapter 3 above for the position 
in Australia and Chapter 4 above for the position in Canada where the concept oppressive or 
oppression was retained, but wider concepts such as unfair prejudice were added to the grounds for 
relief. These jurisdictions removed the reference to oppressive conduct from their corporate law in 
order to move away from the restrictive meaning the courts have given to the concept or term 
oppressive or oppression. One of the restrictive interpretations given to the term ‘oppressive’ was 
that a person had to prove that the affairs of a company were conducted in an unlawful manner to 
able to rely on the oppression remedy for relief. In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [55] and [57] the court held that the term ‘oppression’ refers 
to unfairness ‘if not something worse’. The court ([60]) remarked with the reference to the English 
case of Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All ER 66 (HL) that the term 
‘oppression’ includes the element of legality. In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm 
(Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [19.5] the court expressly held that the term ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ carries a wider meaning than the term ‘oppressive’. The terms should not be equated. 
The court clearly stated its preference for the wider term ‘unfairly prejudicial’. 
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strange in light of the recommendation of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission in 
relation to section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 – the predecessor of 
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 – that terminology must be used that 
will extend the application of the remedy as the use of the concept of ‘oppression’ 
is too restrictive.421 Conduct or a result that is ‘oppressive’ is regarded by some 
commentators and courts as being harsher than a result or conduct that is only 
‘unfairly prejudicial’ or ‘unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant’.422 In Peel 
and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others423 the court held that 
with the addition of the ground ‘unfairly prejudicial’ to the interests of the applicant, 
the legislature had the objective to extend the remedy beyond grounds that are 
usually regarded as oppressive or that are ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable.’424  
From this reasoning it follows that although the establishment of oppressive 
conduct or an oppressive result can be a starting point, section 163 covers conduct 
                                                 
421 See the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970) 246-47 
read with 250. 
422 In this regard the court in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 
(5) SA 179 (WCC) [54] held that conduct that is found to be oppressive or an unfair disregard of 
interests would also translate into the conduct being unfairly prejudicial. See the commentary on 
section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) 
who points out that the concepts oppressive conduct or result include the unfair disregard of 
interests, but that the ‘the opposite will not hold true’. 
423 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ).  
424 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [53.1]. 
In the context of ‘oppressive’ conduct see Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All 
SA 111 (SCA) [23]. See also Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C) 525-26 
where it was held that ‘oppressive’ can be defined as ‘unjust or harsh or tyrannical’ or ‘burdensome, 
harsh and wrongful’ or which involves ‘at least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing’ or ‘visible 
departure from the standards of fair dealing’.  
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and results of a much wider ambit as what can be described as oppressive.425 Thus, 
the term ‘oppressive’ should be interpreted with the other grounds set out in section 
163(1) which entitles a shareholder or director to relief.426 
5.7.3.3 Unfair prejudice 
To obtain relief an applicant must not only show that the result or the manner of the 
conduct complained of is prejudicial but should convince the court that the conduct 
or the result thereof is unfair.427 This concept was incorporated into section 252 of 
the previous Act on recommendation of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission in an 
attempt to free the application of the remedy from the restrictive interpretation of the 
concept ‘oppression’ in section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926.428 
 
                                                 
425 The court in Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 
146 (WCC) [9] held that an applicant would be entitled to relief in terms of section 163 where an 
applicant has proven a ‘lack of probity or fair dealing, or a violation of the conditions of fair play on 
which every shareholder is entitled to rely’. A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in 
South African Company’ (2013) 38:2 Journal for Juridical Science 58, 66 n 44 argues that when the 
courts had to establish whether particular conduct was unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable for 
purposes of section 252 of the previous Act, the interpretation of ‘oppressive’ conduct was used as 
a starting point.  
426 See also Christiaan Swart and Marianne Lombard ‘Vonnisbespreking: Statutêre 
Aandeelhouersbeskerming: Die Geregtelike Beoordeling van Onderdrukkende en Onredelik 
Benadelende Direksiebesluite Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 
(5) SA 179 (WCC)’ (2015) 12:1 Litnet Akademies 387 at 393 who argue that the grounds in section 
163(1) should not be interpreted to form separate concepts or grounds, but should be viewed as a 
whole in which reasonableness in a commercial context is promoted.  
427 In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [55] 
the court held that an applicant should prove that the conduct is prejudicial and unfair. See also 
Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) [8]. 
428 See the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45/1970) 250. 
 471 
 
5.7.3.4 Unfair disregard of interests 
In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others the court 
left open the question on whether specific meaning must rather be given to each of 
the terms or concepts stated in section 163(1).429 The court avoided the question 
by stating that the applicant relied specifically on an unfair disregard of his interests 
and further stated that such an unfair disregard of interests must result in 
‘commercial unfairness’ affecting the applicant in his capacity as shareholder.430 
The reference by the court to Louw and Others v Nel431 and more specifically the 
reference to the phrase ‘unfairly prejudicial to the interest of a dissenting minority’ 
justifies the inference that the ground, ‘unfairly disregards the interests’ of the 
applicant, can be equated to conduct that is ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable’.432 Viewed in this light it cannot be argued that the concept ‘unfairly 
disregards the interests of the applicant’ is a new ground upon which an applicant 
can rely. However, the court in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) 
Ltd and Others433 held that the ground ‘unfairly prejudicial to the interests’ of the 
applicant is a new ground upon which relief can be sought.434 It is submitted that 
                                                 
429 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.12]. See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van 
Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ 
(1988) 2 TSAR 268, 285 where he argued that the concept or words ‘unfairly prejudicial’ carries a 
wider meaning than the term ‘oppressive’. 
430 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
[17.12]. 
431 [2011] 2 All SA 495 (SCA). 
432 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) 
[17.12]. 
433 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [53]. 
434 See further A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company’ 
(2013) 38:2 JJS 58, 73. 
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this concept can also be understood to provide for those instances where an 
applicant is excluded from participation in a company in breach of a mutual 
understanding or agreement which may take the form of a legitimate expectation. 
Prejudice in this form does not always take the form of a financial nature.435 
5.7.3.5 The concept of commercial fairness (or unfairness) 
Neither the Act nor the courts provide clear guidance on the correct interpretation 
and application of the provisions of section 163. This is evident from the judgments 
on section 163(1), where the courts seldom pronounced on which specific grounds 
in section 163(1) a judgment was based. Although the result of the judgments in 
terms of section 163 is aligned with the purpose of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy, the failure of the courts to deal in detail with the correct interpretational 
approach of the grounds and conduct described in section 163(1)(a)-(c) stifles the 
development of principles in accordance with which cases based on the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy can be disposed of. Though some cases do indicate that 
the provisions of section 163(1)(a)-(c) must be read as a whole, these cases do not 
provide a detailed reasoned justification for the deviation from the general rules of 
interpretation in this regard.  
A similar problem presents itself in respect of the interpretation of the concepts 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and an unfair disregard of interests. While some 
courts adopted the view that these concepts must be understood to form a 
composite whole or unified concept, other court courts expressed some discomfort 
                                                 
435 See also 5.7.1.4 (b) above. 
 473 
 
with such approach.436 An evaluation of the provisions of section 163 reveals that 
the section is aimed at providing relief437 in circumstances where a shareholder438 
or director439 is unfairly prejudiced as a result of the conduct of a company and/or 
related persons,440 including the directors of a company or its shareholders.441  
Case law supports the view of Delport who argues that section 163 
introduces a new dimension to contracts as these contracts will be measured 
against ‘oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct’.442 In terms of section 163 
conduct has to be evaluated against the concept of ‘commercial fairness’.443 
Therefore the concepts in section 163 must be read and interpreted in such a 
manner as to form elements of the concept commercial fairness against which the 
result of the conduct complained of is measured.444 
                                                 
436 With reference to the position in Australia the court in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [49] read with [52] noted in [49] that ‘the words 
“oppressive to”, “unfairly prejudicial to” and “unfairly discriminatory to” should be seen as a composite 
whole and the individual elements mentioned in the section should be considered merely as different 
aspects of the essential criterion, namely, commercial unfairness’. See Count Gotthard SA Pilati v 
Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [15.4] where the court held 
that the Australian approach that concepts should be interpreted as to form a ‘composite whole’ is 
not an acceptable approach as South African law requires that ‘if possible effect is given to each 
word or phrase in order to avoid tautology’. See also 3.5.5.2 above for the position in Australia. 
437 See 5.9 below. 
438 See 5.7.1.1 above. 
439 See 5.7.1.3 above. 
440 See section 1 read with section 2(1)(a)-(c) of the Act. See also 5.7.7 below. 
441 See 5.7.2.1 and 5.7.2.2 above. 
442 See Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61] n 14. 
443 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54].  
444 See also Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 
190 (GNP) [17.12] where the court described the criterion for relief under section 163 of the Act as 
commercial unfairness. In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others 
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In essence an applicant must prove unfairness, and more specifically 
commercial unfairness. Commercial unfairness will be determined objectively445 
while taking into consideration established corporate law principles446 together with 
any other relevant considerations.447 It needs to be stressed that the fairness or 
unfairness of the results flowing from the conduct needs to be evaluated and not 
the nature of the conduct itself.448 Because the application of section 163 is 
dependent on the commercial unfairness of the result of the conduct complained of, 
a shareholder or director is not required to prove conduct that is unlawful.449 The 
                                                 
[2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [16.3] the court held that it is the fairness of the consequences of the 
conduct. The fairness of the consequences will be adjudicated in the corporate context taking into 
consideration the principle of majority rule as an aspect of fairness. See also Pakade NO and Others 
v Lukhanji Leisure (Pty) Ltd 2017 JDR 0449 (ECG) [31] where the court held, footnotes omitted, that 
‘the act or conduct complained of must be judged in a commercial sense. Furthermore, a court faced 
with an application of this nature must also not easily enter into the commercial space and must 
respect the majority rule’. The court in De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) 
[75] held that the provisions of section 163 of the Act should be applied while taking into consideration 
established principles of company law which ‘include notion of bona fides, probity, fair dealing, and 
respect for clear and legitimate understandings between company members’.  
445 Geffen and Others v Martin and Others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [31] and [78]; De Sousa and 
Another v Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 36298 (GJ) [30]. 
See also L van Rooyen ‘Versuim om Dividend te Verklaar: Onredelik Benadelende Optrede of 
Likwidasiegrond’ (1989) TSAR 706, 712 in the context of section 252 of the previous Act. 
446 Pakade NO and Others v Lukhanji Leisure (Pty) Ltd 2017 JDR 0449 (ECG) [31]. See also Geffen 
and others v Martin and Others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [24]. 
447 Such as the protection of legitimate expectations. 
448 See 5.7.3.6 below. 
449 In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP) [16.3] the court held that it is the fairness of the consequences of the conduct that should 
evaluated and not necessarily the lawfulness thereof. See also the Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede 
Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC). In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [65] the court remarked that it will seldom be 
found that the conduct of a director or directors is unfairly prejudicial when there is not a breach of 
the duties of directors in section 76 of the Act or a breach of a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation. It is submitted that although such an approach seems sensible it needs to be 
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motive of the party whose conduct is complained of is generally also irrelevant for 
the establishing commercial unfairness.450 Although the remedy in section 163 of 
the Act is flexible, the starting point for the determination of commercial unfairness 
remains the wording of the provision. 
5.7.3.6 Conduct and result 
The requirement that a shareholder or director has to prove that the result or 
consequences of the conduct complained must justify relief is not new. In terms of 
section 252 an applicant had to prove that the conduct (act or omission) and the 
consequences (result) of the conduct complained of were ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust 
or inequitable’.451 In contrast with the position under section 252 of the previous Act 
                                                 
cautioned that the criterion for relief in terms of section 163 of the Act remains the wording of the 
provision. For example, the fact that directors acted bona fide and in the interests of the company 
does not place the conduct of directors beyond scrutiny in terms of section 163. This is because it is 
commercial fairness of the result or consequences of the conduct complained of that should be 
evaluated and not necessarily the lawfulness thereof. See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre 
Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 229. Oosthuizen (229) further 
warns that the problematic meaning of bona fide and in the interests of the company should not be 
applied to form part of the statutory criteria to obtain relief in terms of section 252 of the previous 
Act.  
450 Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [27]. See also MJ 
Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 226 
regarding section 252 of the previous Act.  
451 Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 525 (D) 531; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim 
and Others 2001 (3) SA 1074 (C) 1091. For criticism of Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) 
Ltd 1979 (2) SA 525 (D) see E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 361-62 
where she agrees with the argument of MJ Oosthuizen (1981) TSAR 223-240 that the judgment in 
Garden Province regarding section 252 of the previous Act requiring that both the conduct and the 
result must be unfairly prejudicial is not binding. Hurter (361) further argues that the nature of the 
conduct can only be determined with reference to the consequences or results flowing from the 
conduct. Therefore, it does not follow that both the conduct and the results from the conduct should 
be unfairly prejudicial (361). Such an interpretation or requirement would limit the application of the 
 476 
 
the court in Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others 
held that the effect or result of the conduct needs to be evaluated and not the act 
complained of.452 However, it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a 
different view on this aspect. In citing Livanos v Swartzberg and Others453 as 
authority the court held that ‘it is not the motive of the conduct complained of that 
the court must look at but the conduct itself and the effect which it has on the other 
members of the company’.454 This position and approach under section 252 of the 
previous Act were criticised455 and the approach now adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the Appeal may be open to the same criticism. This will be the case if a 
court requires that the act and the effect or result of the act must be unfairly 
prejudicial.456 Such an approach will unjustifiably restrict the application of section 
                                                 
remedy in section 252 of the previous Act as the applicant would carry an additional burden of proof 
(361). See further the commentary on section 163 of the Act by PA Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) who points out that the judgment in Garden 
Province has only been followed in Oosthuizen v Oosthuizen and Others [2017] JOL 39213 (WCC). 
Regarding the words ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’ see De Sousa and Another v 
Technology Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 36298 (GJ) [47] where the 
court remarked that these words are ‘of wide import and encompass both legal and commercial 
unfairness’. 
452 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) [17.6]. 
453 1962 (4) SA 395 (W). 
454 Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA) [27]. 
455 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 361-62. 
456 See Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 525 (D) 531. See MJ Oosthuizen 
‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 231 who argues that 
the judgment in Garden Province was based on a misinterpretation of Livanos v Swartzberg and 
others 1962 (4) SA 395 (W) 399 which interpretation was accepted in Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (K) 529. According to the author (231-32) the last mentioned cases 
are not authority for the argument that the act complained of must be oppressive independently from 
the consequences thereof. See also E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 361-
62. 
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163 of the Act as it will have the implication that a shareholder or director will not be 
able to rely on section 163 where the consequences or result of an act are unfairly 
prejudicial but the act or conduct that led to the result can be regarded as fair.457 It 
is regrettable that the court in Grancy458 did not properly contextualise the judgment 
in Garden Province.459 
5.7.4 The nature of interests that are protected 
 
In order to obtain relief a shareholder or director must demonstrate that the result of 
the conduct complained of are unfairly prejudicial to the interests460 of a shareholder 
or director. By the use of the term interests instead of rights the legislature has 
acknowledged that a shareholder or director may suffer prejudice not only in the 
form of a breach of his or her rights but also as a result of infringement on his or her 
interests.461 The difficulty with the use of the concept of interests, is that the concept 
                                                 
457 See MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 
232 who explains that ‘[d]ie vereiste dat die handeling sowel as die uitwerking daarvan onredelik 
benadelend, onregverdig of onbillik moet wees, lei tot ’n ernstige beperking op die trefwydte van 
artikel 252. Die besluit van die meerderheid om byvoorbeeld ʼn sekere bate van die maatskappy te 
verkoop, kan bona fide in die belang van die maatskappy wees en die verkoping self objektief redelik 
en billik. Nogtans kan dit teenoor minderheidsaandeelhouers onredelik benadelend wees. Ook sal 
dit binne die konteks van artikel 252.2 beteken dat die wysiging self onredelik benadelend moet 
wees en dat dit sodanige gevolge moet hê. Die omskepping van ʼ n publieke na ʼ n private maatskappy 
of vice versa kan egter maklik onredelik benadelende gevolge vir sekere aandeelhouers teweegbring 
ten spyte van die feit dat die omskepping self ʼn regverdige en billike handeling was.’ 
458 Grancy v Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others [2013] 3 All SA 111 (SCA). 
459 Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 525 (D). 
460 See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyreg (slot)’ (1981) 
TSAR 223, 224 who argues that the provisions of section 252 protected the interests of a member 
or shareholder, despite the fact that no reference had been made to the interests of a member or 
shareholder. 
461 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [58]. See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange 
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is not defined in the Act. One is reliant upon the courts to give content to the concept 
of interests. The use of the concept or term interest is not foreign to our company 
law.462 The court in Utopia463 held that interests have a wider meaning than rights.464 
However, the court in Utopia465 confined the concept of interests to benefits that are 
of patrimonial nature.466 It is argued that such an approach to the concept of 
interests is too narrow in the context of seeking relief for purposes of section 163 of 
the Act. The interests of shareholders as defined in section 1 of the Act overlap with 
those of beneficial shareholders (or owners) where the interests of the first 
mentioned shareholder can include the economic and contractual interests of the 
beneficial shareholder.467 
                                                 
in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 
275-76 who argues that the interests of a shareholder included the legitimate interests of each of the 
parties to the dispute. He (271-72) further states that the protection of interests in addition to rights 
is supported in that the conduct of the affairs of a company may not necessarily affect the rights of 
the shareholder but may impact on the interests of a shareholder in a company. See 5.7.6 below for 
a discussion of legitimate expectations. 
462 In Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A) the court dealt with the concept 
of interests in the context of section 62quat(4) of the Companies Act 1926. The court had to 
determine the interests of preference shareholders whose dividend was in arrears.  
463 Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A); Smyth and Others v Investec Bank 
Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP). 
464 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [58] See also Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [54] where the court held that section 163 includes the protection of 
interests and not only rights. See also BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van 
Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 
5 SA Merc LJ 216, 221 remarked that the concepts interests appear to be wider than the terms rights. 
465 Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A); Smyth and Others v Investec Bank 
Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP). 
466 Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A) 181-82. 
467 Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) [64]. See also 5.7.1.2 
read with 5.7.1.4 (b) above. 
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When considering the interests of the applicant one should not lose sight of 
the interests of a shareholder or director who finds him- or herself not to be a party 
to a dispute. A court must take into consideration the interests of parties who are 
not directly involved in the dispute before the court.468 A careful balance should be 
struck between the applicant or plaintiff, the company, other directors and other 
shareholders.  
To define the term interests is not the only problematic task in interpreting 
section 163 of the Act. The use of this term creates difficulty in that the statutory 
derivative action contained in section 165 and the personal statutory action 
contained in 163 of the Act will often overlap.469 The question then arises whether 
an applicant can make use of section 163 to approach the court for relief for 
prejudice suffered by him or her in the capacity of a shareholder or director or 
whether the applicant is obliged to make use of section 165.470  
5.7.5 The conduct of the applicant or plaintiff (shareholder or director) 
 
The conduct of a shareholder or director may be relevant in determining whether 
the conduct of the other party is unfairly prejudicial.471 The conduct of a shareholder 
or director may also be a factor that a court will take into consideration to determine 
the appropriate relief in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.472 The 
                                                 
468 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) in the context of section 252 of the Act. 
469 See 5.9.15 below. 
470 See 5.9.15 below for a discussion of the interrelations between section 163 and section 165 of 
the Act. 
471 McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [40]. For the position in England see 2.6.4 above. 
For the position in Australia see 3.6.5 above. 
472 McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [40] 
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conduct of a shareholder or director may influence the terms of the buy-out order.473 
Amongst others it may impact on whether an order is made that the shares of the 
applicant should be bought by other shareholders of a company or the company 
itself. The fact that the conduct of a shareholder or director attracts a degree of 
blameworthiness does not bar an applicant from relying on section 163 of the Act.474 
5.7.6 The protection of legitimate expectations  
 
The legitimate or reasonable expectations of shareholders fall within the protection 
of section 163 of the Act.475 The legitimate expectations of shareholders form part 
of the interests of a shareholder or shareholders.476 These legitimate expectations 
                                                 
473 See McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [38]. 
474 See PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). In the 
context of section 252 of the previous Act see McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [40]-[41] 
where is was also held that the ‘clean hands’ principle does not apply. The court [40] held that 
‘[h]aving regard to the equitable nature of the remedy, and the attendant wide ambit of the judicial 
discretion to grant or withhold it on terms appropriate to the peculiar characteristics of the given case, 
there is no compelling reason why fault on the part of the applicant should as a rule preclude the 
grant of relief in terms of s 252’ (footnote omitted). This position differs from when an applicant 
applies for a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds and the applicant’s conduct wrongfully 
contributed to the circumstances on which the applicant relies for relief. See in this regard Knipe and 
Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [27] where the court noted that an 
‘[a]pplicant who relies on the just-and-equitable ground must come to court with clean hands. He 
must not himself have been wrongfully responsible for, or have connived at bringing about, the state 
of affairs which he relies upon for winding-up of the company’.  
475 See McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [34] where the court emphasised the significance 
of understandings or arrangements between shareholders, especially in the context of a quasi-
partnership. For the protection of legitimate expectations in England see 2.6.5 above. For the 
position Australia and Canada see 3.6.7 and 4.8.2 above, respectively. See also 5.9.5.3 (c) below 
for a discussion of the enforcement of legitimate expectations. 
476 See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die 
Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 275 in 
relation of section 252 of the previous Act who states that ‘[o]nder sekere omstandighede moet daar 
ook kennis geneem word van regte, pligte of verwagtinge wat nie in die Maatskappywet of konstitusie 
vervat is nie, maar uit ʼn onderlinge verstandhouding, ooreenkoms of ander feite voortvloei’, and 
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will only be protected if such legitimate expectation can be proven. The legitimate 
expectation may not necessarily take a contractual form or be contained in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation, but may be found in a fundamental understanding 
between the parties.477 
5.7.7 The application of the unfair prejudice remedy in company groups 
 
A reading of section 163(1) reveals that reliance can be placed on the section for 
relief not only against a company but also against a ‘related person’. An individual 
or juristic person could be a person related to a company.478  
Control is an essential element to determine whether an individual or juristic 
person is related to a company.479 An individual is a related person to a company 
when the individual can directly or indirectly control the company (juristic person).480 
Persons are related to one another when one can control the majority of the voting 
rights in relation to the securities of a company481 or control the majority votes on 
the board of a company.482 
A juristic person is related to another juristic person if either of the juristic 
persons has the ability to control the other directly or indirectly or the business of 
                                                 
‘[o]ptrede in stryd met die geregverdigde of redelike verwagtinge van ʼn lid betreffende die deelname 
aan die bestuur van die maatskappy kan beskou word as gedrag wat op die belange van die lid 
inwerk en kan die basis vorm van ʼn bevel ingevolge die onderhawige statutêre remedie desondanks 
die feit dat die gewraakte optrede ooreenkomstig konstitusionele of statutêre voorskrifte geskied het’. 
477 See Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP) [17.4].  
478 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2. 
479 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(2). 
480 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(b). 
481 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(2)(a)(ii)(aa). 
482 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(2)(a)(ii)(bb). 
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the other.483 Juristic persons in a holding-subsidiary relationship are also related to 
each other.484 Juristic persons are also related when each of them of them are 
controlled by the same person.485 
In some instances, the relationship between individuals may be relevant. 
Individuals are related to each other when they are married or live together in a 
similar relationship486 or are not separated by more than two degrees of 
consanguinity or affinity.487 
What is critical to gain from this discussion is that a person is not related to a 
company by merely being a shareholder or director of a company. For such a 
relationship to exist the shareholder or director must be able to exercise a form of 
control over the company. 
5.7.8 The heading of section 163 
 
A further peculiar aspect of section 163 is its heading. The reference in the heading 
of the section to the abuse of the separate juristic personality of a company is un-
clear. The reference to the abuse of the separate juristic personality of the company 
was erroneously made by the legislature and should be rectified by way of a 
                                                 
483 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(c)(i) read with 2(2)(a)(i). 
484 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(c)(ii). 
485 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(c)(iii). A company is a subsidiary of another company if the last 
mentioned company has the ability to directly or indirectly control the majority of the voting rights 
associated with the issued securities in a company (see s 3(1)(a)(i)) or alternatively controls the 
majority of the voting rights on the board of a company (see s 3(1)(a)(ii)). 
486 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(a)(i). 
487 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 2(1)(a)(ii). 
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legislative amendment, as the relevant remedy is contained in section 20(9).488 
The heading of section 163 also refers to prejudicial conduct. The remedy is 
aimed at oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. To prove only prejudicial 
conduct will not be enough to entitle the applicant to relief.489 
5.8 Alternative remedy 
 
The development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy reveals that the 
legislature had the objective of creating a remedy that provides alternative form of 
relief to the winding-up of a company.490 It must further be noted that a direct 
relationship between relief in terms of the unfair prejudice remedy and the winding-
up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds does not exist anymore.491 The 
implication of this is that although an overlap does exist between the grounds for 
relief in the form of a winding-up order on ‘just and equitable’ grounds and unfair 
prejudice, the grounds for obtaining a winding-up order on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds are wider than the grounds in section 163(1). A breakdown of confidence 
or dissatisfaction with the manner with which the affairs of a company are conducted 
generally does not constitute unfair prejudice and therefore will not attract relief in 
terms of section 163 of the Act, while such breakdown in confidence or 
dissatisfaction may constitute grounds for the winding-up of a company on ‘just and 
                                                 
488 See the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). See 6.3.1 below for recommendations in this regard. 
489 See 6.3.1 below for recommendations in this regard. 
490 See 5.2 above for a discussion of the statutory development of the remedy. 
491 See MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 
233 in the context of section 252 of the previous Act. See 5.2.3 above for a discussion of section 
111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 where a direct relationship existed between relief based on 
oppression and the winding-up of a company on just and equitable grounds. 
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equitable’ grounds.492 
In the context of insolvent companies, it is important to consider the 
provisions of section 347(2) of the previous Act that still apply to the winding-up and 
liquidation of an insolvent company. This section provides that in an application by 
members (shareholders) of a company for the winding-up of a company 
consideration needs to be given to the availability of alternative forms of relief. In 
dealing with solvent companies a similar approach is taken.493 
5.9 Relief in terms of section 163(2) 
5.9.1 Introduction 
Once the jurisdictional requirements in section 163(1) are proven a court may 
exercise its discretion to grant relief in terms of section 163(2).494 A court enjoys a 
wide discretion in granting relief.495 The court may grant relief that it ‘considers fit’ 
and appropriate in the particular circumstances of each case.496 The relief that a 
                                                 
492 See Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP) [19.5] where the court found that the mere dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the conduct 
of a company’s affairs does not constitute unfair prejudice.  
493 In Knipe and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [47] the court 
stated that a solvent company will be wound-up as a measure of ‘last resort only’.  
494 M Lehloenya and T Kgarabjang ‘Defining the Limits of the “Oppression Remedy” in the Wake of 
the Section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Grancy Properties Limited v Manala [2013] 3 All 
SA 111 (SCA)’ (2015) 2 Obiter 511, 514. 
495 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61]. 
496 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2). It should also be noted that relief can take the form of interim 
or final relief. See Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others v Omar and Another; 
In re: Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others (13902/2015) [2016] 
ZAWCHC 18 (26 February 2016) [25] where the court held that ‘[t]he purpose of section 163 is to 
provide redress when unfairness between directors or shareholders is found to exist’. The court 
further [25] found that there is no indication in the provisions of section 163 that a court may in the 
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court may grant is not limited to the possible orders or relief expressly stated in 
section 163(2).497 The statutory personal action provides for an alternative remedy 
to the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ grounds.498 
The forms of relief under section 163(2) are analysed below. The scope of 
the analysis is not limited to the relief listed in terms of section 163(2). At the end of 
the analysis of the forms of relief that could be granted by a court in terms of section 
163, some weaknesses of these provisions are pointed out. In light of the wide ambit 
of the discretion to grant relief for the conduct complained of it must be kept in mind 
that the high courts have the inherent power to develop the common law.499  
5.9.2 Order restraining conduct 
5.9.2.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 163(2)(a) a court may issue an order in terms of which the 
conduct complained of is restrained or interdicted. As with its predecessor, section 
                                                 
exercise of its discretion impose sanctions or penalties on parties that participated in unfair 
prejudicial conduct. 
497 See the wording of section 163(2) of the Act where it provides: ‘Upon considering an application 
in terms of subsection (1), the court may make any interim or final order it considers fit, including’. 
498 It should be noted that the legislature specifically avoided the qualification that the relief should 
be ‘just and equitable’. Section 252 of the previous Act required that the relief should be ‘just and 
equitable’. This requirement was criticised by E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheids-
beskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of 
South Africa) 392-93. See 2.9 above for a discussion of the unfair prejudice remedy as an alternative 
to the liquidation of companies on ‘just and equitable’ grounds in England. See 3.3, and more 
specifically 3.3.2 above, for the position in Australia. For the position in Canada see 4.9 above and 
5.8 above for the South African position. 
499 See section 173 of the Constitution which also provides that such development of the common 
law should take into account the interests of justice. See 5.5.2.2 above. 
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163 does not make explicit provision for interdicting threatening or future conduct.500 
Based on the manner in which the provisions of section 163 are formulated a 
shareholder or director cannot rely on the express provisions of the section to bring 
an application for relief in the form of an interdict, preventing the passing of a 
resolution or other forms of threatening or future conduct, that may constitute 
conduct that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the rights or interests of the a 
shareholder or director.501  
5.9.2.2 Protection in terms of section 252 of the previous Act from 
threatening or future unfair prejudicial conduct  
For a proper understanding of the position under section 163 of the Act one has to 
consider the application of section 252 of the previous Act in relation to threatening 
and future conduct. One of the criticisms against section 252 was that it appeared 
that courts were reluctant to issue interdicts restraining future or threatening 
conduct.502 Judgments handed down under section 252 suggested that an applicant 
would be unable to rely on the statutory oppression remedy to prevent the passing 
of a proposed resolution.503 One of the reasons for this is that there is, prior to the 
adoption of the resolution, an absence of conduct (an act or omission) on which an 
applicant can base his or her complaint.504 In Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal 
                                                 
500 See 5.9.2.3 and 5.9.2.4 below. For a discussion of the relief against future or threatening conduct 
in terms of section 252 of the previous Act see 5.9.2.2 below. 
501 See 5.9.2.2 below. 
502 E Hurter Aspekte van statutêre minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 350 and 392. See also MJ Oosthuizen 
‘Statutêre minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 232. 
503 See Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W); Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) 
Ltd 1979 (3) SA 170 (W). 
504 The court in Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) 222 held that ‘[t]he first question to be 
considered, however, is whether at this stage the applicant has locus standi under sub-sec (1) to 
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(South Africa) Ltd505 the court held that it did not have the discretion ‘to interfere 
with the ordinary running of the business of a company by its directors or controlling 
shareholders’.506 Despite the acknowledgment of the court that the provisions of 
section 252 did not expressly exclude the possibility to interdict (or restrain) future 
unfair prejudicial conduct and the fact that the legislature’s failure to regulate the 
restraining of future unfair prejudicial conduct was due to a possible oversight, the 
court refused to grant an interdict.507 The unfortunate result of this interpretational 
approach adopted by the courts in terms of section 252 of the previous Act was that 
a court would only be able to intervene after the alleged unfair prejudicial conduct 
had been committed or after an unfairly prejudicial resolution had been adopted.508 
                                                 
apply for an order under the section, and whether the Court has jurisdiction under sub-sec (3) to 
grant an order. In the present case it is said that the “complaint” (which is necessary in an applicant 
under the section) is a complaint that an “act is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable”; and that 
the act complained of is the passing of the resolution, alternatively the calling of the meeting at which 
such resolution will be proposed. But something to be done in the future is not yet an “act”, which is 
something done or performed; and, although the calling of a meeting is an “act”, such calling cannot 
in itself be “unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable” to the applicant’. 
505 1979 (3) SA 170 (W). 
506 Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 170 (W) 177. See also E 
Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 374-75 who is of the opinion that the 
principle on which the judgment was based cannot be reconciled with the provisions of section 252(3) 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in that the last mentioned section made express provision for a 
court to make an order to regulate the future affairs of the company. 
507 See Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) 222 where the court stated that ‘[c]ounsel for the 
applicant argued that there was no reason in principle, why, if the Court could interfere after the 
resolution was passed, it could not interfere to prevent it being passed. It may well be that in this, as 
in other cases, prevention of an act would be better than curing it after it has been committed, but 
the answer is that the section does not provide therefor. This may be a casus omissus’. 
508 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. 
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Such an approach unjustifiably restricted the availability of the remedy.509 As the 
remedy only applied when the consequences of threatening or future conduct 
presented, the remedy could not be used to prevent unfair prejudicial 
consequences. The remedy therefore could not be used to obtain relief when the 
consequences of the threatening or future conduct may cause the demise of the 
company or when the conduct resulted in the removal of the name of shareholder 
from the company’s register of members.510  
5.9.2.3  Future and/or threatening conduct and section 163 of the Act 
Based on the wording of section 163(1) of the Act, Cassim is of the view that a 
shareholder or director would be unable to obtain relief in terms of section 163 
against future conduct or threatening conduct.511 The court in Juspoint Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees 
for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)512 
took an interesting approach to the question whether section 163 can be used to 
interdict threatening or future conduct.513 In its judgment, the court considered the 
                                                 
509 E Hurter Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg 
(1996) (unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 392. See also MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre 
Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 233 suggested that the remedy 
should have been extended to future or threatening conduct. 
510 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 
232. 
511 See FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2nd ed, 2012) 765 regarding section 163(1)(a) 
where they point out that a ‘result’ is required before reliance can be placed on this particular section. 
According to the authors (766) an applicant will also not be able to rely on section 163(1)(b) as the 
section applies to the manner which the business of the company ‘is being or has been’ carried. 
512 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
513 In this case a proposed general meeting of a company was interdicted. 
 489 
 
judgment in Porteus v Kelly514 which was decided under section 252 of the previous 
Act. The court clearly distinguished section 163 of the Act from section 252 of the 
previous Act.515 The court held that in contrast with section 163 of the Act, section 
252 only referred to an ‘act’ or an ‘omission’ that had already taken place, which 
was also the basis on which the case in Porteus v Kelly516 was decided.517 The court 
further found that, unlike section 252 of the previous Act, section 163 of the Act does 
not only deal with conduct (acts or omissions) but now covers an unfair disregard of 
the interests of a shareholder or director.518 The court also considered and 
emphasised that a shareholder or director does not have to prove that his or her 
rights have been affected or ‘violated’ because the focus of section 163 is the 
protection of the interests of a shareholder or director.519  
In this case the court interdicted the proposed meeting. This was done on the 
basis that in terms of the principle of majority rule, minority shareholders are bound 
                                                 
514 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
515 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [86]. 
516 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
517 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [86]. 
518 The court in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 
2016 JDR 0773 (ECP) [86] distinguished the wording of section 163 of the Act from section 252 of 
the previous Act that was considered in Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) by stating that ‘section 
163 not only incorporates act or omissions but refers to any unfair disregard of the interests of the 
applicant’. 
519 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [58]. 
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by the decisions of the majority.520 Because shareholders are bound by the 
decisions adopted by the majority of shareholders it is an important aspect of 
shareholder protection that shareholders who are entitled to attend and vote at such 
meetings must be properly informed and must be furnished with sufficient 
information to make an election on whether or not to attend the relevant meeting 
with the purpose of influencing the adoption of the resolution.521 The right of a 
shareholder to be properly informed of all the relevant information pertaining to a 
proposed resolution is not limited to the shareholder him- or herself, but also entails 
that the a shareholder has the right that his or her co-shareholders must be properly 
informed about the relevant information pertaining to the proposed resolution.522 
The proposed meeting in this case was interdicted on the basis that shareholders 
who exercised their rights in terms of section 164 on the basis of a decision taken 
during a previous meeting triggering the provisions of section 164, were excluded 
from a proposed meeting where the latter decision would be reconsidered. 
 
 
 
                                                 
520 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [84]. See also Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd and Others v Investec Bank Ltd 
and Others 2009 (4) SA 89 (SCA) [36]. 
521 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [84] and [88]. 
522 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [88]. See also Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd and Others v Investec Bank Ltd 
and Others 2009 (4) SA 89 (SCA) [36]. 
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5.9.2.4 Protection against future and/or threatening conduct in terms of 
section 163 of the Act 
(a)  The importance of Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods 
Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the 
Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening 
Parties)523 for the interpretation of section 163 of the Act 
The inference to be drawn from this case is that the court did not exclude the 
possibility that section 163 can be used to interdict future or threatening conduct 
based on its interpretation of ‘unfairly prejudicial disregard’ of interests. However, the 
facts of each case must be carefully examined to determine whether there is a real 
possibility that the rights and interests of a shareholder or director would be unfairly 
prejudiced should the relevant threatening or future conduct not be interdicted. The 
importance of the judgment in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods 
Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the 
Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)524 is that it rejects the 
mechanical application of the judgment in Porteus v Kelly525 to the wording of section 
163 of the Act.526 While Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments 
Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family 
Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)527 opens the possibility for obtaining relief 
against future and threatening conduct, it must be noted that such relief will only be 
available in very specific circumstances, in order to prevent unjustified interference 
with the ordinary running of the affairs of a company. 
                                                 
523 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
524 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
525 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
526 See 5.9.2.4 (b) below. 
527 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
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(b)  The differences between the judgments in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) 
Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) 
Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, 
Cilliers Intervening Parties)528 and Porteus v Kelly529 
Although the court in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments 
Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family 
Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)530 distinguished the case from Porteus v 
Kelly531 based on the applicable law,532 it must also be noted that the facts in 
Porteus v Kelly533 and Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments 
Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family 
Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)534 differ in very important respects. The 
court in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS 
Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, 
Cilliers Intervening Parties)535 took into consideration the fact that once a 
shareholder exercised his or her rights in terms of section 164, such a shareholder 
loses his or her shareholder rights save for the right to demand the acquisition of 
the shareholder’s shares at a fair value.536 One of the rights which is lost by a 
shareholder in terms of section 164 is the right to attend and vote at meetings of 
                                                 
528 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
529 Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
530 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
531 Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
532 See 5.9.2.3 above. 
533 Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
534 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
535 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
536 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [61]-[63]. 
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shareholders.537 According to the court the provisions of section 164 of the Act 
cannot be allowed to be applied in such a manner as to isolate shareholders by 
holding a shareholder to the exercise of his or her appraisal rights, in circumstances 
where the last mentioned decision or resolution is revisited.538 The dissenting 
shareholders in Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited 
(BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, 
Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties)539 were captured between to two extreme 
alternatives, namely, to withdraw their demands and be entitled to vote on the 
proposed resolution or to keep their rights intact and be excluded from voting on the 
proposed revocation of the resolution in terms of which they exercised their 
appraisal rights and the subsequent proposed resolutions that would serve at the 
same meeting.540  
Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS 
Nominees (Pty) Ltd, Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, 
Cilliers Intervening Parties)541 dealt with the constructive exclusion of the informed 
participation of shareholders from a meeting where a proposed resolution or 
                                                 
537 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [63] where the court specifically held that the applicant was excluded from the fair 
participation in the business of the company. 
538 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [63]-[64] and [77]. 
539 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
540 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP) [64]. 
541 2016 JDR 0773 (ECP). 
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decision would be taken while Porteus542 was concerned with the potential impact 
of a proposed resolution to be adopted a meeting to be convened. The application 
in Juspoint543 was not aimed at the prevention of the majority adopting a decision 
but was rather based on a procedural irregularity that may affect the proper and 
informed consideration of the proposed decision or resolution leading up to the 
meeting where the proposed resolution would be adopted. 
5.9.3 Appointment of liquidator 
 
A court may also order the appointment of a liquidator in circumstances where it 
appears that the company is insolvent.544 It is interesting that the wording of the 
provision limits this particular form of relief to circumstances where a company is 
insolvent. It may have been the objective of the legislature to limit this form of relief 
to circumstances of insolvency only, in light of the fact that section 163 should 
provide for alternative forms of relief to the winding-up and liquidation of a 
company.545 However, there are a number of circumstances one can think of where 
it would be appropriate to wind-up a company in circumstances where the company 
is not necessarily insolvent. It is submitted that the test for granting this relief should 
rather be whether the relief is able to rectify the unfair prejudicial conduct 
complained of instead of whether the company is solvent or insolvent. For purposes 
of section 163(2)(b) a shareholder or director must in effect not only prove the unfair 
prejudicial conduct and but also that the company is insolvent. It is submitted that 
                                                 
542 Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
543 Juspoint Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Sovereignfoods Investments Limited (BNS Nominees (Pty) Ltd, 
Trustees for the Time Being of the Cilliers Family Trust, Cilliers, Cilliers Intervening Parties) 2016 
JDR 0773 (ECP). 
544 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(b). 
545 See 5.8 above. 
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solvency or insolvency should rather be a factor a court should take into 
consideration in exercising its wide discretion to make an appropriate order.546  
5.9.4 Business rescue 
 
A court has a discretion to grant relief in the form of supervision and the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings.547 This relief may only be granted 
when the provisions of section 131(4)(a) apply.548 The requirements of section 
131(4)(a)549 stand independently from the grounds in section 163.550 
One of the criticisms against the business rescue regime contained in 
Chapter 6 of the Act is that a single director may not initiate or commence with 
business rescue proceedings in circumstances where the company is in financial 
distress.551 In terms of section 131 only an affected person may apply to a court for 
an order placing a company under business rescue. A director is not included in the 
definition of an affected person in section 128(1)(a).552 This exposes a director to 
                                                 
546 See the recommendation made in this regard in 6.3.5.2 below. 
547 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(c). 
548 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(c). See also Dolphin Management AS v Belmont 
Development Company (Pty) Limited 2015 JDR 2620 (ECG) [17]. 
549 Section 131 of the Act provides: 
‘(4)  After considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court may – 
(a) make an order placing the company under supervision and commencing 
business rescue proceedings, if the court is satisfied that – 
(i) the company is financially distressed; 
(ii) the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation 
under or in terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to 
employment-related matters; or 
(iii) it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons; 
and there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.’ 
550 Dolphin Management AS v Belmont Development Company (Pty) Limited 2015 JDR 2620 (ECG) 
[19]. 
551 Anneli Loubser ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and 
Questions (part 1)’ (2010) 3 TSAR 501, 509. 
552 An affected person is defined in section 128(1) as follows: - 
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personal liability when the provisions of Chapter 6 have not been complied with and 
a party suffers losses due to the fact that the company has not commenced with 
business rescue proceedings in circumstances where the company was financially 
distressed and a reasonable prospect existed for rescuing the company.553 The 
alleged unfair prejudicial conduct, in the form of the board not adopting a resolution 
to commence with business rescue proceedings, must be evaluated against the 
written reasons provided for such failure in terms of section 129(7). 
Section 163(2)(c) opens the possibility that a single director can approach 
the court with the relevant information demonstrating that the company is in financial 
distress and thereby require relief in the form of the commencement of business 
rescue proceedings. Section 163 therefore supplements and remedies the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of the Act.554 However, one would rather have preferred that 
this issued to be adequately addressed in Chapter 6.  
 
 
 
                                                 
‘(a)  “affected person”, in relation to a company, means – 
(i) a shareholder or creditor of the company; 
(ii) any registered trade union representing employees of the company; and 
(iii) if any of the employees of the company are not represented by 
a registered trade union, each of those employees or their 
respective representatives.’ 
553 Anneli Loubser ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and 
Questions (part 1) (2010) 3 TSAR 501, 509. 
554 However, it is uncertain how the courts would receive such a submission as the court in Dolphin 
Management AS v Belmont Development Company (Pty) Limited 2015 JDR 2620 (ECG) [19] clearly 
stated that the application was disposed of in terms of the grounds in section 131(4)(a) and not 
section 163. The court further stated that these two grounds stood separately from each other. The 
application was brought by a shareholder who has standing for purposes of section 163(1) and is 
defined as an ‘affected person’ in section 128(1)(a)(i) of the Act. 
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5.9.5 Regulation of a company’s affairs 
 
5.9.5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the more contentious forms of relief a court may grant is an order in terms 
of which the affairs of a company are regulated by an amendment to the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation or the creation or amendment of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.555 The relationship between parties to a Memorandum of 
Incorporation is supplemented by the provisions of the Act. In some instances, the 
parties choose to conclude an additional shareholders’ agreement. 
5.9.5.2 Court intervention in the private affairs of parties 
Generally, courts demonstrate a reluctance to interfere with the arrangements and 
agreements of parties. This approach is justified on the basis that effect should be 
given to the agreements between parties concluded on a free and voluntary 
basis.556 Viewing the provisions of section 163(2)(d) in light of the traditional 
approach not to interfere with the private arrangements between parties, dismissed 
any doubts that courts do have the power to make appropriate orders under section 
163 that may affect the private understandings or arrangements exchanged 
between parties. 
 
 
 
                                                 
555 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(d). 
556 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 518-19. See also 5.6.2.1 
above. 
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5.9.5.3 The amendment of agreements 
 
(a)  Consensus and unanimous shareholder agreement557 
 
Shareholder agreements are normal commercial agreements between some or all 
of the shareholders of a company. Therefore, the default principles of the law of 
contract apply to shareholder agreements. The parties to a shareholder agreement 
are bound to an agreement based on consensus. This also entails that an 
agreement can only be amended by way of mutual agreement between the parties 
thereto. Contracts between parties can be formal or informal, unless the law 
prescribes specific formalities. The same principles apply to variations or 
amendments to contracts or agreements between parties.  
(b) The differences in the amendment of a Memorandum of 
Incorporation and a unanimous shareholder agreement 
Although a Memorandum of Incorporation has contractual force between the parties 
listed in section 15(6), it cannot be fully equated to that of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement. In contrast with a unanimous shareholder agreement, a Memorandum 
of Incorporation can be amended by the adoption of a special resolution. With 
regard to the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company it should be noted that 
the Act contains a prescribed procedure for the amendment thereof.558  
                                                 
557 The use of the word ‘unanimous’ is unnecessary because of the fact that agreements between 
parties are reached based upon consensus. It is further important to note that the term ‘unanimous 
shareholder agreement’ is not defined in the Act. It appears that the term ‘unanimous shareholder 
agreement’ originates from the Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985 c C-44). See Chapter 
4 above for a discussion of the term unanimous shareholder agreement. 
558 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 16. If the Memorandum of Incorporation contains restrictions, 
limitations additional to the procedure contained in the Act, the name and Memorandum of 
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(c) Section 163 and the enforcement of legitimate expectations 
  
The legitimate expectations of parties play an important role in the application of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy.559 This provision underscores the power of a 
court to intervene in such agreements or arrangements. This particular provision 
includes the power of a court to enforce understandings and agreements that do 
not expressly form part of a Memorandum of Incorporation or a shareholder 
agreement. This is justified on the basis that commercial fairness requires that 
parties to agreements should be held to their promises.560  
(d) Section 163 and ‘non-variation clauses’ 
 
(i) Introduction  
 
To avoid uncertainty and subsequent disputes, parties must clearly describe their 
relationship and mutual understandings or arrangements in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation. In some instances the parties choose to conclude a shareholder 
agreement in addition to the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. It is important 
to understand the effect of section 163 of the Act on the application of the common 
law principles of the law of contract within a company law perspective. The effect of 
section 163 on non-variation clauses and on the enforcement of agreements or 
understandings between parties to a Memorandum of Incorporation and/or 
shareholder agreements, which are not necessary incorporated, is considered. 
                                                 
Incorporation should comply with formalities prescribed by the Act. See in this regard section 11(3)(b) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
559 See also 5.7.6 above for a discussion of the protection of legitimate expectations by the 
oppression or unfair prejudice remedy. 
560 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [61]. 
See 5.6.2.1 above. 
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(ii) The validity and enforcement of subsequent agreements 
 
Unless the law prescribes specific formalities, contracts between parties can be 
formal or informal. The same principles apply to variations or amendments to 
contracts or agreements between parties. It often occurs that parties for a variety of 
reasons, for example, the lapse of time and/or to accommodate changing 
circumstances, informally conclude new agreements or vary existing agreements. 
Such new agreements or amendments are not necessarily contained or 
incorporated into the Memorandum of Incorporation and/or the shareholders’ 
agreement but, for example, may be deducted from their conduct. From a law of 
contract perspective these informal arrangements are still enforceable between the 
parties.  
To ensure legal certainty and in an attempt to avoid disputes that may arise 
between the parties, shareholder agreements and Memorandum of Incorporation 
may contain clauses which may restrict the variation of a shareholder agreement 
and/or the Memorandum of Incorporation. Usually, these clauses provide that a 
variation or amendment to the Memorandum of Incorporation or shareholder 
agreement will not have any force unless it is formally recorded in writing and signed 
by the parties to the contract. Such a clause is often referred to as a non-variation 
clause. For a non-variation clause to be effective the non-variation of the clause self 
should itself be entrenched.561 The entrenchment of a variation clause is 
enforceable, but will be restrictively interpreted.562 The reason for the restrictive 
                                                 
561 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 518-21; S van der Merwe, 
LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles (5th ed, 2016) 148. 
562 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(5th ed, 2016) 151 and 153. 
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interpretation of such clauses is based on the restriction or limitation that such a 
clause places on the freedom of contract of the parties.563 The effect of a non-
variation clause is that any agreement reached after the formal conclusion of an 
agreement will be ignored.564 The court will only enforce the clauses contained in 
the original contract between the parties. 
(iii) The enforcement of agreements or understandings not 
contained in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
and/or in a shareholder agreement 
 
From a practical perspective a situation may arise where the understandings or 
arrangements between shareholders differ from the written understandings and 
arrangements contained in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company or any 
applicable shareholder agreement. This form of relief can be used to enforce 
unwritten and/or informal understandings or arrangements between shareholders 
on the basis that parties must honour undertakings that they have given freely and 
voluntary.565 This approach will then be based on the need and the objective to 
achieve commercial fairness as envisaged in section 163 of the Act.566 
(iv)  Conclusion  
From a law of contract perspective agreements and subsequent amendments to 
such agreements are subject to the normal legal requirements for a valid contract. 
To avoid confusion or uncertainty parties opt to reduce the agreements between 
                                                 
563 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 518-19. 
564 SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Beperk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 740 (A); Brisley 
v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [6]-[10]. 
565 See 5.6.2.1 above for a discussion of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
566 See 5.6.6.4 above for a discussion of the need for fairness within the company structure and 
5.7.3.6 above for a discussion of the concept commercial fairness. 
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themselves to writing. Often the parties further agree that the document is the only 
source of the agreement and that any subsequent agreements and amendments 
will not be valid and enforceable unless they have been reduced to writing. Such 
agreements, known as non-variation clauses, are enforceable provided that such 
agreements or clauses do not offend public policy.567 Section 163 of the Act has 
important consequences for the enforcement of non-variation agreements and the 
enforcement of agreements that are not incorporated formally in written agreements 
and which may have been reached even prior to the conclusion of the written 
agreement. In De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others568 the court held 
that ‘[i]t seems plain then that agreements and understandings of the non-formal 
kind may, depending on the circumstances, found justification for relief under 
section 163’.569 
5.9.6 Issue or exchange of shares 
 
Section 163(2)(e) further provides for an order in terms of which a company issues 
shares or whereby the exchange of shares can be ordered. There is authority which 
suggests that an order in terms of this particular section includes an order for the 
buy-out or purchase of the shares of a member.570 Aspects of relief in the form of a 
                                                 
567 GB Bradfield Christie’s The law of contract in South Africa (7th ed, 2016) 519-20; S van der Merwe, 
LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles (5th ed, 2016) 148-49. 
568 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) [60], [61] and [68]. 
569 De Villiers v Kapela Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 1942 (GJ) [68]. See also Leon van Rooyen ‘Die 
Statutêre Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in 
die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 275 regarding section 252 of the previous Act for a 
similar approach. See further 5.7.6 above regarding the protection of legitimate expectations. 
570 See Gushman NO and Another v Traut NO and Others [2013] JOL 30862 (FB) [29] where the 
court alluded to the possibility that ‘[a]lthough not specifically mentioned in section 163(2), a court 
could, for example, order that the majority purchase the shares of the minority or that the majority 
sell their shares to the minority’. See also Muller v Lilly Valley (Pty) Ltd [2012] 1 All SA 187 (GSJ) 
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buy-out order are discussed below.571 
5.9.7 The appointment of directors and the declaration of persons as 
delinquent 
 
5.9.7.1 Appointment of directors 
 
Relief may also be granted in the form of the appointment of directors in addition to 
and/or to replace of other directors.572 This power of a court has important 
implications from the perspective of viewing a company as a democracy.573 Section 
163 therefore creates an additional avenue for the possible removal and/or 
appointment of directors.574 
5.9.7.2 Delinquent persons 
 
Section 163(2)(f)(ii) provides that a court may declare a person a delinquent or place 
a person under probation as envisaged in section 162. It is important to note that 
                                                 
[41] where the court distinguished between the formulation of relief in terms of section 252(3) of the 
previous Act and section 163(2) of the Act by stating that ‘[t]here are various other powers which a 
court has under section 163(2), but the specific power under section 252(3) to order the “purchase 
of the shares of any members of the company by other members thereof or by the company” is not 
contained within section 163. It might be that in terms of section 163(2)(e), the court can order an 
exchange of shares for cash on a value determined in terms of the articles’. 
571 See 5.9.14 below. 
572 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(f)(i). 
573 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others 
[2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) [61]. 
574 See Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) for an example where the court had to grant relief to appoint a 
board to attend to the business and affairs of a company, while the legal status of the original 
appointed directors were being resolved in other pending legal proceedings. See also Jenkins v 
Davison 2017 JDR 1380 (GP) where the court granted interim relief in the form of an order where a 
director of whose conduct was complained of in terms of section 163, was removed and a person 
was appointed for the purpose to investigate the financial transactions entered and conducted by 
the particular director.  
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although section 162 is mentioned in section 163(2)(f) as a form of relief, section 
162 stands separate and independent from section 163. An order in terms of section 
162 further serves a different purpose and function than an order in terms of section 
163(2).575 
(a) The purpose of the provisions of section 162 
 
In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others576 the purpose of section 
162 was described as ‘to protect the investing public, whether sophisticated or 
unsophisticated, against the type of conduct that leads to an order of delinquency, 
and to protect those who deal with companies against the misconduct of delinquent 
directors’.577 Therefore, the provisions of section 162 serve a public interest 
objective.578 The purpose and effect of section 162 have to be compared with the 
objective of relief in terms of section 163(2) where the aim of such relief is to end 
                                                 
575 See 5.9.7.2 (a) below for a discussion of the purpose of court orders in terms of section 162. 
576 [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA). 
577 See Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [142] 
(footnote omitted) and [144] where the court reiterated that ‘[i]ts aim is to ensure that those who 
invest in companies, big or small, are protected against directors who engage in serious misconduct’. 
The court further explained [144] that ‘it is required in the public interest that those who enjoy the 
benefits of incorporation and limited liability should not abuse their position’. The court also explained 
[145] that the provisions of section 162 are ‘an appropriate and proportionate response by the 
legislature to the problem of delinquent directors and the harm they may cause to the public who 
place their trust in them’. 
578 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and Others 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) [39] and [40]. See also the 
comment of the court [41] that ‘[t]he remedy bears on the public law status of the allegedly delinquent 
person rather than the assertion of a company’s individual rights, and the purpose, as Wallis JA 
observed in Gihwala, is the protection, in the public interest, of those who deal with companies’ and 
‘[t]hat the remedy goes to the affected director’s status’. See further R Cassim ‘The Launching of 
Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by Means of the Derivative Action 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)’ (2017) 38:3 Obiter 673, 675 and R Cassim 
‘Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 
ZASCA 35’ (2016) 19 PER/PELJ 1, 7-9. 
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and rectify the conduct complained of.579 An order in terms of section 162 may have 
a penal effect as the entrepreneurial freedom of the person who is declared a 
delinquent or under probation is restricted.580 
(b) The nature of the conduct that justifies orders in terms of section 
162 
 
The circumstances in which reliance may be placed on obtaining an order for 
declaring a person a delinquent or placing such a person under probation are 
stipulated in section 162(5) and section 162(7)-(8).581 
(c) Interpretational aspects of sections 162(5) and 162(7) 
In terms of this section 162 a court must make an order declaring a person a 
delinquent director if the circumstances set out in section 162(5) are proven. What 
is important to note is that this section describes circumstances and misconduct of 
a serious nature, which are met with the most severe consequences in terms of 
section 162(5), namely, that a court must declare the directors involved as 
delinquents.582  
It is interesting to compare the wording of section 162(5) with section 162(7) 
in terms of which a court may make an order for placing a person under probation. 
                                                 
579 See 5.9 above. 
580 R Cassim ‘The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by 
Means of the Derivative Action Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)’ (2017) 38:3 
Obiter 673, 675-76. 
581 See 5.9.7.2 (c) below for a discussion of the interpretation of section 162(5) and (7). See also 
section 162(3) and 163(4) where the Commission, Panel and certain organs of state may apply for 
orders for delinquency and/or probation under certain circumstances. 
582 See also the court’s discussion of section 162(5)(c) in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd 
and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA). 
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This is significant as section 162(7)(a)(iii) provides that a court may place a person 
under probation when such a person ‘acted in, or supported a decision of the 
company to act in, a manner contemplated in section 163(1)’. Section 162(7)(a)(iii) 
must be read with section 162(8) which provides that a person may only be placed 
under probation in terms of the former section ‘only if the court is satisfied that the 
declaration is justified having regard to the circumstances of the company’s or close 
corporation’s conduct, if applicable, and the person’s conduct in relation to the 
management, business or property of the company or close corporation at the time’. 
For a proper interpretation of the provisions of section 162(7) regard must be 
had to section 162(7)(a)(ii). In terms of this provision a director may be placed under 
probation where a person has acted materially inconsistently with the duties of a 
director.583 This means that trivial transgressions by a director will not justify an 
order in terms of the particular section. This provides the context in which the 
provisions in section 162(7)(a)(iii) should be read. The section must not be 
interpreted and applied in a manner which will have the effect that a particular 
conduct of a director will be met with an order placing a director under probation 
while such relief would not have been justified in terms of section 167(2)(a)(ii). 
Although section 162(2)(a)(iii) may justify an order for placing a director under 
probation on the basis of conduct that has been oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to, or unfairly disregard the interests of a shareholder or director as applicant for 
purposes of section 163, it is submitted that not all conduct that can be regarded as 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarding the interests of a 
                                                 
583 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 162(7)(a)(ii). 
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shareholder or director would justify an order for the probation of a director.584  
5.9.8 Return of consideration 
 
In terms of section 163(2)(g) a company or any other person can be ordered to 
repay, in part or in total, any consideration that a shareholder paid for the shares in 
question. Such repayment may be ordered with or without conditions. The provision 
also refers to the payment of the equivalent value paid for the shares. Some authors 
point out that it is not certain whether a return of consideration should be regarded 
as a repurchase of securities for purposes of section 48 and whether the solvency 
and liquidity test in section 4 finds application in such circumstances.585 
5.9.9 Setting aside of transactions and agreements 
 
The court is also entrusted with the power to set aside a transaction or agreement 
to which the company is a party.586 When this form of relief is granted, compensation 
can be awarded to the company or any other party to the transaction that has been 
set aside.587 This form of relief is also a very invasive remedy as it involves the 
interference with or intervention in legal relationships between private parties such 
                                                 
584 See Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) Ltd and others [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC) where 
the court found that the refusal of a co-director of the applicant and the company secretary to provide 
the applicant with certain company records is materially inconsistent with the duties of a director for 
purposes of section 163(7)(a)(ii) but made the obiter remark that such conduct does not necessarily 
constitute oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct for purposes of relief in terms of section 
162(7)(a)(iii). See also section 162(8)(a) of the Act. 
585 See the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). 
586 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(h). In this regard K van der Linde ‘Share Repurchases and 
the Protection of Shareholders’ (2010) 2 TSAR 288, 303 explains that relief in the form of section 
163(2)(h) may be appropriate to set aside repurchase transactions where shareholders are unfairly 
treated unequally or where a selective repurchase is attempted. 
587 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2)(h). 
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as consensual agreements, creditor/debtor relationships and shareholder 
agreements.588 
5.9.10 Access to financial statements 
 
Financial statements contain information which plays a substantial role in the 
financial decision-making of a shareholder. Directors of a company also rely on the 
information in financial statements to make informed decisions relating to the 
business and affairs of a company. The production of financial statements or access 
thereto also forms part of the duties of directors to account. In some instances 
creditors also rely on the financial statements of the company to decide whether, for 
example, loan facilities to a particular company should be expanded.589 
Section 163(2)(i) is a remedy in terms of which an applicant can request that 
a company be ordered to produce financial statements within a time frame and/or 
in a format required by the Act or in a form determined by the court. Companies are 
under a legal duty to keep proper accounting records and to compile financial 
statements.590  
5.9.11 Compensation 
 
Section 163(2)(j) provides that a court may order the payment of compensation to 
‘an aggrieved person, subject to any other law entitling that person to 
compensation’. The application and need of this provision is uncertain for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the provision is ‘subject to any other law entitling that person to 
                                                 
588 See the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (Service issue 17, 2018).  
589 However, it should be noted that a creditor does not have standing for purposes of section 163. 
590 Companies Act 71 of 2008, ss 28 to 30. 
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compensation’. Further ‘an aggrieved person’ will usually rely on the law of delict 
and/or the law of contract to claim damages based on a breach of the rights of the 
‘aggrieved person’. The only possible explanation for this provision is to allow an 
award based fairness in terms of section 163 which is a sui generis remedy. This 
may entail that the prejudice suffered will be assessed in light of what is fair in light 
of the facts and circumstances of a case. This compensation will not necessarily 
have a bearing on the damages a person may have suffered, although the damages 
a person may have suffered will be taken into account as a factor. However, such 
an explanation does not provide adequate guidance on the legal basis and the 
circumstances in which ‘an aggrieved party’ will need to rely on section 163(2)(j) for 
relief.  
From reading section 163(2)(j) is appears that ‘an aggrieved party’ may 
include a person who does not necessary enjoy standing in terms of section 163(1). 
Thus, the question remains whether a person may rely on section 163(2) to obtain 
damages or ‘compensation’ where such a person, especially when he or she is not 
a shareholder or director for purposes of section 163(1), cannot rely on the ordinary 
principles of the law of delict. Alternatively, section 163(2)(j) may also be interpreted 
as merely confirming the current legal position without creating any additional or 
alternative remedies. This must further be viewed in light of the fact that the 
objective of relief in terms of section 162(2) is to end the oppressive or unfair 
prejudicial conduct complained of and not necessarily to ‘compensate’ a 
shareholder or director.591  
In light of the uncertainty in this regard it important to understand the 
                                                 
591 See 5.9 above. 
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developments relating to the award of damages to a shareholder who suffered a 
loss in the form of a diminution of the value of his or her shares and/or in the form 
of a diminution in dividends. This form of loss usually results from conduct 
committed against the company; or conduct committed against a shareholder or 
shareholders, or instances where the same conduct may affect both the company 
and all or some of its shareholders.592 To determine whether a cause of action exists 
and by whom such a cause of action is actionable, the applicable principles of the 
law of delict and company law have to be considered. In light of section 163(2)(j) it 
is especially relevant to determine whether a shareholder may personally recover 
loss in the form of a diminution of the value of his or her shares when the relevant 
principles of the law of delict are considered. 
In accordance with the ordinary principles of the law of delict a plaintiff must 
prove that he or she suffered a loss as a result of the wrongful conduct and fault of 
the defendant.593 Case law is available that a shareholder may rely on the law of 
delict personally to recover loss suffered in the form of a diminution of the value of 
shares as a result of a wrong committed against the company.594 However, this 
approach is not supported by academic commentators.595 Their criticism is based 
on the fact that in the commission of the wrongful conduct a legal duty towards the 
                                                 
592 BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van 
die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 219. 
593 Johan Scott ‘An Unsuccessful Long Shot Aimed at Effecting Liability for Causing Pure Economic 
Loss Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA)’ (2017) 80 THRHR 483, 484. 
594 See McLelland v Hullet 1992 (1) SA 456 (D); Kalinko v Nisbet 2002 (5) SA 766 (W); McCrae v 
Absa Bank Ltd 2009 JDR 0782 (GSJ). Contra Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others 
[2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) and Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA). 
595 BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van 
die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216. 
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company and the shareholder is breached. Unless a legal duty towards the 
shareholder is breached the loss suffered by the shareholder in the form of a 
diminution of the value of his or her shares is only a reflection of the loss suffered 
by the company as a result of wrongful conduct committed against it.596 Based on 
the principles in Foss v Harbottle597 the company and not the shareholder is the 
proper plaintiff to recover the loss suffered by a company.598 By allowing a 
shareholder personally to recover a loss suffered by a company will negate the 
separate legal personality of a company, and cannot be justified on the remoteness 
of the possibility of double recovery against the wrongdoer or wrongdoers.599 A 
                                                 
596 See BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld 
van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 219 where the author pointed 
out that the personal action should only be available for protection against the direct infringement on 
personal or individual rights. See further Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others 
[2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [109] where the court confirmed that loss suffered by a shareholder in the 
form of a diminution of value or deprivation of a dividend is often only a reflection of a loss suffered 
by a company. See also the principles in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 
2) [1982] Ch 204 as discussed in 2.10.6 above. The Prudential Assurance case was recently 
considered in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [108] 
and Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [10]-[12]. See 2.10.6.4 above for a discussion 
of the criticism of the reflective loss principle in England. 
597 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
598 See Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [107] and 
[109]. 
599 See McLelland v Hullet 1992 (1) SA 456 (D); Kalinko v Nisbet 2002 (5) SA 766 (W); McCrae v 
Absa Bank Ltd 2009 JDR 0782 (GSJ) where the judgment in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 
67 ER 189 was interpreted to prevent a double recovery from a wrongdoer. In McLelland v Hullet 
1992 (1) SA 456 (D) 467 the court held that the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 
189 is not absolute. The approach of these courts left the door open for shareholders to institute 
legal proceedings to personally recover damages in the form of the diminution of the value of their 
shares, which resulted from a wrong committed against a company in circumstances where the 
possibility of a double recovery against the wrongdoer was unlikely. See specifically McLelland v 
Hullet 1992 (1) SA 456 (D) 467; Kalinko v Nisbet 2002 (5) SA 766 (W) 778-79; McCrae v Absa Bank 
Ltd 2009 JDR 0782 (GSJ) [36]. This approach was also criticised by BA van der Merwe ‘Die 
Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle 
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shareholder may recovery loss suffered in the form of a diminution in the value of 
his or her shares when this loss is separate and distinct from the loss suffered by 
the company.600  
More recently the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider whether a 
shareholder may rely on the principles of the law of delict for the recovery of loss in 
the form of diminution of the value of shares as pure economic loss.601 A loss 
                                                 
Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 227-28 who holds the view that the court in McLelland v Hullet 
1992 (1) SA 456 (D) overemphasised the possibility of ‘double recovery’ and failed to take other 
equitable considerations into account, such as the view that the rejection of a shareholder’s individual 
claim as a mechanism to ensure that the relief granted benefits all shareholder proportionally; to 
avoid that the interests of creditors are bypassed by orders for payment directly to a shareholder; 
the availability of alternative remedies; the fact that a duplication of multiple actions is undesirable; 
and the possibility of the ratification of the wrong committed. See further the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 
649 (SCA) and Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA). In Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 
2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [16] and [17] where the court found that the proper plaintiff rule in Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 is not aimed at the protection of wrongdoers against the 
double recovery of damages, but rather the upholding the separate legal personality of a company. 
600 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 649 (SCA) [114]. The court 
held ([109] and [111]) that when a shareholder has a claim based on the breach of a legal duty or 
obligation towards the shareholder that is separate and distinct from the duty towards the company, 
a shareholder may recover losses suffered in the form of a diminution in the value of shares. The 
court in Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [11] held that provided that a shareholder 
has a cause of action against a wrongdoer, a shareholder will also be entitled to institute a claim in 
circumstances where the company has suffered harm but does not have a cause of action to recover 
the loss suffered. The court further held [11] that in such circumstances a shareholder may rely on 
a diminution of value of his or her shares in the relevant company. 
601 Johan Scott ‘An Unsuccessful Long Shot Aimed at Effecting Liability for Causing Pure Economic 
Loss Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA)’ (2017) 80 THRHR 483, 484 summarises 
the categories within which one may possibly claim damages for pure economic loss based on the 
lex Aquilia as follows ‘namely, (i) loss not emanating from damage to property or infringement of 
personality, or, (ii) if it does flow from property or personality infringements, does not involve the 
plaintiff’s property or personality, or finally, (iii) if it does involve the plaintiff’s person or property, it 
was caused by someone other than the defendant’. 
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suffered as a form of pure economic loss is generally not actionable as the conduct 
which caused the loss is not prima facie regarded as wrongful.602 The wrongfulness 
of such conduct must be established in light of the legal convictions of the 
community in terms of which the interests of the various parties are weighed and 
balanced, the relationship between the parties is considered as well as the social 
consequences that may flow from the imposition of liability in a particular 
situation.603 The principles in Foss v Harbottle604 and other company law 
principles605 form part of the legal convictions of the community.606 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal found that a shareholder cannot rely the law of delict to recover 
losses suffered in the form of a diminution of value as a pure economic loss.607 
A further stumbling block for a shareholder to claim for losses in the form of 
a diminution of the value of his or her shares or in the form a diminution of dividends, 
is that a shareholder in a company only has a right to participate in the business 
and affairs of a company in accordance with the Memorandum of Incorporation, 
                                                 
602 Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 432 (SCA) [8]; Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) [1]. 
603 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 371 (D) 384. See 
Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng 2015 (1) SA 
1 (CC) [23]. See also Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) 410. See 
specifically Johan Scott ‘An Unsuccessful Long Shot Aimed at Effecting Liability for Causing Pure 
Economic Loss Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA)’ (2017) 80 THRHR 483, 486-87 
on the use of the boni mores criterion for establishing wrongfulness for purposes of determining 
liability for pure economic loss. 
604 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
605 More specifically the separate legal personality of a company as entrenched in section 19(1) of 
the Act. 
606 Johan Scott ‘An Unsuccessful Long Shot Aimed at Effecting Liability for Causing Pure Economic 
Loss Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA)’ (2017) 80 THRHR 483, 488-93 and 498. 
607 Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA). 
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which is unaffected by a diminution of the value of shares.608 
5.9.12 Rectification of records 
5.9.12.1 Introduction  
Section 115 of the previous Act provided for a summary remedy for the rectification 
of a company’s share register.609 The legislature omitted to incorporate a similar 
remedy in the Act.610 However, section 163(2)(k) of the Act provides for relief in the 
form of ‘an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a 
company’. Although section 163(2)(k) provides for the rectification of the registers 
or other records of the company, such form of relief is significantly restricted when 
compared to section 115 of the previous Act.611 
                                                 
608 Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA) [10]. See also Johan Scott ‘An Unsuccessful 
Long Shot Aimed at Effecting Liability for Causing Pure Economic Loss Itzikowitz v Absa Bank Ltd 
2016 (4) SA 432 (SCA)’ (2017) 80 THRHR 483 for a critical evaluation of the legal principles relating 
to the law of delict and company law that was applied. In Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) [23] the court held that the 
question whether a shareholder can institute legal proceedings based on a wrong committed to the 
company, can be answered on the basis that a share in a company provides the shareholder with 
the right to participate in the company in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation. The implication 
of this is that should a wrong be committed against the company the rights of a shareholder remain 
unaffected.  
609 Section 115 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 read as follows: 
‘115. Rectification or register of members.  
(1)  If – 
(a) the name of any person is, without sufficient cause, entered in or 
omitted from the register of members of a company; or 
(b) default is made or unnecessary delay takes place in entering in the 
register that fact of any person having ceased to be a member, 
the person concerned or the company or any member of the company, may apply to the 
Court for rectification of the register.’ 
610 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 246. 
611 See 5.9.12.2 below. 
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5.9.12.2 The availability of relief  
 
Only a shareholder or director may rely on the provisions of section 163 of the Act.612 
For purposes of section 163 the term shareholder carries a very specific meaning.613 
Because of the definition of a shareholder for purposes of section 163, the 
application of the remedy contained 163(2)(k) is limited.614 The definition excludes 
a shareholder whose name does not appear on the register of securities of the 
company.615 Section 115 of the previous Act was available to a much wider range 
of applicants in comparison to section 163 of the Act. Oosthuizen and Delport616 
point out that standing for purposes of the summary remedy for the rectification of 
the share register of a company in terms of section 115 of the previous Act extended 
to any person who alleged to have the right to have his or her name entered into 
the share register of a company.617 When the right of a shareholder to have his or 
her name included in the register of securities is in dispute, section 163 would not 
be available to such a shareholder, as the shareholder’s name would not appear on 
the register of securities of a company.618 The remedy in section 163(2)(k) of the 
                                                 
612 See 5.7 above. 
613 See 5.7.1.1 above. 
614 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 246. 
615 See 5.7.1.1 above. JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities 
Register of a Company and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 246 point out that 
standing for purposes of the summary remedy for the rectification of the share register in terms of 
section 115 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was extended to any person who alleges to have the 
right to have his or her name entered into the share register of a company. 
616 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228. 
617 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 246. 
618 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 247. 
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Act serves as another example of a disconnect between the remedies available 
under section 163(2) and the persons who enjoy standing in section 163(1) read 
with section 1 of the Act. 
5.9.12.3 Alternative relief  
 
(a) Introduction  
 
The consideration of alternative remedies available to a person claiming that he or 
she is entitled to have his or her name noted in the register of securities of a 
company, may further aid comprehension of the implications of the limitations on 
the relief that may be obtained in terms of section 163. 
(b) Common law 
It is significant to note that in contrast with section 165(1) of the Act, section 163 
does not abolish the common law rights of a shareholder.619 Thus, when a 
shareholder is unable to rely on section 163, such a shareholder could alternatively 
rely on his or her common law remedies such as specific performance to obtain 
relief compelling the company to include the name of the shareholder in the 
company’s register of securities.620  
(c) Section 161 
One other alternative remedy that can be considered in circumstances where a 
shareholder alleges that he or she has a right to have his or her name included in 
                                                 
619 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 252. 
620 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 243 and 246. 
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company’s register of securities is section 161.621 One of the benefits of section 161 
is that an applicant does not have to prove that he or she is a shareholder whose 
name is recorded in the company’s register of securities.622 It is only required that 
the applicant is the holder of issued securities of a company.623 
Section 161 is available to the holder of issued securities of a company.624 
The standing requirements for purposes of section 161 of the Act are therefore wider 
than the standing requirements for purposes of section 163 as a shareholder would 
only have to prove that he or she is the holder of securities and it is not required to 
prove that his or her name appears on the company’s register of securities.625 
Oosthuizen and Delport are critical regarding the use of section 161 by an 
unregistered claimant when the section is analysed with reference to section 115 of 
the previous Act.626 Although the standing requirements of section 161 of the Act 
include a wider variety persons compared to section 163, the authors remain critical 
of section 161 as a form of relief to a shareholder whose name has been 
                                                 
621 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248 argue that for purposes of the standing 
requirements in terms of section 161, an applicant does not have to prove that his or her holding of 
issued securities is recorded in the company’s register of securities.  
622 It should be noted that section 161 does not only protect shareholders but also the holders of 
securities. Section 1 of the Act defines ‘securities’ as meaning ‘any shares, debentures or other 
instruments, irrespective of their form of title, issued or authorised to be issued by a profit company’. 
623 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 161(1). See also JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport 
‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 
THRHR 228, 248. 
624 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248. 
625 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248. 
626 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248. 
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unjustifiably omitted from a company’s register of securities.627 When the standing 
requirements of section 161 are compared to that of section 115 of the previous Act, 
it is clear that the section 115 was available to a wide variety of persons compared 
to the narrow band of persons, namely the holders of securities, who may rely on 
section 161 of the Act.628  
The omission of a shareholder’s name from a company’s register of 
securities automatically disqualifies a shareholder from reliance on section 163. 
Such a shareholder’s position is further eroded in comparison with the previous Act 
as the Act does not contain a similar remedy to section 115 of the previous Act. 
According to Oosthuizen and Delport629 statutory provisions such as section 161 of 
the Act serve as unsatisfactory alternatives to relief in terms of section 163 and 
section 115 of the previous Act. 
5.9.13 Referral for trial 
5.9.13.1 Introduction  
It is trite that legal proceedings can commence by way of either action procedure or 
motion proceedings. It is interesting to note that section 163(1) provides that ‘[a] 
shareholder or a director of a company may apply (my emphasis) to a court for 
                                                 
627 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248. 
628 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 248. The authors (248-49) further argue that 
while section 115 specifically dealt ‘with the title to be on the register of members’ section 161 is 
rather aimed at the enforcement of the rights of a security holder in terms of the Act, Memorandum 
of Incorporation, applicable rules or any debt instrument. 
629 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228. 
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relief’. The wording of the provision implies that relief in terms of the section should 
be sought by way of motion proceedings.630 Further, section 163(2)(l) provides that 
a court can refer to trial, matters or issues that arise from an application based on 
section 163.631  
5.9.13.2 Action procedure and motion proceedings 
(a) Section 163 and motion proceedings 
Relief in the form of referring a matter for trial must be considered in light of the 
established principles relating to motion proceedings. Legal proceedings in terms of 
section 163 by way of motion proceedings is ‘permissible when there are no 
anticipated disputes of fact or these disputes can easily be determined by referral 
to trial’.632 Thus section 163(1) does not compel a shareholder or director to 
commence with legal proceedings in the form of motion proceedings.633 The section 
should rather be read to permit the commencement of legal proceedings in terms of 
section 163 by way of motion proceedings. 
(b) The referral to trial as an alternative remedy in the event of a factual 
dispute 
 
A court may only grant the relief sought in motion proceedings when the facts 
contained in the papers of the respondent or respondents considered with the 
                                                 
630 See 5.9.13.2 (a) below for a discussion of whether it is mandatory to commence with legal 
proceedings based on section 163 by way of motion proceedings. 
631 See 5.9.13.2 (b) below for a discussion of the function of section 163(2)(l) of the Act. 
632 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [93]. 
633 According to the court in Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [93] it could not 
have been the intention of the legislature to limit the procedural rights by excluding the availability of 
the commencement of legal proceedings by way of action proceedings.  
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admissions contained in the papers of the applicant justify such relief.634 In 
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another635 the court 
articulated the test as follow:- 
‘Recognising that the truth almost always lies beyond mere linguistic 
determination the courts have said that an applicant who seeks final relief 
on motion must, in the event of conflict, accept the version set up by his 
opponent unless the latter’s allegations are, in the opinion of the court, not 
such as to raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or are so far-
fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them 
merely on the papers.’ 
A fact is not regarded as in dispute merely because it is denied by a party.636 A court 
will not conclude that a reasonable dispute exists on the papers when the 
allegations made by the opponent or opponents of the application is ‘far-fetched or 
clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers’.637 
The party raising the dispute must ‘seriously and unambiguously’ deal with the fact 
in dispute in his or her papers.638 The existence of a dispute on the facts in motion 
                                                 
634 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [93]; Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van 
Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) 634.  
635 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) [12]. 
636 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) [13]. The 
court ([13]) noted that there may be some instances where a party can only answer to factual 
allegation by way of a bare denial. In those instances, a denial will suffice to find that a bona fide or 
real dispute is present on the papers. In Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 
1949 (3) SA 1155 (T) 1162-63 the court held that ‘[t]he crucial question is always whether there is a 
real dispute of fact. That being so, and the applicant being entitled in the absence of such dispute to 
secure relief by means of affidavit evidence, it does not appear that a respondent is entitled to defeat 
the applicant merely by bare denials such as he might employ in the pleadings of a trial action, for 
the sole purpose of forcing his opponent in the witness box to undergo cross-examination. Nor is the 
respondentʼs mere allegation of the existence of the dispute of fact conclusive of such existence’.  
637 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) [12]. 
See also Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [100]; Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v 
Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) 634-35. 
638 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) [13]. 
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proceedings justifies a court to dismiss the application with costs.639 This will 
especially be the case when the version of the applicant is placed in doubt.640  
Thus, an applicant is not entitled to relief in terms of section 163(2)(l) or the 
referral of the matter for oral evidence, merely because a factual dispute is raised 
on the papers before a court. Although a court can refer a dispute on the facts for 
trial, it will not do so in circumstances where the applicant commenced with motion 
proceedings with knowledge of the fact that the facts on which the applicant’s 
application for relief is based will probably be placed in dispute, requiring a detailed 
consideration of the available evidence to establish the facts in the matter.641 A court 
can also make an order in the form of a declaratory order in respect of the disputes 
in question to be referred for trial.642 In Harilal v Rajman and Others643 the court 
explained that when an applicant knows that a dispute cannot be resolved by motion 
proceedings, the applicant can approach the court for relief in terms of section 
163(2)(l). The applicant must clearly set out the issues that should be determined 
by a trial court.644 Despite the provisions of section 163(1) a party retains the right 
to institute action proceedings in the event of an anticipated factual dispute.645 
                                                 
639 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [95] and [104]. 
640 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [95]. 
641 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [96]. See also Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 (T) 1162. 
642 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [101]. 
643 [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD). 
644 Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [101]. 
645 The court in Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) [102] held that factual disputes 
cannot be resolved by way of motion proceedings and in the event of serious factual disputes action 
proceedings are more appropriate. The fact that proceedings in terms of section 163 of the Act may, 
in appropriate circumstances, be commenced with by way of action proceedings does not hold any 
prejudice for the party against whom proceedings are instituted.  
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(c) Summary 
 
Section 163(1) is not prescriptive of the form of proceedings a party must use in 
relying on the statutory unfair prejudice remedy. Section 163(2)(l) does not provide 
a safety net for an applicant who elected to rely on motion proceedings where the 
applicant knew or should have foreseen a bona fide factual dispute that would have 
caused the dispute to be referred to trial. When a party approaches a court by 
motion proceedings with the knowledge or the reasonable foreseeability of a bona 
fide factual dispute, the applicant runs the risk of his application being dismissed as 
it is not the function of section 163(2)(l) to entitle such an applicant to rather have 
the matter referred to trial. When a party wishes to seek some sort of relief by way 
of motion proceedings, the applicant must clearly describe the specific issues that 
are required to be referred to trial. 
5.9.14 Buy-out orders in terms of section 163(2) 
5.9.14.1 Introduction 
Relief in the form of a buy-out of a shareholder is only available when unfair 
prejudicial conduct is proven and when the court is of the view that it is appropriate 
in the context of the facts and circumstances of a case.646 Relief in the form of a 
buy-out order does not entitle a shareholder to exit from and divest its investment 
in the company at will. It is, however, strange that the legislature did not expressly 
                                                 
646 Usually a majority shareholder will be ordered to buy the shares of the minority shareholder at 
fair value. In exceptional circumstances it will be ordered that the shares of the majority be bought 
by the minority. See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [26] and [27]. See also in 
the context of section 252 of the previous Act Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van 
Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ 
(1988) 2 TSAR 268, 291. 
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provide for this form of relief in section 163(2).647 It can, however, be argued that 
section 163(2)(e) incorporates relief in the form of a buy-out order.648 Although there 
is some merit in this argument, the legislature missed the opportunity to clarify some 
aspects relating to relief in the form of buy-out orders. These aspects include who 
may be compelled to buy the shares subject to a buy-out order and, in the event of 
a company being compelled to acquire the shares of a shareholder, whether the 
requirements relating to the solvency and liquidity of a company apply to the making 
and enforcement of such an order.649 The valuation of shares subject to a buy-out 
order is also a complex matter. Factors that may influence the value of such shares 
include the date on which the valuation is made and the adjustments that have to 
be made to the value of the shares to counter the effect of the unfair prejudicial 
conduct complained of.650 
5.9.14.2 The practical value of buy-out orders 
Purchase or buy-out orders are the most frequent form of relief granted by courts 
on the grounds of unfair prejudicial conduct. This is because relief in this form is 
regarded as the most efficient and practical one to resolve unfair prejudice disputes, 
as the relationship between the parties to the dispute is terminated.651 A further 
advantage of a buy-out order is that the termination of the relationship between the 
                                                 
647 Compare to the position under section 252 of the previous Act where express provision was made 
for relief in the form of a buy-out order. This is especially significant because section 252 was 
criticised for not adequately describing the available forms of relief. See 5.2.4.3 (f) above in this 
regard. 
648 See 5.9.9 above. 
649 See also the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018).  
650 See 5.9.14.4 below. 
651 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [15]. 
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parties does not affect the existence and sustainability of a company as the case 
would have been in the event of the winding-up and liquidation of such a 
company.652 Oosthuizen argues that it is important for a shareholder to obtain relief 
in the form of a buy-out order when the company’s controllers committed a wrong 
against the company, as the normal derivative action has the disadvantage of 
placing the damages received by the company again under the control of the 
wrongdoers.653 Providing a shareholder with relief in the form of a buy-out order in 
circumstances where the controllers of the company have committed a wrong 
against the company will also have a more deterrent effect and protect a 
shareholder against future or re-occurring conduct.654  
5.9.14.3 Persons against whom a buy-out order can be made 
A court enjoys a wide discretion in the relief that it may grant.655 This discretion 
includes a discretion to tailor the relief to suit the facts and circumstances of a case. 
It is submitted that nothing in section 163 prevents a court to order that the shares 
subject to a buy-out order must be bought by the company and/or other 
shareholders of the company.656 When it considers the making of a purchase order 
the court will take into account the interests and rights of parties and stakeholders 
                                                 
652 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [15]. See also 5.8 above.  
653 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 115 
and 117. See also 5.9.15.2 above. 
654 MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 115 
and 117. 
655 See 5.9 above. 
656 This was also the position under section 252(3) of the previous Act where a buy-out order could 
be made against the company or shareholders. See also the buy-out order made in Omar v Inhouse 
Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) in terms of section 
163(2) of the Act. 
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who are not a party to the dispute before the court.657  
5.9.14.4 The valuation of shares  
Although the granting of a buy-out order is often a very useful mechanism in 
resolving unfair prejudice disputes it does have its drawbacks. Generally, a buy-out 
order requires that the shares in question be bought at fair value.658 Although courts 
have a wide discretion in fixing the value of shares subject to a buy-out order, judges 
are not businesspersons or experts in commerce.659 Judges are experts of law. One 
of the ways in which the fair value of shares can be determined is with the assistance 
of experts such as chartered accountants.660 Buy-out orders often contain 
instructions to the experts relating to issues and considerations that need to be 
taken into account during the valuation of the shares.661 Factors that may influence 
the valuation of the said shares may include discounts based on the fact that the 
                                                 
657 See regarding section 252 of the previous Act Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 
(SCA) [25] where the court stated that ‘[i]n any exercise of a discretion under s 252(3) the court is 
bound to consider not only the interests of the warring shareholders but also those of shareholders 
who have stood apart, and the best interests of the company itself’. 
658 See Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) 
[78]. See also Knipe and Others v Kameelhoek (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (1) SA 52 (FB) [33] where 
the court held that a court should determine a price for the shares that is subject to a buy-out order 
that is that is objectively ‘a fair price’. See also in the context of section 252 of the previous Act Leon 
van Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike 
Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 290. See further MJ Oosthuizen 
‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 237. 
659 See the commentary on section 163 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). 
660 See, for example, Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) 
SA 146 (WCC) [78]. 
661 See also Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 
(WCC) [78].  
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shares are a minority holding in the company,662 the date of the valuation of 
shares663 and the adjustments to be made to the value of the shares to provide for 
the unfair prejudicial conduct.664 
 
 
                                                 
662 See Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) 
[78] where the court held that the shareholding of a minority shareholder is to be valued on a pro 
rata basis. For a similar order see Engelbrecht v Coleman 2017 JDR 0415 (GJ) [12]. See further 
McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [47] where the valuation of the particular company was 
done on a going-concern basis. See also in the context of section 252 of the previous Act Leon van 
Rooyen ‘Die Statute Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike 
Ontwikkelings in die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 291 who is of the view that different 
considerations may apply in circumstances where a shareholder did not receive his shares at the 
incorporation of a company, but bought the shares in the company by means of a sale agreement 
where the fact that the relevant shares are a minority share was known. See also MJ Oosthuizen 
‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 237. 
663 See Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) 
[37] and [78] where the court ordered that the shares of the applicant must be valued as of his 
exclusion as a director from the board of the company. This approach is in line with the principle that 
the shares subject to a buy-out order should be valued on a date immediately preceding the unfair 
prejudicial conduct. See PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 
17, 2018). See further McMillan NO v Pott 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) [50] where the court held that the 
date that is to be used as the basis for the valuation of shares subject to a buy-out order must be 
‘fair to both sides’. See also in the context of section 252 of the previous Act Leon van Rooyen ‘Die 
Statute Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in 
die Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 291 who points out that there is no absolute principle 
as to whether the date on which the conduct complained of took place, the date of the application 
for relief, or the date of judgment or valuation should be used for purposes of the valuation of shares 
for purposes of a buy-out order. The principle is that a date should be chosen that reflects a fair 
valuation of the relevant shares (291). 
664 See also in the context of section 252 of the previous Act Leon van Rooyen ‘Die Statute 
Beskerming van Minderheidsbelange in die Maatskappyreg – Belangrike Ontwikkelings in die 
Engelse Regspraak’ (1988) 2 TSAR 268, 290. See further MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheids-
beskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 223, 237. 
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5.9.14.5 Buy-out orders and the interests of creditors  
 
(a) Introduction 
 
Creditors rely on the solvency and liquidity of a company for the satisfaction of their 
claims against the company. When a buy-out order is made and especially when 
the company is ordered to purchase the shares of the applicant or other 
shareholder, the interests of the applicant may come into conflict with the interests 
of a creditor. This is particularly the case when the company is financially 
distressed665 or where there is doubt about the solvency and liquidity of a company. 
Therefore, it is submitted that a buy-out order against a company should be subject 
to the solvency and liquidity requirements in section 4 of the Act. Because the 
company does not finance the buy-out of shares when such an order is made 
against shareholders of a company, there is no reason why the solvency and 
liquidity requirements have to apply in such circumstances as it is not the resources 
of the company that will be used to satisfy the buy-out order. However, adjustments 
to the value of shares to compensate for the effect of the relevant unfair prejudicial 
conduct raise interesting theoretical questions particularly in relation to the interests 
of creditors, especially if such adjustments to the value of shares are seen as the 
award of compensation directly to a shareholder.666  
(b) Buy-out orders and the award of compensation 
When a buy-order provides for adjustments to compensate for unfair prejudicial 
conduct, it can be argued that a shareholder receives a portion of compensation to 
                                                 
665 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 128(1)(f). 
666 See also 5.9.11 above for a discussion of the award of compensation to a shareholder or 
shareholders in instances where the company suffered damages or loss due to wrongful conduct. 
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which the company is actually entitled. That is specifically the case when a legal 
duty owed to the company is breached.667 The prejudice suffered by a shareholder 
is only reflective of the loss suffered by the company.668 The effect of this argument 
becomes apparent in the event of the winding-up of a company. For purposes of 
liquidation the free residue of the assets of a company which may include the 
compensation awarded to the company for a breach of duty will first be utilised to 
cover the expenses of the liquidation and other similar claims, thereafter the balance 
of the assets would be used to satisfy the claims of creditors as far as possible.669 
Only after the satisfaction of the claims of creditors will be balance of the assets be 
used to repay shareholders for their capital invested in the company.670 This 
highlights the possibility that a shareholder would enjoy a preference over other 
interested parties such as creditors, when a shareholder is awarded compensation 
for unfair prejudice suffered.671  
5.9.15 The interrelationship between sections 163 and 165 of the Act 
5.9.15.1 Introduction 
The Act provides for both a statutory personal action (the oppression or unfair 
prejudice remedy) in the form of section 163 and a statutory derivative action in 
section 165. Both these remedies are aimed at the protection of the shareholders 
of the company, as the legislature recognised that the strict application of the proper 
                                                 
667 See 5.9.11 above. 
668 See 5.9.11 above. 
669 Companies Act 61 of 1973, s 391 read with s 342(1). 
670 Companies Act 61 of 1973, s 391 read with s 342(1). 
671 See also BA van der Merwe ‘Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers: Die 
Toepassingsveld van die Reël in Foss v Harbottle Uitgebrei?’ (1993) 5 SA Merc LJ 216, 228. 
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plaintiff rule and the principle of majority rule may in some circumstances lead to 
injustices.672 The difference between the two remedies is that section 163 is aimed 
at the direct protection of the interests of a shareholder (and/or a director) while 
section 165 is aimed at the protection of the rights and interests of the company 
resulting in the consequential indirect protection of shareholders.673 Currently, the 
South African legislature maintains a strict distinction between the personal remedy 
and the derivative action in the form of section 163 and section 165 of the Act.674 
The merits of the strict maintenance of the difference between section 163 and 165 
are considered below in light of criticism raised in this respect against the previous 
Act and current developments in other jurisdictions considered.675 
5.9.15.2 An overview of section 165 – the basic procedure  
(a)  The service of a letter of demand as the commencement of the 
procedure in section 165 of the Act 
Section 165 of the Act outlines the procedure that must be followed for the 
appointment of a person to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company to 
                                                 
672 See 5.2.2 above. 
673 MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act Guidelines for Judicial 
Discretion (1st ed, 2016) 5 and 7-8. 
674 See 5.9.15.4 below where it is pointed out that this distinction is confirmed by judicial interpretation 
of section 163 of the Act. Compare with the position in England as discussed in 2.10.3 above. See 
also 3.9.6 above for the position in Australia. These jurisdictions make statutory provision in their 
respective statutory personal actions for the authorisation of legal proceedings on behalf of a 
company. The South African position is in line with the Canadian position where no provision is made 
for the authorisation for the institution of the legal proceedings for and on behalf of the company in 
terms of the statutory personal action. 
675 See 5.9.15.3 – 5.9.15.6 below. 
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enforce or protect the legal interests of the company.676 The process commences 
with the service of a demand on the company by a person mentioned in section 
165(2) of the Act.677  
(b)  The company’s options after receiving a demand 
Upon receipt of a demand in terms of section 165(2) of the Act, a company has 15 
business days within which to approach the court to set aside the demand on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit.678 If the company does not 
approach the court in terms of section 165(3) to set aside a demand, the company 
must proceed to appoint a person or committee for purposes of investigating the 
demand.679 Such a person or committee must be independent and impartial.680  
(c) The investigation of the demand by a person or committee 
appointed by the company 
 
After the investigation of the demand by the person or committee appointed by the 
                                                 
676 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of section 165 see MF Cassim The Statutory Derivative 
Action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the Exercise of the Judicial Discretion (2014) 
(unpublished PHD thesis; University of Cape Town). See also CT Chokuda The Protection of 
Shareholders’ Rights versus Flexibility in the Management of Companies: A Critical Analysis of the 
Implications of Corporate Law Reform on Corporate Governance in South Africa with specific 
reference to protection of shareholders (2017) (unpublished Phd thesis; University of Cape Town) 
115-28. 
677 The court in Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 74 (KZD) [34] 
held that the word ‘may’ in section 165 must be understood to mean ‘must’. See, however, section 
165(6) where it is acknowledged that a person may in ‘exceptional circumstances’ apply for leave 
without delivering a demand to the company and/or affording the company an opportunity to respond 
to the demand. 
678 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(3). 
679 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4). 
680 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(a). 
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company, such a person or committee must report to the board.681 This report must 
cover the facts and circumstances that gave rise to or are related to the demand;682 
the costs implications of pursuing the demanded legal action or proceedings;683 and 
express an opinion as to whether the institution or continuation of legal proceedings 
will be in the best interests of the company.684  
(d) The obligations of the company after the consideration of the report 
of the person or committee tasked with investigating the demand 
served on the company 
Unless a company has succeeded in setting aside a demand in terms of section 
165(2) of Act, a company has 60 business days after being served with a demand 
to either commence or continue with the legal proceedings demanded685 or serve a 
notice upon the person who made the demand in which it is stated that the company 
refuses to comply with the demand.686 
(e) Leave to bring or continue proceedings in the name and on behalf 
of the company 
If the company notified the person who made the demand for legal proceedings that 
it refuses to comply with the demand, the person who has made the demand may 
approach the court for leave to bring or continue proceedings in the name and on 
behalf of the company.687 
                                                 
681 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(a). 
682 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(a)(i). 
683 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(a)(i)(bb)(ii). 
684 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(a)(i)(bb)(ii). 
685 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(b)(i). 
686 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(4)(b)(ii). 
687 Section 165(4)(b)(ii) read with section 165(5)(a)(v) and section 165(5)(b) of the Act. It must be 
noted that a person who made a demand for legal proceedings may also apply for relief to bring or 
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(f) A court’s discretion in terms of section 165(5)(b) to grant leave to 
bring or continue proceedings in the name and on behalf of the 
company 
A court may grant leave to bring or continue legal proceedings in the name and on 
behalf of the company, if the applicant can convince the court on a balance of 
probabilities that he or she is acting in good faith,688 the proposed legal proceedings 
to be instituted or continued address a serious question of material consequences 
to the company689 and that the institution of the legal proceedings or the continuation 
thereof is in the best interests of the company.690 
(g) The rebuttable presumption in section 165(7) and the best interests 
of a company 
 
One of the requirements that an applicant has to prove is that the proposed 
proceedings will in the best interests of a company if the applicant is granted such 
leave.691 To satisfy a court that the leave in terms of section 165(5) is in the best 
interests of a company is especially difficult when the rebuttable presumption in 
section 165(7) applies. This presumption provides that it will not be in the best 
interests of the company to institute or continue with legal proceedings if those 
proceedings are by or against a third-party;692 the company decided not to institute 
                                                 
continue legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company based on the conduct of the 
company described in section 165(5)(a)(i)-(iv). 
688 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(5)(b)(i). 
689 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(5)(b)(ii). 
690 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(5)(b)(iii). 
691 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(5)(b)(iii). 
692 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(a). See the criticism of MF Cassim ‘When Companies are 
harmed by their Own Directors: The Defects in the Statutory Derivative Action and the Cures (part 
1)’ (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 168, 180 of the inclusion of a director as a ‘third-party’ for purposes of the 
application of the rebuttable presumption in section 165(7). See also AG Binns-Ward ‘Lost in 
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or defend legal proceedings;693 and all the directors that participated in that 
particular position acted with good faith for a proper purpose.694 These directors 
must have had no personal financial interest in the matter;695 had properly informed 
themselves to an extent that they reasonably believed to be appropriate;696 and took 
the decision while the director or directors reasonably believed that was in the 
interests of the company.697  
(h) Summary 
In short, an applicant who wishes to rely on section 165 will have to overcome a 
number of procedural hurdles to institute or defend legal proceedings on behalf of 
the company.698 An applicant will, for example, have great difficulty in proving that 
the authorisation (leave) for the institution of legal proceedings on behalf of the 
                                                 
Translation: The need for the Judicious Use of Comparative Law’ (2017) 2 JCCL&P 1, 12-13 who is 
of the view that because the directors of a company are regarded as ‘a third party’ for purposes of 
section 165(8) and because of the rebuttable presumption in section 165(7)(a), it is not in the best 
interest of the company to pursue litigation against a director or directors of the company who 
decided not to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the company, is one of the glaring weaknesses 
of the statutory derivative action in section 165 of the Act. This is especially problematic in light of 
the fact that reliance is usually placed on the statutory derivative action to protect that company 
against the wrongful and/or abusive conduct of its own directors. 
693 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(b). 
694 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(c)(i). 
695 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(c)(ii). 
696 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(c)(iii). 
697 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 165(7)(c)(iv). 
698 For a critical analysis of section 165 of the Act see MF Cassim ‘When Companies are harmed by 
their Own Directors: The Defects in the Statutory Derivative Action and the Cures (part 1)’ (2013) 25 
SA Merc LJ 168; MF Cassim ‘When Companies are harmed by their Own Directors: The Defects in 
the Statutory Derivative Action and the Cures (part 1)’ (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 301; MF Cassim ‘Costs 
Orders, Obstacles and Barriers to the Derivative Action under Section 165 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 (part 1)’ (2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 1; MF Cassim ‘The Statutory Derivative Action under the 
Companies Act 2008: The Role of Good Faith’ (2013) 130 SALJ 496; MF Cassim ‘Judicial Discretion 
in the Derivative Actions under the Companies Act of 2008’ (2013) 130 SALJ 778. 
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company will be in the best interests of the company, when the directors of the 
company have already taken the view that the institution or defence of legal 
proceedings is not in the best interests of the company. Because of the strict and 
difficult requirements in section 165, applicants would be inclined to seek alternative 
remedies to obtain the same or similar forms of relief. Section 163 has previously 
been raised as such alternative.699 
5.9.15.3 A theoretical perspective on the potential overlap between sections 
163 and 165 of the Act 
 
The historical development of section 163 and the express wording of section 165 
reveal an objective of the legislature to overcome the injustices and uncertainties 
created by the rule in Foss v Harbottle.700 A potential overlap or relationship 
between section 163 and section 165 is created when wrongs are committed to a 
                                                 
699 See 5.9.15.3 below for a discussion of the potential overlap between section 163 and section 165 
of the Act. 
700 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. See also 5.2 above for the statutory development of the unfair 
prejudice remedy prior to the introduction of section 163 of the Act. With regard to the derivative 
remedy or claim, section 165 expressly abolished the common law position. See further see MF 
Cassim The Statutory Derivative Action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the 
Exercise of the Judicial Discretion (2014) (unpublished PHD thesis; University of Cape Town) 8. 
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company by its directors701 or other parties owing a legal duty to a company.702 Such 
wrongs indirectly affect the interests of shareholders. Because the company is a 
separate legal personality only the company has standing to institute legal 
proceedings to obtain relief for the company.703 Further, the decision to institute 
legal proceedings to obtain redress for wrongs committed against a company 
resides with the company’s board and not the shareholders.704 These two company 
                                                 
701 For example, a breach of a director’s duty. Directors owe fiduciary duties and a duty of care, skill 
and diligence towards a company. These duties are owed to the company and not to individual 
shareholders. However, when a director is in breach of his or her duty towards the company, it is not 
only the company that is prejudiced but it may also infringe upon the rights of shareholders. See 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 76. See also the commentary on section 76 by PA Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018). See also Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 (5) SA 333 (W) [16.6]. Contra Lewis Group 
Limited v Woollam and Others 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) [49] where the court held that ‘the duty of 
company directors to act honestly and in accordance with their fiduciary duties to the company is 
owed not only to the company, but also to the shareholders personally’. A director owes fiduciary 
duties and the duty to act with care, skill and diligence to the company. As the shareholders of a 
company do not owe fiduciary duties towards the company they may act in their own interests. See 
in this regard Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 
(WCC) [89] and Rentekor (Pty) Ltd v Rheeder & Berman 1988 (4) SA 469 (T) 479. 
702 For example, a breach of a director’s duty. Directors owe fiduciary duties and a duty of care, skill 
and diligence towards a company. These duties are owed to the company and not individual 
shareholders. However, when a director is in breach of his or her duty towards the company, it is not 
only the company that is prejudiced but the effect of the wrong committed towards the company may 
also infringe upon the rights of shareholders. See Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 76. See also the 
commentary on section 76 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service 
issue 17, 2018). See also Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 
2006 (5) SA 333 (W) [16.6]. Contra Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and Others 2017 (2) SA 547 
(WCC). The fiduciary duties and the duty to act with care, skill and diligence of a director are owed 
the company, in contrast with shareholders who do not owe any such duties towards the company 
and may act in their own interests. See in this regard Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) [89] and Rentekor (Pty) Ltd v Rheeder & Berman 1988 
(4) SA 469 (T) 479. For an English law perspective on the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 
461, 67 ER 189 see 2.3.1 above. 
703 See 5.4.3 above. 
704 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 66(1). 
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law principles preclude a shareholder from seeking redress for indirect prejudice 
suffered as a consequence of a wrong committed against a company.705 The fact 
                                                 
705 See MJ Oosthuizen ‘Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Maatskappyereg’ (1981) TSAR 105, 
117-18 who argues that an extension of the personal action to instances where a wrong is committed 
against the company should only be granted in exceptional circumstances where the indirect 
prejudice suffered by the shareholder is of an exceptional nature. The author further warned (115 
and 117) that the inclusion of relief on such basis may lead to the involvement of companies in 
unnecessary litigation in circumstances where companies have not decided to pursue legal action 
against the wrongdoers on acceptable grounds. The advantages of relying on section 163 in 
appropriate circumstances instead of section 165 include the open and flexible concepts within which 
section 163 is formulated, making section 163 applicable to a variety of facts and circumstances. 
Also, section 163 provides the court with a wide discretion to tailor relief that it considers fit in the 
circumstances of each case. Further, in contrast with section 165, section 163 has a less 
cumbersome procedure to follow. Practitioners may be tempted to advise potential applicants to rely, 
where possible, on section 163 rather than section 165, as section 163 is not plagued by similar 
procedural requirements as section 165. Other than the normal rules of civil procedure, section 163 
is a much simpler and faster method of approaching a court. Section 163 also does not have 
prerequisites which are linked to timeframes that have to be adhered to before a person may 
approach the court for the necessary relief. Based on the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Off-
Beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday SPA Shareblock Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 
(CC) dealing with section 252 of the previous Act, a claim based in section 163 of the Act is not a 
‘debt’ which can prescribe in terms of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. In overturning the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Off-Beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday SPA 
Shareblock Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 181 (SCA) the Constitutional Court found [31] that a claim 
based on section 252 of the previous Act does not constitute a debt as defined in Makate v Vodacom 
Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC). The Constitutional Court [32] further explained that section 252 of the 
previous Act ‘concerns an entitlement to the making of an equitable judicial determination, which in 
any event considers the delay. The outcome of an equitable determination is not certain in advance. 
A court has to decide what is just and equitable based on the unique facts of the case. The 
declaratory order would clearly spell out the rights and duties of a party going forward and whether 
the applicants’ claim should be absolutely barred or not’. Although prescription may not run against 
a claim in terms of section 163 of the Act, a court would probably take into account the time delay 
between the commission of the alleged oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct and the institution of 
legal proceedings to obtain relief in terms of section 163 to determine the commercial fairness or 
unfairness of the conduct complained of. A long delay may be indicative of the shareholder or 
director’s willingness to endure the conduct complained of, which will make it difficult for a court to 
hold without a reasonable explanation that the same conduct must suddenly be regarded as unfair. 
One of the disadvantages in obtaining an order to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company 
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that the directors may decide on whether to pursue legal proceedings is problematic 
in circumstances where the wrong was committed by the directors themselves. 
Based on the separate legal personality of a company and the fact that the directors 
of a company have the power to manage the affairs and management the company, 
the chances of the company seeking redress are fairly slim. Due to the cumbersome 
procedure in section 165, it is unlikely that this statutory form of the derivative action 
would be relied upon to institute legal proceeding on behalf of the company against 
the relevant directors.706 An argument can be made that a decision of the board not 
to institute legal proceedings against directors who committed a wrong against the 
company may constitute oppressive unfair prejudice. Although it may be argued that 
the prejudice suffered by a shareholder in such circumstances is indirect it must be 
noted that section 163 protects the interests of a shareholder or director in addition 
                                                 
in terms of section 163, if possible, is that the position regarding the costs and indemnification of 
costs relating to such subsequent proceedings is uncertain. Section 165 of Act has also been 
subjected to criticisms for not adequately regulating the position in respect of costs in the application 
for and the subsequent institution of derivative proceedings. Traditionally personal actions such as 
section 163 is aimed at the protection of shareholders’ own interests. Therefore, the normal 
principles relating to costs orders apply. MF Cassim ‘Costs Orders, Obstacles and Barriers to the 
Derivative Action under section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (part 1)’ (2014) 26 SA Merc 
LJ 1, 12 is of the view that in the context of the derivative action one would expect different 
considerations to apply in relation to costs, because derivative proceedings are for the benefit of the 
company, and not directly for the benefit of the applicant in terms of section 165. Although section 
165(10) does provide for the making of costs orders, these provisions are vague and leave the issue 
relating to costs within the discretion of the courts. MF Cassim ‘Costs Orders, Obstacles and Barriers 
to the Derivative Action under section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (part 1)’ (2014) 26 SA 
Merc LJ 1, 13 states that section 165(10) fails ‘to shift the burden of the costs back to the company, 
which is the real plaintiff, this provision dismally fails to overcome the shareholder’s disincentive to 
litigate stemming from the normal “loser pays” rule’. The uncertainties embedded in this approach 
fail to incentivise the use of the derivative action in section 165, as section 165 does not provide for 
clear advantages regarding costs in comparison with section 163. 
706 See 5.9.15.2 above. 
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to rights.707 This opens the possibility to obtain relief based on indirect prejudice 
suffered as a result of a direct wrong committed against the company.708 
5.9.15.4  The judicial maintenance of a strict distinction between section 163 
and section 165 
 
The court in Larret v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd709 held that a clear 
distinction must be maintained between section 163 and section 165 of the Act. This 
is in light of the fact that section 163(2) does not expressly provide for the 
authorisation to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company in terms of 
section 165.710 Although this does not mean that the possibility is excluded, as the 
relief listed in section 163(2) is not exhaustive, the legislature did not follow the 
approach of the wording of similar provisions in other comparable jurisdictions.711 In 
light of the provisions and procedures in section 165 the court found that the 
legislature could not have intended to provide for the authorisation of legal 
proceedings on behalf of the company against third parties of a company in terms 
of section 163.712 Section 165 contains a procedure which takes into account the 
interests and rights of shareholders, the company and third parties.713 It is 
interesting to note that the court indicated that it arrived at its conclusion 
                                                 
707 See 5.9.11 above. 
708 See 5.9.11 above for a discussion of the right of a shareholder to recover damages based on an 
indirect harm suffered in the form of a diminution in the value of his or her shares.  
709 2015 (6) SA 16 (ECG). 
710 See Larret v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 16 (ECG) [12] where this 
question was specifically raised. 
711 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 5(2). For the position in England see 2.10.3 above. 
712 Larret v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 16 (ECG) [14]. See also 5.9.15.4 
above. 
713 Larret v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 16 (ECG) [14]. 
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‘reluctantly’.714 
5.9.15.5 The merits of the maintenance of a distinction between section 163 
and section 165 – a practical perspective  
 
The stance of the legislature and judiciary that the remedies provided for in section 
163 and 165 are separate and independent of each other does not solve the 
practicalities with which applicants are faced when deciding whether section 163 or 
section 165 applies to a particular set of facts.715 Such an approach is also not in 
keeping with the fact that conduct may in certain circumstances infringe upon the 
interests of a shareholder or a director and the interests and rights of the company 
on the other hand. This approach is also to an extent not in keeping with 
developments in other similar jurisdictions.716 
Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances in Kudumane 
Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Others717 and the nature of the relief sought by the applicant I am of the view that for 
                                                 
714 Larret v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2015 (6) SA 16 (ECG) [16]. See also E Hurter 
Aspekte van Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) 
(unpublished LLD thesis; University of South Africa) 53-58 pointed out the reluctance of courts to 
acknowledge the overlap between the personal remedy and the derivative action. 
715 This difficulty is well illustrated in the case of Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape 
Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). In this case the applicant relied 
on section 163 to appoint directors to the board of the company and for a temporary amendment of a 
shareholder agreement. During the application it was argued that due to the uncertainty surrounding 
the legal appointment of directors to the board of the company, the company could not with legal 
certainty conclude transactions and agreements. The applicant, Kudumane, who was a minority 
shareholder of the company applied to court for an order relating to the appointment of certain directors 
and the amendment of a shareholder agreement. The court granted the relief prayed for.  
716 See the position in England as discussed in Chapter 2 above. For the position in Australia in 
Chapter 3 above. 
717 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
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the reasons provided above, the applicant was well within its rights to base the 
application either on section 163 or section 165.718 In Kudumane Investment Holding 
Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others719 the applicant 
relied on section 163 for relief. It is submitted that section 165 might well have found 
application to the facts of the case as well.720 The manner with which section 163 was 
applied by the court in Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape 
Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others721 cannot be faulted on the basis that it 
offended the principles of Foss v Harbottle722 or circumvented the provisions of 
section 165. It is equally in the interests of a company and its shareholder to have or 
exercise the right to demand a properly constituted board. This case clearly illustrates 
how difficult it can be to differentiate between the application of section 163 and 
section 165 to the same set of facts. Although the personal remedy and the derivative 
action may be differentiated on a theoretical basis, the practical application of such 
an approach does provide it is challenges. For example, a shareholder or director 
cannot be punished by the dismissal of their claim or application for relying on section 
163 instead of section 165 in circumstances where both these remedies may apply 
to the facts of a case. The development of principles and guidelines for the separate 
and distinct application of section 163 and section 165 would be exceptionally difficult 
due to the overlap between these statutory provisions.  
                                                 
718 See also HGJ Beukes & WJC Swart ‘Blurring the Dividing Line between the Oppression Remedy 
and the Derivative Action: Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese 
Company (Pty) Ltd and Others’ (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 467. 
719 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
720 See HGJ Beukes & WJC Swart ‘Blurring the Dividing Line between the Oppression Remedy and 
the Derivative Action: Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company 
(Pty) Ltd and Others’ (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 467, 471. 
721 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ). 
722 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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5.9.15.6 Conclusion 
 
The above discussion highlights that traditionally a strict distinction has been kept 
between the personal remedy of a shareholder and the derivative action. The 
maintenance of this strict distinction continues to apply to section 163 and section 
165 of the Act. This approach seems to be out of sync with current developments 
in other jurisdictions considered in this thesis. Although the approach adopted in 
these jurisdictions does present a practical solution, the incorporation of such an 
approach does raise issues in relation to the recognition of indirect prejudice and 
the wide ambit of the wording of section 163 of the Act in the context of established 
principles of the law of delict, law of damages, company law and interpretational 
principles. It is submitted that this aspect deserves and justifies a further 
comprehensive study. Recommendations will be made based on the criticism raised 
in relation to this aspect in terms of section 252 of the Act and the developments in 
other jurisdictions evaluated in this thesis. 
5.10 Relationship with section 164 
 
5.10.1 Introduction 
 
One of the innovations in the Act is the introduction of a shareholder’s dissenting 
rights in section 164.723 In terms of section 164 a shareholder can compel a 
company to acquire his or her shares at fair value. This appraisal remedy only 
applies in specific circumstances and provided that the shareholder has complied 
                                                 
723 See Jacqueline Yeats The Proper and Effective Exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South 
African Companies Act, 2008: Developing a Strategic Approach through a Study of Comparable 
Foreign Law (2015) (unpublished PhD thesis; University of Cape Town) for an in-depth analysis of 
section 164 of the Act. 
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with certain requirements.724 
5.10.2 Application 
 
The application of section 164 is triggered when the shareholders of a company 
adopt a resolution to ‘alter the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of any 
class of its shares in any manner that materially adverse to the rights or interests of 
holders of that class of shares, as contemplated in section 37(8)’725 or to enter into 
a fundamental transaction.726 Section 163 covered conduct that is oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards the interests of a shareholder or 
director.727 
5.10.3 Action required by the shareholder 
 
For a shareholder to exercise his or her rights in terms of section 164, the 
shareholder must provide the company with his or her written objection to the 
resolution prior to the voting on the relevant resolution.728 Once the relevant 
resolutions to which the shareholder objected and voted against is adopted, the 
shareholder may demand the company to pay the fair value of the shares in the 
                                                 
724 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(2) read with section 164(5). See the commentary on section 
164 of the Act by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 
2018) who states that the purpose of the remedy is to deter the company from pursuing a particular 
course of action and if the company proceeds to follow the course of action it provides the 
shareholder with the ability to exit a company. 
725 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(2)(a). 
726 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(2)(b). 
727 See 5.6.2.2 above of a discussion of the jurisdictional requirements of section 163 of the Act. 
728 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(3). See also section 164(6) for when the written notice of 
objection to the proposed resolution is not required. 
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company held by the specific shareholder.729  
5.10.4  The effect of serving a demand 
 
The delivery of a demand for fair value has very specific consequences for the rights 
of the relevant shareholder. The effect of the delivery of such a demand is that the 
shareholder has no further rights in the company other than to demand the payment 
of fair value.730 The rights of a shareholder are only reinstated under very specific 
circumstances.731 
 
                                                 
729 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(5). In terms of section 164(5) a shareholder may only make a 
demand for the fair value of the shares held by him or her when the shareholder provided the 
company with his or her written objection to the relevant resolution, the company adopted the 
resolution, the shareholder voted against the resolution and in the event of an amendment of a 
Memorandum of Incorporation that the class rights of the shareholder were materially and adversely 
affected. See also section 164(4) in relation the company’s obligations to notify a dissenting 
shareholder within 10 business days after the adoption of the resolution triggering the shareholder’s 
appraisal rights. In terms of section 164(7) of the Act a demand for fair value must be made by the 
shareholder within 20 business days after receiving notice of the adoption of the resolution or when 
the company failed to provide the required notice, within 20 business days after learning that the 
resolution has been adopted. 
730 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(9). See MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression 
Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 
305, 320 where the author who is of the opinion that section 164(9) does not deprive a shareholder 
of the right to rely on section 163. The author (320) explains that a distinction must be drawn between 
a shareholder’s rights and his or her standing or status in terms of the Act. According to the author 
the effect of section 164(9) is to only sever the rights of a shareholder but it does not terminate a 
shareholder’s status or standing in terms of the Act. Therefore, the dissenting shareholder remains 
entitled to rely on the provisions of section 163 in appropriate circumstances. 
731 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(10). In terms of section 164(9) read with (10) the rights of a 
dissenting shareholder are reinstated in circumstances that include the shareholder’s withdrawal of 
the demand; the lapse of a company’s offer for fair value; the failure of a company to make an offer 
for value and the subsequent withdrawal of the demand for value by the shareholder; and the 
adoption of a special resolution that gave rise to the shareholder’s appraisal rights. 
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5.10.5 The timing of the offer for demand 
 
Section 164 provides that a company against whom a shareholder exercised his or 
her appraisal rights has to make an offer for fair value to a dissenting shareholder.732 
Such a company must make an offer for fair value within 5 business days after the 
latest date of when the action approved by the relevant resolution is effective;733 the 
last day on which a shareholder may make a demand for fair value after receiving 
notice of the adoption of a resolution triggering his or her appraisal rights;734 or in 
the event of a failure by the company to issue a notice informing dissenting 
shareholders of the adoption of the resolution triggering a shareholder’s appraisal 
rights, the day after the company received a demand from a shareholder when a 
shareholder made a demand for such fair value.735 
5.10.6 Section 163 and section 164 of the Act 
 
After making a demand for an offer for the fair value of his or her shares, a 
shareholder does not have any further rights in the company save for the receipt of 
such an offer. Therefore it is in the interests of a dissenting shareholder that the 
offer for the fair value of the shares be made as soon as possible. Based on the 
wording of the provisions of section 164 relating to when a company is obliged to 
make an offer for fair value, it is possible for a company to structure a transaction in 
such a manner that a substantial period of time may lapse between the demand by 
a shareholder and the making of an offer by the company. During this period a 
shareholder may be prejudiced because he or she does not have any rights in the 
                                                 
732 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(11). 
733 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(11)(a). 
734 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(11)(b). 
735 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(11)(c). 
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company except for receiving an offer for the fair value for his or her shares in the 
company. In such circumstances section 163 may assist a shareholder who 
exercised his or her rights of dissent in terms of section 164 to avoid being captured 
within a locked-in situation created by the way in which a transaction triggering the 
provisions of section 164 is structured.736 
The remedies in section 163 and section 164 share some similarities, which 
makes the consideration of the practical issues relating to these remedies 
significant. Both remedies are aimed at the protection of shareholders, more 
specifically minority shareholders.737 In terms of section 164 this is achieved by 
providing a shareholder with relief in the form of the right to withdraw his or her 
capital in a company at fair value.738 The same objective may also be achieved by 
obtaining relief in the form of a buy-out order in terms of section 163. However, it 
must be noted that a court has a wide discretion in terms of section 163(2) and the 
relief a court can grant will not always necessarily take the form of a buy-out 
order.739 Relief in terms of section 163 and section 164 may only be provided if the 
                                                 
736 MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 324. 
737 See MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 319-20 who argues that the 
purpose of section 163 is to test the substantive fairness of a transaction while section 164 provides 
a shareholder with the right to withdraw from a company and to receive fair value for his or her 
shares. 
738 See MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 314 who argues that section 
164 provides for a mechanism for a dissenting shareholder to exit a company in order to avoid a 
situation where such a shareholder is locked into a company that is ‘drastically changed or 
restructured’ in the context of the expectations of the shareholder. 
739 See 5.6 above read with 5.9.14 above. See also MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the 
Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 
2 SA Merc LJ 305, 320. 
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applicable jurisdictional requirements of the sections are met. The jurisdictional 
requirements in section 164 refer to the amendments to the Memorandum of 
Incorporation that have a specific effect on the class rights of a shareholder or the 
entering into a fundamental transaction, while relief in terms of section 163 may be 
granted when oppressive, unfair prejudicial conduct or an unfair disregard of 
interests is proven.740 
In contrast with section 163, section 164 contains very specific provisions as 
to when a shareholder is entitled to receive an offer for fair value. In terms of section 
163 the court enjoys a wide discretion pertaining to the terms and condition upon 
which a buy-out of the shares of a shareholder of a company will be executed.741 
During the period between demanding an offer for value from a company and the 
time when a company is obliged to make such an offer, a dissenting shareholder is 
exposed to potential prejudice. When a shareholder suffers prejudice during this 
period he or she may be required to rely on section 163 for relief.742 The effect of 
section 164 is that a shareholder will exit the company at fair value without 
                                                 
740 See also the commentary on section 164 of the Act by PA Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) who points out that the amendments to the 
Memorandum of Incorporation may be challenged on the basis of section 163. See also MF Cassim 
‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and the 
Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 319 who argues that the application of section 
163 and section 164 is not mutually exclusive. Depending on the circumstances the remedies may 
apply simultaneously. The appraisal remedy does not provide for the effect that oppressive conduct 
had on the value of the shares of a company (321 and 323). In such circumstances a shareholder 
will have to rely on section 163 to seek compensation for the effect that oppressive conduct had on 
the value of the shareholder’s shares in a company (321 and 323). 
741 See 5.9 and more specifically 5.9.14 above. 
742 See MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 317-18 who argues that an 
imbalance exists between the interests of the dissenting shareholder and the company during this 
period. 
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necessarily approaching the court. Although section 163 does provide for a buy-
order, section 163(2) provides for a wide range of relief that does not necessarily 
have effect that the shareholder leaves or withdraws from the company. The form 
of relief in terms of section 163(2) must be considered by a court as fit in light of the 
facts and circumstances of a particular case.743 From a practical perspective section 
163 differs from section 164 in that in terms of section 163(2) a buy-out of a 
shareholder cannot be achieved without court intervention while this is possible in 
terms of section 164.744 A further aspect that has to be considered is that section 
164 does not provide for the award of compensation or the making of adjustments 
for oppression or unfair prejudicial conduct that occurred prior the exercise of a 
shareholder’s appraisal rights in terms of section 164. To obtain relief to 
compensate for oppressive or unfair prejudicial conduct that causes a decrease or 
fall in the value of the shares held by the shareholder in the company, it would be 
more appropriate to institute legal proceedings based on section 163 rather than on 
section 164.745 This makes it clear that the remedies contained in section 163 and 
section 164 must not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Such an approach 
promotes the spirit and purpose of the Act by ensuring the enjoyment of the rights 
and remedies contained in the Act.746 
                                                 
743 See 5.9 above. 
744 The exit of a shareholder from a company at fair value in terms of section 164 does not require 
court intervention save for when the fairness of the offer by the company is challenged. See in this 
regard MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 323. 
745 MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 321. 
746 MF Cassim ‘The Appraisal Remedy and the Oppression Remedy under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, and the Overlap between them’ (2017) 2 SA Merc LJ 305, 320. 
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5.11 Dispute Resolution 
5.11.1 Unfair prejudicial conduct and the role of reasonable offers 
5.11.1.1 Introduction 
The making of offers to settle plays an important role in resolving any disputes or 
litigation. The rejection of an offer for settlement in the context of unfair prejudice 
proceedings is a significant factor to consider in the application of section 163.747 
The rejection of a reasonable offer748 is ‘strong evidence of a willingness to endure 
treatment which is prima facie inequitable despite the choice of a viable 
alternative’.749 
5.11.1.2 The effect of the rejection of a reasonable offer 
A court may find that a party who has complained of unfair prejudicial conduct and 
has rejected a reasonable offer for settlement of such a dispute, did not successfully 
prove that he or she has suffered unfair prejudice for purpose of section 163.750 
Approaching a court for relief in terms of section 163 after the rejection of a 
                                                 
747 The receipt of an offer to buy-out the shares of an applicant is such an important factor in 
determining unfair prejudicial conduct that such an offer should in some circumstances be disclosed 
in the founding affidavit of the applicant. That is especially the case when the offer to buy the shares 
of an applicant in the relevant company was accompanied by supporting documentation 
demonstrating how the basis of the valuation of the relevant company’s shares was established. See 
Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [80]-[81]. 
748 In Geffen and others v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [34] the court extracted the 
criteria to be used to establish whether an offer constitutes a reasonable offer from the English case 
of O’Neill and another v Phillips and others [1999] 2 All ER 961 (HL). For a discussion of O’Neill in 
this context see 2.11.2 above.  
749 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [24] where the court also held that this 
principle is not absolute. 
750 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [23]-[24]. 
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reasonable offer is regarded by the courts as an abuse of the court process.751 
5.11.1.3 Onus of proving a reasonable offer 
The Supreme Court of Appeal under section 252 of the previous Act held in Bayly 
and Others v Knowles752 that when an offer is made to an applicant for purposes of 
section 252, such an offer should be taken to be fair.753 It is for the applicant who 
rejected such an offer to prove that the offer was unfair.754 A mere rejection of the 
offer is not sufficient.755 The applicant must provide a basis for the rejection of the 
offer.756 
                                                 
751 Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [24]. 
752 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA). 
753 Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [21]-[22]. See, however, Omar v Inhouse 
Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) [45] read with [49] 
where the court held that the party who made the offer should allege and prove that the offer is ‘fair 
and reasonable’. See also M Lombard and WJC Swart ‘Relief under Section 163 of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 – Unscrambling the Omelette Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) 
Ltd 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC)’ (2016) 79 THRHR 133, 143 for criticism of the court’s decision that the 
offeror should plead or aver that he or she made a reasonable offer to the applicant and where the 
authors point out that an applicant carries the onus to prove that the requirements of section 163 are 
met. 
754 Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [21]. This appears to be aligned with the 
approach in Feni v Gxothiwe 2014 (1) SA 594 (ECG) where the court held that the applicant bears 
the onus to prove unfair prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct for purposes of section 49 of the 
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. This burden of proof includes ([28]) placing evidence before a 
court ‘as to a fair value of the member’s interest of the member who will be forced to dispose thereof’. 
This is the position unless the unfair prejudicial conduct complained of denied the applicant access 
to the information necessary to place the relevant evidence before the court. For a similar approach 
see Oosthuizen v Oosthuizen and Others [2017] JOL 39213 (WCC) [59]-[60] which was also decided 
in terms of section 49 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
755 See Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [24] where ‘a reasoned opposition to 
the acceptance’ of an offer was not tendered. See Geffen and Others v Martin and others [2018] 1 
All SA 21 (WCC) [67]. 
756 Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) [21]. The court [24] stated that a reasonable 
offer may be rejected when there is ‘not a reasonable prospect that the offeror would be able to meet 
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5.11.2 Arbitration of unfair prejudice disputes 
5.11.2.1 Introduction 
The expeditious resolving of disputes forms one the cornerstones of an effective 
commercial word. One manner in which this can be achieved is to subject disputes 
to arbitration instead of approaching the courts. This approach often holds the 
advantage that a dispute can be resolved in a timely and cost effective manner by 
an arbitrator having the necessary knowledge and experience relating to the nature 
of the dispute. It is not uncommon to find clauses in shareholder agreements or in 
some instances in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation that deal with 
alternative dispute resolution in the form of an arbitration clause or agreement.  
5.11.2.2 The legislative framework relating to arbitration proceedings 
In the context of company law, the Constitution,757 the Act758 and the Arbitration 
Act759 form the legislative framework which applies to arbitration proceedings 
involving disputes in terms of section 163 of the Act.760 Although alternative dispute 
                                                 
the financial commitment involved’. A reasonable offer may also be rejected on the basis that it is 
‘so tainted by bad faith or ulterior motive as to excuse non-acceptance’. See also Geffen and others 
v Martin and others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) [66] where the court required the first applicant to 
provide expert evidence on why information provided to the first applicant is inadequate for purposes 
of calculating the fair value of the applicant’s shares. The court [67] further rejected certain 
allegations that had a bearing on the value of the relevant shares as these allegations were not 
substantiated by expert opinion. See also [81]-[82] where the court found that the applicant failed to 
provide a factual foundation for the valuation of the relevant shares. 
757 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
758 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 166(1). 
759 42 of 1965. 
760 See also the International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017 that applies to international arbitration 
agreements. The main focus is on arbitration agreements covered by the Act and the Arbitration Act 
42 of 1965. Occasional reference is made to the International Arbitration 15 of 2017 to illustrate that 
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resolution is encouraged, it must fall squarely within the framework of the 
Constitution.761 Section 34 of the Constitution762 contains a person’s right of access 
to courts. Courts must adjudicate disputes impartially without fear or favour.763 
Arbitration agreements read with the Arbitration Act764 limit or restrict a party’s 
fundamental right to have a dispute adjudicated by a court.765  
5.11.2.3 Alternative dispute resolution and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Part C of Chapter 7 of the Act contains the provisions relating to the voluntary 
resolution of disputes. In terms of section 166 a person who is entitled to apply for 
relief in terms of the Act could refer the underlying dispute for mediation, conciliation 
or arbitration.766 This is subject to the voluntary submission of the other party to 
alternative dispute resolution.767 
                                                 
the adoption of the provisions thereof may enhance the application of the Act or the Arbitration Act 
42 of 1965. 
761 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
762 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
763 Section 165(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 entrusts the courts with 
judicial authority. 
764 42 of 1965. 
765 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone has 
the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
See also Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) 
[65] where the court held that an arbitration clause does not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of a 
court. 
766 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 166(1). 
767 See Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) 
[75] where the court stated that ‘[r]eference was made to s 166 of the Act which provides a 
mechanism for parties to voluntary agree to resolve a dispute, which would otherwise serve before 
a court of law, by way of arbitration. Given the reference to voluntarism, it is clear, in my view, that a 
party confronted with such a dispute is given the discretion to consider going to arbitration’. See 
further the commentary on section 166 by PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
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5.11.2.4 Arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 
 
(a) Arbitration and the freedom to contract 
 
As discussed above, the freedom of contract includes the freedom to bind oneself 
voluntarily and freely to contractual arrangements provided that such arrangements 
do not offend public policy or are against the legal convictions of the community as 
found in the Constitution.768 The Arbitration Act769 can be seen as giving effect to 
the freedom of contract as a constitutional freedom and balancing this freedom 
against the right of access to courts in section 34 of the Constitution.770 
(b) The law of contract as basis for arbitration proceedings 
Parties may subject disputes that may arise among them to arbitration.771 This is 
done contractually in the form of an arbitration agreement or clause.772 Unless good 
cause is shown why a dispute must not be referred to arbitration, an arbitration 
agreement is enforceable between the parties.773 When a party institutes legal 
proceedings in a court pertaining to a dispute that is subject to an arbitration clause 
                                                 
2008 (Service issue 17, 2018) who is of the view that the court in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [68] could possibly be understood to mean 
that arbitration in terms of section 166 may be enforced in the absence of an agreement between 
parties. 
768 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
769 42 of 1965. 
770 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 36. 
771 It should be noted that in terms of section 2 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 disputes relating to 
matrimonial causes and matters relating to status are precluded from being submitted to arbitration. 
772 In section 1 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 an ‘arbitration agreement’ is defined as ‘a written 
agreement providing for the reference to arbitration of any existing dispute or any future dispute 
relating to a matter specified in the agreement, whether an arbitrator is named or designated therein 
or not’. 
773 Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, s 3(2)(b).  
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or agreement, any party to the arbitration clause or agreement may apply to the 
court for relief in the form a stay of proceedings and a referral of the dispute for 
arbitration as agreed by the parties.774 Unless sufficient reasons can be submitted 
why a dispute should not be referred for arbitration, the court will order a stay of 
proceedings.775 A party who wishes to rely on an arbitration agreement must firstly 
prove that the dispute falls within the ambit of the arbitration agreement or clause.776 
The court’s approach in Peel777 to arbitration of disputes in terms of section 163 is 
open to criticism.778 
5.11.2.5 The approach in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) 
Ltd and Others779  
(a) Introduction 
 
In Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others780 the 
respondents unsuccessfully relied on the enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
against the applicant.781 The court held that because the arbitration proceedings 
were to be conducted by the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa (AFSA) in terms 
of the arbitration agreement, the dispute could not be referred to arbitration.782 More 
                                                 
774 Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, s 6(1). 
775 Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, s 6(2).  
776 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [66], 
[72]-[73]. 
777 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
778 See 5.11.2.5 below for a discussion of the court’s approach in Peel and Others v Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements relating to disputes in terms of section 163 of the Act. 
779 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
780 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
781 See Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [64] 
for the relevant part of the agreement on which the respondents relied on. 
782 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [68]. 
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importantly the court further held that AFSA did not have the powers to grant relief 
in terms of section 163 because such a power is only vested in the courts.783 The 
court further refused to enforce the arbitration clause because AFSA was not an 
accredited entity for purposes of section 166.784 The court was also of the view that 
serious allegations of or matters related to fraudulent conduct cannot be properly 
dealt with during arbitration proceedings.785 
(b) Alternative dispute resolution as a voluntary process 
The Companies Act786 provides an additional alternative to resolving disputes by 
way of a court process and the party initiating the process has the option of 
approaching a court or the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (‘the 
CIPC’), the Companies Tribunal, an accredited entity or any other person.787 
Alternative dispute resolution in South African law is either voluntary or 
prescribed by statute or other law. Both the Companies Act788 and Arbitration Act789 
                                                 
783 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [68]. 
784 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [68]. It 
is interesting that clause 22 of the Companies Amendment Bill 2018 published in GG 41913 of 21 
September 2018 proposes an amendment to section 166(1) of the Act in terms of which applications 
or complaints in terms of the Act may only be referred to the Companies Tribunal to be resolved by 
means of ‘mediation, conciliation or arbitration’. In terms of a proposed amendment to subsection to 
section 166 of the Act, a matter may only be referred to arbitration once the Companies Tribunal has 
issued a certificate that the mediation process in terms of the Act failed. It is significant to notice that 
in terms of the proposed amendments to section 166 of the Act references to ‘an accredited entity’ 
will be removed from its provisions. See also the proposed amendments to section 167 of the Act as 
contained in clause 23. 
785 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [69]. 
786 71 of 2008. 
787 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 166(1). 
788 71 of 2008. 
789 42 of 1965. 
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that may apply to company disputes require the free and voluntary submission of 
the parties to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the two 
statutes. It is submitted that the alternative dispute resolution provisions in the Act 
do not exclude other forms of alternative dispute resolution such as that in terms of 
the Arbitration Act.790 It is suggested that the alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the Act provide an alternative option to dispute resolution for those 
parties who have not pre-empted possible disputes by regulating the resolving of 
disputes contractually in a shareholders’ agreement or the Memorandum of 
Incorporation.  
(c) A ‘court’ grants relief in terms of section 163 of the Act 
Besides the wording of the section, the court did not elaborate on why only a court 
could grant relief in terms of section 163.791 Although section 163 makes specific 
reference to ‘a court’, it does not necessarily mean that disputes to be adjudicated 
in terms with the provisions of section 163 cannot be subjected to arbitration on the 
basis that an arbitrator’s jurisdiction is excluded by the wording of section 163. When 
an arbitration agreement applies to the dispute between parties, it is the arbitration 
agreement that forms the basis of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Based on the 
arbitration agreement between the parties an arbitrator may then exercise the same 
discretion as a court in terms of legislation. To provide the necessary clarity it is 
submitted that the Arbitration Act792 may benefit from a similar provision as found in 
in section 7(2) of the International Arbitration Act793 which provides that an 
                                                 
790 42 of 1965. 
791 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) [68]. 
792 42 of 1965. 
793 15 of 2017. 
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‘[a]rbitration agreement may not be excluded solely on the ground that an 
enactment confers jurisdiction on a court or other tribunal to determine a matter 
falling with the terms of an arbitration agreement’.794 
(d) The exclusion of disputes relating to allegations of fraud from 
arbitration 
The court’s reluctance to refer a dispute to arbitration on the basis that the subject 
of the dispute contains serious allegations of fraud must also be approached with 
some circumspect. One of the advantages of arbitration is that the parties may 
nominate and agree on arbitrators who may possess the necessary expertise 
regarding the subject of the dispute. This will provide all parties to the dispute with 
an opportunity properly to present his or her case. The converse is also true as 
some disputes may be so complex or of such a nature that they fall beyond the 
expertise of a particular judge or court. 
The reliance of the court on Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another795 
to refuse the enforcement of an arbitration agreement based on a dispute involving 
fraudulent conduct is also problematic.796 The case in Peel797 should be clearly 
                                                 
794 See also GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004 para 4.7.3 where the intention was expressed 
that consideration must be given to ‘existing mechanisms’ to settle disputes outside the courts. 
795 2002 (3) SA 433 (W). 
796 In Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another 2002 (3) SA 433 (W) the respondents made 
allegations of fraud against the applicant. The respondents relied on an arbitration agreement in an 
attempt to ventilate the issues before an arbitrator. The applicant brought an application with the 
purpose of avoiding the arbitration so that the matter can be considered in an open court. The 
application was based on section 3(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 in terms of which a court 
has a discretion to order that a dispute should not be referred for arbitration when good cause is 
shown. 
797 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
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distinguished from the matter in Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another.798 
In Rawstorne799 the applicants made allegations of fraudulent conduct on the part 
of the respondents while it was the applicant who wished to enforce the arbitration 
agreement against the respondents to ventilate the allegations. The court in 
Rawstorne800 held that the respondent must be allowed to defend these allegations 
in an open court of law, despite the provisions of an arbitration agreement, if they 
wished to do so. The respondents in Peel801 who were also accused of fraudulent 
conduct were the parties who wished to enforce the arbitration agreement. The court 
in Rawstorne dealt with the question whether party against whom the allegations of 
fraud is made should be kept to an arbitration agreement, while in Peel802 the 
respondents wanted to enforce the agreement so that the matter would not be 
ventilated in an open court. In these two cases different considerations apply. In 
Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another803 the court stated that: 
‘Although not referred to by the applicant’s counsel, there is, however, 
more direct authority for the proposition relied upon by him and that is that 
disputed averments of fraud should be ventilated, not in the privacy of 
arbitration, but in open Court. In this regard a distinction has been drawn 
between the situation where the person against whom the fraudulent 
conduct is alleged seeks a hearing in open Court, rather than through the 
arbitration process, and the situation where the person who alleges 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the other contracting party desires the 
matter to be heard in open Court. In the former it has been held that the 
claim for a hearing in open Court will generally granted.’ 
 
 
 
                                                 
798 2002 (3) SA 433 (W). 
799 Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another 2002 (3) SA 433 (W). 
800 Rawstorne and Another v Hodgen and Another 2002 (3) SA 433 (W). 
801 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
802 Peel and Others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ). 
803 2002 (3) SA 433 (W) [21]. 
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5.12 Conclusion 
 
5.12.1 The Constitution and section 163 
 
Section 163 of the Act creates an interesting interrelationship between company law 
and the law of contract.804 The standard against which conduct should be measured 
in terms of section 163 is the fairness or unfairness of the relevant conduct in the 
corporate law context.805 Delport noted that the result of section 163 of the Act is 
that contracts should be tested against ‘oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct’.806 Some courts have described the standard as ‘commercial fairness’.807 
Such an approach requires a review of traditional views, approaches to contracts 
and the role that courts play in the protection of shareholders.808 Firstly, tension is 
created between the principle of pacta sunt servanda809 and the intervention by a 
court in contractual relationships when it is justified based on the concept of 
fairness.810 Secondly, the application of the law of contract in the context of 
companies should be carefully considered as different policy considerations apply 
within the company structure.811 
The developments in the law of contract are important, as the Act clearly 
states that one of its purposes is to align South African company law with the Bill of 
                                                 
804 See 5.9.5.3 above. 
805 See 5.7.3 and more specifically 5.7.3.5 above. 
806 See 5.6.6.3 and 5.7.3.5 above. 
807 See 5.7.3.5 read with 5.6 above where the role of bona fides, reasonableness and fairness in the 
context of the law of contract is discussed. 
808 See 5.9.5.3 above. 
809 See 5.6.2.1 above. 
810 See 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 above read with 5.9.5.3 above. 
811 See 5.5.3 above. 
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Rights.812 Secondly, an assessment should done on the role of fairness in the 
formation and enforcement of contracts.813 For a contract to be valid and 
enforceable it has to comply with the requirement of legality.814 Legality consists of 
public policy.815 Public policy is found in the legal convictions of the community as 
defined by the values of human dignity, freedom and equality in the Constitution.816 
On a number of occasions our courts had to consider whether the principles of bona 
fides, reasonableness and fairness are requirements for the validity and 
enforcement of contracts or contractual clauses.817  
The notion that contracts should comply with the requirement of bona fides, 
reasonableness and fairness has been rejected by various courts including the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.818 In most of these cases the rejection was based on the 
ground that the adjudication of disputes between parties to a contract on bona fides, 
reasonableness and fairness will lead to legal uncertainty.819 In arriving at this 
conclusion the courts referred to the legal convictions of the community based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality. Principles such as pacta sunt servanda were 
evaluated against the Constitution and its values. It was concluded that fairness and 
reasonableness were already embedded in the traditional principles of the law of 
contract and that the application of these principles complies with the provisions and 
                                                 
812 See 5.6.1 above. 
813 See 5.6.2-5.6.6 below. 
814 See 5.6.1 above. 
815 See 5.6.1 above. 
816 See 5.6.1 above. 
817 See 5.6.4 above. 
818 See 5.6.2.2 above. 
819 See 5.6.2.2 above. 
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values entrenched in the Constitution.820  
The Constitutional Court judgment in Botha and Another v Rich NO and 
Others821 is being interpreted as authority for the notion that a court will only enforce 
a contract when it is fair to do so.822 However, there is uncertainty as the court was 
not clear on the principles on which the case was decided.823 Further, the court 
failed to consider and discuss the body of case law developed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, creating uncertainty of the status of these cases.824 
Unlike the position in England, the exceptio doli generalis does not form part 
of the South African law.825 The exceptio doli generalis is a defence which can be 
used when the enforcement of a contract will be unfair, unreasonable or 
oppressive.826 This defence is often raised when unforeseen circumstances 
developed after the conclusion of the contract.827 Although the exceptio doli 
generalis was rejected, South African courts do recognise the need to do simple 
justice between parties to a contract.828 
 
 
                                                 
820 See 5.6.2.2 above. 
821 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
822 See 5.6.4 above. 
823 See 5.6.5.1 above. 
824 See 5.6.5.2 above. 
825 See 5.6.3 above. 
826 See 5.6.3 above. See also Jacques du Plessis ‘Giving practical effect to good faith in the law of 
contract’ (2018) 3 Stell LR 379, 397. 
827 See 5.6.3 above. 
828 See 5.6.3 above. 
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5.12.2 The development and reform of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy 
 
5.12.2.1 The proper plaintiff and internal management rule 
 
The development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South Arica shares 
many similarities with the developments in its equivalents in other jurisdictions 
evaluated in this thesis.829 These developments recognised the unsatisfactory 
position created by the strict application of the principles in Foss v Harbottle.830  
5.12.2.2 The use of the ‘oppressive’ concept 
 
(a) The use of the ‘oppressive’ concept in section 111bis of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 and section 252 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 
 
To expand the application of the unfair prejudice remedy legislatures in other 
jurisdictions introduced concepts to avoid the restrictive meaning given by the courts 
to the ‘oppressive’ concept.831 This tendency was also followed in South Africa when 
section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and section 252 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 is compared.832 The concept was initially used in section 111bis of 
                                                 
829 See 2.3 above for a discussion of the development of the unfair prejudice remedy in England. 
See also 3.3 for the development of the remedy in Australia. See further 4.2 above for the 
development of the remedy in Canada. 
830 (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. See 5.2.2 above. For a discussion of the approach in England to 
the principles in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 see 2.3.1, and more specifically 
2.3.1.4 above. See 3.9.6.3 above for the application of the proper plaintiff rule and the internal 
management rule in Australia regarding the relationship between the statutory personal action and 
the statutory derivative action. For a similar discussion in the context of Canada see 4.12 above. 
831 See 5.2.3 read with 5.2.4.1 above. For a discussion of the use of the terms ‘oppressive’ in England 
see 2.6.3.2 above. See also for 3.3.5 for the problems associated with the use of the ‘oppressive’ 
concept in Australia. See further 4.7.6.2 above for a discussion of the ‘oppressive’ concept in the 
development of the remedy in the Canada. 
832 See 5.2.3 read with 5.2.4.1 above. 
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the Companies Act 46 of 1926 but it was recommended by the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission that the concept should be removed and replaced by concepts that 
would be of a wider ambit than the ‘oppressive’ concept.833 Section 252 of the 
previous Act removed the use of the concept ‘oppressive’ from the body of the 
remedy, but retained the concept in the heading of the provision.834  
(b) The use of the ‘oppressive’ concept in section 163 of the Act in light 
of development in England, Australia and Canada 
 
It is interesting to note that while English company law has moved away from the 
use of the concept ‘oppressive’ by omitting the concept from the provisions of the 
remedy,835 other jurisdictions have retained the concept but introduced additional 
concepts to expand the scope of application of the remedy.836 It is interesting that 
section 163 of the Act reintroduced the ‘oppressive’ concept to the substantive 
provisions of the remedy. This approach aligns the reforms to the current form of 
the statutory personal remedy to the developments in relation to the remedy in 
Australia and Canada.  
5.12.3 The grounds for relief in section 163(1)(a)-(c)  
 
5.12.3.1 The relationship between the grounds for relief in terms of section 
163 and the winding-up of a company on ‘just and equitable’ 
grounds 
 
It does not have to be proven that the facts and circumstances on which a person 
                                                 
833 See 5.2.3 read with 5.2.4.1 above. 
834 See 5.2.4.1 above. 
835 See 2.4 above. 
836 See 3.4 and 4.5, respectively, for a discussion of the developments and reforms of the Australian 
and Canadian equivalents of the statutory personal remedy, where the concept ‘oppressive’ has 
been retained. 
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relies for relief must justify relief in the form of a winding-up order on ‘just and 
equitable’ grounds for such as person to be entitled to obtain relief in terms of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy.837 Although to some degree there may be an 
overlap between the grounds for a winding-up order on ‘just and equitable’ grounds 
and the grounds stated in section 163(1), these grounds differ in that the grounds 
for an order for liquidation on ‘just and equitable’ circumstances cover a broader 
range of circumstances than that covered by the grounds in section 163(1).838 This 
position is aligned with the approaches in other jurisdictions covered in this thesis.839 
5.12.3.2 The interpretational problems associated with section 163(1)(a)-(c) 
 
(a) Section 163(1)(a)-(c) 
 
It has been demonstrated above that the manner in which section 163 is formulated 
and how the provisions in section 163(1) are applied by the courts have the potential 
for creating some interpretational difficulties.840 One the one hand it can be argued 
that the provisions of section 163(1)(a)-(c) should be read as forming separate and 
distinct grounds for relief.841 Others argue that these provision should be read as a 
whole.842 However, there are some important differences between sections 
163(1)(a)-(c). One of these differences is that only section 163(1)(a)843 refers to the 
                                                 
837 See 5.2.4 and 5.8 above 
838 See 5.8 above. 
839 See 2.9 above for the position in England. See also 3.9.1 above for the position in Australia. See 
further 4.9 above for the position in Canada. 
840 See 5.7.2 and 5.7.3.5 above. 
841 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) read with 5.7.3.5 above. 
842 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) read with 5.7.3.5 above. 
843 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) above. 
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result of the conduct complained of, while section 163(1)(b)844 and (c)845 refer to the 
manner in which the affairs of a company are conducted. This creates the question 
whether the conduct or the consequences/effect or result flowing from the conduct 
must objectively be evaluated against the concept of commercial unfairness.846 
There are also differences in the tenses in which the grounds in section 163(1)(a)-
(c) are formulated.847 In chapter 6 it is recommended that the jurisdictional grounds 
in section 163(1)(a)-(c) be amended to facilitate a clearly understanding as to the 
type of conduct to which section 163 applies and the time when the conduct 
occurred.848 
(b) The concept of commercial unfairness 
It is clear from the judgments dealing with section 163 that the concepts oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial and an unfair disregard of interests have been described as 
forming elements of commercial unfairness. To determine the commercial 
unfairness or fairness of conduct in terms of section 163 a court has to consider the 
facts and circumstances of each case in light of established corporate principles.849 
The conduct complained of must not be prejudicial850 but also unfair.851 The conduct 
complained of will be evaluated with reference to the result flowing from the conduct 
complained of using an objective test.852 The application of an objective test holds 
                                                 
844 See 5.7.2.2 (b) above. 
845 See 5.7.2.2 (c) above. 
846 See also 5.7.2.1 above. 
847 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(i) and 5.7.2.2 (b)(i).  
848 See 5.7.6 above. 
849 See 5.4.3 above. 
850 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
851 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
852 See 5.7.3.6 above. 
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certain important implications in relation to the evaluation of the conduct complained 
of.853 Firstly, the test for relief is fairness, more specifically commercial fairness, and 
not unlawfulness.854 This makes the remedy in section 163 sui generis. Secondly, 
the motive of the person whose conduct is complained of is generally irrelevant.855 
When considering the commercial unfairness of the conduct a court may also 
consider the conduct of the applicant,856 any reasonable offers an applicant 
received to exit the company at fair value,857 and the breach of any legitimate 
expectations of an applicant. 
5.12.3.3 Commercial unfairness and reasonable offers 
A reasonable offer to buy the shares of a person complaining of unfair prejudicial 
conduct plays a significant role in the consideration of the unfairness of the conduct 
complained of. The rejection of such an offer may place the complaining 
shareholder at risk of the court finding that the conduct complained of is not unfair.858 
From a practical point of view an applicant must disclose such an offer in his or her 
court papers.859 When the offeree has rejected the offer he or she must clearly state 
his or her grounds for doing so.860 
5.12.3.4 Commercial unfairness and the conduct of the applicant 
One of the differences between relief in terms of section 163 and relief in the form 
                                                 
853 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
854 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
855 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
856 See 5.7.5 above. 
857 See 5.11.1 above. 
858 See 5.11.1.2 above. 
859 See 5.11.1.3 above. 
860 See 5.11.1.2 above. 
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of a winding-up order based on ‘just and equitable’ grounds is that an applicant does 
have to approach the court with clean hands in terms of section 163.861 However, 
this does not mean that the conduct of the applicant is irrelevant. Depending on the 
seriousness of and the context in which the conduct of the applicant took place, the 
conduct may render the conduct complained of not to be commercially unfair.862 
The conduct of the applicant may further be taken into account in determining the 
appropriate relief.863 
5.12.4 Prejudice and the capacity in which prejudice is suffered 
 
The requirement that a shareholder or director has suffered prejudice in his capacity 
as such, is problematic as such an interpretation artificially restricts the scope of 
application of the remedy and further neutralises the efforts of the legislature to 
expand the availability of the remedy to other persons such as directors.864 
Recommendations for legislative intervention are made in the following chapter. 
5.12.5 Prejudice to all shareholders 
 
It is uncertain whether relief in terms of section 163 is available in circumstances 
where all shareholders are affected by the same commercially unfair conduct.865 
There are jurisdictions where it is recognised that conduct may be unfairly prejudicial 
despite the fact that all shareholders are equally affected by the same unfair 
prejudicial (commercially unfair) conduct. Van Rooyen also advances compelling 
reasons why the statutory unfair prejudice remedy must be available to a 
                                                 
861 See 5.7.5 above. 
862 See 5.7.5 above. 
863 See 5.7.5 above. 
864 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
865 See 5.7.1.4 (b)(ii) above. 
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shareholder in circumstance where all shareholders are affected by the same 
conduct.866 
5.12.6 Related persons 
 
The fact that section 163 provides that an applicant can rely on the conduct of a 
person related to a company is a welcomed expansion of the application of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy.867 This provides protection to shareholders and 
directors in the context of a group of companies. The statutory unfair prejudice 
remedies, prior to section 163, did not specifically make provision for the application 
of the remedy to a group of companies. It should, however, to be noted that the fact 
a person is a shareholder or director of a company does not make such a person a 
related person.868 In this regard South African company law takes a leading role 
when compared to the approach taken in the other jurisdictions discussed.869 
5.12.7 Standing 
 
Standing for purposes of section 163 is extended to a shareholder and a director.870 
The definition of a ‘shareholder’ in section 1 of the Act carries a similar meaning to 
the definition of a member in section 103 of the previous Act. One may recall that 
only a member could rely on the provisions of section 252 of the previous Act. The 
current provisions relating to the standing of an applicant are deficient in a number 
of respects. Firstly, no provision is made for persons to whom shares were 
transferred by operation of law such as liquidators, curators, executors and 
                                                 
866 See 5.7.1.4 (b)(ii) above. 
867 See 5.7.7 above 
868 See 5.7.7 above 
869 See 5.7.7 above 
870 See 5.7.1.3 above. 
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trustees.871 Secondly, some courts still require an applicant (shareholder or director) 
to prove that he or she has suffered prejudice in his capacity as such.872 Such an 
approach significantly restricts the application of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy that was designed to find application in a variety of facts and circumstances. 
The provisions relating to standing is extremely problematic as the legislature 
provides for important forms of relief such as the rectification of company records 
and registers, but because the persons who need these forms of relief are not 
recognised as having standing due to the provisions of the Act and/or the 
requirement set by the courts that a person must prove that he or she has been 
prejudiced in his or her capacity as such, they are excluded from obtaining much-
needed relief and are also left without any other alternative forms of relief.873 The 
courts have also contributed to the uncertainty in respect of the application of the 
provisions relating to standing by acknowledging the standing of persons who 
clearly do not quality for standing because of the definitions in the Act.874  
The disconnect between the standing requirement of the unfair prejudice 
remedy and the available relief may have been created by transferring the 
substantive provisions of the Canadian equivalent of section 163 almost verbatim 
to the Act. However, the legislature for some reason used substantially different 
definitions for persons who are entitled to apply for relief in terms of section 163. 
Proposals and recommendations in this regard are made below. 
 
                                                 
871 See 5.7.1.2 above. 
872 See 5.7.1.2 above. 
873 See 5.7.1 above read with 5.7.1.4 (b) and 5.7.1.4 (c). 
874 See 5.7.1.2 (b) above. 
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5.12.8 Relief 
 
5.12.8.1 Buy-out orders 
 
Although such relief is not expressly listed, relief in the form of buy-out orders is 
available in terms of section 163(2).875 For the sake of consistency, it would have 
been preferred that the legislature expressly recognised this form of relief and to 
clarify whether the solvency and liquidation requirements in section 4 of the Act apply 
to such orders.876 Proposals for legislative amendment are made in Chapter 6. 
It is the duty of a court to determine the fair value of shares that are subject 
to a buy-out order.877 A number of factors may impact on the value of shares, 
namely, the application of a minority discount, the date that is used as the basis of 
the valuation of shares, the adjustments that have to made to neutralise the effect 
that commercially unfair conduct had on the valuation of the relevant shares, and 
the parties against whom such an order will be enforced.878 As with the case in order 
jurisdictions evaluated in this study there is no fixed method how these principles 
and factors should be applied. The overriding principle remains that a court must 
determine a fair value for which the shares must be bought. It is important to note 
that the purpose of a buy-out order is to sever the relationship between the parties 
by allowing the party who has suffered unfair prejudice to withdraw his or her 
investment from the company.879 The purpose is not to award damages to such a 
party and this may be reason why the legislature opted for the terms ‘compensation’ 
                                                 
875 See 5.9.14 above. 
876 See 5.9.14.5 (a) above. 
877 See 5.9.14.4 above. 
878 See 5.9.14.1 above. 
879 See 5.9.14.2 above. 
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in stead of damages in section 163(2), as the remedy is based on equity. 
5.12.8.2 Threatening and future conduct 
Earlier versions of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy were criticised for not 
protecting shareholders against future or threatening conduct.880 Judicial 
interpretation of section 252 of the previous Act also did not assist in this regard.881 
Some courts approached the grant of relief against future or threatening unfair 
prejudicial conduct as an unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a company 
while in other instances courts justified their reluctance to intervene by holding that 
future or threathening action is not conduct for purposes of the provisions of the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy.882 The fact that the predecessors of section 163 
of the Act did not provide for protection against future or threatening conduct was 
subject to much criticism.883 The current formulation of section 163 also does not 
expressly provide for the protection against future and threatening conduct.884 This 
position is further exacerbated by the tenses in which the grounds in section 163(1) 
are formulated.885 
5.12.8.3 Commencement of business rescue proceedings 
The inclusion of relief in the form of the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings in section 163(2)(c) is welcomed. This provision creates an avenue for 
a director who cannot approach a court for the commencement of business rescue 
                                                 
880 See 5.2.4.3 (d) above. 
881 See 5.9.2.2 above. 
882 See 5.9.2.2 above. 
883 See 5.9.2.2 above. 
884 See 5.9.2.3 and 5.9.2.4 above. 
885 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) above. 
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proceedings when a company on whose board he or she serves is in financial 
distress and the board failed to commence with business recue proceedings.886 
5.12.8.4 Section 163(2)(f)(ii) 
Relief may also be granted in the form of placing a director under probation or 
declaring a director a delinquent as provided for section 162 of the Act.887 The 
provisions of section 162 aim to provide the general public with protection against a 
particular director or director. Being placed under probation or being declared a 
delinquent holds drastic implications for a director. It is submitted that courts 
carefully consider the facts and circumstances in which this form of relief is granted. 
Because the criterion for relief in section 163(1) is commercial unfairness, a director 
may run the risk of being subjected to an order in terms of section 162 despite the 
fact that such a director has complied with his or her duties as director and/or acted 
bona fide and in the best interests of a company.888 A mechanical justification of an 
order in terms of section 162 based on commercially unfair conduct in terms of 
section 163 may yield unjust consequences for directors. As the test for commercial 
unfairness is objective a director can be exposed to a form of strict liability. 
Submissions in this regard are made in Chapter 6 where it will be pointed out that 
only commercially unfair conduct of a specific nature or character may justify a 
probation order or an order for delinquency of a director. 
5.12.8.5 Section 163(2)(l) 
Relief in the form of referring a dispute to trial is not a defence against the dismissal 
                                                 
886 See 5.9.4 above. 
887 See 5.9.7.2 above. 
888 See 5.9.7.2 above. 
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of an application based on the fact that a bona fide dispute exists between the 
parties.889 The fact section 163(1) states that a person may ‘apply’ for relief must 
not be interpreted to mean that relief may only be obtained by means of motion 
proceedings.890 If a bona fide dispute is foreseeable a party initiating legal 
proceedings must commence with proceedings by way of action proceedings.891 
5.12.8.6 The statutory unfair prejudice remedy and derivative proceedings 
 
Section 163(2) of the Act does not provide for an order in terms of which a person 
is authorised to bring derivative proceedings for or on behalf of a company.892 This 
is because section 165 of the Act specifically regulates the derivative 
proceedings.893 In South Africa a clear distinction is maintained between the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy and the statutory derivative remedy.894 This 
approach is out of touch with developments in other jurisdictions and is also 
impractical.895 It is recommended that section 163 be amended to provide for relief 
in the form of derivative proceedings based on the provisions of section 163. Such 
an amendment will align the remedy with developments in other jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis. Relief in the form of derivative proceedings based on the 
grounds of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy will only be available in very 
specific circumstances.  
 
                                                 
889 See 5.9.13 above. 
890 See 5.9.13.2 (b) above. 
891 See 5.9.13.2 (b) above. 
892 See 5.9.15.4 above. 
893 See 5.9.15.3 read with 5.9.15.4 above. 
894 See 5.9.15.4 above. 
895 See 5.9.15.4 above. 
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5.12.8.7 Relief for shareholder for wrongs committed to a company 
 
Prima facie there is no reason why a shareholder must be able to rely on the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy to obtain personal relief for a wrong committed 
against the company.896 Such a view is justified based on the separate juristic 
personality of a company and the availability of the derivative action.897 However, 
there are instances where the application of established corporate law principles 
fails to provide the redress required. 
As a general rule a shareholder will not be entitled to any compensation or 
damages. This is because the diminution of value in the shares held by the 
shareholder is only reflective of the loss suffered by the company.898 Awarding 
damages to a shareholder will ignore the separate legal personality of a company 
and may put the interests of creditors at risk. A shareholder will only be allowed to 
recover a loss suffered in the form of a diminution in the value of shares when he or 
she has suffered a loss that is separate and distinct from the loss suffered by the 
company. However, it is interesting to note that courts seldom hesitate to adjust the 
value of shares subject to a buy-out order if the conduct complained of caused a 
depreciation in the value of those shares.899 The application of this principles is 
especially unique if the conduct complained of and which causes the diminution in 
the value of the shares is not necessarily unlawful but only commercially unfair.900 
 
                                                 
896 See 5.9.11 above. 
897 See 5.9.11 above. 
898 See 5.9.11 above. 
899 See 5.9.14.5 (b) above. 
900 See 5.9.11 above. 
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5.12.9 Section 163 and section 164 
 
The effect of relief in the form of a buy-out order and the exercise of appraisal rights 
in terms of section 164 of the Act are substantially similar.901 The appraisal remedy 
provides for the buy-out of a shareholder at a fair value of his or her shares.902 Such 
a buy-out can be demanded from the company in specific circumstances.903 The 
provisions of section 164 are triggered in the event of a company giving notice of a 
proposed resolution in terms of which the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company will be amended to the effect of altering the preferences, rights, limitations 
or other terms of any class of its shares in such a manner that will be materially 
adverse to the rights or interests of the holders of a particular class of shares.904 
The provisions of section 164 will also apply in circumstances where a company 
engages in a fundamental transaction (or affected transaction).905 The buy-out order 
in terms of section 163 may apply in circumstances where the provisions of section 
164 are not applicable.906 The main difference between a buy-out order in terms of 
section 163 and the application of the provisions of section 164, is that in case of 
the latter in principle no court intervention is required which makes it a much faster 
and cost-effective remedy.907 
5.12.10 Arbitration  
 
Some courts have raised their concerns about the appropriateness of subjecting 
                                                 
901 See 5.9.15.5 above. 
902 See 5.10.1 above. 
903 See 5.10.2 above. 
904 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(2)(a). 
905 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 164(2)(b). 
906 See 5.10.6 above. 
907 See 5.10.6 above. 
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disputes in terms of section 163 to arbitration. These reservations are based on the 
wording of section 163 which refers to ‘a court’ and that the provisions of section 
163 are often of a public interest nature.908 Due to the many benefits arbitration 
holds and the fact that the unfair prejudice remedy does not raise public interest or 
public policy matters, unless relief in the form of a winding-up order is sought, courts 
in other jurisdictions do not have any objections in enforcing arbitration agreements 
despite some of these statutory unfair prejudice remedies referring to relief that a 
court may grant. Proposals are made for legislative intervention in this regard. 
                                                 
908 See 5.11.2.5 (c) and 5.11.2.5 (d) above. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of three parts.1 The alignment and position of section 163 in 
the context of the Constitution and other constitutional-related developments are 
provided in the first part.2 In the second part recommendations are made regarding 
possible legislative amendments.3 The third part contains a framework for the 
legislative interpretation of the current provision.4 This framework is based on 
interpretational principles that were distilled from cases considered during the 
preparation of this thesis.  
6.2 PART A:  
Section 163 of the Act in the context of the Constitution 
6.2.1 The interpretation of section 163 
The Constitution is the point of departure for purposes of the interpretation of section 
163.5 The Constitution6 contains very specific provisions relating to the 
interpretation of statutory provisions.7 The Act also contains provisions relating to 
the interpretation of the Act.8 The Act also clearly states as one of its objectives the 
promotion of the Bill of Rights9 in the application of company law.10 It is therefore 
imperative that the provisions of section 163 be studied in the context of the 
                                                 
1 See Part A–C. 
2 See Part A below. 
3 See Part B below. Omissions from the current legislative provisions are marked in bold and [ ] while 
insertions are underlined. 
4 See Part C below. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 See 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 above. 
8 See 5.4.1 – 5.4.2 and 5.4.4 above. 
9 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
10 See 5.4.2 above. 
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Constitution.11  
6.2.2 Company law and the law of contract 
 
Company law does not function in a vacuum. Company law has an inseparable 
interrelationship with related branches of the law. It is therefore very important for 
the application of company law principles to note and recognise the developments 
and the influence of the Constitution12 on other branches of the law.  
6.2.2.1 The importance of the law of contract 
The developments in the law of contract are of particular importance. This is 
because courts still approach the constitutive documents of a company such as the 
Memorandum of Incorporation as a contract between the parties.13 Secondly, 
section 163 introduced ‘oppressive or unfair prejudicial’ conduct as a standard 
against which contracts will be measured.14  
6.2.2.2 Commercial fairness and fairness 
Courts interpret the criteria in section 163(1) to mean commercial unfairness.15 The 
application of fairness or unfairness in South African law is not foreign. South African 
courts have considered the role that fairness, bona fides and reasonableness play 
in the law of contract in light of the Constitution.16 In the context of the law of 
contract, fairness may potentially influence the formation of a contract and secondly 
                                                 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
13 See also 5.5.3 above. 
14 See 5.6.6.3 above. 
15 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
16 See 5.6 above. 
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the enforcement of a contract. One of the requirements for the formation of a valid 
contract is legality.17 Legality is determined with reference to public policy.18 Public 
policy has to be established in terms of the provisions of the Constitution.19 It is 
notable that although fairness is not mentioned as a value of the Constitution,20 it is 
one of the elements of the legal convictions of the community or public policy.21 
Recently, the Constitutional Court further held that the enforcement of provisions of 
a contract must be fair and reasonable on the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case.22 There are important similarities in the application of fairness in the context 
of the law of contract and the application thereof to company law in terms of section 
163 of the Act. Section 163 makes fairness directly applicable to conduct covered 
by its provisions. For purposes of section 163 the concept of fairness must be 
applied in a particular context.23 Courts held fairness for purposes of section 163 to 
mean commercial fairness.24 This means that the established principles of company 
law and the facts and circumstances of each of the matter must be considered to 
determine whether particular conduct triggers the provisions and relief of section 
163.25 Although commercial unfairness is a wide and flexible concept, it must be 
given content based on a principled approach to ensure that it is applied 
consistently. The fact that this concept is for purposes of section 163 always applied 
                                                 
17 See Chapter 7 in S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract 
General Principles (5 ed, 2016). 
18 See 5.6.1 and more specifically 5.6.1.1 above. 
19 See 5.6.1 above. 
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21 See 5.6.3 above. 
22 See 5.6.4 above. 
23 See 5.4 and more specifically 5.4.3 above. 
24 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
25 See 5.4 and more specifically 5.4.3 above. 
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within a company structure, makes the context and application of the concept 
commercial unfairness or fairness more predictable compared to the application of 
the concepts fairness and reasonableness in the law of contract. A number of 
factors have been identified to assist in the determination of the commercial 
unfairness or fairness of conduct.26  
6.2.2.3 Fairness and the exceptio doli generalis 
A need has been identified in the context of the law of contract for a remedy to avoid 
the enforcement of contractual obligations in circumstances not foreseen by the 
parties to a contract that would make the enforcement thereof oppressive, 
unconscionable, unreasonable or unfair.27 Although, the common law provided for 
such a remedy in the form of the exceptio doli generalis, it was found not be part of 
South African law of contract resulting in leaving a void in this area of the law of 
contract.28 This void can be addressed by the application of the provisions of the 
Constitution29 and the legal convictions of the community embedded in the 
Constitution.30 However, a study of case law and the opinions of some 
commentators reveal that courts have not yet been able to establish a principled 
approach in this regard.31 Because of the provisions of section 163 it appears that 
this problem does not present itself as acutely as in the law of contract. This is 
because the provisions of section 163 that form the basis for the intervention in the 
enforcement and/or the refusal to enforce certain arrangements or understandings 
                                                 
26 See 5.4 and 5.7.3.5 above. 
27 See 5.6.3 above. 
28 See 5.6.3 above. 
29 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 5.6.3 above. 
31 See 5.6.5.1 above. 
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between parties are clear. Due to the nature and complexity of the relationships 
between various parties to and stakeholders of a company a similar remedy is 
required properly to balance the various rights and interests. The only challenge for 
the courts is the consistent and principled application of the concept commercial 
unfairness where the facts and circumstances of a particular case have certain 
unique features. In such instances the content and application of the remedy will be 
determined and done on a case-by-case basis.32  
In the application of the provisions of section 163 cognisance must be taken 
of the distinct features of its provisions. Firstly, the remedy is sui generis as it is not 
dependent on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conduct complained of.33 A 
person having standing only has to prove ‘commercial unfairness’ in terms of section 
163(1).34 Secondly, it is the effect of the conduct that is complained of that has to 
be evaluated against the criteria in section 163.35 This is especially important when 
the remedy is applied to the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company and/or a 
shareholder agreement. The remedy is not triggered by the mere presence of a 
particular article, clause or provision in a Memorandum of Incorporation and/or 
shareholder agreement. The commercial fairness of the conduct in terms of such 
an article, clause or provision is considered.  
6.2.3 The balance of interests  
It is submitted that the provisions of section 163 established a framework in which 
the interests of parties must be appropriately balanced by scrutinising the conduct 
                                                 
32 See 5.7.2.1 above. 
33 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
34 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
35 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
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of parties in light of commercial unfairness. This entails a conscious process 
whereby the interests of parties are carefully weighed and balanced in a particular 
context which includes the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case, the 
relevant common law principles, the provisions of the Act and the Constitution, and 
in particular the Bill of Rights. 
6.3 PART B: 
Recommendations for legislative intervention 
 
6.3.1 The heading of section 163 
 
Because of an error in the heading of section 163 it is recommended that the 
heading be amended.36 It suggested that the word ‘oppressive’ and the phrase ‘or 
from abuse of separate juristic personality of a company’ be removed, while it is 
further recommended that consideration should be given to inserting the word 
‘unfairly’ before the word ‘prejudicial’.37 This will align the heading of the requirement 
of section 163 that the conduct must be both prejudicial and unfair.38 It would further 
emphasise that the section applies to conduct that is unfairly prejudicial which is of 
a wider ambit when compared to conduct that can be described as oppressive.39 In 
light of the above it is recommended that the heading of section 163 be amended 
as follows: 
163. Relief from [oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of 
separate juristic personality of a company] unfair prejudice or an 
unfair disregard of interests. 
 
                                                 
36 See 5.7.8 above. 
37 See 5.7.8 above regarding the incorrect use of the phrase ‘or from abuse of separate juristic 
personality of a company’ in the heading to section 163 of the Act. 
38 See 5.7.1.4 (a) above. 
39 See also 6.3.2 below. 
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6.3.2 The use of the concept ‘oppressive’ in section 163 
 
In light of the historical development of the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa 
and other jurisdictions investigated in this thesis, it is recommended that the 
reference to the concept of ‘oppressive’ be removed or deleted from section 163.40 
This recommendation is based on the fact that the ‘oppressive’ concept played a 
fairly limited role in the development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in 
South Africa. Further the removal of the concept from section 111bis of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 has been recommended by the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission based on the fact that it restricted the functioning and application of 
the remedy.41 Based on this recommendation the concept was removed from the 
substantive provisions of section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, but for 
unknown reasons was retained in the heading of the section. The case law 
generated under section 252 was mostly based on the concept ‘unfairly prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable’ conduct in contrast with the case law handed down in terms 
of section 111bis of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 that used the much criticised 
‘oppressive’ concept.42 Secondly, the reintroduction of the term in section 163 of the 
Act does not contribute any value to the interpretation and application of the remedy 
that outweighs the problems previously associated with the use of the term. The 
                                                 
40 See 5.2 read with 5.7.3.2 above for the development of the remedy in South Africa. For the 
development of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in England see 2.3 above. However, see 
Australia and Canada who have retained the concept ‘oppressive’ in their statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy. See 3.3 and in particular 3.3.5 and 3.5.5.2 above regarding the use of the oppressive 
concept in Australia. See 4.2 above for the development of the statutory personal remedy in Canada 
and 4.7.6.2 above regarding the use of the concept oppressive or oppression. See also 
recommendation in 6.3.1 above. 
41 See 5.2.3 above and 5.2.4 above. 
42 See 5.2.3 above and 5.2.4 above. 
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‘oppressive’ concept has also been abolished from the English equivalent of section 
163.43 This is significant as the development of the statutory personal remedy in 
South Africa has until recently followed the reforms in English law.  
Although the oppressive concept is still used in Australia and Canada the 
development of the remedy in these jurisdictions must be distinguished from the 
development of the remedy in South Africa. This also has to be viewed in light of 
the fact that the legislatures in Australia and Canada incorporated concepts and 
terminology to counter the restrictive effect that the ‘oppressive’ concept had on the 
application of the remedy. Although the latter approach may have the desired 
practical effect, it does create some interpretational problems when these concepts 
have to be interpreted alongside the ‘oppressive’ concept. 
6.3.3 Standing in terms of section 163(1) 
6.3.3.1 Introduction 
There are two pertinent issues relating to standing in terms of section 163(1) that 
deserve consideration. The first is the category of persons to whom standing must 
be extended. Secondly, consideration must be given to whether it would be required 
that a person to whom the remedy has been extended has to be prejudiced in a 
particular capacity.  
6.3.3.2 The approach to standing followed in section 163(1) of the Act  
(a)  A shareholder or a director 
Currently the remedy is available to a shareholder or director of a company. Two 
                                                 
43 See Chapter 2 above and more specifically 2.4 for the provisions of section 994 of the Companies 
Act 2006. 
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important observations can be made in this regard. Firstly, only a shareholder 
whose name has been recorded in the company’s register of securities can rely on 
the provisions of section 163. Secondly, the statutory personal remedy is now 
extended to a director of a company for the first time. 
(b) The registration requirement 
 
The requirement that a shareholder’s name must appear on the register of securities 
has some problematic consequences. Firstly, a shareholder whose name was 
removed from a company’s register of securities as a result of unfair prejudicial 
conduct is disqualified from obtaining relief, for example, in the form of the 
rectification of company records or registers.44 A further consequence is that 
persons such as curators, executors and trustees are excluded from the definition 
of a shareholder for purposes of section 163(1).45 Thirdly, a beneficial shareholder 
cannot rely on the provisions of section 163.46 
(c) Capacity  
 
Section 163(1) is not specific on whether a shareholder or director must have 
suffered unfair prejudice in a particular capacity. Case law is available that requires 
that a shareholder must have suffered prejudice in his capacity as such to rely on 
section 163 of the Act.47 This requirement restricts the application of the remedy by 
potentially disqualifying a shareholder from relief when he or she suffered prejudice 
in another or related capacity. 
                                                 
44 See section 163(1) read with section 163(2)(k) of the Act. 
45 See 5.7.1.2 above. 
46 See 5.7.1.2 above. 
47 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
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Providing a director with standing for purposes of section 163 was supposed 
to expand the scope of application of the remedy and strengthen the position of a 
director. However, when the provisions of section 163 are critically analysed the 
section is of limited use to a director. This is because a director will be unable to 
make use of the remedy if he or she is removed from the board as a director. This 
is especially the case when the director does not hold shares in the company. Even 
though a director may have shares in a company, the provisions may be interpreted 
in such a manner that a director only has standing when he or she is prejudiced in 
his or her capacity as director.48 
6.3.3.3 The English approach to standing for purposes of the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy 
 
(a)  Persons with standing 
 
The English statutory unfair prejudice remedy is only available to a member 
(shareholder) whose name is recorded in the register of members.49 A beneficial 
shareholder does not have standing for purposes of the remedy.50 It is important 
that the provision extends standing to petitioners to whom shares have been 
transmitted by operation of law.51  
(b) Capacity  
Although it is required that a member (shareholder) must have suffered prejudice in 
his or her capacity as shareholder, it is open to a shareholder to demonstrate that 
                                                 
48 See 5.7.1.3 and 5.7.1.4 above. 
49 See 2.6.1 above. 
50 See 2.6.1.1 above. 
51 See 2.6.1 above. 
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he or she has been prejudiced in a capacity other than that of a shareholder, as 
long as the conduct also has been prejudicial to him or her as shareholder.52 The 
shareholder only has to prove a relationship between the capacity in which he or 
she suffered prejudice and his or her capacity as member (shareholder).53 The 
remedy is further available to provide protection to a shareholder in circumstances 
where the shareholder, for example, has been removed from the board as a director 
contrary the legitimate expectations of the member.  
6.3.3.4 The Australian approach to standing for purposes of the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy 
(a) The default position 
The Australian remedy adopts a more flexible approach than the South African 
legislature to the standing requirements for purposes of the statutory unfair 
prejudice remedy. As a general rule the remedy is only available to a member 
(shareholder) whose name appears in the register of members of a company.54  
(b) Capacity  
The provisions of the Australian remedy clearly state that reliance may be placed 
on the remedy irrespective of the fact that a member (shareholder) suffered 
prejudice in such capacity or not.55  
 
 
                                                 
52 See 2.6.2.2 above. 
53 See 2.6.2.2 above. 
54 See 3.7.1 above. 
55 See 3.7.1 read with 3.7.4 above. 
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(c) Extended standing 
 
Courts are further provided with the statutory power to extend standing to persons 
who are not registered members.56 The court may grant standing to a specific class 
of persons.57 This class of persons are all persons who were members of a company 
but whose names were removed from the register of members as a result of a 
selective reduction or whose membership was terminated as a result of the conduct 
that forms the basis of the petition in terms of the statutory personal action.58 
Provision is also made for persons to whom shares were transmitted by operation 
of law.59 
6.3.3.5 The Canadian approach to standing for purposes of the statutory 
unfair prejudice remedy 
 
(a) The default position  
 
The Canadian legislature’s approach to standing is significant because the drafting 
of the South African statutory unfair prejudice remedy closely resembles the wording 
of its Canadian equivalent. However, the Canadian legislature makes the remedy 
available to a wider range of persons compared to South Africa. The remedy is 
amongst others60 available to registered shareholders, directors and officers of a 
company.61 The remedy is also available to former registered shareholders, directors 
or officers.62 Beneficial owners are specifically included for purposes of standing in 
                                                 
56 See 3.7.2 above. 
57 See 3.7.2 above. 
58 See 3.7.2 above. 
59 See 3.7.2 above. 
60 See 4.6.3 above. 
61 See 4.6 above and in particular 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
62 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
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terms of the remedy.63 It is important that current or former registered shareholders 
or directors and officers of a corporation’s affiliates also enjoy standing. 
(b) A court’s statutory discretion 
A court is also provided with a statutory discretion to allow any other persons who 
do not enjoy standing in terms of the provisions of the remedy to rely on the remedy 
based on unfair prejudicial conduct.64 However, a person who does not enjoy 
standing for purposes of the remedy may be granted standing if the person has 
direct and substantial interest in the affairs of a corporation, or holds a specific 
reasonable or legitimate expectation in relation to the affairs of a corporation.65 
(c) Capacity  
There is no requirement in the provisions of the remedy that a person must be 
prejudiced in a particular capacity. The Canadian remedy does not only protect 
shareholders but also the holders of securities.  
6.3.3.6 Recommendations for the amendment of the provisions relating to 
standing for purposes of section 163  
(a) Introduction 
To avoid technical disputes, it is important that the categories of persons who enjoy 
standing in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy be established with 
relative ease and certainty.  
                                                 
63 See 4.6.1 above. 
64 See 4.6.4 above. 
65 See, for example, the position of creditors as discussed in 4.6.4.2 above and the position of an 
employee as discussed in 4.6.4.3 above. 
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(b) The English approach 
The English approach to standing in terms of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
has some practical aspects that should be considered. First, the remedy is only 
available to members whose names appear on the register of members.66 Secondly, 
a member (shareholder) may rely on prejudice in a capacity other than that of a 
member (shareholder), provided that there is a relationship between the capacity in 
which a person complains of unfair prejudicial conduct and the person’s capacity as 
member (shareholder) of a company.67  
In light of the analysis of the English position the South African position can 
benefit from not requiring that the prejudice should be suffered in a particular 
capacity as long as a nexus can be established between the capacity in which a 
shareholder suffered prejudice and his or her capacity as member. It is therefore 
recommended that that section 163 be amended to neutralise the self-introduced 
requirement by courts that prejudice must be suffered in a particular capacity. 
(c)  The approach in Australia and Canada 
In terms of both the Australian and Canadian remedy a court enjoys a statutory 
discretion to extend standing for purposes of the remedy to persons who are not 
specifically afforded standing based on the provisions of the statutory remedy.68  
The provisions of the Australian remedy allow a court to grant standing to a 
very specific category of persons.69 It clear that it is intended that standing must 
                                                 
66 See 2.6.1 above. 
67 See 2.6.2.2 above. 
68 See for the position in Canada see 4.6.4 above and for the position in Australia 3.7.2 above. 
69 See 3.7.2 above. 
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specifically be extended to persons whose names have been removed from the 
register of members as a result of unfair prejudicial conduct.70  
The provisions relating to standing in terms of the Canadian remedy is of a 
wider ambit than that of Australia. Firstly, standing is extended to the holders of 
securities whose names are recorded in the register of securities and to directors 
and officers of a corporation.71 Secondly, former registered security holders and 
former directors and officers may rely on the remedy.72 Thirdly, the remedy is 
available to current and former registered security holders and directors and officers 
of an affiliate of a corporation.73 Fourthly, a current or former beneficial holder or 
owner of securities of a corporation or of its affiliates is specifically included as 
having standing for purposes of the remedy.74 Fifthly, the court is given a statutory 
discretion to extend standing to ‘any other person’.75 It is important to note that this 
discretion is not limited to a particular category of persons as is done in the 
Australian equivalent of the remedy. It must be noted that the persons who enjoy 
standing for purposes of the Canadian remedy may utilise the remedy to obtain 
relief when the interests of a ‘security holder, creditor, director or officer’ are 
prejudiced in a manner that is unfair, oppressive or is an unfair disregard of 
interests.  
 
 
                                                 
70 See 3.7.2 above. 
71 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
72 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
73 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
74 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
75 See 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above. 
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(d) Critical assessment of the provisions relating to standing for 
purposes of section 163 
 
The position of persons relying on the provision of section 163 will be improved 
significantly if the recommendations below are implemented. As demonstrated 
earlier some of the remedies listed in section 163(2) are not available to persons 
who often need it the most because of the current wording of the provisions dealing 
with the standing of persons for purposes of section 163.76  
(i) Section 163 and the definition of a ‘shareholder’ 
 
The recommendations affect the definition of a ‘shareholder’ as defined in section 1 
of the Act and the category of persons named in section 163(1). These 
recommendations are made in light of the view that section 163 is aimed at the 
protection of the shareholders of a company.  
(ii) Security holders 
 
Currently, no need has been identified for the extension of this remedy to the holders 
of securities, such as the position in Canada. This may be explained in light of the 
fact that the Act contains very specific provisions and remedies aimed at the 
protection of the holders of securities.77  
(iii) The ambit of the Canadian statutory unfair prejudice remedy 
 
Of all the jurisdictions considered in this thesis it is submitted that the provisions 
relating to standing in terms of the Canadian statutory personal remedy are 
formulated in the widest terms. It is submitted that the recommendations made will 
                                                 
76 See, for example, 5.9.12 above regarding the rectification of company records. 
77 See, for example, section 161 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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to a large extent achieve the same result. The Canadian remedy is also more 
comprehensive because it protects the holders of securities. 
(e) Recommendations for amending the requirements for standing for 
purposes of section 163 
 
The following recommendations are made pertaining to the provisions relating to 
standing in respect of section 163: 
(i) Shares transferred by operation of law 
Provision must be made for the inclusion of persons such as executors, 
administrators, curators, liquidators and trustees of a shareholder to whom shares 
were transferred by operation of law.78 
(ii) Beneficial holders or owners 
A beneficial holder or owner of shares should be included in the category of persons 
who enjoy standing under section 163. 
(iii) Former shareholders and directors 
The remedy must also be extended to former shareholders and former directors. 
This will afford protection to persons whose names were removed from the 
company’s register of securities or who were removed from the board as a director. 
As has been pointed out above, these persons are often left without redress in 
instances where such person’s name is removed from a company’s securities 
register or removed from the board under circumstances that are unfairly prejudicial. 
                                                 
78 See 5.7.1.2 (b) above for criticism of the exclusion of curators and executors from relying on the 
provisions of section 252 of the previous Act. 
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In the interest of legal certainty, it is recommended that such former shareholder or 
director only be allowed to institute legal proceedings within a limited period of time 
calculated from the date of the removal of the shareholder’s name from the register 
of securities or from the date a director has been removed from a company’s board. 
Serious consideration should also be given to the proposals of Oosthuizen and 
Delport who suggest the adoption of a summary remedy aimed at the protection of 
shareholders whose names were removed from the company’s register of 
securities.79  
(iv) The capacity in which prejudice is suffered 
The requirement that a shareholder must have suffered prejudice in a particular 
capacity has been criticised repeatedly in the context of the predecessors of section 
163.80 It is also notable that legislatures in comparable jurisdictions expressly 
incorporated provisions which do not require a person who has standing in terms of 
the statutory personal remedy to prove that he or she has suffered prejudice in a 
particular capacity. The benefit of such an approach is that it provides protection to, 
for example, a shareholder-director who has been formally removed from the board 
of directors. Such a person can approach a court as a shareholder on the basis that 
his or removal from the board is unfairly prejudicial not only in his or her capacity as 
director but also as a shareholder. A shareholder will also be protected in his or her 
capacity as a creditor of a company. This is essential for shareholders who amongst 
others hold loan accounts in a company. An amendment should also be introduced 
to the effect that a person who has standing in terms of section 163 must be able to 
                                                 
79 See 5.9.1.2 above. 
80 See 5.7.1.2 (b) above. 
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rely on prejudice in any capacity provided that it is in connection with his or her 
capacity as shareholder or director of a company. 
i. The requirement that a shareholder or a director may rely on the 
provisions of section 163 must be retained. 
ii. The remedy should be extended to a former shareholder or former 
director. 
iii. A former shareholder or former director may only rely on the remedy 
within a specified period of time after his or her name has been 
removed from the company’s register of securities or his or her 
removal from the board as director provided that such removal relates 
to the unfair prejudicial conduct on which the former shareholder or 
former director wishes to rely. It is recommended that such 
proceedings must be instituted within 6 months after such removal as 
shareholder or as director. 
iv. Standing should further be extended to beneficial holders or owners 
of shares. 
v. Persons such as executors, curators, liquidators or trustee must also 
be given the benefit of the remedy. 
vi. A person relying on section 163(1) does not need to have suffered 
prejudice in a particular capacity but has to demonstrate a rational link 
between the capacity in which legal proceedings are brought in terms 
of section 163 and the capacity in which a person has suffered 
prejudice. 
In light of the considerations described above the following recommendations are 
made regarding the provisions dealing with the requirements for standing for 
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purposes of section 163. The recommendation takes the form of the insertion of a 
subsection into section 163 that will specifically deal with the persons who will have 
standing for purposes of section 163. This proposed subsection should read as 
follows: 
(4) For purposes of this section a person is defined as: - 
(a) A shareholder as defined in section 1 in his capacity as 
such or in any other capacity related to his or her 
shareholding; 
(b)  A person whose name has been removed from the register 
of securities, within six months immediately preceding the 
institution of legal proceedings in terms of (1), as a result of 
a selective reduction; or  
(c) A person who has instituted legal proceedings in terms of 
(1) within six months after having ceased to be a 
shareholder of the company provided that the proceedings 
relate to the circumstances in which they ceased to be a 
member; or 
(d) A beneficial shareholder; or 
(e) A director or prescribed officer in his capacity as such; or  
(f) A person to whom shares in the company have been 
transferred or transmitted by operation of law; 
 
6.3.4  Section 163(1) – The jurisdictional requirements 
6.3.4.1 Introduction and background 
The grounds on which a person with standing may rely for relief are stated in section 
163(1).81 The formulation of the provisions in section 163(1) creates some 
interpretational difficulties. Firstly, it is uncertain whether the provisions in sections 
163(1)(a)-(c) should be interpreted as being separate grounds for relief or whether 
the provisions should be read to form a whole.82 Secondly, the persons stated in 
section 163(1)(a)-(c) whose conduct may form the basis for relief in section 163 
                                                 
81 See 5.7.2 above. 
82 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) and 5.7.2.2 (b)(i) above. 
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differ in each of the grounds.83 Thirdly, only section 163(1)(a) requires that a result 
must be proven while sections 163(1)(b) and (c) refers to the manner in which the 
conduct complained of was carried out.84 Fourthly, the tense in which the provisions 
in sections 163(1)(a)-(c) are formulated is inconsistent, creating doubt as to when 
the alleged unfair conduct had taken place before reliance may be placed on the 
remedy.  
It is important to note that the tense in which section 163(1)(a) is formulated 
excludes the application of the provision from being applied to future or threatening 
conduct.85 In light of this it is important to note that the predecessors of section 163 
were criticised for not making provision for relief against future or threatening 
conduct.86 Further section 163 does not expressly provide for relief against future 
or threatening conduct and therefore the same criticism may apply to it.87 There are 
very compelling reasons for providing a person with standing in terms of section 163 
to obtain relief against future or threatening conduct.88 It is notable that both the 
English and Australian remedy expressly covers future or threatening conduct.89 It 
is submitted that the grounds in section 163(1) should be amended to entitle a 
person with standing to obtain relief against future or threatening conduct.90 Fifthly, 
it appears that courts are uncertain about the application of the result requirement 
                                                 
83 See 5.7.2.1 and 5.7.2.2 above. 
84 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) and 5.7.2.2 (b)(ii) above. 
85 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(i) and 5.7.2.2 (b)(i) above. 
86 See 5.2.4.3 (d) above. 
87 See 5.9.2.3 and 5.9.2.4 above. 
88 See 5.9.2.2 above. 
89 See section 994(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 for the position in England and 3.5, and in 
particular 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, above for the position in Australia. 
90 See 6.3.4.2 below. 
 600 
 
and what constitutes a result.91 It is submitted that the purpose of the result 
requirement is to emphasise that it is the nature of the objectively determined result 
of the conduct that must be evaluated independent from the nature of the conduct.92 
6.3.4.2 Recommended amendments to section 163(1) 
In light of the above it is submitted that the provisions of section 163(1) be amended 
in the following manner: 
i. To make express provision for protection against future and 
threatening conduct and to amend the general language in section 
163(1) more appropriately.  
ii. To make it clear that the result of the conduct complained of must be 
evaluated against the commercial unfairness criterion and not the 
manner in which the conduct has taken place.  
iii. That the section is directed at the conduct of the company which may 
include the conduct of a shareholder, a director, prescribed officer and 
the board.  
iv. Legal proceedings in terms of section 163 may be commenced by way 
of action or motion proceedings depending of the existence of a bona 
fide dispute between the parties which cannot be resolved in motion 
proceedings.93 In relation to the form of the proceedings in terms which 
a dispute must be brought before a court it is recommended that 
section 163 be amended to state clearly that the use of motion 
                                                 
91 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) above. 
92 and 5.7.3.6 above. 
93 See 5.9.12 above. 
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proceedings is not mandatory and further that the normal rules 
pertaining to the law of procedure apply. 
In light of the above it is proposed that section 163(1) be amended to read as follows: 
(1)  A person [shareholder or a director of a company] may [apply 
to] approach a court or, where appropriate, an arbitrator or other 
competent tribunal for relief if – 
(a) [any act or omission of the company, or a related person, 
has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant;] in relation to its affairs an act or omission of a 
company, shareholder, director or prescribed officer or related 
person to the company; or  
(b) [the business of the company, or a related person, is 
being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that] an 
actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a 
company; or  
(c) [the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the 
company, or a person related to the company, are being 
or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of, the applicant.] a resolution or a proposed 
resolution of shareholders or class of shareholders;  
effects a result that is: 
(d) contrary to the interests of the shareholders as a whole; or 
(e) unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interests of a 
person  
 
(i) in that person’s capacity as a shareholder or in any other 
capacity related to that person’s shareholding; or  
(ii) in that person’s capacity as director or prescribed 
officer. 
 
6.3.5 Forms of relief 
6.3.5.1 Section 163(2) 
Some decisions of the South African courts expressed doubt on whether disputes 
based on section 163 may be referred for arbitration. In this regard it is suggested 
that this uncertainty be addressed by making it clear that such disputes may be 
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referred for arbitration where appropriate. Such an amendment will be in line with 
the legislative approach to introduce alternative dispute resolution mechanisms into 
South African company law and the approaches of other jurisdictions evaluated in 
this thesis. It is also proposed that the section make it clear that disputes based on 
section 163 may be referred to other tribunals such as the Companies Tribunal as 
far as it is appropriate to do so.94 
It is further recommended that this section be amended to make it clear that 
the purpose of the relief is to end the conduct complained of in the least intrusive 
manner possible. The discretion of the court must be exercised while taking into 
consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. 
In light of the suggestions and recommendations discussed above it is proposed 
that section 163(2) be amended as follows: 
(2)  Upon considering a matter in terms of subsection (1), [the] a court, 
arbitrator or other tribunal has the discretion to make any interim or 
final order it considers fit, with the primarily purpose to end the 
matters complained of in the least intrusive manner possible unless 
any other form of relief appropriate in the context of the facts and 
circumstances of the case, including – 
 
6.3.5.2 Section 163(2)(b) 
The current formulation of section 163(2)(b) is too restrictive. The wording of this 
section only allows a court to make an order for the appointment of a liquidator in 
the event of the company being insolvent. This approach can be criticised as one 
may think of circumstances where a company is solvent, but the unfair prejudicial 
conduct of one or more of the shareholders or directors may justify the liquidation 
                                                 
94 See also 6.3.4.2 above. 
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of the company as other forms of relief will not be able practically to resolve the 
dispute between the parties. The test for relief in this regard is whether one of the 
grounds in section 163(1) has been proven and the ability of the relief to resolve the 
dispute. These requirements stand independently from whether a company is 
solvent or insolvent. Courts, however, will be more reluctant to order the winding-
up of a solvent company based on section 163 in circumstances where alternative 
forms of relief are practical and available. In light of the above the following 
amendment is proposed to section 163(2)(b):  
(b) an order for the winding-up of a company [appointing a liquidator, 
if the company appears to be insolvent]; 
 
6.3.5.3 Section 163(2)(d) 
Section 163(2)(d) refers to a ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’. This term is 
foreign to the South African law of contract and company law. Indications are that 
this term originates from Canadian corporations law, where it has a very specific 
meaning.95 The meaning of a ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’ in the context of 
Canadian corporations law has a much more restrictive meaning than the meaning 
of a shareholder agreement in the context of South African corporate law.96 To 
eradicate any confusion it is recommended that this provision be amended by 
deleting the word ‘unanimous’.97 In light of the above the following amendment is 
proposed to section 163(2)(d): 
 
                                                 
95 See 4.11.6.2 above. 
96 See 4.11.6.2 above for a discussion of a ‘unanimous shareholder agreement’. 
97 See also 5.9.5 and in particular 5.9.5.3 (a)–(b) above for the use of the phrase ‘unanimous 
shareholder agreement’ in the context of South African law. 
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(d) an order to regulate the company’s affairs by directing the 
company to amend its Memorandum of Incorporation or to create 
or amend a [unanimous] shareholder agreement; 
 
6.3.5.4 Section 163(2)(g) 
 
This provision caters for the return of consideration paid for shares.98 An order may 
require the company or any other person to return any part of the consideration paid 
for shares. It is recommended that the return of any consideration by the company 
must be subjected to the solvency and liquidity test in section 4 of the Act. This 
amendment will provide protection to the interests of creditors. The following 
amendments are proposed in this regard: 
(g)  [an order directing the company or any other person] to 
restore to a shareholder any part of the consideration that the 
shareholders paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with or 
without conditions [;] by 
(i)  the company, subject to section 4; or  
(ii) any other person; 
 
6.3.5.5 Section 163(2)(f)(ii) 
The appropriateness of the inclusion of section 163(2)(f)(ii) as a form of relief must 
be evaluated in light of its purpose and function and the general function and 
purpose of section 163. Section 163(2)(f)(ii) directly refers to section 162. The 
purpose and function of the latter section should also be considered when a court 
exercises its discretion in granting relief ‘it considers fit’.99 While the objective of the 
relief in terms of section 163(2) is to end and rectify the conduct complained of,100 
                                                 
98 See 5.9.9 above. 
99 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163(2). See also 5.9 above. 
100 See 5.9.1 above. 
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an order for probation or delinquency serves a public interest function.101 In this 
regard it is important to note that section 163 applies to the private relationship 
between parties to a company.102  
 It is recommended that section 163(2)(f)(ii) be removed from section 163. 
This will resolve issues relating to the interpretation and application of section 163(1) 
read with section 163(2)(f)(ii) and section 162. The forms of relief in section 163(2) 
and an order in terms of section 162 serve two different purposes. In exercising its 
discretion in terms of section 163(2) a court has to determine whether the relief 
sought is appropriate in that the relief will rectify the matters complained of in the 
least intrusive manner possible.103 In contrast with section 163(2), section 162 
serves a public interest function.104 To declare a person a delinquent or placing a 
person under probation in terms of section 162 different considerations apply when 
a court exercises its discretion under section 162 when compared to the general 
discretion a court enjoys in terms of section 163(2) of the Act. Sections 162 and 163 
further appear as separate and distinct remedies in the Act. The fact that an order 
may in terms of section 163(2)(f)(ii) or section 162 have the effect of rectifying the 
conduct complained of in terms of section 163(1), will only be incidental.105 
 The inclusion of section 163(2)(f)(ii) also creates some interpretational 
                                                 
101 See 5.9.7.2 (a) and (b) above. 
102 See also 5.9.5 and in particular 5.9.5.2 above. 
103 See 5.9 above. 
104 See 5.9.7.2 (a) and (b) above. 
105 For a similar argument in the context of section 165 see Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and 
Others 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) [40] where the court held that ‘[i]t is significant that the evident object 
of s 162 goes essentially to the provision of a protective remedy in the public interest, and it is only 
incidentally that the provision can in some circumstances operate arising out of a wrong done to an 
individual company [shareholder or director]’. 
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problems.106 Section 163(2)(f)(ii) states clearly that a court may make an order 
‘declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as contemplated in section 
162’. The provisions of section 162 reveal that a court may order that a person be 
placed under probation on the grounds that he or she ‘acted in, or supported a 
decision of the company to act in, a manner contemplated in section 163(1)’.107 It is 
interesting to note that while section 163(1)(f)(ii) states that conduct contemplated 
in terms of section 163 may justify an order for declaring a person a delinquent 
and/or placing a person under probation, section 162(7)(b)(iii) implies that conduct 
in terms of section 163(1) may only possibly justify relief in the form of an order 
declaring a person under probation. This is further indicative of the fact that the 
grounds on which relief may be relied on for purposes of section 162 and section 
163 are not necessarily aligned.108 
The removal of section 163(2)(f)(ii) will resolve the discrepancies between 
these two sections. This will also not prejudice any person who has standing for 
purposes of section 163(1), as a shareholder or director also have standing to rely 
directly on section 162 for an order declaring a person a delinquent or placing a 
person under probation, if required. 
In light of the above the following amendment to section 163(2)(f) is 
proposed: 
                                                 
106 See 5.9.7.2 (c) above. 
107 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 162(7)(a)(iii). 
108 The fact that the conduct of a director triggers relief under this section cannot be seen as justifying 
relief in the form of a probation or delinquency order. This is because relief under this section is 
triggered based on the commercial unfairness of the conduct complained of. For purposes of section 
163 conduct can be rendered commercially unfair despite the relevant conduct not being unlawful or 
being bona fide.  
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(f)  an order [–] 
(i) appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of 
the directors then in office [;]. 
[(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as 
contemplated in section 162;] 
 
6.3.5.6 Section 163(2)(j) 
This section provides for the payment of compensation to an aggrieved person.109 
Such payment is subject to any other law entitling that person to compensation. The 
purpose of this form of relief is uncertain.  
A similar form of relief can be found in section 241(3)(j) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act.110 This form of relief is used to hold the directors of corporations 
personally liable by ordering such directors to compensate a party prejudiced by 
unfair conduct.111 Based on the current formulation of section 163(2)(j) of the Act 
and the conceptional difficulties associated with this form of relief in the context of 
the current South African law,112 South African courts should be prudent in blindly 
adopting the Canadian approach to section 241(3)(j) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act.113 
It appears that the purpose of the provision is the payment of compensation in 
circumstances where an aggrieved person’s right to compensation is not recognised 
by other branches of the law such as the law of delict. The reference to ‘an 
                                                 
109 See 5.9.11 above for a discussion of section 163(2)(j) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
110 RSC 1985 c C-44. 
111 See 4.11.13 above. 
112 See 5.9.11 above. 
113 RSC 1985 c C-44. See also 1.5.1 above for a caveat against the blind application of English 
company law to South African company law. It is submitted that the application of Canadian company 
law to South African law must also be approached with the same circumspect for similiar reasons. 
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aggrieved person’ also adds some confusion to the interpretation of the provision. 
Currently, only a shareholder or a director may rely on the provisions of section 163 
to obtain relief. Therefore, an aggrieved person can only be a shareholder or 
director. Alternatively, the provision makes it possible for a shareholder or director 
to obtain compensation for ‘an aggrieved person’ which is someone other than a 
shareholder or director. The provision also refers to ‘compensation’ and not 
‘damages’. This indicates that when relief is granted in the form of compensation it 
will be done on the basis of fairness.  
It is recommended that section 163(2)(j) be removed from section 163(2) as 
it does not make any meaningful contribution to the current form of the remedy. It is 
further suggested that the position be regulated by the common law principles and 
applicable statutory provisions relating to the award of compensation and/or 
damages. 
The following legislative amendment is therefore proposed in this regard: 
[(j)  an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject 
to any other law entitling that person to compensation;] 
 
6.3.5.7 Section 163(2)(k) 
Section 163(2)(k) provides for an order directing the rectification of the register or 
other records of a company. As has been pointed out earlier, this form of relief is 
not available to a shareholder whose name does not appear on the register of 
securities of a company.114 The position of the shareholder will be vastly improved 
and strengthened in this regard by extending standing to former shareholders 
                                                 
114 See 5.9.12 above. 
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and/or beneficial shareholders as recommended above.115 In addition to the 
recommendation above the suggestion by Oosthuizen and Delport for the 
incorporation of a summary remedy similar to section 115 of the previous Act is 
strongly supported. Using the exact wording of section 115 of the previous Act, it is 
recommended that the following provision be inserted as section 161A of the Act: 
‘Rectification of register of securities. –  
(1)  If – 
(a) the name of any person is, without sufficient cause, entered in 
or omitted from the register of securities of a company; or 
(b) default is made or unnecessary delay takes place in entering 
in the register the fact of any person having ceased to be a 
shareholder, 
the person concerned or the company or any shareholder of the company, 
may apply to the Court for rectification of the register. 
(2) The application may be made in accordance with a rule of Court or 
in such other manner as the Court may direct, and the Court may 
either refuse it or may order rectification of the register and payment 
by the company, or by any director or prescribed officer of the 
company, of any damages sustained by any person concerned. 
(3) On any application under this section the Court may decide any 
question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the 
application to have this name entered in or omitted from the register, 
whether the question arises between shareholder or alleged 
shareholders or between shareholders or alleged shareholders on 
the one hand and the company other hand, and generally may 
decide any question necessary or expedient to be decided for the 
rectification of the register. 
 
6.3.5.8 Legal proceedings by or on behalf of the company 
Traditionally and theoretically a strict distinction was maintained between the 
personal remedy and the derivative remedy of shareholders. This approach is still 
observed in the statutory forms of the personal and derivative remedy in some of 
                                                 
115 See 6.3.3.6 (e) above. 
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the jurisdictions considered in this thesis.116  
However, from a practical point of view the maintenance of a strict distinction 
between these remedies may be extremely complex and may create and promote 
injustices. To avoid the injustices that flows from the strict application of the 
principles in Foss v Harbottle117 and to adopt a more practical approach in this 
regard some jurisdictions incorporated relief in the form of derivative proceeding into 
the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.118 It must be emphasised that this form of 
relief will only be applied in very specific circumstances. The fact that derivative 
relief will also be available in terms of the statutory personal remedy will not justify 
or necessarily lead to the abolishment of a separate statutory derivative remedy.119  
It has been demonstrated above that the statutory personal remedy has 
enough mechanisms in place to prevent abuse of the statutory unfair prejudice 
remedy such as section 163 to bypass or circumvent the provisions of section 
165.120 If the current legal position in South Africa is compared with similar 
                                                 
116 See 5.9.15.4 above for the position in South Africa where the strict distinction between the 
statutory personal action and the statutory derivative action is maintained. The Canadian equivalent 
of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not expressly provide for authorisation of 
derivative proceedings and case law is currently divided on whether derivative proceedings may be 
ordered or authorised in terms of the Canadian derivative proceedings. For the position in Canada 
see 4.12, and more specifically 4.12.6 above.  
117 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
118 See, for example, 2.10.3 above for the approach in England, 3.9.6 for the position in Australia. 
See also the ratio of the cases in Canada that support the granting of derivative relief in terms of the 
statutory personal remedy as discussed in 4.12 above. 
119 See 2.10.3.5 read with 2.10.3.6 (c) above for the position in England where doubt is expressed 
whether the availability to order derivative relief in term of a statutory personal remedy should be 
interpreted to circumvent the provisions of the statutory derivative action. 
120 See 3.9.6.3 (d) above for an example the approach in Australia where courts consider the nature 
of the grounds on which a person relies regarding the relief sought. 
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jurisdictions it is clear that the traditional and theoretical approach where a strict 
distinction is maintained between the statutory unfair prejudice remedy and the 
statutory derivative action is an outdated approach and in some circumstances may 
be impractical which further may lead to injustices which the statutory personal and 
derivative actions attempt to eradicate.  
It is therefore recommended that section 163(2) be amended as follows: 
i. To provide a court with a discretion to grant relief similar to the relief 
that can be obtained in terms of the statutory derivative proceedings.  
ii. A court may exercise this discretion only after considering the specific 
circumstances of each case. The factors that a court would need to 
consider will have to include but not be limited to the nature of the 
grounds on which relief is sought, the nature of the relief sought and 
the nature of the relationship between the shareholders of a company.  
iii. A person who has been granted authorisation to institute legal 
proceedings in terms of section 163 to obtain relief for the company 
must be indemnified for the relevant costs incurred. It is further 
important that the provisions relating to the granting of costs for the 
institution of legal proceedings on behalf of a company in terms of 
section 163 and the provisions relating to costs pertaining to the 
institution of the statutory derivative action in section 165 be aligned as 
far as possible, to prevent that one of the sections is preferred above 
the other because of costs considerations in stead of the application of 
the correct principle. It should, however, be noted that the provisions of 
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section 165 dealing with costs are subjected to sharp criticism.121  
In light of the above, the inclusion of an amendment to section 163(2) is proposed: 
(m) order the company to  
(i) institute or defend legal proceedings; 
(ii)  authorise a person to institute or defend legal proceedings to 
be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such 
person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct 
including the making of an appropriate order in relation to the 
reasonable costs incurred or to be incurred by a person in 
connection with instituting or defending legal proceedings on 
behalf of the company; 
 
6.3.5.9 Relief in the form of a buy-out order 
 
(a) The need for legislative intervention  
 
Relief in the form of a buy-out order is one of the most practical forms of relief that 
a court may grant.122 This is because the purpose of the relief is to end the 
association between parties on fair terms and conditions.123 It is surprising that 
despite the frequency with which this form of relief is granted, it is not included in 
the list of orders expressly mentioned in section 163(2).124 This omission is 
significant in light of the fact that the predecessors of the remedy explicitly included 
buy-out orders as a form of relief.125 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
                                                 
121 See MF Cassim ‘Costs Orders, Obstacles and Barriers to the Derivative Action under Section 
165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (part 1)’ (2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 1; MF Cassim ‘Costs Orders, 
Obstacles and Barriers to the Derivative Action under Section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(part 2)’ (2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 228. See also 5.9.15 above for a discussion of the interrelationship 
between section 163 and section 165 of the Act. 
122 See 5.9.14.1 and 5.9.14.2 above. 
123 See 5.9.14.1 and 5.9.14.2 above. 
124 See 5.9.14.2 above. 
125 See section 111bis(2)(b) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 as discussed in 5.2.3 above and 
section 252(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 as discussed in 5.2.4 above. 
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this form of relief is excluded from section 163(2).126 For purposes of section 163 it 
is not only important that buy-out orders should have been expressly mentioned in 
section 163(2) but the legislature should have made use of the opportunity to clarify 
some aspects regarding relief in the form of a buy-out order. Aspects that could 
have been clarified included the persons against whom such order could be made 
and the role that the solvency and liquidity test plays in the event of such an order 
being made against the company.127 
(b) Recommendations for legislative intervention in relation to buy-out 
orders 
In light of the evaluation of buy-out orders as a form of relief in terms of section 
163(2) the following legislative interventions are recommended: 
i. That the provision explicitly provides for relief in the form of a buy-out 
order. 
ii. That the inclusion of a buy-out order must clearly provide that such an 
order may be made against the company or a shareholder of a 
company. 
iii. That buy-out orders against the company are made subject to the 
solvency and liquidity requirements of section 4 of the Act. 
In light of the above, the following amendment to section 163(2) is proposed: 
(o) provide for the purchase of the shares of a shareholder or 
shareholders of the company  
(i) by another shareholder or shareholders of the company or 
related company; or  
 
                                                 
126 See 5.9 above. 
127 See 5.9.14.5 above. 
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(ii) by the company itself, subject to the solvency and liquidity 
requirement of section 4(1) of the Act, and the reduction of 
the company’s capital accordingly.  
 
6.3.6 Arbitration 
 
During this study no reason was found why the adjudication of disputes in terms of 
the remedy must remain exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts provided 
that the nature of relief sought in terms of section 163 does not take the form of an 
order for the winding-up of a company or any other form of relief that could not be 
subjected to arbitration based on public policy considerations. The fact section 
163(1) refers to ‘a court’ does not mean that proceedings in terms of section 163 
cannot be submitted to arbitration proceedings.128 It is submitted that arbitration 
agreements between parties must be enforced even when reliance is placed on the 
provisions of section 163.129 To clarify the position, the following recommendations 
are made: 
i. Section 163 be amended so that a court or arbitrator may grant relief 
in terms of section 163(2) of the Act. Consideration may also be given 
for the referral of such disputes to the Companies Tribunal. 
ii. Alternatively, the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 be amended to include a 
similar provision as found in section 7(2) of the International Arbitration 
Act 15 of 2017. The effect of such an amendment would be that 
                                                 
128 See 5.11.2.5 (c) above. Compare with the position in England as discussed in 2.11.3.2 (e) above. 
See also 3.11.5 above for the approach of the judiciary in Australia and 4.14 and in particular 4.14.2.3 
above for the approach in Canada. 
129 Although disputes in terms of section 163 may be arbitrated this would not mean that an arbitrator 
may grant relief such as an order for the winding-up and liquidation of a company on public policy 
considerations. 
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‘[a]rbitration may not be excluded solely on the ground that an 
enactment confers jurisdiction on a court or other tribunal to determine 
a matter failing within the terms of an arbitration agreement’.  
In light of the above the following amendments to section 163(1) and (2) of the Act 
are proposed: 
In relation to section 163(1): 
(1) A person [shareholder or a director of a company] may [apply 
to] approach a court [-or, where appropriate, an arbitrator or other 
competent tribunal for relief if an act or omission of a company, 
including that a shareholder, director or prescribed officer or related 
person to the company – 
 
In relation to section 163(2): 
(2) Upon considering an application in terms of subsection (1), [the] a 
court, arbitrator or other tribunal has the discretion to make any interim 
or final order it considers fit, to primarily end the matters complained of 
in the least intrusive manner possible or alternatively grant any other 
form of relief appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the case, 
including – 
 
Alternatively, the following amendment should be made to section 3 of the 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965: 
3  Binding effect of arbitration agreement and power of court in 
relation thereto 
(1) Unless the agreement otherwise provides, an arbitration agreement 
shall not be capable of being terminated except by consent of all the 
parties thereto. 
(2) The court may at any time on the application of any party to an 
arbitration agreement, on good cause shown-  
(a) set aside the arbitration agreement; or  
(b) order that any particular dispute referred to in the arbitration 
agreement shall not be referred to arbitration; or  
(c) order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect 
with reference to any dispute. 
(3) An arbitration agreement may not be excluded solely on the ground 
that an enactment confers jurisdiction on a court or other tribunal to 
determine a matter falling with the terms of an arbitration agreement. 
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6.4 PART C: 
Principles for judicial interpretation and application 
 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 is drafted in open and flexible 
terms.130 This creates the possibility for various interpretations and applications of 
the remedy which may create legal uncertainty which threatens the consistency with 
which the remedy is interpreted and applied.131 It is therefore essential that the 
provisions of section 163 are interpreted and applied in a principled manner.132 The 
correct interpretation and application of section 163 are not only dependent on a 
proper understanding of the terminology and concepts used, but also on an 
understanding of the interrelationship that the various terms and concepts have with 
each other.133 Guidelines and principles distilled from case law in relation to the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of section 163 are provided below. 
6.4.2 Principles and guidelines  
6.4.2.1 An interpretation has to be given to the provisions of section 163 that will 
advance the remedy rather than limit it.134 However, this does not mean 
that the jurisdictional requirements of the remedy can be ignored or be 
indiscriminately applied.135 For example, the provisions relating to 
standing cannot be interpreted to provide standing to persons who do not 
                                                 
130 See 5.7.2.1 above. 
131 See 5.7.2.1 above. 
132 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) above. 
133 See, for example, 5.7.3 above. 
134 See 5.7.2.1 above. 
135 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
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fall within a class of persons predefined by the Act.136 
6.4.2.2 For section 163 to apply the conduct must not only be prejudicial but must 
also be unfair.137 This emphasises that not all prejudice will be regarded 
as unfair for purposes of section 163.138 The unfairness of the prejudice 
suffered must be evaluated in the context of the application of established 
corporate law principles and the facts and circumstances of a specific 
case.139 Conduct that is contrary to the legitimate expectations of a party 
may be indicative of unfairness.140 The statutory provisions of section 
163(1) remain the criteria against which the conduct complained of must 
be measured.141 This is especially relevant when the conduct of directors 
is under scrutiny. The fact that a director or directors complied with their 
duties or acted bona fide and in the best interests of a company does not 
by default exclude the application of section 163. This is because 
commercial fairness is the criterion for reliance on section 163 and not 
unlawfulness.142 Further, fairness to a shareholder does not necessarily 
coincide with the best interests of the company. 
6.4.2.3 When the result or consequences of the conduct complained of is 
evaluated an objective test is used to establish the commercial fairness 
or unfairness of the conduct.143 This means that as a general rule the 
                                                 
136 See 5.7.1 and more particularly 5.7.1.2 (b) and (c) above. 
137 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
138 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
139 See 5.4.3 read with 5.7.1.4 above. 
140 See 5.7.6 above. 
141 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
142 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
143 See 5.7.2.2 (a)(ii) and 5.7.3.5 above. 
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motive of the party or person who committed the conduct complained of 
is irrelevant.144 However, the motive of the party may in some 
circumstances be taken into account to determine whether the conduct 
complained of is commercially fair or unfair. 
6.4.2.4 Section 163 specifically protects interests.145 The concept of interests is 
to be given a wide interpretation.146 Although the prejudice suffered is 
usually of a financial nature, it does not exclude other forms of prejudice 
such as the exclusion from the participation in the business and affairs of 
a company. It is submitted that such an interpretation is in line with the 
introduction of the phrase ‘unfair disregard’ of the interests of a director 
or shareholder.147 It should be noted that the interests of a shareholder 
include the commercial and legal interests of a beneficial 
shareowner/holder.148 
6.4.2.5 Although some courts require that a person has been prejudiced in his or 
her capacity as shareholder or director, it must be pointed out that such 
an interpretation is highly undesirable as it introduces an unjustifiable 
restriction to the wording of section 163.149 
6.4.2.6 In the evaluation of the commercial fairness or unfairness of the conduct 
complained of it has to be emphasised that it is the effect or result of the 
conduct that has to be commercial unfair for purposes of relying on the 
provisions of section 163 to obtain relief. It is not and must not be a 
                                                 
144 See 5.7.3.5 above. 
145 See 5.7.4 above. 
146 See 5.7.4 above. 
147 See 5.7.1.4 above. 
148 See 5.7.4 above. 
149 See 5.7.1.4 (c). 
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requirement for a person to prove that both the conduct and the result 
thereof are commercially unfair.150 
6.4.2.7 Section 163 has important implications for the enforcement of a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, rules and, where applicable, 
shareholder agreements.151 Courts are usually reluctant to interfere with 
the contractual arrangements between parties, especially if such 
arrangements relate to the conduct of the internal affairs of a company.152 
Such an approach limits the application of section 163 without 
justification. Section 163 plays an important role in balancing the interests 
of various parties such as those of the company, the directors and 
shareholders without being restrained by the traditional law of contract 
principles. This does not mean that a court can ignore contractual 
arrangements between parties to a company dispute.153 Section 163 
provides the court with the power and discretion to give effect to 
understandings or arrangements (legitimate expectations) that are not 
necessarily formulated and contained in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company or a shareholder agreement.154 These 
legitimate expectations are enforceable provided that they are based on 
consensus between the parties.155 Based on section 163 a court can 
enforce a legitimate expectation despite the inclusion of contractual 
clauses in a written agreement excluding agreements or understandings 
                                                 
150 See 5.7.3.6 above. 
151 See 5.9.5 above. 
152 See 5.9.5.2 above. 
153 See 5.9.5.3 above. 
154 See 5.6.6 read with 5.9.5.3 above. See further 5.9.5.3 (c) above. 
155 See 5.9.5.3 (c) above. 
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not embodied in the written agreement between the parties.156 Section 
163 also recognises that changing circumstances may render the 
enforcement of understandings or agreements commercially unfair. The 
agility of section 163 in this context is commendable in the context of the 
dynamic nature of the company structure and the relationships within its 
structure. 
6.4.2.8 Section 163 is available to any shareholder or director who cannot use 
his or her control in the company to protect him- or herself against the 
commercially unfair conduct complained of.157 
6.4.2.9 As far as establishing the value of shares for purposes of section 163(2) 
is concerned, the overriding principle is that such value must be fair to all 
the parties involved in and affected by the dispute.158 Factors that may 
affect the valuation of the shares subject to a buy-out order include the 
possible application of a minority discount, the date on which the 
valuation will be based and the adjustments that have to be made to fix a 
fair value.159 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
 
6.5.1 The economic importance of shareholder protection 
 
Shareholder protection is important for the development and growth of the South 
African economy. Appropriate remedies aimed at the protection of shareholders 
                                                 
156 See 5.9.5.3 (d) above. 
157 See 5.7.1.1 (e) above. 
158 See 5.9.14.4 above. 
159 See 5.9.14.4 above. 
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and/or other investors is one of the mechanisms to attract capital and to lower the 
costs and risks of investment in South African companies.160 Effective remedies 
further protect the sustainability and existence of companies as such remedies will 
reduce the need to liquidate companies on just and equitable grounds.161  
6.5.2 Implications of following of Canadian approach 
 
In drafting section 163 of the Act, the legislature followed similar wording to the 
statutory unfair prejudice remedy in Canada. This potentially has significant 
implications for the approach to the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa 
on various levels.  
6.5.2.1 The role of the courts 
 
Traditionally the statutory oppression or unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa 
followed the developments in English law.162 In this regard it is important to recall 
that English company law developed from the law of partnership.163 In contrast with 
English company law, Canadian company or corporations law did not develop from 
                                                 
160 See section 7(g) which states the aggregation of capital as one of the purposes of the Act. 
161 Section 163 of the Act is often an alternative remedy to the liquidation of companies. See 5.8 
above for a discussion of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy as an alternative form of relief. This 
gives effect to the purpose in section 7(b)(ii) of the Act to encourage high standards of corporate 
governance as companies play a ‘significant’ role within the social and economic role of the South 
African nation. Companies are one of the means to achieve social and economic benefits. See in 
this regard section 7(d). Effective remedies also contribute to encourage efficient and responsible 
investment in companies as envisaged in section 7(j) of the Act. See also E Hurter Aspekte van 
Statutêre Minderheidsbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg (1996) (unpublished LLD 
thesis; University of South Africa) 456 in the context of the previous Act. 
162 See 2.1 read with 5.1.3 and 5.2.2.5 above. 
163 For the role and implications that the law of partnership had on the development of the English 
company law see 2.3.1.3 (b), 2.3.1.5, 2.6.5.1, and 2.6.5.4 (b) above. 
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the law partnership.164 This casts doubt on the traditional approach to court 
intervention (or the reluctance thereof) which is associated with the English law 
equivalent of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy.165 This is because the Canadian 
company is a form of universitas in contrast with societas. At the moment there are 
doubt whether the Act ascribes to the contractarian or the division of powers model 
as the Act contains features of both.166  
To follow the Canadian model of the unfair prejudice remedy further implies 
that courts are now specifically mandated to restore balance to the interests of role 
players within the company structure when imbalances arise.167 From a company 
law perspective, the sanctity of contract will therefore not always be appropriate 
justification for not intervening in the relations between parties to a dispute in relation 
to a company. Although the legislature adopted the statutory oppression and unfair 
prejudice remedies, courts were reluctant to intervene in the relations between the 
                                                 
164 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 235-36. 
165 See 2.6.5.3 above for a discussion of the contractual theory in relation to companies and the 
unfair prejudice remedy in England. For the nature of the relationship between the company, 
directors and shareholders under South African company law see 5.5.1 and 5.5.3 above. 
166 JS (Schoeman) Oosthuizen and PA Delport ‘Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy’ (2017) 80 THRHR 228, 244-45 point out that under the Act companies 
enjoy the same powers as natural persons in so far as a juristic person can exercise such a power, 
the directors hold the original power to manage the business and affairs of company and the Act 
allocates powers and remedies to specific persons. Amongst others, these are all features of the Act 
that are associated with the division of powers model. However, it must be noted that the statutory 
contract provision has been retained in section 15(6). This is one of the features of the contractarian 
model. The authors submit (245) that the Act follows a hybrid model. It is submitted that this issue 
deserves further in-depth research. 
167 See also section 7(i) where it is stated that the purpose of the Act is to balance the rights and 
obligations of shareholders and directors within companies. 
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shareholders pertaining to matters of internal management.168  
6.5.2.2 The formulation of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy – standing 
 
Following the Canadian model of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy implies that 
the traditional approach to the drafting and interpretation of the remedy is replaced 
or at least must be reconsidered. This must be done especially in light of the fact 
the locus standi or status of person in terms of the Canada Business Corporations 
Act169 is statutorily determined by the provisions of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act.170 Therefore, it is imperative that the Act contains clear statutory 
provisions relating to the standing of persons in relation to specific remedies in the 
Act. It is found that the South African legislature extended the unfair prejudice 
remedy to a too narrowly defined group of persons.171 The legislature further failed 
to address criticism raised against the predecessors of section 163 that may still be 
relevant.172  
6.5.3 Predictable environment and legal certainty 
 
The Act places emphasis on corporate governance173 and the efficient regulation of 
companies.174 The principle of majority decision-making within companies aids the 
                                                 
168 The reluctance of courts to intervene in the relations between shareholders was described as a 
problem associated with the contractarian company model deriving from the law of partnership in 
English law. However, some authors argue that a more acceptable justification for the reluctance of 
courts to intervene in the relations between shareholders would rather be the principle of majority 
decision-making within companies. See in this regard specifically 2.3.1.3 (b) above. 
169 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
170 RSC, 1985, c C-44. 
171 See 5.12.7 above. 
172 See 5.12.7 above. 
173 See section 7(b)(iii). 
174 See section 7(l). 
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efficiency of decision-making.175 The strict application of established corporate law 
principles, such as majority decision-making, and related rights may be abused or 
may be inappropriate in some circumstances.176  
Section 163 of Act is a flexible remedy under which courts do enjoy a wide 
discretion. However, it is essential that its provisions be clearly drafted to promote 
a predictable environment within which companies are regulated and to ensure that 
the remedy is consistently applied based on a principled approach. However, it must 
be kept in mind that it is impossible for the legislature provide for all possible 
circumstances in which the remedy will be applied. To address this the legislature 
has to draw from past experience to introduce practical statutory provisions and to 
provide the courts with the ability to grant innovative forms of relief to solve company 
disputes.  
6.5.4 The purpose of the proposed legislative amendment and 
interpretational framework 
 
Although the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 of the Act has 
incorporated features to strengthen and improve the remedy, the ‘good intentions’ 
of the legislature are hampered by poor execution. It is submitted that the proposed 
amendments to section 163 of the Act together with the proposed interpretational 
framework will assist in streamlining and strengthening the application and 
interpretation of the remedy. 
 
                                                 
175 See 5.4.3.2 above regarding decision-making within companies. 
176 See 5.2.2 above. 
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